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# Africana Studia

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The end of the cold war during the second half of 1989 also culminated in the Bretton Woods institutions joining the surviving superpower, the United States, in galvanising changes in the world order and for Sub-Saharan Africa. Multiparty, democratic elections were part of the constraints for accessing international finance. This left *part of* the North Africa and Middle East regimes to continue because of its special oil relationship with the West. In implementing competitive leadership change to replace the post-colonial One-Party-State system, a new process of national consultative conventions in former Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone countries started putting together new draft constitutions, establishing function parliaments whilst reforming the public service to now include Election Management Bodies (EMB) as well as parliamentary mandated Election Commissions (ECs) established through the new Electoral Acts. This structure was and continues to be responsible for managing the six key dimensions of an election: delimitation, voter and candidate registration, campaigning, polling, collating and the announcement of results. The actual start for the continent to implement the new democratic norms was Benin 1991.

However, nearly two decades later, an evaluation of the impact and take up rate of multiparty elections within the previous 48 Sub-Saharan states and now joined by some of the North African countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and even Sudan reveals that the notion has not been well received. There has been reluctant acceptance and serious interference regarding the working methods of the ECs and EMBs. Worried with the level of mistrust between the incumbents and their close proximity to dominant ruling party ECs, according to credible surveys by *Afro-Barometer*, a new body of monitors have emerged around the industry of Observer Missions and Monitoring. Their goal was to compel reluctant incumbents to level the playing field and to allow the political opposition an equal chance at the polls. Their action was widespread. From the Mediterranean to the Central African states of the Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the Central African Republic (C.A.R), presidents have engineered constitutional amendments to extend their term limits to beyond 2034 nullifying the expected consolidation of the post 1990s multiparty democratic agenda.

Given the uneven pace of democratisation in the majority of the 55 African states, comparative evaluations on the different African elections are more and more useful.

The present issue of *Africana Studia* intends to contribute for the understanding of this ongoing process. Its starting point was the 2018 *Conference Series Internal Changes and Foreign Policy of African Countries* organised by the Institute for African Studies in Moscow, in collaboration with the CEAUP and the University of Pretoria, which focused precisely on African Elections. The network of researchers that came out of this Conference covered a broad range of issues, conceptual and comparative, and thus allowed for an editorial project.

Thus, the article of M. Rupyia tackles the question as to what factors explain the stalling and back sliding of African transitional processes in the 1990s. A comprehensive comparison of ‘Third termism’ cases from the Great Lakes to West Africa concludes that family dynasties and formal election processes are not mutually excluded phenomena.

Foreign observers have been important players in the legitimisation of African electoral processes. Olga Kulkova focus on the EU observer missions and discusses its consequences for the sending institutions, the government and the African societies. In a parallel way, the “Beijing Model” of attitudes towards African transitions is described by the article of Tatiana Deych, which gives particular details regarding Zambian presidential elections of 2011.

The case studies presented in the following sections cover a sample of processes of North, West and Central Africa.

Sergey Volkov checks the policies of the current Egyptian government to tighten control over society in a context of recession and youth unemployment with the results of the 2018 presidential elections and of the 2019 constitutional referendum. Lubow M. Sadovskaya contributes to the knowledge of the Ivory Coast political crisis and of its much discussed electoral dispute between the candidates A. Ouattara and L. Bagbo: an everlasting conflict since the year 2000. Abdou-Wahabi Abdou’s article refers to what may be considered as a standard case of family dynasties, despite so-called transparent elections being held periodically in Togo. His work also stresses the Togolese post-election contestations and their impact on the country’s democratization process.

The last five empirical studies included in the file regard Central Africa. Augusto Nascimento argues that the small but potentially oil-rich S. Tomé and Príncipe is another interesting case of transition from the one-party regime to a periodical failure to hold free and competitive elections. From the project “Re-examining elections after African experiences”, two researchers, Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga and Pietro Alighieri, use the EleQta digital and direct enquiries in order to a better understanding of the 2016 presidential elections in the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). The efficiency of power-sharing as a response to ethnic division in Kenya and its electoral clashes is the focus of Maria Piotrowska article, which analyses Kenyan presidential election results since 1992. Vladimir Shubin considers the electoral history of Zimbabwe and concludes that the major changes in independent Zimbabwe were not determined by any electoral process. In a parallel way, Gordon Moyo stresses the role played in the Zimbabwean politics by foreign powers - the ones connected with the former colonial forces (UK, the EU, and the U.S.) and the new players (Russia and China) - during the 2018 elections.

The geographical range of the case studies is, of course, far from covering the continental scale. But the main goal of this issue is to provide theoretical and empirical data on one of the most biased and media-ephemeral political phenomena – African elections.

**Martin Revayi Rupyia\***  
**Maciel Santos\*\***

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

\* Institute for African Renaissance Studies (IARS)/University of South Africa (UNISA).

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
## Eleições em África



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*Eleições em África  
– critérios de avaliação*

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# African: the Exhaustion of Electoral Democracy against the Resurgence of Presidential Third Termism and beyond?

Martin Revayi Rupiya\*

pp. 11-19

## Introduction

The introduction of liberal democracy in Africa arrived as a consequence of the changed post-cold war global dynamics, seeking to create different relationships between the North African Maghreb region on the one hand and Sub-Saharan Africa on the other, as they related to the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Central to the system of liberal democracy is the notion of constitutionalism and regular political transitions mediated through scheduled elections. In Africa this became an alternative to the staid, post-colonial one party-state-system. Launched with much fanfare in Benin during 1990, the subsequent Benin model produced a wave of elections in over 20 African countries before 1994 (Adrienne, 2016: 172). In the immediate aftermath, Gabon (1990), the Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger and Togo (1991), Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo (1992) and Chad (1993) all opened up following street protests and spirited campaigns by the political opposition. The outcome of the new wave resulted in the departure of long serving presidents such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi (Bierschenk, 2009: 338). Entering the shoes of the departing presidents was a combination of activist academics from the universities law faculties working hand in glove with civic societies, nascent opposition parties and labour movements.

Meanwhile, the African Union (AU) welcomed the democratization initiative and sought to consolidate this through adopting complimentary protocols such as the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007 (ACDEG). This continental framework provided impetus for sub-regional economic and security communities (RECS) to draw similar Principles and Guidelines on Governance and Electoral Conduct in the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) amongst the leading entities. However, even against this euphoria and elaborate continental and sub-regional legislative arrangements, by the early 2000, substantive evidence was emerging of deliberate push back and reluctance to embrace liberal democracy multi-partyism. The reasons why the reluctance to transform post-colonial entities are varied, ranging from lack of political will, the absence of credible election management boards and commission as well as the

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paucity of opposition political parties able to challenge the incumbents to bring about change. This list however, misses out on at least two important variables: that of sitting presidents seeking power retention beyond the third term and secondly, the phenomenon of siblings, sons of presidents who manage to take over with the support of key aides and then continue the unending rule as witnessed in Gabon and Togo. This article seeks to make a contribution towards answering the question why electoral democracy has stalled in Africa by employing relevant case studies that provide empirical evidence to the two dimensions. It is therefore arranged in three sections after the introduction with the first looking at the phenomenon of third-termism followed by the era of the siblings in power before making conclusions and recommendations. To that end, this article argues that now that the 1990s enthusiasm and euphoria has become exhausted, the determined power retention intentions of some of the incumbents are likely to take the continent back to the immediate post-colonial era of one-party-state system.

## The Golden Era

The introduction of liberal democracy tenets in Africa during the 1990s was part of the withdrawal of the then United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the unbridled ascendancy of Washington to almost unfettered global influence. In 1992, Samuel P. Huntington had published his seminal thesis, *The Third Wave of Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century* in which he noted that Africa had missed out on all the waves which occurred between 1828-1926, 1943-1962 and finally, from the 1970s and 80s (Scott, 1993).

However, even as this text was going to print, significant parallel developments were already taking place. Following the end of the cold war, the Bretton Woods Institutions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched an initiative to integrate African countries into the global, market economy subject to conditionalities. The policy prescription relied upon was the so-called *Washington Consensus*, initially crafted for Latin American countries and later simply imposed on African states (Williamson, 2004: 5; Williamson, 2004-2005).

It is significant to note that the Washington Consensus was aimed at the 47 Sub-Saharan states before the independence of South Sudan while excluding the North African Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Because this was about the further integration into the market economy of countries that had remained outside, in contrast, the North African region, in spite of the ruling monarchies and military regimes, these had already found accommodation within the volatile oil and Middle Eastern geo-strategic considerations.

An early Sub-Saharan respondent to the initiative was Benin when the ruling party's Central Committee, during its sitting in February 1990 decided to adopt the new ethos. Implementation of the break with the past was to be through a wildly popular National Convention Conference. This soon spread like wild fire to other countries adopting the now popularised Benin Model affecting Gabon (1990), the Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger and Togo (1991), the then Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo (1992) and Chad (1993) (Bierschenk, 2009: 388). The wave also spread to former Anglophone and Lusophone countries, affecting over 20 countries between 1990 and 1994, culminating in the deposing from office of long serving presidents such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi (Adrienne, 2016: 172). More recently, street protests have resulted in the dislodging the 'big man' syndrome when, on 30 October 2014, protestors set ablaze parliament buildings in Burkina Faso when President Blaise Compaore attempted to extend his rule after 27 years in power, forcing him to flee (Al-Jazeera Africa News, 30 October

2014). In February 2019, months after the forced removal of the 82 year-old and wheelchair bound, Abdel Azziz Bouteflika of Algeria, the scheduled elections have been suspended as protestors agitate for political and institutional reforms as well as the 'departure of identifiable old guard' before a new page can be turned in the country's political history.

Beyond the electoral crisis states, the following have emerged as positive outcomes and now enjoying peaceful transfer of power through elections. The list includes the latest addition, the Gambia after the ousting of President Yaya Jammeh followed by Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and the island states of Mauritius, Seychelles and now Madagascar. This also includes Nigeria in spite of the obvious chaotic manner of electoral conduct by the outcome has been widely accepted and legitimized the incumbents (Aig-Imokhuede, 2009).

In the vanguard of the new political elite were academic professors from the universities law faculties working with civic groups and organised labour movements. Available evidence suggests electoral democracy in Botswana, Ghana and more recently in Gambia, Nigeria in spite of the messy organisational characteristics, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia have created peaceful centres of stability on the continent (Aig-Imokhuede, 2009).

Furthermore, in the first decades of the introduction of electoral democracy in Africa, attention focussed almost exclusively on the presidency with little attention paid towards local government. To this end, the removal from power of the likes of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1991 and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi in 1994 which had been preceded earlier with the first multiparty elections in Mozambique in 1992 all concentrated on presidential and parliamentary elections. For most then, it was only after 2014 that Malawi and more recently in Mozambique and DR Congo in 2018 that the countries' elections now included local government. The impact of the extended reach in most cases simply collapsed the very fragile and nascent capacity within the EMBs. Furthermore, in the DR Congo, the outlying areas in the Eastern Kivus are still plagued with violence and conflict resulting in the Election Commission abandoning any attempt to hold elections in the volatile region.

Three decades later, the democratisation project through elections has stalled (Okpèh, 2009). In February 2016, the AU's Department of Peace & Security as well as Political Affairs issued a communique citing disputed elections and the undemocratic behaviour of incumbents as representing the new site of conflict in many countries on the continent. Curiously, the leading Benin model has also witnessed transformation and regression: with the military on the streets firing live ammunition at protestors against abuse of power and perceptions of electoral fraud (Hendricks & Kiven, 2018; Small, 2006). The actual reasons why Benin and other likeminded states have sought the slippery slope is located in the two areas of presidential third-termists and secondly what we think is a new feature: that of siblings continuing the conduct of their fathers in ensuring sustained power retention.

The evaluation reveals a negative picture of either no progress or severe regression, epitomised by the floundering Benin model itself with national contexts characterised by increased insecurity and instability as acknowledged by the AU. For example, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Gabon, Kenya, Togo, Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe have been cited as particularly exhibiting repressive states, 'banning opposition activities and ordering the military to open live fire' on protestors (BBC News, 6 May 2019; Gift Tichaona Tsvetere, 2015). Furthermore, there have been incidences of serious disputed elections resulting in unending street protests in Angola, Cameroon, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Malawi, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Sudan, Egypt, and the Central African Republic (C.A.R) amongst others.

### The Third Termism

*When term limits are found in presidential system, they act as a method to curb the potential for monopoly of power, where a leader effectively becomes “president for life” or “a king.” In (Angola, Algeria, Egypt) Nigeria, Niger, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, and presently Burundi, elected leaders have attempted to stage ‘a coup from within’ embarking on personal consolidation at the expense of democratic consolidation. While 34 African countries have two-term limit provisions in their constitutions, only 20 per cent of these limits have been compiled with (Riedl, 2014, cited in Durotoye, 2016: 39).*

Against the wave of democratisation which was underpinned by new constitutions providing limited terms and shared responsibilities between the three spheres of government comprising, the executive, the legislature and judiciary, has emerged a group of presidents willing to amend the constitution in order to extend their stay in office (Emerging Trends, 2016: 12, 26, 42; Mtembu, 2017/18). According to Adeolu Durotoye since 1990 to 2000, eleven presidents had attempted to amend the national constitutions in order to extend their stay with seven succeeding (Durotoye, 2016: 40-42). Between 200 and 2015, fifteen African presidents also embarked upon constitutional amendments with the majority of them succeeding (LeBas, 2016: 170). A graphic regional trend that has emerged in Central Africa where the presidents amended the national constitutions extending their stay to 2034. This includes: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan and Sudan, Togo, Uganda (Hendricks & Kevin, May 2018). Meanwhile, countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic (C.A.R), Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Somalia area experiencing such severe internal political and security crises at the centre of which is violent conflict and electoral jostling (Mtembu, 2017/18). Combined, these states constitute a significant portion of member countries that have simply failed to make the transition from the dominant political system to the competitive style that has been argued as the preferred choice towards being about peace and stability on the continent.

An important feature of the Third Termists in the Central African states is that there are serious tensions between the presidents resulting in a situation of no peace-no war but clearly the embers of conflict continue to smoulder (Mtembu, 2017/18). For example, in July 2019, the latest attempts to reconcile Ugandan President Museveni and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame were made in Luanda, Angola, after each of the countries had shut their borders to trade and human traffic. A little earlier, the AU has sought to appeal to Museveni to intervene in the deteriorating situation between Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza and Kagame. Meanwhile to both Museveni and Kagame, relations with DR Congo former President but still influential leader, Joseph Kabila continue to fester without solution. Furthermore, the same cauldron of crises has also drawn in President Guess of Republic of Congo in the milieu. Of this group of presidents, while Kabila eventually failed to amend the constitution to extend his stay in power, all the others have removed the age limits and become almost life presidents to be in office beyond 2034.

In these countries, the public sector institutions of Election Management Bodies (EMB) and the Election Commission (EC) have all been skewed to have their mandates answer to the perceived, external national threat by the presidency. In the event that the presidencies change and the threat disappears, then fundamental work to reconstitute effective ECs and EMBs will become the first priority before the nations enjoy free and fair democratic elections.

## The Undemocratic Siblings extending the reign of their fathers

Togo and Gabon reflect two countries whose underhand political manoeuvring has tended to fool researchers and analysts. We consider the situation in Togo first before that of Gabon.

Togo holds the longest surviving military coup on the continent when President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated, barely a metre from reaching the American Embassy to seek refuge on 13 January 1963. Part of the military contingent pursuing Olympio included Sergeant Etienne Eyadema, who remained the power behind the throne until he stepped in from the shadows to take over as president on the anniversary date of the assassination of Olympio in 1967. President Olympio's death therefore predated the formation of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established on 25 May 1963, later to become the AU in July 2001. In limiting the reflection on Eyadema's reign given the limited space of this article, once he took over on the anniversary date of Olympio's death in 1967, he remained in power until his untimely death from cardio vascular arrest whilst being flown in an emergency ambulance plane to Paris for treatment on 5 February 2005. Since the advent of multiparty and the temporary Benin electoral wave of the 1990s, Eyadema had successfully stifled all attempts to democratise and allow the citizens an opportunity to express themselves through the ballot box. Employing at least four identifiable elements, Eyadema was able to sustain his stay in office until his untimely death on 5 February 2005. The included: suspending all political parties and declaring, officially a one-party-state under the Rally of the Togolese People (RTP) by November 1969. The RTP, whose membership was exclusively drawn from his ethnic clan tightly controlled all entry into the public sector while exclusive drawn from his ethnic clan. Next, Eyadema paid attention to the establishment of a military and internal security institutions, officered and populated by candidates from his ethnic clan. These have not been hesitant to violently suppress protests and political opposition resulting in millions of southern Togolese Ewe ethnic group forced to flee into exile and refugee camps overseas and neighbouring Benin and Ghana. The latest wave to flee, estimated at over 38 000 was recorded in April 2005 when the election to install Eyadema's successor, his son, Faure Gnassingbe Eyadema.

Only hours after the death of Presidente Eyadema in the emergency plane to Paris, the partisan army moved and named his son, already the country Minister of Equipment, Mines, Posts & Telecommunications, Faure Gnassingbe Eyadema, as his successor whilst isolating the country by shutting all the borders and international airport. Soon afterwards, the military rounded up all legislators to the National Assembly with instructions to change the constitution accordingly. The succeeding steps reveal the automatic reaction of the instruments of power retention, comprising the military, the party, ethnic loyalty and a weak public sector, put into place by Eyadema during his 38 years in power. Elections were held on 30 December 1979 after declaring a one-party-state, followed by the 21 December 1986 single candidature of the presidency in which he easily won. Afterwards, the 25 August 1993 and the 21 June 1998 were under violent repression of the opposition, a closed media and partisan EMB. This trend was to continue under his son following his untimely death.

Succession according to the constitution was designed to install the Speaker of the National Assembly, Natchaba Quatarra. Meanwhile, the Speaker was currently outside the country on official business in Paris and upon being prevented to return back to the country, ended up in Cotonou, Benin (Banjo, 2008: 38-39; Bearak, 13 September 2017). Instead of allowing the constitutional provisions, only hours after Eyadema's death, the army, General Zachari Nandja immediately suspended the constitution and nominated

his son, Faure Gnassingbe as President, while closing down all the borders. This denied the travelling Speaker, Quatarra, the opportunity to return while rounding up all the legislators to gather and amend the constitution accordingly. The ruling party, RPT held 72 of the available 81 seats and easily passed the extraordinary resolution to install Faure as the new President (Banjo, 2008: 38; Godwin, 26 February 2005).

The international community, ECOWAS and the AU reacted, calling on authorities in Togo to respect the constitution. Threatening to further tighten the diplomatic and military hardware sanctions imposed by the then Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo the AU and the United States, Faure agreed and stood down on 25 February. Meanwhile, an election was immediately called, according to the constitution this had to be held in 60 days and deliberately dated back to the 5<sup>th</sup> February. This found the political opposition, led by Olympio's son Gilcrest who was in exile in Paris, seriously disadvantaged in relation to the campaign period. Within weeks of the strategic withdrawal from office by Faure, he had overcome, through 'constitutional means' and through an election; all the ECOWAS, AU and Washington expressed concerns returning to office after the violent 24 April 2005 election as "Faure was no different to his father" (Banjo, 2008: 37-43). Later, according to the UN, over 500 people were killed while an estimated 38 000 fled into neighbouring Ghana and Benin from the state sponsored violence. An associated report citing the UN findings asserts:

*An estimated 2 500 soldiers dressed in civilian clothes and armed with knives, machetes and nail-headed clubs helped party militants repress opposition rallies, according to the report. (Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian, 26 September 2005).*

President Faure Gnassingbe has remained in office to this day, in spite of sustained protests on Togolese streets and teaming refugee camps in Ghana and Benin. For over 52 years, a single family and ethnic group has ruled Togo with no prospect of change on the horizon.

### **Case study Gabon: El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba to 'Ben' Ali Omar Bongo (1967-2019)**

The second case study reflecting siblings taking over from authoritarian fathers and continuing the trend effectively ruling out electoral democracy is that of Gabon. Early in 1967, following President Leon Mba' ill health and death in Paris, the Vice President, Omar Bongo took power.

However, the reality of Omar Bongo's reign was dependent on France as much as allowing him the opportunity to create an effective internal structure similar to what we have witnessed in Eyadema's Togo. To that end, Michael Reed has argued that:

*Bongo's ability to stay in power must be credited both to his own talents and to his pragmatic relations with France. They have used each other in a cynical and efficient manner (Reed, 1987: 287).*

This incestuous relationship became even more robust after the discovery of oil in Gabon during the 70s.

Within a few months, Omar Bongo banned all political parties while establishing a single national party, the Gabon Independent Party later changed to the Gabon Democratic Party.

*Bongo strengthen (ed) his regime by investing the (ruling party Democratic Party of Gabon (PDG) with constitutional support... by 1983 the PDG was the virtual representative of national sovereignty. In order to become a deputy, a member of local and departmental assemblies, or a holder of any other public office, a candidate had to*



*be invested by the PDG (and come from the Baleke tribe). Furthermore, the inclusion of military officers in the party's central committee completed Bongo's antidemocratic measures (Ngolet, 2000: 64-65).*

During the post 1990s, leading the multiparty introduction in Gabon were students, academic staff from the local University Omar Bongo and the nascent civil society who were repelled with force of arms (Mtembu, 2017/18).

Fast forward to case studying Gabon and the post 1990s elections, the real expected change was supposed to have happened in June 2009 when E Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba died in a Barcelona Clinic in Spain. Already his son, Ben Ali Bongo was the Minister of Defence (MoD) while his daughter, Pascaline held the post of Secretary to Cabinet and the Presidency. The MoD working with the military immediately closed all borders as well as international ports of entry while a power struggle ensued between the siblings. Eventually, Ali Ben succeeded when the ruling party announced his candidature as the presidential nominee. According to constitutional requirements, the succession to El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba was through an election in 90 days and the ruling party unleashed violence on opposition parties and protestors. Ben Ali secured a 41.73 % poll and seized complete power (African Elections Database: Elections in Gabon).

Seven years later, the same pattern was repeated, this time with the leading political opposition Ben Ali's brother in law and former AU Chair of the Commission, Dr Jean Ping who had a relationship during which he sired two children with Pascaline-Mferi Omar Bongo (Obangone, 31 August 2016). In that election, Jean Ping claimed to have won and the incumbent launched a ferocious attack on the opposition headquarters that resulted in some deaths and fear of further destruction. Faced with threats, both the AU and UN dispatched mediators to intervene in the electoral dispute and calm matters.

On 24 October 2018, President Ali Ben Bongo suffered a heart attack whilst on a visit to Saudi Arabia to attend the Future Investment Forum. Government in Libreville immediately went into the defensive, alleging that this was only exhaustion and the president would soon emerge. Several weeks later, Bongo was transferred to Morocco, a favourite place for the Bongo's if we recall the last place that his step mother, Edith Lucie Bongo Ondimba spent four months before her death on 15 March 2009 (France 24 News, 15 March 2009). Edith was daughter to the Republic of Congo President, Denis Sassou Nguesso. (France 24 News, 15 March 2009). The reaction of top aides in closing ranks until Ali Bongo was able to recover demonstrated the 'deep-state' that Omar Bongo and Eyadema have created in Gabon and Togo. The key officials had no qualms in overriding the constitutional provisions and even amending certain section in order to maintain the status quo.

## Conclusions

What has been the record of electoral democracy and multipartyism in Africa since its introduction during the 1990s, following the end of the cold war? The evaluation reached in this discussion witnessed an initial wave under the auspices of the Washington Consensus, aimed at only Sub-Saharan Africa. The assumption has always been that the West and the global markets have created a niche for the North African Maghreb region which has not been required to adopt liberal democratisation. The argument is that the region is already firmly integrated in the global economy and the regimes in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and even Sudan have been able to serve their interests without changing the guards. Where some of the countries have broken ranks, such as Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, then punishment has been swift and unremitting. Meanwhile, in so far as Sub-

-Saharan Africa is concerned, while the initial experiments took off from Benin during the 1990s under the National Conference initiatives, within two decades, the same has abandoned the so called Benin Model with key sectors of the state, particularly the military showing signs that they are still to be reformed and accept the tenets of constitutionalism, separation of powers and respect the outcome of the ballot box. Instead, even against the OAU and AU ban on the unconstitutional changes of government, several regimes have carried out events that can only be described as smart coups. The events in Egypt against the elected President Mohamed Morsi who was removed and later died in custody on 17 June 2019 without eliciting any recriminations from the West reveals the pregnant interests behind the scenes with the ruling elite and the international community. What has since presented calls for democracy has been the Arab Youth Uprisings employing social media and other forms of protests, including street protests and attempts to occupy prominent city centre parks that had confronted the staid regimes with a home grown challenge (Chalcraft John, 2015; Emerging Trends IDEA Policy Dialogue, 25-27 May 2016). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the initial reaction was to welcome the liberal democratic agenda but soon some countries have simply reversed the provisions in the constitutions and amended the same to return to the one-party-state post-colonial status. In the discussion, the most challenging dimensions are from the embedded regimes on the one hand, with a handful concerned about national security such as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the Republic of Congo and the DR Congo. For this region, until the imagined or perceived security threat that has so been personalized has disappeared, elections do not matter. Further afield, in Kenya, Algeria, Tunisia and Zimbabwe, the incumbent regimes and barely concealed ethnic, cultural and even religious tensions have ruled out transfer of power through the ballot box. Instead, all will go through the motions but ready to undermine the process leading to a charade of observing the constitutional periodic mandates. Again exactly when these situations are likely to change is something that is not on the horizon of the political elite in those states.

Finally, the discussion has sought to identify yet another category that has stifled the advance of electoral democracy, successful in Togo, Gabon and barely concealed in the political machinations in the DR Congo. In these countries under the control of siblings, the states are not hesitant to unleash the partisan military willing to fire on protesting citizens in order to instil fear, intimidation and compliance. The experience of the opposition for example in Eyadema's Togo during the 70s, 80s and 90s has not changed under his son, Faure and yet, the sub-region, AU and the international community appear to acquiesce once the actual violence has ended. Its lasting impact, as witnessed in the Kenyan 2007 and 2018 disputed elections, are the masses still huddled in the Internally Displaced Camps within the country and outside.

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# The EU as an Observer of Elections in Africa: Aims, Methods and Consequences (2000s)

Olga S. Kulkova\*

pp. 21-29

The European Union pays close attention to the monitoring of electoral campaigns and elections themselves in the African countries. The EU often sends its observers to monitor the African elections, by invitation from the respective African governments. The paper will aim to analyze the role of EU election observation missions (EU EOMs) working in African countries, their aims, methods, and consequences which that process may entail for the EU political relations with this or that African country.

This commitment of the EU is in line with its declared aim to promote democratic, liberal, Western values on the African continent. The aim is to introduce the good governance in all African countries, to which the democratic, fair, inclusive and transparent elections are seen as a first step and the necessary precondition. EU promotes election observation as a tool to support democracy and promote human rights around the world. According to the EU, it contributes to strengthening democratic institutions, building public confidence in electoral processes, helping to deter fraud, intimidation and violence, especially in fragile, post-conflict or developing regions.

European countries contributed to election observation in Africa even back to 1990s. For example, Danish researcher, Prof. Gorm Rye Olsen in his article “Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa: How Serious is Europe and for What Reason?” mentioned that

*“long before democracy became a hallmark of European development aid, the European Community was engaged in attempts to transform the white minority regime in South Africa. <...> In anticipation of non-racial general elections, the EC supported a major programme of voter registering and voter education with the aim of ensuring that as many people as possible were in a position to participate in the democratic process. The support of free and independent news and media was also considered to be vital for the election campaign. <...> More than 300 EU observers were subsequently deployed for the country-wide coverage of the national and provincial elections scheduled for April 1994” (Olsen, 1998: 348-350).*

However, as German political scientist Christine Hackenesch argued,

*“the third wave of democratization that hit the African continent in the early 1990s has in many countries not resulted in long-term democratic development. By the early 2000s it had become clear that in many African countries political liberalization was not followed by democracy but by a new form of authoritarianism – dominant party*

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*systems. In these regimes a ruling party has strongly entrenched itself in power. These regimes establish formal democratic institutions (i.e., regular elections), but without introducing meaningful political competition” (Hackenesch, 2015: 85).*

Therefore, in the 2000s the EU has also become much more concerned on democracy promotion on the African continent, and interconnected this issue with the question of the development aid.

Since 2000, 147 EU EOMs have been deployed in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (*EU and Election Observation 2018/08/23*). In addition, EU organized Election Expert Missions (EU EEM) to various African countries. Such missions usually analyze all frameworks and phases of the electoral cycle, having regards to the relevant recognized international standard. They have technical nature and do not conduct direct observation. They are not headed by political figure and do not deliver public statements or press releases. They provide a technical document that reports on the country specific electoral situation to EU institutions and Member States (*EU Election Expert Mission 2009/11/20*).

The observation of African elections gives the EU first-hand information about the election process, the possibility to approve of the election results or to denounce them, to praise or criticize the organization of elections. The EU election observation missions review the whole election cycle, which starts long before the elections themselves, therefore the mission can last up to 6 months.

An observation mission assesses all aspects of the electoral process, including its legal framework, the delimitation of constituencies, the registration of voters and candidates, the training of election staff, voter education, media coverage, the campaign and the preparations for the vote, as well as the appeals process. On election day observers visit polling stations in order to assess the opening, voting, counting and aggregation of results. This is done according to the principles of independence, full coverage, impartiality, transparency, professionalism and non-interference in the process.

This helps to promote public confidence in the electoral process and may serve to promote electoral participation and mitigate the potential for election-related conflict.

The EU observers produce their report with the evaluation of the whole election cycle, which gives recommendations on how to improve the electoral system of the country. However, as EEAS comments,

*“EU EOM recommendations have a wider scope than electoral reform and touch on issues such as free media, active and engaged CSOs, an independent judiciary, human rights and democratic institutions. They can be used as the basis for informing electoral assistance projects supporting democratisation processes in partner countries” (EU and Election Observation 2018/08/23).*

This shows that the EU election missions collect and analyze information in the African countries that does not directly connect with the electoral process, which may not be approved by the African governments. The EU also monitors whether the government of the country eventually implemented the recommendations of this report, or not. Which gives them a degree of obligation. Some governments may see this as affecting their internal political affairs.

Sometimes the African governments express their disappointment with the work of the European election observers and with their conclusions (the example is Kenyan electoral process in 2017). A first election in August 2017 was nullified by the country’s Supreme Court. The Court’s decision came after the EOM by the European Union and others had released preliminary statements which, while raising a number of concerns, drew no

conclusions regarding the overall validity of the election. It gave the winning party the possibility to present EOMs as stamps of democratic legitimacy. The final report of the EU EOM, including the election redo, which took place last October, was released in January 2018, but both the incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta as well as the opposition leader Raila Odinga dismissed it<sup>1</sup>.

Unfortunately, often election observers are either ignored or misquoted or utilised to serve the individual agendas. Besides, election observing is imperfect. Observer missions are usually made up of small teams, constrained by logistics and time.

The fact is that EOM reports inevitably distort domestic processes in the countries where elections are observed. As researchers from ECDPM Ronceray and Aggad note, findings of EOMs “*inevitably influence the legitimacy of certain actors (incumbents, challengers, judiciary, media, etc.) and, hence, change the possible power configuration resulting from the electoral process. As such, it can go directly against the underlying rationale of democracy: self-determination*”<sup>2</sup>.

It is especially significant for the EU, because it is often suspected of serving the purposes of its former-colonialist member states. And even the decision to send or not an EOM is a political one, which tends to consolidate some positions while undermining others.

The EU is also involved in the mediation of the post-electoral conflicts in Africa, such as the one in Kenya (2007-2012). Mediation efforts are used as a tool for conflict prevention and peace-building. So, the election observation also reinforces other key EU foreign policy objectives, in particular peace-building in Africa.

The EU observation of elections may also be used as the instrument of “legitimization” of the incoming government in the eyes of the Western world, or “international community”. European researcher Martin Ronceray conceptualises EOMs as ‘*dealers of legitimacy*’ in a foreign political marketplace, due to their ability to endorse or condemn (parts of) electoral processes (Ronceray, 2017: 3).

This is well-illustrated by the case of Zimbabwe after the resignation of Robert Mugabe. The need for organizing “*peaceful, inclusive, transparent, democratic*” elections and carrying out political and economic reforms as a condition for expanding partnership with Zimbabwe was stated in the EU Council resolution adopted in light of ongoing political transition in the country on 22 January 2018.

It read:

*“The upcoming electoral process will be an essential step. The EU welcomes the commitment of the authorities to hold elections in line with the constitution, and underlines the importance that the conditions are in place to allow those elections to be peaceful, inclusive, credible and transparent. The EU would consider favourably electoral observation, provided that the required conditions are fulfilled and that an invitation from the Government of Zimbabwe is received”* (Zimbabwe: Council adopts 2018-01-22).

The EU planned to send its election observers to Zimbabwe for a preliminary assessment ahead of the country’s harmonised elections, they were invited by the President Mnangagwa in March 2018 (*EU election observers 2018-03-9*). Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections in July 2018 were the first since 2002 that UN and EU observers have been able to attend. However, as the outcome of their work during the elections the EU observers listed several problems, including media bias, voter intimidation and mistrust in the electoral commission<sup>3</sup>. They also questioned delays in releasing the

<sup>1</sup> Muriuki B. Kenya responds 2018-01-10.

<sup>2</sup> Ronceray M., Aggad F. Do we expect too much 2018-02-26.

<sup>3</sup> Dzirutwe M., Brock J. EU observers 2019-08-01.

results. However, African observer groups also raised concerns about state media bias and the electoral commission. They also called for improvements in the counting procedure. Head of the EU EOM in Zimbabwe Elmar Brok stressed that the report his team prepared and its 23 recommendations also serve as important benchmarks for assessing the commitment of the Government of Zimbabwe to furthering democratic transition in the country (*EU Election Observation Mission 2018-10-II*). The EU's assessment is critical in determining whether Zimbabwe can exit painful sanctions imposed on the government and secure the donor funding and investment needed to stem chronic cash shortages and whether it could attract investors and trigger an economic revival.

Despite the mixed results of the Zimbabwe elections, it can be said that the EU is intended to strengthen the political dialogue with the government of Emmerson Mnangagwa. There were even critics who said that the final report of the EU EOM should be much stricter. It is worth noting that since February 2015, Zimbabwe and the EU have resumed their bilateral development cooperation (*EU stands ready 2018-04-10*). Before that, EU cooperation with the government was suspended between 2002 and 2014. Despite this situation, direct assistance to the people of Zimbabwe continued to be provided through trusted partners and NGOs. The EU and its Member States have disbursed more than €2 billion for Zimbabwe over the past fifteen years. The European Commission alone continued to provide more than €700 million in direct support to the Zimbabwean population, notably in the field of humanitarian aid, education, health, agriculture and food security (*EU stands ready 2018-04-10*).

Development cooperation with Zimbabwe under the 11th EDF (2014-2020), worth €234 million, focuses on the focal sectors health, agriculture-based economic development, as well as governance and institution building. In addition to this, the EU helped respond to various natural disasters and the 2016/17 drought with over €25 million. In spring 2018, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica met President Emmerson Mnangagwa and said this was an indication that the European Union was ready to accelerate support for Zimbabwe to their transition towards democracy and prosperity (*EU stands ready 2018-04-10*). He also launched new EU support programmes for a total amount of €23 million in the area of health and job creation. Moreover, by April 2018 the EU has already provided €11 million to support the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission and civil society stakeholders in the preparation of the electoral process (*EU stands ready 2018-04-10*). Another rather different case when elections in an African country received high appreciation from the EU EOMS is provided by the positive case of Liberia. At the end of December 2017, presidential elections took place in Liberia, at which the EU launched an observation mission and recognized the electoral process as “exemplary” (*Election Day 2017-12-28*). The new president, Mr George Weah, in the past a famous football player, succeeded Ellen Johnson Sirleaf after 12 years in power.

Mrs. Sirleaf also received the Mo Ibrahim Prize amounting to \$ 5 million, which is awarded to the democratically elected leaders of African countries who voluntarily left their posts. Before, in 2011, President E.D. Sirleaf was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. International donors – Sweden, the EU and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) – have allotted the total of US\$42 million for support to the Liberian electoral cycle, 2015 to 2018<sup>4</sup>. The project will last till October 2019. Out of this sum, the EU alone provided \$11 million<sup>5</sup>. The funding is intended to enhance the democratization process in Liberia with emphasis on improving electoral institutions and processes.

<sup>4</sup> Johnson T. EU Clarifies 2017-02-14.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



Sometimes local activists who do election observation are not satisfied with the work of foreign election observers, including the EU. Some international observers are being described as 'tourists' who base their conclusions on the little they saw, and they usually work only in a capital of the country<sup>6</sup>. This was the case for the recent elections in Angola in August 2017. The EU sent only a small team of observers to Angola. However, the EU spokesperson before elections explained that the EU has scrapped plans to observe elections in Angola after Luanda failed to agree to a package of conditions, including access to all parts of the country during the poll. The EU finally sent a smaller team of experts to assess the elections, consisting of four people (*Angola agrees 2017-08-01*) and therefore not able to provide an in-depth account of the electoral process. *"Notwithstanding positive discussions with the Angolan side, the conditions for deployment in accordance with our methodology have not been met, therefore the EU will not deploy an Electoral Observation Mission,"* a spokesman for the EU's mission in Angola told<sup>7</sup>. The EU had looked set to send its first Electoral Observation Mission to Angola since a 27-year civil war ended in 2002. But a request from the EU that Angola sign a memorandum of understanding, which set out conditions for the observation mission, was rejected earlier this month. Angola's Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti said the EU was invited to observe the elections, just like a number of organizations, but that no specific memorandum would be signed with it. *"We do not expect anyone to impose on us their way of looking at the elections and give us some lesson, just as we don't hope to give lessons in terms of elections"*<sup>8</sup> Chikoti was quoted as saying on July 16 in the state-controlled newspaper, "Jornal de Angola". Sometimes local actors and groups in a given African country, struggling for the victory at the elections, view the European Union and its Delegation and its Election observation mission as a critical advantage on their own side or obstacle against them. For example, presidential elections in Nigeria in February 2019 were postponed by a week by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Two Nigerian civil society activists, whose article was published on the 'Euronews' website, expressed their opinion critical of Brussels neutral position towards the situation with the Nigerian elections. They wrote:

*"Although the EU has deployed an election observation mission to the country, its political leadership has kept its distance. With the success of Africa's biggest democracy at risk, the EU can do more. At a minimum, it should send a firm diplomatic message of zero tolerance for political interference in the INEC... <...> The EU's political leadership does not consider the success of Africa's biggest democracy a priority – a critical error. It has not used its leverage to ensure Nigerian authorities deliver safe and fair elections. This contrasts sharply with the UK and US, who have warned those who undermine the democratic process that actions will have consequences, such as visa restrictions. The fact that the EU is negotiating a sensitive agreement with Nigeria on returns and readmission of migrants begs the question where the EU is willing to put its political weight"*<sup>9</sup>.

Interestingly, those activists praised the conduct of the EU Delegation in Nigeria, saying that it supported the civil society organizations – including domestic observer groups. They also regarded highly the EU election observation mission – mentioning that it had "stabilizing effect on the conduct of elections"<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> Louw-Vaudran L. Local election 2017-09-21.

<sup>7</sup> Eisenhammer S. EU says 2017-07-28.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ilo U.J., Dijkstra B. The success of Africa's 2019-02-22.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

In March 2019, the European Union observer mission presented its report on Nigeria's elections of president and governors. Maria Arena, chief of the EU mission, told a news conference in the capital Abuja that Nigerian elections need serious reform after being marred by violence, systemic failings and low turnout (*EU: Nigerian Elections 2019-03-II*). Around 600 people died in election-related violence from the start of campaigning to the end of the presidential election.

EU observers have been present at every general election held in Nigeria from 1999 to 2019, since democracy established in the country in 1998 – this year for the sixth consecutive time<sup>11</sup>. In 2017, the EU established a specific programme 'Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria' for a five year period. The programme's budget is €26.5 million. It was launched at the beginning of 2018, and its work was based on the recommendations of the 2015 EU EOM.

*"It provides funding to ten organisations that implement various activities (trainings, seminars, capacity development, awareness raising etc.) in support of the Independent National Electoral Commission (€13 million), Nigeria's National Assembly (€3 million), political parties (€2.7 million), media (€2.6 million) and civil society organizations (€3 million)"<sup>12</sup>.*

The European Parliament is also making its contribution to reinforcing electoral processes in Nigeria. The Parliament's Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG) oversees a comprehensive programme of capacity-building activities developed and implemented with the National Assembly of Nigeria. In the framework of this programme several joint seminars between Nigerian parliamentarians and EP Members, a fact-finding mission to Abuja, as well as training for the staff of the Nigerian parliament were held<sup>13</sup>.

Trying to keep diplomatic relations safe, the EU Missions have to be very careful in their statements which sometimes disappoint opposing sides and communities in the observed countries. Election observers' main audience has often been the international community, rather than the population whose election they were monitoring. Across the continent, there were examples of observers describing elections as broadly free and fair, when there was a perception domestically that rigging occurred<sup>14</sup>.

International monitors generally approved of Kenya's 1997 and 2013 presidential elections, even though the opposition raised issues about the integrity of both elections. Similar contradictions were accompanied with the EU election observation and its results during the elections in Rwanda in August 2017<sup>15</sup>, and in Uganda in 2016, where the EU mission neither endorsed nor condemned the election. Instead, it urged the public to read its report and "draw their own conclusions"<sup>16</sup>. Critical voices were heard also on EU election observation results in the Democratic Republic of Congo elections in 2019<sup>17</sup>.

To conclude with, the EU EOMS play an important role as 'dealers of legitimacy' approving (or not) of results of elections which often bring new governments in Africa to power. As Martin Ronceray and Faten Aggad point out, the ability of the EOMs to distort the domestic political arena is particularly problematic if observers are not fully neutral. They state:

<sup>11</sup> Zamfir I. General elections 2019-02-15.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Kuo L., Dahir A.L. Foreign election 2017-09-06.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ilo U.J., Dijkstra B. Op. cit.

*“Observers such as the EU are known to keep watch over the findings of their missions before they are released, which opens up the possibility to amend them to serve other purposes, such as preserving peace, protecting allies or defending other interests. In such cases, EOMs can be the vehicle of deliberate international interference and undermine a country’s self-determination”* (Ronceray M., Aggad F. Op. Cit.).

EU EOMs results and reports have certain connections to the amounts of aid and other types of political and economic support the incoming government will receive from the EU. Monitors are more likely to endorse elections in the countries that are major foreign aid recipients. Endorsed countries also tend to receive more aid.

This highlights the important question of EU EOMs’ independence: can they be subjected to interferences, why and through which processes? Martin Ronceray underlines: *“While standardization ensures a high level of neutrality throughout the span of EOMs, significant glitches make them prone to episodic interest-driven interference”* (Ronceray, 2017: 3). Therefore, the EU’s role as an observer of African elections is multilateral, may be evaluated differently and is worth further exploration.

There is a qualitative shift between the EU’s policies on supporting democratic reforms in Africa in the 1990s and in the 2000s. German researcher C. Hackenesch underlined, that

*“during the 1990s, the EU mainly relied on democracy aid and negative conditionality in the form of sanctions (Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement), but sanctions represented a reactive instrument to respond to serious violations of human rights and democratic principles. Also, during 1990s the volume of democracy aid was still comparatively small in both absolute and relative terms. However, since the early 2000s the EU instruments evolved allowing it not only to respond to imminent political crises but to support slight political openings or prevent degradations in political liberalization. In particular, reforms in the international aid system have allowed the EU to considerably develop and expand its instruments to support political reforms”* (Hackenesch, 2015: 86).

Among these instruments C. Hackenesch mentions, among others:

- aid negotiations with recipient governments to gain support for political reforms;
- political dialogue with the African governments, setting financial incentives for reforms (for example, the governance incentive tranche that the EU introduced in 2006) and pushing for the justice-sector reform in the African countries and highlighting the role of democratic oversight institutions;
- considerable increase of the volume of democracy aid in absolute and relative terms.

Researcher Elizabeth Magnes considers that both the EU and African governments see election monitoring as an instrumentalised tool, and this instrumentalization hinders the EU norm diffusion in Africa through EU-EOMs (Magnes, 2019: 1). She implies that EU-EOMs are also influenced by the EU’s dichotomous character and inherent tensions between its normative and strategic commitments.

Although the research on elections in Africa has significantly advanced in the past fifteen years, there has been limited scholarly work on EU-EOMs. For advancing the studies of the EU election observation in various African countries, careful contextualization of all the related phenomena is needed. It is critically important that many factors of the political culture of African countries are taken into consideration as well. As specialists from the African Studies Centre of the University of Leiden put this,

*“specific traits in local political traditions impact on the success and durability of elections: cultural notions of authority and accountability, levels of economic development, the extent of ‘neopatrimonial’ networks, civil liberties, gender relations, and religious values regarding the political process and community representation. The role of the judicial system in shaping and regulating the democratic and institutional context of elections is also highly relevant”* (Elections in Africa 2018-01-04).

So, the EU as an observer of elections in Africa might have various aims (democracy promotion, diffusion of its norms and normative power, strengthening political dialogue with African counterparts, endorsing – or not – the new governments and others). And despite claiming the usage of neutral and unified methods in all cases, the realities of EU EOMs’ Work on the ground vary, and in some cases may lead to unforeseen consequences.

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# Elections in Africa and China's Position: African Opinion

Tatiana Deych\*

pp. 31-41

## Introduction

Almost half of African conflicts are the direct result of disputed claims over legitimacy of the elections, including leaders staying in power past a designated two-term limit. A successful election can calm a nation (Namibia, 2015), whereas a disputed election can tear it apart (Burundi, 2015, Côte d'Ivoire, 2010, Kenya, 2008) and sometimes cause armed struggle. In 2016, there was unrest in Kenya caused by the elections, where opposition called for electoral commission reforms, demonstrations and a violent reaction from security forces took place; in the Republic of the Congo, where election led to violent protests; in Gabon, where bloody clashes erupted after President Ali Bongo claimed a widely disputed re-election victory. In Ghana, pre-election anxieties put questions about the electoral commission's revision (Afrobarometer, 2019: 35).

Many citizens in African countries say elections are not working well as mechanisms to ensure that people's views are represented and that voters can hold non-performing leaders accountable. Nevertheless, we must admit, that few African countries have achieved improvement in the perceived performance of elections over the past decade.

## Level of Trust in Elections in the Continent

Unfortunately people in the countries with upcoming elections, or who have had elections recently, express some of the lowest levels of trust to their results. Such a conclusion was made by Peter Penar, a researcher and lecturer in political science at Michigan State University, on the results of a survey, based on Afrobarometer, an African-led research network, interviews with between 1,200 and 2,400 people in 36 countries (Morlin-Yron, 2016). On average just half (50 %) of respondents say they trust their electoral commission, "somewhat" (25 %) or "a lot" (25 %). Some of the lowest levels of trust are expressed in countries with closely contested elections in 2016 including Gabon (25 %), São Tomé and Príncipe (31 %), and Ghana (37 %). Two thirds of Africans rate their most recent elections as "*completely free and fair*" (41 %) or "*free and fair, but with minor problems*" (24 %). But substantial proportions of the population are skeptical about the quality of their elections. More than four in 10 Africans say that voters are at least "*sometimes*" threatened with violence at the polls (4 %); that opposition parties and candidates are at least "*sometimes*" prevented from running (43 %); that the news media "*never*" or only "*sometimes*" provides fair coverage of all candidates (43 %); and that voters are "*often*" or "*always*" bribed (43 %). Only one third (34 %) of Africans think that votes are "*always*" counted fairly. Several countries with a history of

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election-related violence express low levels of confidence in the vote count, including Kenya (26 %), Zimbabwe (22 %), and Nigeria (6 %). Almost half of Africans say that elections do not work well as mechanisms to ensure that people's views are represented (50 %) or that voters are able to remove non-performing leaders from office (51 %). Countries with the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the representation and accountability performance of elections include Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Madagascar (Penar *et al.*, 2016). If a successful election can calm and focus a nation (e.g. Namibia 2015), a disputed election can tear it apart (e.g. Burundi 2015, Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Kenya 2008) and sometimes becomes the reason of violence. In at least 25 African countries conducting national elections in 2016-2017, great attention is focused on electoral management bodies – national electoral commissions – as crucial players in electoral processes and in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable election fraud and produce public mistrust, protest, and violence.

Citizens' views on election quality are generally consistent. Gabon, where President Ali Bongo claimed reelection, the opposition leader Jean Ping lost by less than 6,000 votes. The country has witnessed post electoral protests, unrest, and bloody clashes. 51 % of citizens have no trust in their election commission, and 25 % say they trust them somewhat. There were unrests in Kenya in 2016, where opposition called for electoral commission reforms. People have sparked demonstrations, accompanied by a violent reaction from security forces. Election malpractices led to violent protests in the Republic of the Congo and in Ghana, where pre-election anxieties brought up question about the electoral commission's revision the voter roll (Penar *et al.*, 2016). *"Those are all very alarming numbers and, it shows an extreme lack of confidence,"* – "Afrobarometer" considers (Morin-Yron, 2016). The researchers have identified a number of key factors contributing to the lack of trust. A history of vote manipulation entrenched in people's memories, lack of transparency of election monitoring bodies and corruption all influence people's trust in the system and many are afraid when casting their vote, the researchers found.

But the counting of votes worries people the most. 38 % of Africans believe votes are only sometimes, or even never counted. Vote counts can be tampered with in many ways, according to Penar. *"This happens at the polling stations. Stuffing ballots, double voting, multiple voting."* Methods for swaying voters may also include threats, actual violence and bribery. Bribery is commonplace in some countries. The bribes may range from giving a little money at the polling stations to being offered seeds or medicines during campaigns. The practice is illegal, and so rather than asking people whether they have accepted bribes, researchers posed the indirect question of how often people in the country face bribery around election time. On average, 43 % of Africans said people are often or always bribed, with nearly 70 % saying voters were bribed at least sometimes. In Mali, 78 % of people said voters were often or always bribed, and in Senegal the figure was 68 %.

Voter intimidation is also a key, the researchers found, with 44 % of those surveyed saying they are sometimes, often or always threatened with violence when voting. *'This makes people afraid of going to the polls'*- experts consider. They called seven African countries, where people are most afraid during elections: Uganda, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Egypt, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and seven African countries where people are least afraid during elections: Niger, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Botswana.

In Africa, the "Afrobarometer" study showed that an average 54 % across the 36 countries believe, that votes are often or always counted fairly in their country.

In Namibia, a new system appears to have boosted voters' trust. *"Namibia has invested in an electronic voting system. Interestingly one of the best countries in terms of trust in their election commission is Namibia, at 74 %"*, Penar says. But while new digital tools can make



it harder to tamper with votes, they can also create problems as they require electricity and technical know-how at the polling stations, something not to be taken for granted in rural areas. While election processes are improving by storing and counting votes digitally, issues with corruption remain (Morin-Yron, 2016).

## Africa's Elections of 2019

Africa is the host of two dozen national elections in 2019. Africa's first presidential election of this year in Nigeria on 23 February was very important, because the continent's most populous country with the largest economy and the oil producer selected its leader for the next four years. Buhari won elections in 2015 having promised to put the end to Boko Haram insurgency. While the number of attacks and fatalities linked to Boko Haram has declined since a peak in 2015, Boko Haram, the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), remains active in the northeast of the country. In 2018, this organization was associated with 483 violent events and 2,297 deaths in the country, contributing to the internal displacement of nearly 2 million Nigerians. In addition to the militant Islamist group threat in the north, Nigeria is facing security challenges involving growing farmer-herder violence, separatist tensions in the southeast, unresolved grievances in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, and growing criminal violence. The 2015 elections facilitated Nigeria's first democratic transfer of presidential power between candidates of opposing political parties. This progress has been greatly facilitated by the active participation of civil society groups assisting with voter registration (Siegle, 2019). Significant improvements have been realized since the 2011 polls when an estimated 800 Nigerians died in post-election-related violence. The 2019 elections demonstrated progress that has been made. The electoral process was fair and transparent. The new president must sustain alternative approaches in the hotspots where government presence is often lacking and trust in the security services is low.

Another important event for the continent was the South Africa's general and parliament elections on May 8 2019, where voters made their choice between political parties instead of voting for one candidate. In terms of the South African political system, this means that the winning party appoints the President of the country and seats in Parliament are distributed pro rata to the amount of support given to a party in the national election. South Africa is one of Africa's leading economies, so the elections in this country have influence for the rest of the continent. Because of the important role of the South African elections African Union Commission (AUC) has created a short-term African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) for the National and Provision elections in South Africa. Mission comprised a core team of four electoral experts, technical support staff from the AUC and 30 short-term observers (STOs) from various African Union (AU) member states and institutions on the continent. The former President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete, was appointed the head of AUEOM. The core team and AUC staff arrived in South Africa on 29 April 2019 and remained until the announcement of final results of the elections. These people were responsible for analyzing all aspects of the electoral process to ensure that they were conducted in accordance with international standards for democratic elections. The AUEOM participation in South African elections demonstrates the African Union aspiration to support transparent electoral process in its member states in accordance with Aspiration N.º 3 of the AU Agenda 2063, aims at good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law in Africa. The conduct of free, fair and credible elections is also widely recognized as being critical to ensuring an integrated, peaceful and prosperous African continent (African Union deploys an Election Observation Mission, 2019).

The pre-election process and the 2019 elections have become the most keenly contested since the end of the apartheid era in 1994. In 1994, the National Party under the pressure from national activists and the international community, held the elections, where the victory was gained by Nelson Mandela's party, the African National Congress (ANC) with 64 % of the vote. In 2019 the three leading parties competed in the elections: the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Nobody doubted that the ANC would win the 2019 elections in South Africa, despite its public support has declined in the last years in connection with corruption scandals within the party. Corruption flourished during the rule of President Jacob Zuma, the ANC member, who was removed from office before the end of his term in connection with the corruption scandal. He was succeeded by Cyril Ramaphosa, acting President, a close ally of Nelson Mandela. The Democratic Alliance is the main election opponent of the ANC. DA, the "white party", as people call it, was established in 2000, as an opposition to the ANC. It holds a majority in some municipal districts. So the ANC wins, however, it lost in number of the National Assembly seats, in comparison to the result of previous elections. Besides the corruption scandals, South Africa has great problems with energy supply, which also do not improve the rating of the ruling party. The difficulties arise from the fact that the state energy monopoly enterprise ESCOM (Electricity Supply Commission), which provides electricity to 95 % of the country's consumers, faced an unprecedented corruption scheme and has to introduce load-shedding operation mode (scheduled power cuts) even in major cities, such as Cape Town, which affects all sectors of consumers, from households to mining giants. The voters believe that the responsibility for the national socioeconomic problems falls on the ruling party. Over the many years passed after the end of apartheid era, people tend to forget about the heroism of fighters against the ruling racial regime and it also contributes to the ANC losing support of its voters (Malkevich, 2019).

Among the African countries which prepare to elections in October 2019 is Tunis, the country, which went through the "Arab Spring" and the risk of political violence here has not fully receded. So the 2019 elections, therefore, is an important test in the consolidation of non-violent norms to resolve political differences in Tunisia. This country still faces security risks of returning ISIS fighters from Iraq and Syria. It is estimated that some 7,000-8,000 Tunisians joined ISIS in 2014-2015. There is danger, that these fighters would return and provoke instability. Militant Islamist groups are remaining limited in recent years. In 2018, there were 36 such episodes and even fewer fatalities than in 2015, when ISIS attacks at a resort in Sousse and the Bardo Museum contributed to 154 fatalities related to extremist violence in Tunisia that year (Siegle, 2019).

## The Foreign Interference in Voting Process in Africa

The very important problem, connected with elections in Africa, is interference of external forces into voting process. There are many cases of support any candidates and parties by the West countries. The former Chinese Special envoy to the Middle East Wu Sike accused the Western countries, that the revolutions that confused the Arab world from the late 2010 had been used by them to push their agenda. "The West is to blame for the refugee crisis confronting Europe after it interfered in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries to try and push its own values, such as democracy, but only caused chaos", – a former senior Chinese diplomat has said (Former China diplomat, 2015).

The USA keep on building its influence at the continent, a strategy implemented through spreading propaganda, even by using radical propaganda tools in some cases. At the

same time, the US actively promotes its globalization concept. However, this approach does not find much response among the local population. The US yet apply their political technology tools and experience in this area to brainwash the population – primarily, through the propaganda content disseminated among young people via the Internet. They apply a traditional technique of spreading “fake news”, when the political score is increased by smearing the rivals.

For example the US strengthens its influence in the country and brings “democracy” to South Africa through a network of non-profit organizations and the experts in political quarters. These forces implement their political projects disguised as humanitarian activities – the fight against AIDS or campaigns for women’s rights. Such networks of influence as USAID, Soros Foundation, etc., are also involved in this process. American advisers are nested in the South African ministries: de facto they drive the country into the debt pit of the American financial system. Some experts tell, that party Democratic Alliance cooperates closely with the US Democratic Party. The DA leader Mmusi Maimane is nicknamed “Obama from Soweto” (Soweto is South Western Township, the area of Bantu compact settlement). Another fact to be considered is that ever since election of George Bush, the DA has been supported by billionaire George Soros, Tom Steyer, and other donors, spreading the American “democracy” across the globe, including Africa (Malkevich, 2019).

The US convinced in their right to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states, but they act in their own interests only. Measures aimed at destabilizing other states are implemented by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Since its establishment, the NED has been generating opposition and dissenting movements around the world. For instance, in 2011, the Wikileaks portal linked the NED activities with protests in a number of countries (the Arab Spring), including the state coup in Libya and the civil war in Syria. De facto, the NED openly intervenes in the affairs of other states using financial means from various sources. Even more concerns arise from the fact that the Americans themselves seem to have no clue about whom they are financing. Aided by their contracting agents, for instance, South African USAID (which the NED is subordinated to), hiding behind various programs for the “development” of democracy, Americans work with the population, as well as with civil and political groups, exerting direct influence – on them. They lure people into their “team” and vanish after receiving information. The US make no secret of their interventions, brings experts even more causes for concern. Moreover, the US demonstrates in every possible way that they may do that.

It has long been stated by many experts that the interference in the affairs of sovereign states, including elections, has become a US tradition. This usually happens in those countries, where politics is either disturbing for Americans or just does not meet their interests (Malkevich, 2019).

## **Beijing Model, Washington Consensus and Elections in Africa**

As for China, its leadership constantly repeat, that the fundamental Chinese foreign policy principle is non-interference in internal affairs of other states. Critics assert that China is embarking on neo-colonialism in Africa, while others claim the PRC often turns a blind-eye on dictators on the continent – mainly looking for economic gains. In response, the Chinese insists they have increase the ‘bargaining chip’ for African countries to negotiate any trade deal with Western nations, will continue to show mutual respect for the continent and will not yield to pressure from the West over its cooperation with Africa. As Mr. Dai Bing, Deputy Director General for African Affairs at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs told journalist in Beijing that China and Africa friendship “*has come a far long way and there will be no political string attached*” to giving aid to countries on the continent. As Mr. Dai said, *China is not looking to replicate its one party style of governance in Africa*, adding that the main principle of bilateral relationship with African countries is “*non-interference with the country’s politics*”. China sincerely supports the development of Africa, and will not interfere in African domestic affairs. “*We will not impose our will to others and have no political terms in (to) our assistance*” (Senkpeni, 2017).

Since the holding of the China-Africa Forum in December 2015, trade, investments, and bilateral cooperation between China and Africa have made significant inroads as the Asian nation – now the world’s second largest economy – continue to show interest in accelerating the cooperation. Ten plans, nominated by this Forum, are fulfilled. On the next China-Africa Forum in Beijing in 2018, China proclaimed new plan of eight items which must come with African countries prioritizing important goals based on the African Union’s Agenda 2063. This plan fulfillment will help the continent get over the development period and solve people’s everyday life problem. Besides economic and trade success, politics is a key factor to sustaining China-Africa relations. China has called for stability in policies like tax incentives for investors, security and skilled manpower in African countries – and experts say only political stability can achieve the aforementioned. West African countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia prepare for general and presidential elections. The positive comment came from Beijing on these events. Since re-establishing diplomatic ties with PRC Liberia under the leadership of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, has benefited millions dollars from China in aid. China is also including peace keeping forces into UN and African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa and renders health care support; significant amongst them – support during the Ebola outbreak. Bilateral relations in recent years between the Asian economic superpower and the West African nation have also seen projects worth millions too. The latest being the agreement to modernize the country’s main international airport and the construction of a US\$50 million ministerial complex in Monrovia. Concerns about China’s support for a definite candidate in Liberia’s elections have linger especially as Sirleaf’s Vice President Joseph Boakai has tossed his hat in the race for the presidency, but China reechoing its stance allays fears over the election’s result consequently derailing the existing friendship (Senkpeni, 2017).

Chinese position in question of African elections and their future political systems is supported by Africans. Simplice F. Asongu argues, that in Africa the “*Beijing Model*” outdoes the “*Washington Consensus*”. She says, political stability and economic growth have priority, while democratic values “*can wait*,” because most Africans believe that “*food, shelter, health, and good sanitation*” are more important than “*the right to vote*.” They make a choice Chinese model instead of Washington Consensus. The Beijing Model is known for its non-interference in foreign policy. The model advocates “*strong economic and political leadership, which is essential to growth and stability*.” The model championed by the West places a premium on human rights and democracy, while the one advocated by China is more concerned with political stability and economic growth. The principles China favors – like political stability, trade, and counterterrorism – than human rights. Africa’s policymakers also consider that strong economic and political leadership is essential to growth and stability. The fastest way to build a strong middle class in Africa would be to move toward the hierarchy of principles that China’s model promotes (Asongu, 2018).

He Wenping, a Chinese scholar from Charhar Institute compared USA and US president Donald Trump’s reaction on Africa which surprised the African countries with China’s

one. The most typical was the reaction of Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, who angrily said in a speech at Oxford University that if Trump won the election he would cut up his green card and start packing up to leave the country. African intelligentsia felt itself disappointed because of Trump's words on Africa – and more importantly of a concern that Trump's 'America first' stress and trade protectionism will further marginalize Africa in the foreign and economic policies of the US. Trump attempts to conceal his very negative views on Africa and Africans.

*“Although we don't know yet whether real estate developer Trump's comment on Africa will be a basis for President Trump's Africa policy, it may be anticipated that changes in American fiscal, economic and diplomatic policies when Trump is in the White House is likely to bring about harm rather than blessing to Africa. Assistance to Africa may well be cut, which will affect countries dependent on American aid, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As the US has been a leading source of aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, reduced American assistance and investment will naturally lead to decrease of available financial resources for African development”* (Wenping, 2017).

On Oct 24, 2016, Afrobarometer, which conducts surveys in African countries, released a report detailing citizens attitudes toward China and published a report titled *China's Growing Presence in Africa Wins Largely Positive Popular Reviews*. The poll was conducted among 54,000 people from 36 African countries. 63 % of respondents thought China's economic and political influence in their country was positive. In Mali, 92 % of citizens said China's influence in Mali was positive. The countries in which less than half of the respondents had a positive opinion about China's influence included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco and Zimbabwe (Dionne, 2016). According to the poll results, most Africans believe China has made contributions to their countries' development through its economic and political activities in Africa. They give positive evaluations to China's infrastructure investment in Africa, its business and trade activities and products made in China. Besides a good impression of China's role in African economic development, the report also shows that respondents regard China as a model of national development second only to the US in popularity. In this connection, if the Trump administration truly adopts a policy to marginalize Africa, the US may well lose its status as the favorite model of development among African people to China (Wenping, 2017).

Neither the Washington Consensus nor the Beijing Model has all the answers. But, as Rwanda has demonstrated, if discipline and strong leadership are improving lives and delivering public goods, perhaps liberal democracy should be a long-term priority. The World Bank had praised Rwanda's recent *“remarkable development successes”*, which it said have helped reduce poverty and inequality, based on the exports of mainly coffee and tea. Paul Kagame has run Rwanda since 1994. In 2000 parliament elected him president. He won presidential elections in 2003 and in 2010, and again in 2017 after gaining approval by referendum to stand for an unprecedented third term. To his admirers he is a visionary leader, but to his critics he is a despot who tolerates no opposition. On September 2, 2018, Rwandans voted in parliamentary elections. The polls were projected to reinforce the dominant majority of President Kagame's ruling party Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Since the end of Rwanda's 1994 genocide, the RPF has retained an absolute majority in the Rwandan legislature – in large part due to its decisive role in the military victory that helped to stop the genocide. While the RPF won 40 of the 53 open seats in elections, opposition members from the Rwanda Green Party gained two seats in the parliament, with the remaining seats falling to members of RPF allied parties. It marks

the first election in post-genocide Rwanda in which the citizens have voted members of an opposition party into parliament. The African Union Election Observation Mission considered the elections to be *“peaceful, free, and fair.”*

## Africans Opinion on China in Africa

As for China and China-Africa relations, during the opening ceremony of FOCAC Summit in September 2018, President Xi discussed China’s *“five-no”* approach to engagement with Africa, based on the values of *“sincerity, friendship, and equality”* underpinning China-Africa cooperation. The tenets of the approach are *“no interference in African countries”* pursuit of development paths that fit their national conditions; no interference in African countries’ internal affairs; no imposition of our will on African countries; no attachment of political strings to assistance to Africa; and no seeking of selfish political gains in investment and financing cooperation with Africa, which he further noted *“could apply to other countries as they deal with matters regarding Africa.”* According to a recent blog post by famous specialist on China-Africa relations Yun Sun, these remarks highlight China’s efforts to reaffirm the message that its development cooperation in Africa is based on mutual respect and support, especially in light of critiques that the China’s Belt and Road Initiative constitutes *“neo-colonialism”* or a *“debt trap”* (Coopley, 2018).

Opinion surveys and research on China-Africa ties are generally positive about Chinese engagements. Although China is a latecomer to Zambia’s decades-old copper industry, it has quickly established itself as an ambitious rival to *“traditional”* mining partners like Australia and South Africa. As almost everywhere in Africa these days, Chinese contractors are building highways, dams, and other large infrastructure projects. Zambia even boasts two Chinese-built special economic zones, and has recently allowed banking in the Chinese renminbi instead of dollar, or euro to facilitate trade with China. For a long time now, Zambia has been at the leading edge of China’s drive to expand its relations with the continent. Many Chinese have migrated to Zambia, setting themselves up in mining, farming, commerce and small industry.

At the same time Zambia has become one of the first African countries where the role of China and of Chinese people in the country became an explicit and potent political issue. During the campaigning for elections in 2006 and 2008, the Michael Sata, made a sport of baiting China, calling its business people in the country *“profiteers,”* not investors, and denouncing Chinese for *“bringing in their own people to push wheelbarrows instead of hiring local people.”* *“Zambia has become a province of China,”* Sata thundered in one campaign rally back then. *“The Chinese are the most unpopular people in the country because no one trusts them. The Chinaman is coming just to invade and exploit Africa”* (French, 2011).

Anti-Chinese sentiment was further fueled by violence against workers at Chinese-owned copper mines. In 2006, at one mine, Chinese managers opened fire on workers protesting over back pay and working conditions, injuring several employees. A year earlier, 50 Zambians had been killed at the same mine by an accidental blast at the company’s explosives plant. In 2010, at another mine, two Chinese managers were charged with attempted murder after opening fire on a group of employees protesting poor working conditions. Earlier this year, before the election season got underway, the case against the Chinese was quietly dropped, feeding resentment in some circles about China’s fast-growing political influence. So election rhetoric offers a way to chart anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa, which is increasingly harnessed for electoral gain. Anti-China propaganda helped Michael Sata to win presidential elections in Zambia in 2011, when he outstripped incumbent President Rupiah Banda. On the eve of Zambia’s presidential

elections one of the most common tropes about the vote was to describe it as a referendum on China. So election rhetoric offers a way to chart anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa, which is increasingly harnessed for electoral gain.

China's presence is felt almost everywhere in the country nowadays, from the big Bank of China billboard ads that welcome visitors in Chinese and are among the first sights that any passenger arriving at the Lusaka airport sees, to the city's markets, streets, and shopping malls, where Chinese who were all but invisible just a few years ago now abound. The most politically significant aspect of this presence, though, is the high-profile projects that China rushed to complete in time for the election. These include the newly delivered and fully equipped 159-bed Lusaka General Hospital, and a striking 40,000 seat stadium in Ndola. China's ambassador Zhou Yuxiao, a veteran of several African postings spoke of these contributions to Zambia's developments, calling the hospital "a grant". *"Among all nations, I think China is doing the best at getting resources from countries and putting back into those countries?"* – Zhou told. – *"Can you find any other country that is doing better?"* When the ambassador was asked what the Americans had contributed to Zambia, he marked that they employ local people and put them as observers at each polling station. *"What else? I haven't seen any road being built by them, any school, any hospital that can serve society for long. Maybe training election people is their biggest contribution"* (French, 2011).

Sata's anti-Chinese sentiment helped him to defeat incumbent President Rupiah Banda. But is this an emerging pattern – or a sporadic political occurrence in African elections? The more recent example – the elections in Zimbabwe in summer 2018, when the opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa of the MDC alliance using strong anti-China rhetoric and promises to expel Chinese businesses if he will win, tried to galvanize popular support against the incumbent Emmerson Mnangagwa of the ZANU-PF. His efforts however have no success because he had 44.3 % to 50.7 % loss to Mnangagwa (Aidoo, 2018).

China as an important development partner and provider of infrastructure and financial resources for many African countries. Nevertheless, anti-China rhetoric has some appeal: African elections are essentially about the economy, and China is a significant economic player. Beijing has edged out Western economies to become the most crucial economic partner to many African countries. With South Africa's unemployment rate more than 26 % in 2018, even the continent's top performers and Beijing's major partners need to increase trade and investments, and build resilient economies that provide and protect jobs. Opponents can blame the willingness to accept an expanding Chinese economic influence, but if they win, they may decide to follow through with their anti-China pronouncements, or not. For example, recently, new president of Sierra Leone Julius Maada Bio canceled a Chinese-funded airport project signed by his predecessor, after referring to Chinese projects as "a sham" during a campaign debate (Aidoo, 2018).

Foreign involvement or domination of extractive sectors can easily elicit popular discontent. China's increased interests in these sectors no doubt sparks intense political debates, especially when there are reports of mistreatment of local mine workers or increased Chinese involvement in unregulated mining activities. Hardships of Zambian mine workers in Chinese-owned mines also explain the anti-China moods that fueled Michael Sata's victory in 2011.

Chinese involvement in illegal gold mining in Ghana incurred local resentment, which featured in the 2016 vote that elected Nana Akufo-Addo – who promised to deal with the situation. While some research show that local population near the Chinese-operated mines enjoy better infrastructure and social services, anti-Chinese sentiments are also highest around these areas.

A 2016 Afrobarometer survey of African countries indicated an average of 35 % of respondents perceived the quality of Chinese products in Africa as problematic for China's image. Despite the benefits of providing cheaper options of products to African consumers, people don't want to see substandard materials in infrastructure building, or risk purchasing fake pharmaceutical products. African politicians often remind voters that cheap Chinese textiles and other goods compete with local products, and these declarations can be exploited on the campaign trail to influence voters at the polls. To some pro-Western politicians, China's increased engagement in Africa is nothing more than "new colonialism". For pro-China African politicians, China-Africa engagement means immense job creation, much-needed infrastructure, and most significantly, the chance to meet electoral promises with an injection of foreign capital with few conditions. The anti-China view, alternatively, sees the opportunity to remind voters of high rates of unemployment, particularly among the youth, and stir up popular anger to defeat incumbency.

## Conclusion

What does China mean for African countries and for Africans if it becomes an influence factor in African elections? For a global China, the benefits of increased economic engagement in Africa and becoming the continent's preferred development partner comes with the burden of ensuring the viability and sustainability of these projects. A politically stable Africa would likely enhance these benefits – but Africa's democratic cultures may sometimes feature not-so-friendly political rhetoric. Nevertheless there is opinion in Africa that for many Africans the current increase of Chinese investments and loans mean that China may remain a major factor in future African elections.

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*Estudo de casos  
– África Ocidental e Mediterrânica*



# The Results of the Presidential Elections in Egypt in 2018 and of the Constitutional Referendum in 2019

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## Introduction

The Arab Spring emphasized the importance of youth policies to ensure national security in North African countries. The top political leaders of Egypt learned the lesson from what happened and put the youth issues at the center of domestic politics.

Party creation, focused on work with the youth – the Nation's Future Party became the most important tool of youth policy. It totals about 250 thousand members and has offices in all 27 governorates of Egypt. More than 90 % of party members, including heads, are younger than 35 years. They take active part in public life of the country.

Tightening the control over the activities of non-governmental organizations became one of the main directions of the youth policy in Egypt. For this purpose instead of the Law on Non-Governmental Organizations N.º 84 of 2002 the Law on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work N.º 70 of 2017 was adopted (Volkov, 2018: 38).

National youth conferences became an important tool of the new youth policy. President al-Sisi took active part in their work.

Besides, much attention was paid to the solution of the main economic problems of the Egyptian youth: to a housing problem and youth unemployment.

These were the main directions of Egyptian domestic policy on the eve of the presidential elections of 2019.

## Preparations for the Presidential Elections

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, adopted at the referendum of January 2014, the National Election Authority (NEA) appointed the next presidential elections in the country to take place on March 26-28, 2018, and for the citizens of Egypt living abroad – on March 16-18.

Long before the elections, a number of well-known Egyptian politicians announced their intention to take part in them. However, as their date approached, many of them began to withdraw their candidatures. They did so for various reasons – both as a result of official pressure and due to a sober assessment of their prospects against the background of incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who announced his participation in the elections.

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Among them were Anwar Essmat Sadat – the nephew of the former president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat; Mortada Mansur – chairman of the famous Egyptian sports club «Zamalek», el-Sayyid el-Badavi – chairman of the «*New Wafd*» party, who was widely recognized as a worthy opponent to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; and a veteran of Egyptian politics, a participant of the presidential elections of 2012 and 2014 – Hamdin Sabahi.

When the well-known Egyptian lawyer and founder of the «Bread and Freedom» party, Khaled Ali, refused to participate in the elections, it became a major focus of public attention. To support his candidature, the Democratic Civil Movement was created. It comprised 70 political parties and associations, as well as about 150 public figures (Hassanin, 2018).

His decision to refuse to participate in the elections came as a result of the arrest of another participant in the presidential race – the former Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Egypt, Sami Anan, on charges of «*forging documents*».

In addition, the National Election Authority did not allow Ahmed Shafiq, the former prime minister of Egypt during the time of Hosni Mubarak, to participate in the 2018 election. Meanwhile, it was him who lost to Mohammed Mursi by only 1 % of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections in 2012, and in the second – by less than 2%.

After all these candidates left out of the presidential race, many Egyptian politicians began to rightly claim that the presidential election lost competitiveness and turned into a referendum. One of the reasons for this was, in our opinion, the overly harsh policy of the authorities aimed at «clean-up» of the political opponents of the current president, who, without any doubt, under the conditions of the ban on the activities of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, would convincingly defeat them in democratic elections.

As a result, at the last moment before the acceptance of applications from candidates for presidential elections was stopped, Moussa Mustafa Moussa, chairman of the «Tomorrow» parliamentary party, submitted his documents to the National Election Authority. It should be noted that the «Tomorrow» party, although not pro-government, works closely with the current government. During the presidential race its chairman highly appreciated the achievements of al-Sisi during the first presidential term. Therefore, supporters of the opposition parties stated that M. Moussa is a «*sham candidate*».

Some of them drew parallels between the participation of M. M. Moussa in the presidential election of 2018 and the much more successful participation, by the way, of his predecessor, A. A. Noura, in the presidential election-2005 as the only opponent of the incumbent President H. Mubarak. Those elections were the most disastrous in the history of republican Egypt, since only 23 % of voters took part in them.

In an interview given to the correspondent of the Russian newspaper «Kommersant» during the election campaign, M. M. Moussa, answering the question about the reasons that prompted him to take part in the elections at the last moment, honestly stated: «*When in the end no one dared to participate in the elections, I put forward my candidacy to avoid accusations of Egypt that we do not have democratic elections, but a referendum*» (Belenkaya, 2018: 6).

The provisions of Article 142 of the Egyptian Constitution require candidates for the presidency of the country to receive recommendations from at least 20 elected members of parliament or signatures of at least 25 thousand citizens who have the right to vote in at least 15 provinces, in each province not less than 1 thousand signatures in their support (The Egyptian Constitution, 2014). M. M. Moussa submitted 47 thousand voters' signatures in his support and approval of 20 members of parliament to the National Election Authority.

As for the current president of the ARE, A. F. al-Sisi, he gathered the signatures of 173,000 Egyptians in his support. In total, more than 24.2 million people, or 41.05 % of all voters, voted at the presidential elections in Egypt at 13,000 polling stations in March 2018. This is considered to be a rather high turnout in Egypt.

## Results of the Presidential Elections

The high degree of absenteeism of voters in all Egyptian provinces, which requires deep political and sociological research, is a characteristic feature of the Egyptian political system. Even during the presidential election of 2012 – the only election in the history of republican Egypt, which took place in two stages and was remarkable for an acute political struggle, the turnout in the first round accounted for only 46 %. Meanwhile, exactly in the first round there were determined two leaders out of six candidates – Mohammed Mursi, who gained 25 % of the votes, and Ahmed Shafiq – 24 %. And only in the second round of elections between these two candidates, the first of which represented the *Sharia* principles of organization of the Egyptian society, and the second – secular, the number of voters (51.8 %) exceeded the number of absentees (48.2 %). As is known, Mohamed Mursi won the election, as he received 51.7 % of the ballots found valid.

On April 2, 2018, the National Election Authority announced the official results of the election: more than 97.08 % of the ballots found valid were submitted for the current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and for his only rival, chairman of the «Tomorrow» parliamentary party Moussa Mustafa Moussa – 2.92 %. The highest percentage of voter support A.F. al-Sisi received in the province of Kafr El-Sheikh – 98.07 %, and his rival – in the province of North Sinai – 5.4 %.

As for voter turnout, it was above 50 % level only in three provinces: New Valley – 58.8 %, South Sinai – 51.7% and Gharbia – 51.0 %, and below 30 % level – in two provinces: Aswan – 29.8 % and Qena – 29.7 %. The percentage of voters turned out to be higher in Lower Egypt, especially in the rural provinces of the Nile Delta. Voter turnout was lower than average in the largest urban provinces: in Alexandria – 37.8 %, Cairo – 35.0 % and Giza – 30.4 % (Presidential Elections, 2018). In general, 41.05 % of registered voters took part in the Egyptian elections of 2018, compared with 47.5 % in 2014.

However, it is especially disturbing for the ruling authorities to see a significant increase in the share of invalid ballots, which serves as evidence of a protest voting. If in the 2014 elections about 1 million ballots (4.1 %) submitted were invalid, then in 2018 their number increased to almost 1.8 million, or 7.3 %. During the last elections, photos of ballots were shown on social networks in Egypt with the name of player of the national team Mohamed Salah inscribed on them as a candidate.

No doubt, some of the bulletins dropped in the ballot box were spoiled unintentionally but their share seems very insignificant. One can judge about their share by the results of the first round of the presidential elections in Egypt in 2012, in which 6 candidates participated, when the turnout reached 46.42 % and the proportion of invalid ballots – only 1.72 %. In the second round, with two candidates, these figures increased respectively to 51.85 % and 3.19 %.

It is remarkable that if the voter turnout in urban provinces in 2018 was lower than the average, the share of protest votes in them was significantly higher than the average. It reached its maximum in Cairo – 9.6 % of those who took part in the elections spoiled their ballots, 9.3 % – in Alexandria and 8.6 % – in Giza.

As for the provinces in Upper Egypt, in particular, Aswan and Qena, where the minimum turnout was registered, the percentage of invalid ballots was even lower than the national average – voters simply chose not to appear at the polling stations.

The convincing victory of the current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi at the elections in March 2018, who was first elected to this post in 2014, extended his term of office to 2022. At the same time, in accordance with Article 140 of the Egyptian Constitution, which unequivocally determines that the president is elected for 4 years and can be re-elected only once, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi lost the right to run again for this post. As a result, a dilemma arose before the ruling elite of Egypt: either to make a transfer of power in 2022, as required by the Constitution or to change the Basic Law once again (over the past 7 years it has been changed twice: in 2012 and in 2014).

## The Constitutional Referendum

The problem of 2022, faced by the Egyptian authorities after the successful re-election of A.F. al-Sisi's presidency, was resolved unexpectedly quickly for most Egyptian politicians and foreign observers in a rather traditional way for African countries – by changing the constitution. According to the current Basic Law, changes in it can be initiated either by the president of the country, or by a group of deputies representing at least one fifth of the deputies of parliament. In case if no less than two thirds of the parliamentarians vote for the amendments, they must then be approved by popular referendum.

In accordance with this scenario, on February 3, 2019, a group of Egyptian parliamentarians presented a draft law on amending the Egyptian constitution to the Speaker of Parliament Ali Abdel Aal. These amendments, which provided for major changes in the Basic Law, affected the redistribution of powers between the three branches of power: executive, legislative and judicial.

After more than a month of discussion of this bill, on April 16, 2019, the parliament adopted the law amending the country's Constitution. The overwhelming majority voted for this decision – 531 deputies, against – 22.

The National Election Authority appointed a constitutional referendum in Egypt for April 20–22, 2019 (abroad – it was supposed to start and end a day earlier).

The positions of more than 100 Egyptian political parties in relation to the question put to the referendum turned out to be quite expected: a small group of pro-government relatively large (by Egyptian standards) parties supported constitutional changes, and numerous opposition parties that did not have sufficient wide popular support and, as a rule, their representatives in parliament, expressed unequivocally against.

Already on April 23, the National Election Authority published the results of the referendum, which could be easily predicted. Out of total of 61344.5 thousand voters 27193.6 thousand people voted, or 44.3 %. About 3.1 % of the ballots, that is, more than 831 thousand were declared invalid (a number of politicians urged to spoil them). Of the 26,362 thousand valid ballots in favor of changing the constitution were submitted almost 23,414 thousand, or 88.8 % of their number, and about 2,946 thousand, or 11.2 % – against (Egypt's constitutional amendments, 2019).

It should be noted that, no matter how hard the opponents of the current Egyptian authorities are trying to prove the opposite; the results of the constitutional referendum reflect the true mood of the country's population and correlate well with the results of the presidential elections-2018.

The first thing that attracts attention is the high voter turnout by the standards of the country, exceeding even a 41.0 % turnout during the presidential elections of 2018, which



was accompanied by a loud election campaign. This indicates, on the one hand, the greater interest of voters in the referendum than in the elections, at which they received the right to freely express their opinions, and on the other hand, it points at certain mistakes of the presidential administration in organizing the election campaign.

This right to free choice received at the referendum is also confirmed by a significantly smaller proportion of invalid ballots compared to the 2018 elections. If 1.8 million ballots, or 7.3 % of the total number of ballots, were considered invalid during the presidential elections, then in 2019 – only 3.1 % of the ballots, or more than 831 thousand. Thus, the majority of voters who deliberately spoiled the ballots during the presidential election clearly spoke out against the constitutional changes during the constitutional referendum. The Egyptian opposition can take credit for the results of the constitutional referendum. As a result of the referendum it was supported by almost 3.0 million voters, that is, much more than during the presidential election of 2018. However, this is only one part of the truth, because the government was able to attract even more supporters. If at the presidential election A.F. al-Sisi mobilized support of 37.0 % of all voters who had the right to vote, then the percentage of ballots cast for constitutional changes was 38.2 %.

### **Political consequences of the Referendum**

First of all, the Egyptians supported the prolongation of the presidential term from four to six years, which shifted the time of the next presidential election from 2022 to 2024. Moreover, while maintaining the rule that the current president can be re-elected only once, a new transitional Article 240 was included in the Basic Law, which allows A. F. al-Sisi to put forward his candidacy in 2024 for another six-year term.

In addition, the new article 150 returns the once existed norm on the president's right to appoint one or several vice-presidents, and, importantly, the vice-president, if he takes office, does not have the right to amend the Constitution, dissolve parliament or the -government, as well as run for president. The rationale for the return of the post of vice-president, who does not have the opportunity to become a legally elected president, is quite obvious – increasing the resilience of the Egyptian political system.

Changes to the Constitution, approved by referendum, also significantly reduce the independence of the judiciary branch, strengthening control over it by the executive one. In particular, Article 185 gives the president the right, which he did not have before, to appoint, for four years, the heads of the judicial organs out of the five candidates, who are determined by their supreme councils. The Supreme Judicial Council, which was an independent body under the current Constitution, will now be headed by the president. In addition, if the Attorney General had previously been elected by the Supreme Judicial Council, then Article 189 grants the right to appoint him to the President. He receives the same right in respect of the chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Significant changes were made in the activities of the legislature. First of all, the bicameral structure of parliament is reintroduced: along with the House of Representatives, whose number is reduced from the current 596 people to 450 deputies, the Senate should be elected and is to be composed of 120 senators. The Senate is authorized to submit bills aimed at the development of democracy, the promotion of social peace and the realization of higher values, rights, freedoms and public duties, but the Prime Minister, his deputies, ministers and other members of the government are not accountable to it.

It seems that at the present time it is impossible to give an unambiguous assessment of the results of the constitutional referendum, which significantly prolonged the term of A. F. al-Sisi and strengthened the executive power vertical in Egypt. In the long run, these

steps significantly increase political risks, and first of all, during the transfer of power in 2030. In addition, the efficiency of the state apparatus, as demonstrated by the experience of H. Mubarak, decreases significantly over time, and the threats of corruption increase. However, in the short and medium term, the results of the referendum will contribute to the successful completion of the reforms initiated by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014 in all spheres, and especially in the economic sphere.

In 2019 the three-year successfully realized structural adjustment program, agreed by Egypt with the IMF, ends. For its implementation the country has already received 10 billion USD loans out of 12 billion USD planned (IMF praises, 2019). In 2018, Egypt achieved certain economic success: the GDP growth rate was 5.3 %, and the public debt proportion to it decreased from 103.2 % to 92.6 % (Egypt – General government gross debt, 2019).

### **What ensured the results of the elections and referendum?**

It should be recognized that the overwhelming majority of voters who came to the polls in March 2018 and April 2019 expressed support for the course conducted by A. F. al-Sisi, especially since the results of M. Mursi's short reign are still fresh in their memory. The overwhelming majority of the leading media outlets in developed countries tried to deny this fact – they covered the overall course and results of the presidential elections and the constitutional referendum in Egypt very negatively.

The active participation of young people in the Arab Spring once again reminded the current leadership of the country about the need to take into account the interests of young Egyptians and to develop an active youth policy. In addition, attracting young people to its side is the best way to increase the number of their active supporters over the long term.

First of all, in 2014, with the financial support of local businessmen, the youth party the Nation's Future Party was founded, which won 53 seats in parliament during the 2015 parliamentary elections. Its goal, with which it is successfully coping so far, is to involve young people in the political process on the side of the current government. It is significant that it were the members of the youth party who took an active part in collecting signatures (since September 2017) in support of al-Sisi's nomination for a new presidential term.

National youth conferences with the direct participation of the president became a new phenomenon in the internal political life of the country, not familiar not only for an African country, but also for countries that consider themselves democratic. They started with a meeting held in Sharm el-Sheikh in October 2016. In accordance with the decision taken then – to conduct them regularly 4 times a year, youth conferences were then held in Cairo, Aswan, Ismailia and Alexandria. In addition to issues of regional socio-economic development, acute nation-wide problems were also discussed at these conferences. The last event in this series before the presidential election was the World Youth Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2017, in which, like in all regional conferences, the President of ARE, A. F. al-Sisi, took part.

It should be noted that the practice of holding national and international conferences and forums was continued after the re-election of A. F. al-Sisi in March 2018.

Another important direction in the struggle for the minds of young people in Egypt was the active opposition to the illegal activities of a number of foreign non-governmental organizations, many of which were created in Arab countries with the help of the West with a well-defined goal – to transform the ruling regimes they recognized as undemocratic.

However, the main front of the struggle to win the affection of the Egyptian youth – the main participant in the political process in Egypt – was deployed by A. F. al-Sisi in the sphere of solving the most acute economic problems: housing shortages and youth unemployment.

However, it should not be forgotten that the previous leaders of Egypt also paid attention to the housing problem: housing construction has been rather active for four decades already in the country. To this end, in 1979, the Department of New Urban Settlements was created in Egypt.

However, under the current president, the activities of the Department intensified. Currently, 24 new urban settlements are being built, and the total number of residential units put into circulation is 2282 thousand, of which about 1/3 are built by the Department and 2/3 by the private sector and the army. In Egypt, a program is underway to build 1 million social housing units ranging from 75 to 90 square meters for young people and people with limited incomes. To date, the Department has completed construction of 141 thousand social housing units (88 thousand are under construction), another 90 thousand were built by the private sector and the army (81 thousand under construction). Already today, 7 million people live in the new urban settlements, and after all construction projects are completed, the number of new settlers, mostly young people, should increase to 17 million (New Urban Communities, 2019).

However, the construction of cheap housing is just one side of the solution to the housing problem for young people, who often do not have the means to purchase it.

In order to provide it with such an opportunity, in 2014 the Central Bank of Egypt decided to allocate 10 billion Egyptian pounds to Egyptian banks participating in the mortgage lending program. These funds were intended only for banks providing mortgage loans with a maturity of 20 years at an interest rate of 5 % for low-income families (below 1,400 Egyptian pounds a month) and at 8 % – for families with average income. At the same time the advance payment was only 12 thousand Egyptian pounds. In 2017, 14 of the 39 banks operating in Egypt participated in this program of the Central Bank of Egypt, and over the 3 years of this program, they provided 5 billion pounds to finance the purchase of 62 thousand housing units (Mounir, 2017). These are, of course, quite modest figures, but, nevertheless, they can be considered as a definite step towards the alleviation of the housing problem of young people.

Even more obvious were the successes of the country's leadership in solving the problem of unemployment, especially against the background of the failure caused by the events of the Arab spring. If in 2010 the number of unemployed in Egypt jumped by 800 thousand people, having increased from 2.4 to 3.2 million, and in the next two years it grew annually by 200 thousand people, then since 2013 the number of unemployed has stabilized while employment grew. Since 2013, when the overall unemployment rate was 13.15 %, it has a steady tendency for a slow decline, although the situation with youth unemployment is not so simple.

#### The level of unemployment in Egypt (in %) in 2010-2017

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
General unemployment	11,85	11,85	12,6	13,15	13,1	13,05	12,41	12,08
Youth unemployment	28,76	30,07	35,61	35,63	34,12	34,89	34,62	34,43

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/377343/unemployment-rate-in-egypt/>; <https://www.statista.com/statistics/811968/youth-unemployment-rate-in-egypt/>.

According to preliminary data, the situation with respect to general unemployment was successfully reversed in 2018, when it was 10.9 % (Egypt – Unemployment rate, 2019). It can be assumed that youth unemployment in Egypt in 2018 will also decrease by at least 1.0-1.5 percentage points.

At the same time, it should be noted that the economic situation of the country remains difficult, despite the fact that the economic growth rate is more than 4 % a year and that the unemployment rate decreased. The structural economic reform carried out in the country under an agreement with the IMF led to a sharp jump in inflation as a result of the liberalization of the Egyptian pound in 2016 and a sharp reduction in fuel subsidies. This caused a surge in inflation in the country, which reached a maximum of 35.3 % in July 2017. The food price inflation, exceeding 23.5 % in 2017, is especially painful for the Egyptians. However, as a result of tightened monetary policy, the inflation rate was significantly lowered by the end of 2017, and already in January 2018 the level of core inflation was 14.4 %. However, it should be noted that the rapid growth of prices in 2016-2017 didn't cause anything like 1977 bread riots.

The share of the population living below the poverty line, the criteria for which each country sets independently, is high, according to the World Bank. In 2015, it was 27.8 %. In the same year, the share of Egyptians with daily incomes less than \$ 1.9 (extreme poverty) was 1.3 %, \$ 3.2 (moderate poverty) – 16.1 % and \$ 5.5 – 61.9%. However paradoxical it may seem, despite the economic upheavals caused by the Arab spring, the fight against poverty in 2010-2015 has seen certain progress, since in 2010 these figures were as follows: 3.0 %, 26.6 % and 72.5 % (Egypt – Poverty gap, 2019).

Thus, during the first presidential term of al-Sisi, some success was achieved in solving the most acute social problems. This, in particular, acknowledged M. M. Moussa, who stated the following: «I understand that I am competing with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who has achieved a lot, roads, bridges, weapons – and all this benefits us» (Belenkaya, 2018: 6).

## Conclusion

Thus, the outcomes of the presidential elections in Egypt in 2018 and of the constitutional referendum of 2019 appeared as a result of two main factors:


- active youth policy of al-Sisi, which was in many respects innovative for the African continent and led to the improvement of the youth economic and social situation in comparison with those in Mursi's times;
- dissociation of his political opponents, each of whom has no great influence within the political space which is strictly controlled by the authorities.

The main result of the constitutional referendum has become the strengthening of the executive power vertical in the country for the medium term. However, policy risks increased in the long term. In case if the Egyptian elite is split, then the transfer of power in 2030 or later will cause great threats, considering the changed psychology of the present generation of Egyptians who have the experience of overthrowing Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi.

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# The Problem of Political Leadership and the Electoral Process in Côte d'Ivoire

Lubow M. Sadovskaya\*

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Over the period of ten years from 2000 to 2010 the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire was undergoing a severe political crisis that was overcome due to the intervention of the global community. The situation stabilized in the end of 2010, after A. Ouattara won the presidential election.

However, Côte d'Ivoire's society remains split between supporters of the acting president and those who stayed loyal to the previous one – L. Gbagbo. After being charged with crimes against humanity – murders, rapes, persecution and other inhuman acts – and spending seven years in jail in Hague, in the beginning of 2019 Gbagbo was acquitted by the International Criminal Court; he now lives in Belgium and hopes to stay there until the prosecution appeal is considered. The decision on appeal is to be made in summer 2020, several months before the presidential election.

## The attitude of the country's political elites towards the revision of the Constitution

The escalation of the political struggle could be observed long before the beginning of the election campaign. It was catalyzed by the problem of acting president A. Ouattara's third term of office: after winning the 2015 election, Ouattara decided to change the existing constitution that allowed presidents to serve no longer than for two terms. To make this decision seem more democratic, the head of state called a national vote – a referendum that took place on 30 October 2016.

Before holding the referendum, A. Ouattara consulted with traditional chiefs, promising them to include a chamber of chiefs into the structure of state power, and with some of the opposition leaders. They confirmed their approval of the idea of a referendum, as well as the plan to introduce the position of vice president<sup>1</sup> and create an upper house of parliament – the Senate<sup>2</sup>. The traditional chiefs expressed the wish for the amendments to the constitution «to open the path for A. Ouattara's third presidential mandate» (Amani, 2016).

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<sup>1</sup> A. Ouattara suggested electing vice president by direct popular vote, same as president of the Republic (later he appointed him single-handedly).

<sup>2</sup> The Senate was abolished by the constitution adopted in Côte d'Ivoire in 2000. Article 35 stipulated that president was to be elected for five years by universal direct suffrage and be only re-eligible once. Presidential candidates were to be forty years of age at least and seventy-five years at most.

At their 12<sup>th</sup> convention in 2016, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) that was part of a pro-presidential alliance until July 2018<sup>3</sup> adopted a resolution concerning the necessity of introducing the position of vice president. The party's leader and former president of Côte d'Ivoire, H. K. Bédié, supported the procedure of the Senate's formation suggested by A. Ouattara: two-thirds of its members were to be elected and one-third was to be appointed by the president (Nouvelle Constitution, 2016).

Nevertheless, not all opposition parties supported the constitutional referendum (Mel, 2016). For instance, Affi N'Guessan, the leader of the country's leading opposition party Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), claimed that «amending the constitution does not equal searching for consensus between the authorities and the opposition; quite the opposite, it will further exacerbate disagreements». Other opposition leaders believed that «Côte d'Ivoire is infected with a virus of “the third mandate”» (Amani, 2016). Such comments were caused by the fact that, despite the speculative character of all the statements concerning the third presidential mandate, allies of A. Ouattara struggled to justify its legitimacy.

Without consulting the opposition and gaining its approval, the president made use of his recent victory in the first round of the 2015 presidential election and decided to change the existing constitution and create the Third Republic with a new constitution – the third one – that would substantially limit the opportunities for the opposition.

93,43 % of voters endorsed the new constitution on a turnout of 42,42 % (Référendum, 2016). The support of changing the basic law by the population is partly explained by the fact that, with the help of mass media and other methods of propaganda, the Côte d'Ivoire's authorities managed to convince Ivorians in the necessity of making the amendments that would correspond to the country's realities. A special emphasis was laid on articulating the expedience of removing the concept of «ivoirité» from the constitution. Its elimination from the basic law appealed to many, especially non-indigenous citizens of the country.

## The Concept of «Ivoirité» and its impact on the electoral processes

This concept was born in 1994, at the time of crisis within PDCI, and dominated Côte d'Ivoire's political arena for fifty years (Dozon, 2011: 37). It was coined by H. K. Bédié – the leader of PDCI, who became head of state in 1993, after the death of F. Houphouët Boigny, and won the 1995 presidential election. To prevent one of his main political rivals, A. Ouattara<sup>4</sup>, from participating in this election, shortly before the beginning of the electoral campaign H. K. Bédié amended two articles of the constitution and introduced a new electoral code defining the rights and the criteria that had to be met by presidential candidates. The main thing was to have parents of Ivorian descent. As A. Ouattara's father was from Burkina Faso, the current president was eliminated from the election.

The idea of «ivoirité» was founded on H. K. Bédié's attitude towards the Dyula ethnic group whom he, as well as many indigenous citizens of the country, did not consider to be Ivorians. This was aggravated by religious differences between the ethnic groups. Each presidential aspirant in the country was supported by population groups of varying ethnic origins and religious beliefs who came from different social strata.

<sup>3</sup> This falling-out was caused by A. Ouattara who broke the agreement concerning the consecution of nominating presidential candidates from the presidential party – the RR – and the DPCI. According to this agreement, in 2020 a representative of PDCI should have become head of state.

<sup>4</sup> Between 1992 and 1995, both northern and southern electorates viewed A. Ouattara as a technocrat whose lifestyle differed from those of common people, and, in the eyes of many, that made him «a symbol of modernity», a «World man». Apparently, that was because he worked abroad – for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and for the Bank of Economic and Commercial Development of West Africa.



H. K. Bédié was supported by ethnic groups from southern and central regions of the country, primarily catholic *Baoulé*, who mostly represented wealthy social strata. His principal competitor, A. Ouattara, was mainly backed by the Dyula from northern regions, who overwhelmingly professed the Islamic faith and were generally much poorer than the southerners.

«Ivoirité» was also based on an economic component – the crisis of 1990s-the beginning of 2000s attributed to the drop in prices for cocoa beans on the world market. The concept emerged in the period when new job creation in the country stalled, while the influx of immigrants from the neighboring poor Muslim countries of overpopulated Sahel did not decrease. The situation was aggravated by H. K. Bédié's land tenure reform, according to which only citizens of Ivorian origin could legally own land<sup>5</sup>.

It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the concept of «ivoirité» laid emphasis on the Akan culture, or, to be precise, on the *Baoulé* world. It was made equivalent to «*baoulité*» (Dozon: 2011: 40). H. K. Bédié believed that «the *Baoulé* world must be the lodestar for the Ivorian nation on the way to the modernization of the society» (Dozon, 2011: 40).

According to French researcher C. Videll, «... the transition of Côte d'Ivoire's politicians from manipulating latent feelings against foreigners to xenophobic policy at the state level was not only a substantial element of the brutalization of the country's political class; worst of all, it paved the way for violence throughout the society» (Videll, 2008: 176).

The events following the adoption of the concept of «ivoirité» led to many years of permanent politico-military crisis in the country (military coup of 1999, civil war of 2002-2007).

It becomes clear why the majority of the country's constituents who took part in the 2016 referendum voted for amending the new constitution, as voters were eager to remove from it the concept of «ivoirité» that limited the rights of non-indigenous citizens<sup>6</sup>.

### **Exacerbation of the political struggle in the country after the Parliamentary Election**

It is undeniable that A. Ouattara had the greatest interest in the constitutional reform. As it happens, in the sitting of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Hague, L. Gbagbo claimed that Côte d'Ivoire's acting president was implicated in the 2010-2011 politico-military crisis in the country (Sadovskaya, 2016: 22). The concern for his personal safety could have prompted A. Ouattara to think of a successor and to secure him the position of vice president by constitution. Côte d'Ivoire's head of state was undoubtedly interested in assigning this position to a person he could have full trust in.

The incorporation of the article concerning the formation of a bicameral parliament into the constitution was also aimed at strengthening the position of the acting president: in contrast with the lower house that is elected by universal direct suffrage, the upper house, or the Senate, is appointed in an undemocratic way – by indirect voting system and the appointment of a third of its members by the president himself.

The success of the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP)<sup>7</sup> at the parliamentary election held on 30 October 2016 was yet another victory of the acting

<sup>5</sup> The law reforming the land tenure regime was adopted only in July 2004. According to the amendment passed by the National Assembly, non-indigenous *ivorians* also gained a right to inherit property.

<sup>6</sup> In his time, Houphouët Boigny allowed many immigrants from French West Africa to participate in the voting. By contrast with other French West African countries, they were employed in all economic sectors of Côte d'Ivoire. All this brought forward the development of multiculturalism and multiconfessionalism in the Ivorian society.

<sup>7</sup> The RHDP is an alliance of the DPCI and The Rally of the Republicans – RR (A. Ouattara's party). (any reason for being in bold?)

president, although in comparison with previous elections the accomplishments were less convincing: RHDP won 167 of the 354 seats against 197 in 2011 (Gohobi, 2017). Representatives of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), including Affi N'Guessan, won only three mandates.

However, despite the political victory of Ouattara at the referendum and the parliamentary election, by early 2017 the domestic political situation in the country started to deteriorate. It provoked discontent both from the opposition that was unable to come to grips with the authoritarian tendencies in the president's actions and diverse sections of the Ivorian society that did not enjoy any of the hypothetical advantages of the constitutional reforms. Within three months after the parliamentary election, the country witnessed events that allowed to speak of a socio-political crisis: on 6 January 2017, demobilized soldiers – former militants of the New Forces who supported A. Ouattara during the civil war of 2002-2004 and were integrated into the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (RFCI) in 2007 – launched armed mutinies in the country's second-largest city Bouaké. On the same day, they were joined by active soldiers from Daloa and Korhogo – cities situated in the north-eastern part of Côte d'Ivoire.

Former soldiers broke into police stations and looted weapons. Among their demands was the immediate payment of their military compensations and back wages from 2007 to 2011 amounting to from 5 to 10 mln francs CFA (from 7600 to 15200 euros) due to each soldier, as well as the improvement of their living conditions (Malagardis, 2017).

Fearing that the mutiny would escalate out of control, on 7 January A. Ouattara agreed to meet their demands and pay 8.5 thousand of 22 thousand soldiers who were serving in the Ivorian army at the time. The authorities announced that they would primarily pay to former members of the New Forces rebel group who had been receiving neither wages nor bonuses from 2007 to 2011 (Tagro, 2017).

This armed military upheaval prompted the president to reform the Ivorian army, advancing the drawdown planned in 2016. He explained his decision by the necessity of the army's modernization, as well as improving discipline and the living conditions of soldiers. One cannot exclude that the decision is connected with the fact that there are former members of the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI)<sup>8</sup>, many of whom still support L. Gbagbo and oppose to the prolonged term of A. Ouattara's presidential office, within the ranks of the RFCI (Côte d'Ivoire, 2017).

To prevent the prevailing situation of January 2017 from turning into a politico-military crisis, the day after the mutiny A. Ouattara dismissed the government and formed a new one, which now consisted not of 29 but of 36 ministers. The new cabinet was incorporated with 7 new members.

On 10 January 2017, after the political outings, A. Ouattara issued a decree appointing former prime-minister Daniel Kablan Duncan the country's new vice president. On the same day, former speaker Guillaume Soro, who is extremely popular among the military, was re-elected as president of the National Assembly.

The reason for his popularity lies in his being the leader of the New Forces (NF) in the early 2000s. Abidjan newspaper «*Libération*» draws attention to the fact that the «*January rebels*» snapped into action at the exact moment when their former leader lost the position of the country's second-in-command (Malagardis, 2017). The 2016 constitutional reform changed the power hierarchy in Côte d'Ivoire. Before that, G. Soro used to be second in authority, but after the reform he became the fourth after the president, the vice president and the prime-minister. This politician with presidential ambition had hoped that Ouattara would appoint him vice president.

<sup>8</sup> 13 thousand out of 23 thousand military officers of the Republican army were former rebels of the New Forces.

However, after the acting president claimed that the new constitution of Côte d'Ivoire allows him two more mandates from 2020 in his interview to «*Jeune Afrique*» magazine on 3 June 2018, the activities of the supporters of former NF leader G. Soro visibly intensified. They openly expressed their desire to see him, not A. Ouattara, as presidential candidate at the upcoming election.

At the same time their movement, the Soroist Union (SU) headed by Marc Ouattara, proclaimed the slogan «A. Ouattara is the Father of Injustice». As for G. Soro, many sympathetic Ivorian journalists saw in him the combination of such virtues as «A. Ouattara's selflessness and H. Bédié's wisdom».

G. Soro also had on his side another organization created in August 2017 – the Association of New Forces (ANF) led by its secretary-general Félicien Sékongo, former spokesman of the New Forces rebel movement.

It should be noted that, being the president of the National Assembly, G. Soro constantly advocated giving former rebels of the NF deputy seats in the country's parliament and his appeals had a certain success.

Nevertheless, there was no place for the representatives of the NF who helped A. Ouattara rise to power back in the day (in 2011 and 2015) in the new government formed by Ouattara after the events of January 2017 and headed by prime-minister A. Gon Coulibaly.

G. Soro's communications director Moussa Traoré believes that Soro's supporters are under the impression that members of the New Forces became unwelcome to the current authorities.

This became especially apparent after the military uprisings of January and May 2017 and the discovery of an arms cache in the house of G. Soro's director of protocol Souleymane Kamagaté. A. Ouattara realized that G. Soro was backed by former rebels who were displeased with the acting authorities and prepared to take a stand in Soro's support at any moment. To avoid confrontation, the president tried to draw him closer, «neutralizing» him before the election.

To this effect, in August 2018 he received G. Soro in his residence Cocody Riviere Golf and offered to pay the expenses on his education and accommodation in Harvard (USA), as the former NF leader entered a PhD program in finance, and to appoint him ambassador to a country of his own choosing. In return, the president asked G. Soro to meet one condition: he was not to ally with H. K. Bédié who had made a complete break with the presidential coalition (Mieu, 2018).

However, G. Soro could not put aside his presidential ambition even for these tempting offers. In early 2019 he made a final decision to run for president at the 2020 election<sup>9</sup> and formed the Political committee – a takeoff site intended for preparing for the election and discussing the principal issues of national interest. The committee will mainly focus on social matters, such as unemployment, impoverishment, corruption and young people. Although G. Soro is considered a fringe politician in Côte d'Ivoire's political circles, he is popular among the young generation who view him as a «rebel» and one of the youngest renowned political leaders in the country (Soro is 46 years old). His slogan is «Make Way for Youth!» He is convinced that «in 2020, none of the Ivorians want to live through the scenario of 2010» which through the fault of Gbagbo, Bédié and Ouattara almost escalated into a civil war (Nyamsi, 2019).

G. Soro believes that the soroist mobilization that started in 2013 and their long-term efforts in the country's regions will eventually lead to success. At the same time, he

<sup>9</sup> In February 2019, G. Soro resigned from the position of the president of National Assembly and, along with Bédié, became one of the main opponents of A. Ouattara.

understands that, to win the election, he needs to be supported by the global community. G. Soro is certain that in his many years of working in parliament (2012-2019) and in the government as prime-minister (2007-2012) he managed to achieve international standing. His plans include the intensification of contacts with Paris<sup>10</sup> and many African countries whose heads he regularly negotiates with.

## L. Gbagbo and the consequences of his return to Côte d'Ivoire

L. Gbagbo is also a power player in the country's political space. The ICC's acquittal of the former Ivorian president (2000-2011) paved the way for his return to Côte d'Ivoire, and this fact cannot fail to affect the 2020 election. The Ivorian society has a mixed attitude towards L. Gbagbo. He still enjoys the support of the population, especially in his home region in the western part of the country. Besides, his return to Côte d'Ivoire will confirm his alleged innocence and contribute to the success of the struggle against A. Ouattara.

L. Gbagbo is one of the founders of the country's leading opposition organization – the Ivorian Popular Front that put him forward as a presidential candidate in 1990, 2000 and 2010. After his arrest and extradition to Hague in 2011 FPI split between those who stayed loyal to him and those who wanted to move beyond his legacy. Abdoumame Sangaré, a friend of L. Gbagbo, rejected the idea of continuing the party's activities without him. He was convinced that the former leader would return to the country to challenge A. Ouattara. A. Sangaré even received an unofficial title 'the guardian of the temple' and bore it until his death in 2018.

The activities aimed at overriding L. Gbagbo's legacy were predominantly carried out by his government's former prime-minister P. Affi N'Guessan who became president of FPI before the 2015 election. This resulted in protests by L. Gbagbo's supporters, especially after P. Affi N'Guessan ran for president despite the boycott of this election by FPI's other wing led by A. Sangaré.

There are several possible scenarios in case of the return of L. Gbagbo to Côte d'Ivoire before the 2020 election. One of them is that he will assume leadership of FPI and run for president, especially since the new constitution abolished the age limit for presidential candidates (the limit was 75 years of age), thus giving him the right to stand. Another scenario is that FPI will join a new political alliance before the election to unify the opposition forces and put forward a new candidate, while L. Gbagbo stays the leader of FPI. Finally, the former prisoner of the Hague jail might stay out of the electoral process and exhibit activity on the political arena.

Yet, one cannot ignore that a sword of Damocles hangs over L. Gbagbo's head. The president and the government have cards up their sleeves. Although acquitted of the crimes against humanity by the ICC, he is still sentenced in absentia to 20 years' imprisonment for «economic crimes» in the so-called case of the Agency of Central Bank of West African States (ACBWAS) in Abidjan during the post-electoral crisis. It is worth paying attention to the fact that in August 2018 A. Ouattara granted amnesty for 800 prisoners, including L. Gbagbo's wife Simone Gbagbo, but not himself (Brouck, 2019).

## The problems of the Third Term. The solution proposed by A. Ouattara

The nearer to the election, the higher the political tension in the Ivorian society. Côte d'Ivoire's citizens are fearful of a new electoral crisis, and A. Ouattara's statement

<sup>10</sup> Especially since E. Macron spoke out against A. Ouattara's third term of presidential office.

concerning the date he would decide on whether he is going to run is ambiguous. He promised to make the decision before the beginning of the electoral campaign that is to start on 28 July 2020. The president's declarations concerning 'transferring the leadership to the new generation' are also intriguing. In this regard, it is worth noting the attitude of US under secretary for political affairs David Hale towards the third presidential term of A. Ouattara. Hale stated his views before his visit to Côte d'Ivoire in February 2019. The American politician called A. Ouattara's declaration on transferring the leadership to the new generation «worthy of praise» because he opposed to the prospect of one president remaining in power for too long. «Democratic society is in need of new blood, new ideas» (France 24, 2019). At the same time, D. Hale does not rule out the possibility of A. Ouattara's third presidential term and highlights the fact that 'this is not an American decision, the Ivorian people have their own experience, we just convey to you our best wishes», (Konan, 2019).

Some experts believe that if A. Ouattara does not prolongate his term of presidential office after all, he will appoint prime-minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly his successor. Coulibaly is not a random person in the first person's inner circle. They are warm friends and longtime associates. In times of F. Houphouët Boigny A. Gon Coulibaly used to be technological advisor to then-prime-minister A. Ouattara. When Ouattara rose to power, A. Gon Coulibaly was head of his office for six years (2011-2017). In the midst of the 2017 socio-political crisis A. Ouattara appointed him prime-minister and entrusted to him the formation of the new government. A. Gon Coulibaly enjoys the full confidence of the president. Ouattara allowed him to designate people loyal to the prime-minister for important positions and at the same time gave to him 15 of his councilors.

Nevertheless, many feel that this presidential aspirant is insufficiently popular in the Ivorian society compared with such figures as G. Soro, H. K. Bédié and L. Gbagbo. Ouattara's niece and the president's communications director Massé Touré-Koné, being a communications and marketing specialist, decided to enhance A. Gon Coulibaly's image herself. On top of that, the prime-minister can count on the support of his campaign by the presidential party (Bony, 2019), whose victory at the municipal election in October 2018 is called a test before the presidential election. The results of this municipal election confirmed A. Ouattara's strong position in the majority of the country's regions.

It is important to remember that the political system of Côte d'Ivoire, as well as of many West African countries, contains elements of neopatrimonialism. This is reflected above all in the close correlation between traditional ethno-religious, clan relations and those intrinsic to modern western states: constitutional and legal, parliamentary and cross-party relations etc. They allow A. Ouattara to mobilize the clientele base to affirm his authority. And the constitutional and legal façade created in the country does not mean compliance with respective democratic rules of the «political game». A. Ouattara is confident that the ambitions of his loyal vice president D. Kablan Duncan and prime minister A. Gon Coulibaly will remain subordinate to his own ambitions and they will continue to see him as the embodiment of a leader.

## Conclusion

The analysis of Côte d'Ivoire's socio-political environment in the period between the 2015 and the 2020 presidential elections shows the growth of political tension in the country caused mainly by the problem of A. Ouattara's third term. In view of the upcoming election the struggle for power will inevitably exacerbate and lead to a change in the balance of political powers that are connected with the foundation of new alliances and coalitions.

There is a chance that ethnic and religious factors will manifest themselves once again. For instance, the proposed alliance<sup>11</sup> between H. K. Bédié and G. Soro before the presidential election may well divide the northern electorate (mostly Muslims) and the southern one (mainly Catholics). The return of L. Gbagbo to Côte d'Ivoire may become yet another destabilizing factor.

Another new alliance – the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) led by A. Ouattara, was established in January 2018. At the congress due to take place in 2020, the alliance will put forward their presidential candidate – possibly, A. Ouattara (Yansané, 2019).

## Acronyms

ACBWAS – Agency of Central Bank of West

ANF – Association of New Forces

BECDWA – Bank of Economic and Commercial Development of West Africa

FANCI – National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire

FPI – Ivorian Popular Front

ICC – International Criminal Court

IMF – International Monetary Fund

NF – New Forces

PDCI – Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire

RFCl – Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire

RHDP – Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace

RR – Rally of the Republicans

SU – Soroïst Union

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
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<sup>11</sup> In October 2018, at the extraordinary congress of the DPCI aimed at defining its further strategy in view of the 2020 election, H. K. Bédié underscored the need for his party to unite with other opposition forces.

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# ÉLECTIONS AU TOGO

"Aucun passage en FORCE  
ne sera toléré par  
le PEUPLE TOGOLAIS"



Halte à la FRAUDE à ciel ouvert  
par des RAFLES et la prise des  
EMPREINTES DIGITALES  
de FORCE pour le BOURRAGE des  
URNES par des bulletins  
pré votés.





# Contestations post-électorales: une alternative dans le processus de démocratisation en Afrique? Exemple du Togo

Abdou-Wahabi Abdou\*

pp. 65-78

## Introduction

Parler d'élections au Togo revient à aborder un sujet sensible qui suscite méfiance et peur. Quand il s'agit surtout des élections présidentielles et législatives, tous les scénarios, même les pires sont possibles. Depuis le début du processus de démocratisation au Togo, les élections ont souvent été conflictuelles et les résultats contestés.

Les violences post-électorales et les violations des Droits de l'Homme qui ont souvent caractérisé les élections au Togo ont atteint leur paroxysme en 2005, Lorsqu'après la mort du Général Président Eyadéma, son fils Faure Gnassingbé est alors conduit au pouvoir par l'armée. L'opinion nationale et internationale forceront ce dernier à quitter le pouvoir et des élections ont été rapidement organisées. A l'issue de ce processus électoral taché d'irrégularités, Faure a été déclaré vainqueur et les violences post-électorales ont conduit à la mort d'environ 500 à 800 personnes selon divers rapports.

Par conséquent, le manque de confiance des populations et des partis politiques d'opposition au processus électoral sensé aboutir à l'alternance politique a conduit à une intensification des manifestations de rue – souvent violemment réprimées – pour réclamer des réformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles. En effet, la majorité des Togolais estiment que la pérennité du régime en place est en grande partie due à une constitution taillée sur mesure et à des lois électorales qui lui sont favorables. Ce manque de confiance ne date pas d'hier. Il remonte à l'échec du processus de démocratisation du Togo, qui n'a pas pu conduire à l'instauration d'un système de renouvellement pacifique de la classe dirigeante. Mais ces soulèvements populaires peuvent-ils être une voie crédible pour parvenir à une alternance politique? Y a-t-il quelque chose de nouveau et d'innovant dans ces manifestations de rue?

## 1. Histoire politico-électorale du Togo

L'activité politique au Togo a réellement commencé à partir de 1945 après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Au cours de la Conférence de Brazzaville tenue du 30 janvier au 8 février 1944, plusieurs points relatifs à l'autonomisation des peuples colonisés ont été abordés. Parmi ces points il y avait le fait que les représentants des Africains devraient pouvoir

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participer à certaines instances françaises notamment l'Assemblée Nationale, le Conseil de la République et le Conseil de l'Union, toutes mises en place par la France. Aussi, des Assemblées territoriales devraient être créées. Ces dernières devraient permettre aux représentants des peuples africains de discuter des questions locales (Yagla, 1992: 58-59). Ce sont donc ces discussions sur les questions locales qui marquent le début de la lutte pour la conquête du pouvoir au Togo. Les intellectuels de l'époque saisirent cette occasion pour créer des partis politiques. Le Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT) créé en 1946, le Parti Togolais du Progrès (PTP) fondé en 1946, l'Union des Chefs et Populations du Nord (UCPN) créée en 1951, la Juvento fondée en 1951 et le Mouvement Populaire Togolais (MPT) qui a vu le jour en 1954. Il est important de rappeler qu'à la Conférence de Brazzaville, l'indépendance des colonies n'était pas véritablement à l'ordre du jour. Cependant, certains partis politiques togolais de l'époque ont très tôt exprimé leur désir d'obtenir l'indépendance politique auprès de la France, alors que cette dernière, en organisant la Conférence de Brazzaville envisageait initialement la réunification de ses colonies dans une sorte d'Union, probablement pour mieux les gérer et mieux exercer son autorité. C'est ainsi qu'on a eu des partis politiques dits «progressistes» (PTP, UCPN) et ceux dits nationalistes (CUT, Juvento). Si les premiers étaient pour une indépendance progressive et négociée avec la métropole, les deuxièmes étaient clairement anti-Français et se basaient sur le fait que les Togolais étaient suffisamment murs pour prendre leur destin en main.

A la base, les colons avaient créé une sorte d'association «politique» qui était réunir les populations et les éduquer à adhérer à la politique coloniale de la France. C'est ce mouvement qui a été récupéré et réformé pour devenir le CUT. Progressivement, cette association est donc devenue un mouvement politique qui était basé sur une idéologie nationaliste et était clairement anti-Français. Il prônait par exemple l'enseignement des langues vernaculaires à l'école. Bref, c'est un mouvement qui a su rassembler les populations du Nord au Sud, de l'Est à l'Ouest, sans aucune discrimination.

Mais au moment où le CUT se transformait en un parti politique formel, il s'est curieusement détourné de l'un de ses principes fondamentaux. En effet, les responsables de ce tout nouveau parti politique mettent désormais en avant la question de la réunification du peuple *Éwé*. C'est une question qui est d'une importance capitale pour le groupe socio-ethnique *Éwé*, car ce peuple se retrouvait divisé entre les administrations allemande, française et britannique. Les leaders du CUT estimaient donc qu'il était temps pour eux de créer leur propre Etat qui devrait regrouper les populations *Éwé* du Ghana sous l'administration britannique et celles du Togo et du Bénin sous l'administration française. C'est ainsi que le leader du CUT de l'époque s'était vu confier la tâche de défendre la cause *Éwé* au sein des instances internationales. Le 5 juillet 1950, lors de la 7<sup>e</sup> session du Conseil de Tutelle à New-York, Sylvanus Olympio exprime clairement son indifférence face au sort qui allait être réservé aux autres ethnies, pourvu que les *Éwé* aient réussi à créer leur propre Etat. Il déclara:

*«Nous avons demandé l'unification des peuples, non celle des territoires. Nous avons demandé que des gens qui ont la même langue, les mêmes coutumes, la même culture et le même esprit national soient unifiés. Nous n'avons jamais demandé que les tribus du Nord soient unifiées. Il s'agit là d'une décision qu'il leur appartient de prendre»* (Labante, 2010: 142).

Curieusement, S. Olympio défendait la cause *éwé*, alors que lui-même n'est pas issu de ce groupe ethnique. Certainement que l'ambition affichée de créer un Etat *éwé* n'est qu'un alibi pour parvenir à obtenir l'indépendance du Togo. Tout compte fait, il est curieux de constater que la cause d'un groupe ethnique soit mise en avant dans une lutte initialement menée par plusieurs groupes ethniques, du Nord au Sud du pays.

Cette prise de position politique du CUT a entraîné la montée en puissance des partis politiques pan-togolais, qui se sont surtout basés sur la nécessité de créer un Etat togolais multi-ethnique et multiculturel. Il s'agit par exemple du *Togoland Union Congress* et des partis politiques progressistes (UCPN, PTP). Ces événements combinés au fait que les leaders du CUT avaient pris conscience que leurs revendications étaient vaines, ont poussé ces derniers à réorienter leurs politiques et à changer d'objectif. Désormais il n'était plus question de la création d'un Etat *éwé*; il était plutôt question de créer un Etat togolais multi-ethnique et indépendant.

Même si elle a été abandonnée très tôt, il faut rappeler que la question *Éwé* a eu et continue d'avoir des conséquences importantes sur le vivre-ensemble des communautés ethniques au Togo (Abdou, 2019a: 560-567). Cette question continue de faire débat en ce sens que les divisions, les conflits et les discriminations basées sur des différences historiquement créées de toute pièce sont perceptibles et constituent une menace contre la création d'un véritable État-Nation, transcendant les différences ethniques et régionalistes au Togo. Aussi, faut-il le rappeler, entre 1951 et 1958, avec la complicité des colons, ce sont les mouvements politiques progressistes et pro-français qui dominaient la scène politique au Togo. Il a fallu les élections législatives du 27 avril 1958 pour que la vie politique togolaise prenne un autre tournant (Gayibor, 1997b: 206-209).

## 2. La vie socio-politique après l'indépendance du Togo

L'indépendance politique du Togo a été officiellement proclamée le 27 Avril 1960 à la suite des élections tenues deux ans plus tôt et qui ont été sanctionnées par la victoire du CUT. Sylvanus Olympio est donc élu Président de la République. Deux événements majeurs ont cependant marqué la première décennie de la République Togolaise:

- Le 13 janvier 1963, d'anciens militaires des troupes coloniales au nombre desquels l'ex-sergent-chef Eyadema, procèdent à un coup d'État qui a coûté la vie au Président Olympio. Les militaires placent, sous leur surveillance, Nicolas Grunitzky dans la Magistrature Suprême.
- Le 13 janvier 1967, le lieutenant-colonel Eyadema procède à un second coup d'État et s'empare du pouvoir.

Eyadema se maintiendra au pouvoir pendant trente-huit ans. Il a toujours bénéficié du soutien de l'armée, qui est un acteur important de la vie politique togolaise. Les élections à l'époque ont souvent été remportées à la stalinienne par Eyadema. Son pouvoir était aussi basé sur la manipulation des traits ethniques. Les populations du Nord, principalement de l'ethnie *Kabyè*, ethnie dont est issu lui-même, deviennent privilégiées au cours des recrutements dans la fonction publique. Les *Kabyè* sont également ceux qui détiennent en majorité les postes les plus importants au sein de l'armée. C'est ainsi que le 5 février 2005, après le décès du président Eyadema, l'armée confie le pouvoir à son fils, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé.

Cette décision était pourtant en contradiction avec les dispositions constitutionnelles qui prévoient qu'en cas de vacance du pouvoir, le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale (AN) assure l'intérim jusqu'à l'organisation de nouvelles élections. Etant à l'étranger au moment du décès du président Eyadema, ce dernier fut contraint à y rester et les députés ont logiquement légitimé Faure Gnassingbé comme président à la suite d'un simple vote à mains levées. Auparavant, l'article 65 de la Constitution qui prévoyait que l'intérim devrait être assuré par le président de l'AN fut donc supprimé.

Sous la pression de la rue, des instances sous régionales et internationales notamment la Communauté Economique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), Faure Gnassingbé fut contraint de renoncer au pouvoir qui revint au premier vice-président de l'AN de l'époque, Abass Bonfoh. Des élections furent rapidement annoncées et Faure Gnassingbé fut choisi comme candidat du Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT), ex-parti unique fondé par son père.

Les modifications constitutionnelles ont plusieurs fois été opérées par le RPT afin de permettre au Général Eyadema de se maintenir au pouvoir. Par exemple, en 2002, Eyadema profite d'une large majorité parlementaire dont il disposait à l'AN pour modifier la constitution et se maintenir au pouvoir. Pourtant Eyadema s'était engagé lors du Dialogue Inter-Togolais (du 19 au 29 juillet 1999), entrepris entre tous les acteurs politiques de l'époque sous la médiation de la communauté sous régionale et internationale, à ne plus modifier la constitution pour se présenter aux élections présidentielles. Ce dialogue avait abouti à l'Accord-Cadre de Lomé (ACL), qui a clairement conclu qu'il était nécessaire que le régime en place respecte la constitution et organise des élections libres et transparentes. Cet Accord stipulait que: *«Le strict respect de la Constitution de la 4<sup>ème</sup> République Togolaise et le fonctionnement régulier de l'ensemble des institutions sont les garanties indispensables au libre jeu démocratique et à l'alternance politique»*<sup>1</sup>.

Cependant, contre vents et marées l'article 59 de la Constitution de 1992 fut modifié pour lui permettre de briguer un troisième mandat. Cet article stipulait en effet que *«le Président est élu pour un mandat de cinq ans renouvelable une seule fois»* et *«qu'en aucun cas nul ne peut exercer plus de deux mandats»*<sup>2</sup>. L'arrivée au pouvoir de Faure Gnassingbé est également le résultat de plusieurs modifications constitutionnelles. *«Ce sont ainsi trente-quatre dispositions constitutionnelles qui ont été modifiées au bon vouloir de Gnassingbé père et qui serviront à son fils, pour faciliter sa marche forcée vers le pouvoir»*<sup>3</sup>.

Depuis le 19 Août 2017, le Togo traverse une crise politique qui est également le résultat du non-respect des accords et des dispositions institutionnelles et constitutionnelles. En effet, les violences post-électorales de 2005 ont amené les acteurs politiques à s'assoier autour d'une table et à signer l'Accord Politique Global (APG) le 20 Août 2006. Les réformes institutionnelles prévues par cet Accord devraient permettre d'aboutir à un retour à la Constitution de 1992 et par conséquent, à la limitation de mandats présidentiels à deux.

*«Les Parties prenantes au Dialogue National, engagent le Gouvernement à étudier les propositions de révision constitutionnelle, notamment: le régime politique, la nomination et les prérogatives du Premier Ministre, les conditions d'éligibilité du Président de la République, la durée et la limitation du mandat présidentiel, l'institution d'un Sénat, la réforme de la Cour Constitutionnelle»*<sup>4</sup>.

Le non-respect des dispositions de l'APG plus de dix ans après sa signature a conduit quatorze principaux partis politiques d'opposition regroupés au sein d'une coalition (C14) à mobiliser la population pour non seulement rejeter les résultats des élections présidentielles de 2015 mais aussi pour réclamer les fameuses réformes pouvant conduire à l'organisation d'élections libres et transparentes. Cependant, le régime en place élabore toujours des mécanismes pour se maintenir au pouvoir. L'organisation des élections législatives du 20 décembre 2018 confirme cela. Ce furent en effet des élections organisées, sans la participation de la C14 qui réclamait des réformes avant toute élection. Les négociations n'ayant pas encore abouti, le pouvoir fait un forcing pour organiser

<sup>1</sup> UN Peacemaker – Dialogue Intertogolais: Accord Cadre de Lomé, 2007, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> PRT, Journal Officiel de la République Togolaise – Constitution de la IV<sup>ème</sup> République, n.º 36, 19-10-1992, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> FIDH – Togo: retour sur la crise togolaise, l'exigence de justice demeure, Rapport, 2005.

<sup>4</sup> CENI Togo – Dialogue intertogolais, Accord Politique Global, 2013.

des élections, sans réel adversaire. Comme le confirme un rapport de l'Organisation Non Gouvernementale Solidarité Action pour le Développement Durable (SADD), «le gouvernement semble ne pas encore accepter réellement le principe de l'alternance politique en ne favorisant pas la mise en œuvre de l'ensemble des réformes indispensables à la tenue d'une élection réellement transparente et libre»<sup>5</sup>. Face à cette situation, les jeunes, dont la majorité est sans emploi et sans réel espoir pour l'avenir, ont de plus en plus commencé à exprimer leur mécontentement. Par manque d'élections libres et transparentes qui pourraient garantir une alternance démocratique pacifique, les manifestations de rue apparaissent comme une alternative pour les Togolais. Cependant, ces manifestations sont-elles suffisamment pesantes face au pouvoir en place? Peuvent-elles être réellement une arme pour lutter contre la dictature militaire au pouvoir au Togo?

### 3. Manifestations de rue: est-ce une alternative aux «élections libres et transparentes?»

L'arrivée au pouvoir en 2005 de Faure Gnassingbé suite à des élections mises en cause par l'ensemble de l'opinion nationale et internationale a remis sur scène la nécessité d'un dialogue entre les différents acteurs politiques togolais et des accords notamment l'APG, ont été signés. Hormis l'APG, une série d'accords ont été signés entre le pouvoir et les partis d'opposition. Mais une analyse de la vie politique togolaise laisse apparaître le fait que le pouvoir en place n'a pas la volonté d'entreprendre des réformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles. L'analyse des différents processus électoraux au Togo depuis l'avènement de la démocratie et du multipartisme laisse apparaître le fait que le pouvoir en place – le RPT, ex-parti unique – a toujours organisé les élections de façon à les gagner et se maintenir au pouvoir. Il faut croire qu'en Afrique «on n'organise pas les élections pour les perdre» comme le disait si aisément l'ancien Président du Congo, Pascal Lissouba (Kokoroko, 2009: 115).

Cependant, de façon formelle, plusieurs initiatives ont été entreprises par le gouvernement togolais pour promouvoir la réconciliation entre les Togolais et créer un climat de paix qui devrait assurer l'organisation d'élections libres et transparentes. Ces efforts étaient censés aboutir à des réformes non seulement de la Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante, mais aussi des institutions impliquées directement et indirectement dans le processus électoral, notamment la Cour Constitutionnelle, le Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, etc. Pourtant, le gouvernement en place joue au jeu de gagne-temps, un jeu qui devrait lui permettre de gagner infiniment du temps et de toujours garder le pouvoir. Sous la pression des partis politiques de l'opposition qui réclamaient les réformes, le gouvernement réuni en Conseil des Ministres le 03 janvier 2017 a tout simplement mis en place une commission chargée de réfléchir sur les réformes. Avec des membres composés en majorité de personnalités issues du pouvoir en place, ladite commission n'a véritablement pas bénéficié du crédit ni de l'opposition, ni de la société civile. C'est dans ces conditions que le Parti National Panafricain (PNP) créé en 2014 a organisé des manifestations de rue le 19 Août 2017, des manifestations qui ont ouvert la voie à une série de protestations populations occasionnant souvent des répressions violentes.

En effet, le PNP est un parti créé récemment a su mobiliser la population et canaliser ses frustrations, ses désirs et ses forces pour les qui exprimer devant l'opinion nationale et internationale. Le régime en politique, même s'il a essayé de se réformer de façon superficielle après le décès du président Eyadema, ne bénéficie véritablement plus du

<sup>5</sup> CCFD – Rapport de suivi indépendant du SADD, Lomé, 2010.

soutien de la population même dans les zones rurales et au Nord du pays qui furent autrefois son fief. Il est difficile de qualifier les manifestations de rue du 19 Août d'historiques dans la mesure où plusieurs manifestations ont souvent eu lieu dans le pays surtout après les élections. Ces manifestations sont l'expression du mécontentement de la population face à l'échec de l'instauration d'un système d'alternance politique à travers des élections démocratiques. Les faits en témoignent.

Le Combat pour l'Alternance Politique en 2015 (CAP 2015) organisait déjà des manifestations de rue à l'issue des élections organisées au cours de la même année. Cette coalition de partis politiques d'opposition suppose que les résultats de ces élections étaient truqués, la victoire devant revenir à Jean-Pierre Fabre, le candidat de l'Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC), principal parti d'opposition.

Bref, même si les manifestations ayant débuté en Août 2017 peuvent être perçues comme ayant été déclenchées par le PNP, la réalité est qu'elles expriment des frustrations et le mécontentement de la population dû non seulement à un manque d'alternance politique et à une carence démocratique en général, mais aussi au manque de politiques sociales pouvant assurer aux jeunes des emplois décents et un système de santé convenable. Dans un pays où le taux de chômage était de 8,1 % en 2011 et 6,51 % en 2012 et celui du sous-emploi de 22,76 % de la population active au cours de cette dernière année et où 53,5 % de la population vit sous le seuil de pauvreté en 2017 (PNUD Togo, 2019), il est clair que les jalons d'un soulèvement populaire sont en train d'être posés. C'est ainsi que sur toute l'étendue du territoire national, les populations ont massivement protesté dans un premier temps pour réclamer des réformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles pouvant permettre la tenue d'élections libres et transparentes. Ensuite, la «rue» a exigé le retour à la Constitution de 1992 (C92) et le vote de la diaspora.

Ces manifestations ont connu leur paroxysme lorsque les populations, dans les différentes localités du pays ont réclamé une démission pure et simple du Président de la République. Ce qui devrait conduire à une transition politique à l'issue de laquelle des élections libres devraient être organisées. Même si ces différents événements s'étaient passés de façon rapide et non programmée, ils ont tout de même mobilisé même les localités qui autrefois étaient à la solde du pouvoir en place, exprimant ainsi des frustrations latentes. Aussi, toutes ces revendications populaires ont pour noyau central, l'organisation d'élections libres et transparentes.

Il faut noter que ces manifestations de rue ont quelque peu été récupérées par les partis politiques. Que ce soit les partis politiques d'opposition ou ceux de la mouvance présidentielle, les acteurs politiques ont compris que la rue devenait de plus en plus un outil de mobilisation important de la population afin d'exprimer une opinion. On a vu par exemple les militants du parti Unir (ex-RPT) organiser des marches de soutien au Président de la République, des marches qui rappellent les périodes de culte de la personnalité qui avaient lieu dans plusieurs pays d'Afrique, à l'époque des partis uniques. Aussi, le recours excessif aux manifestations de rue surtout par les acteurs de l'opposition a en quelque sorte affaibli le pouvoir de la rue et contribué à la démobilisation de la population.

Par exemple, pour des questions qui se discutaient autrefois à l'Assemblée Nationale ou des points sur lesquels pouvoir et opposition s'asseyaient pour discuter autour d'une table, on a l'impression que de nos jours, la seule arme dont dispose l'opposition, c'est la rue. Les récentes manifestations ayant abouti à un projet de loi sur l'organisation d'un référendum relatif au retour à la C92, le processus même de ce référendum était devenu un objet de manifestations de rue.

*«Malgré la situation délétère du pays, une nouvelle CENI a été mise en place; ses membres ont prêté serment et pris fonction, en l'absence des délégués de l'opposition parlementaire qui a refusé d'y envoyer ses délégués pour ne pas cautionner, à l'en croire, la forfaiture qui est sur le point de se préparer. Ces derniers événements ont raidi l'opposition qui n'a eu d'autres moyens que de s'en remettre à la rue pour montrer son mécontentement» (Tsigbé et al., 2017: 11).*

Outre les partis politiques d'opposition, plusieurs autres acteurs collectifs ont saisi l'occasion que constituent ces soulèvements populaires pour réclamer des réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles qui sont une condition importante pour une alternance politique paisible et réussie au Togo.

#### **4. Principaux acteurs collectifs impliqués dans les manifestations post-électorales au Togo**

Les acteurs collectifs ayant mis en place des conditions favorables à la prise de conscience de la population sur la nécessité de faire recours à la rue pour une alternance politique sont nombreux. Ces acteurs collectifs sont issus de divers groupes socio-professionnels.

##### **4.1. Diaspora**

La diaspora est un acteur important qui a fait recours à la rue pour espérer parvenir à une alternance politique au Togo. En effet, la Constitution Togolaise en son article 5 reconnaît le droit de vote à tous les Togolais des deux sexes, vivant sur le territoire national ou à l'étranger. Le Code Electoral confirme cette disposition constitutionnelle dans les Articles 40 et 41. Tous ces éléments ont constitué des preuves légales de la mobilisation de la diaspora togolaise pour réclamer son droit de vote. Des manifestations sont organisées par des Togolais un peu partout dans le monde, notamment dans les principales villes et capitales européennes. Ces manifestations sont organisées sous l'égide d'associations diasporiques comme de la diaspora Togolaise au Canada pour la Démocratie (DIASTOCADE), Renaissance Togo, la Coordination des Mouvements et Associations de la Diaspora, le Collectif pour la Vérité des Urnes, *Committee for Motivation and Action for Freedom in Togo* (CMAF-Togo), Réseau de Coordination de la Diaspora Togolaise Indépendante (RCDTI), etc. On note évidemment une prolifération d'organisations diasporiques à coloration politique ou qui se définissent comme faisant partie des Organisations de la Société Civile (OSC), qui réclament des réformes et par là une alternance politique.

L'implication de la diaspora dans la sensibilisation, la mobilisation et le soutien des manifestants sur place s'explique par des causes lointaines. En effet, depuis la fin des années 1990, le pouvoir togolais et les membres de la diaspora ont souvent eu des relations plus ou moins tendues. La majorité des émigrés originaires de différentes régions du Togo sont des réfugiés politiques. De ce fait, ils sont souvent accusés par le pouvoir en place d'espionnage et d'actes de sabotage. La rupture de la coopération entre le Togo et plusieurs pays occidentaux pour cause de déficit démocratique a aussi eu un impact sur le traitement de l'Etat vis-à-vis de ses citoyens vivant à l'étranger, particulièrement ceux de retour. Des témoignages recueillis auprès d'anciens migrants rapatriés dans les années 90 confirment la nature du traitement que l'Etat togolais réservait à ces derniers. Comme en témoignent les propos de cet ancien émigré, devenu directeur d'une association d'aide aux émigrés de retour basée dans la Région Centrale.

*«Dans les années 1990-2000, le migrant de retour au pays, ... entre ce migrant et Eyadema...tu ne peux pas passer. Quand tu arrives, on te prend tout. Tu as des problèmes partout. Tu ne peux pas aller à la police, au service de l'immigration pour se faire établir un passeport. On a retiré les passeports de tous les Togolais expulsés de l'étranger...» (Abdou, 2019b: 230).*

L'importance de la participation de la diaspora à la vie socio-politique des pays de départ est une évidence de nos jours. Il convient de rappeler ces termes du Secrétaire Général de la Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme: *«La diaspora doit occuper toute sa place dans les négociations entre l'Etat et l'opposition et la Société civile au Togo»*<sup>6</sup>. Cela confirme le fait que les actions de la diaspora ne doivent pas se limiter seulement aux contributions socio-économiques pour le développement du pays. Depuis les événements du 19 Août 2017, on a noté une montée en puissance des organisations diasporiques qui s'engagent pour la démocratie et l'Etat de droit au Togo. Les organisations comme le Mouvement Togo Debout, CODITOGO, Mouvement Patriotes Togolais, etc. réactualisent la problématique de la participation des Togolais vivant à l'étranger au débat politique du pays. C'est le principal point d'achoppement entre le pouvoir politique en place et la diaspora. Si les autorités togolaises sont réticentes par rapport à l'effectivité du vote de la diaspora, c'est qu'elles estiment de façon officielle que cette dernière dans sa majorité, soutient les partis politiques de l'opposition. L'activiste Anani Sossou affirmait ceci:

*«Dans tous les pays démocratiques, la diaspora vote. Mais on n'a jamais accordé ce droit de vote à la diaspora [togolaise] pour la simple raison qu'on pense à tort que cette diaspora est constituée d'opposants. Ce qui n'est pas normal. Nous sommes des citoyens à part entière. Je rappelle qu'en 2016, l'aide que la diaspora apporte au Togo a dépassé l'aide publique au développement. [...] Comment peut-on s'imaginer que des gens qui prennent une part très sensible dans le développement et l'économie du pays ne peuvent pas se prononcer sur les questions qui concernent le Togo; des questions qui les concernent directement? Cela n'est pas normal.»*<sup>7</sup>.

En fait, la problématique de la participation de la diaspora aux manifestations de rue et à la mobilisation de la population se résume aux revendications du droit de vote. La diaspora togolaise estime qu'étant l'un des acteurs importants du développement du pays, elle devrait avoir le droit de participer à la prise de décisions. En effet, les émigrés contribuent de façon conséquente et surtout en croissance continue au développement de plusieurs pays africains notamment le Togo. La partie la plus visible de cette contribution est relative aux transferts de fonds vers leurs familles et régions d'origine. Ces envois se sont élevés à 74 milliards de dollars US en 2000 et ont plus que doublé pour atteindre 429 milliards de dollars US en 2016 (WBG, 2017). Ces diverses contributions de la diaspora au développement des pays de départ sont aussi reconnues par plusieurs organisations internationales notamment l'Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations.

*«À l'échelle mondiale, les rapatriements de fonds sont trois fois supérieurs à l'aide publique au développement. La migration peut aussi se traduire par des transferts de compétences, de connaissances et de technologies, dont les effets sont difficiles à mesurer mais qui pourraient avoir des incidences considérables sur la productivité et la croissance économique [des pays bénéficiaires]» (OIM, 2018: 4).*

<sup>6</sup> CODITOGO – Assises de la Diaspora Togolaise, Dakar, 2018.

<sup>7</sup> Deutsch Welle – La diaspora togolaise veut plus de droits, 2017.



C'est dire que les revendications de la diaspora sont justifiées et fondées. Ces revendications sont aussi reconnues et même soutenues par les leaders des partis politiques, même ceux qui sont désormais proches du pouvoir. L'ancien chef de file de l'opposition togolaise, G. Olympio, ex-président national de l'Union des Forces de Changement (UFC), notait ceci:

*«Le Togo a la chance d'avoir une diaspora dynamique, jeune, soucieuse de l'avenir de notre Nation. Nous pensons qu'il faut mettre la diaspora en confiance en continuant par poser des actes dans le sens du respect des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie. Nous devons travailler à rassurer les Togolais de la Diaspora pour que ceux qui le veulent, fassent profiter de leurs talents, de leur savoir-faire et de leurs investissements au pays. [...] La Diaspora doit avoir la possibilité de voter et il est important d'œuvrer pour ce droit de vote reconnu par notre constitution. Nous devons mettre tout en œuvre pour que dans la mesure du possible les Togolais de la diaspora puissent participer aux prochaines élections»<sup>8</sup>.*

#### 4.2. Eglise Catholique

Parmi les acteurs ayant été présents dans les contestations du pouvoir en place, on peut citer l'Eglise Catholique (EC). En effet, contrairement à d'autres pays africains, l'EC et les autres organisations confessionnelles au Togo sont souvent restées loin de la sphère politique. Lorsqu'elle intervient dans la vie politique, l'EC joue souvent le rôle de médiatrice entre le pouvoir en place et l'opposition politique. La Conférence Nationale souveraine tenue en juillet 1991 avait par exemple été dirigée par Monseigneur Kpodzro Fanoko Philippe. Des années après, la Commission Vérité Justice et Réconciliation (CVJR) mise en place après les violences post-électorales de 2005 suite à l'arrivée au pouvoir de Faure Gnassingbé a été également présidée par Monseigneur Nicodème Barrigah-Benissan. Bref, depuis l'avènement du multipartisme au Togo, l'EC a toujours été présente dans la vie politique mais de façon impartiale et neutre. Cependant, les manifestations de rue récentes ont quelque peu changé la donne. On a l'impression que l'EC a compris désormais que pour parvenir à une paix et à une stabilité durables, il est nécessaire qu'une alternance politique s'opère. Cette alternance passe nécessairement par des réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles tant réclamées par les manifestants. Elle a pris position sans aucune ambiguïté à travers divers communiqués officiels comme en témoignent ces propos de Monseigneur Denis Amuzu-Dzakpah:

*«La Conférence des Evêques du Togo attache une importance particulière à ces réformes sans lesquelles il est impossible de ramener la paix et la cohésion sociale dans notre pays. Elle est convaincue qu'elles sont indispensables à notre vivre ensemble et invite les protagonistes à s'inscrire dans une démarche responsable, sincère et constructive»<sup>9</sup>.*

Tout récemment, lorsque la population et les leaders des partis politiques étaient descendus dans la rue pour réclamer le report des élections législatives prévues le 20 décembre 2018, Monseigneur Kpodzro Fanoko Philippe a plusieurs fois monté au créneau pour appeler le gouvernement à reporter ces élections, craignant un bain de sang qui pourrait avoir lieu lors des manifestations post-électorales. Bref, l'EC a pendant ces dernières années – notamment depuis 2017 – intervenu dans la vie socio-politique au Togo en soutenant d'une part les manifestants, affirmant qu'ils défendent une cause juste et d'autre part, en appelant au gouvernement d'écouter son peuple et d'opérer les réformes.

<sup>8</sup> Afrikamag – Togo: «La diaspora africaine doit participer au vote», 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Togo Online – Un court discours des Evêques du Togo à l'endroit de Faure Gnassingbé et de l'armée, 2017.

### 4.3. Organisations de la Société Civile (OSC)

Un autre type d'acteur engagé dans les protestations de rue est la société civile. Regroupant plusieurs OSC, le Front citoyen «Togo Debout», dirigé par un Professeur d'université, David Dosseh, ancien syndicaliste et un avocat Me Raphaël Kpandé Adzaré, a également rejoint le soulèvement populaire pour réclamer le retour effectif à la C92. Ce Front Citoyen a été créé le 22 septembre 2018. Depuis lors, il a pu mobiliser et rallier à sa cause plusieurs organisations diasporiques qui se sont fait appuyer par d'autres OSC partout ailleurs en Afrique.

La société civile a été fortement impliquée dans la vie socio-politique du Togo au cours de la Conférence Nationale Souveraine. Cependant, celle-ci s'est quasi-complètement éloignée de la politique suite aux divers événements ayant suivi la Conférence Nationale jusqu'au début des années 2000 avec l'arrestation et/ou l'assassinat de plusieurs leaders des organisations de défense des Droits de l'Homme et des leaders politiques.

Pourtant, depuis le décès du président Eyadema, à la faveur d'une relative ouverture démocratique qui a suivi l'arrivée de son fils au pouvoir, l'on a assisté à un retour – quoique hésitant – de la société civile dans la gestion des affaires de l'Etat. Les OSC ne se contentent plus du domaine humanitaire, mais essaient d'intervenir pour informer, éduquer ou même mobiliser la population par rapport aux questions de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance et d'alternance politique. Étant longtemps considérées comme le «maillon manquant» dans la lutte pour la démocratisation de l'Afrique, les OSC ont participé activement aux manifestations visant à instaurer une alternance démocratique au Togo.

Elles s'inspirent pour la plupart des mouvements de la société civile qui ont contribué à l'instauration de la démocratie et de l'Etat de droit dans d'autres pays africains. C'est ainsi que dans une déclaration liminaire rendue publique le 18 septembre 2017, les organisations signataires déclarent:

*«Les OSC voudraient, par cette occasion, témoigner d'abord leur sincère reconnaissance aux Mouvements Citoyens Africains (Lucha et Filimbi de la RDC, Balai Citoyen du Burkina Faso, Jeune et Fort du Cameroun, Y en a marre du Sénégal, Sindumudja du Burundi, Wake Up Madagascar, Lyina du Tchad) pour leur admiration, leur solidarité et leur encouragement à l'endroit du peuple togolais dans sa lutte pour les réformes». Cette déclaration témoignant ainsi de l'appui des autres acteurs de la société civile africaine aux OSC Togolaises. Dans cette déclaration, les OSC ont clairement précisé leur position par rapport aux réformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles qui constituent la base des manifestations dans tout le pays. «Les informations et les échanges recueillis lors de la récente tournée de la Commission de Réflexion sur les Réformes Politiques, ainsi que les revendications portées par les populations lors des manifestations des 19 et 20 août, 06 et 07 septembre 2017 sont très éloquentes et claires: il s'agit, pour ce qui concerne les réformes constitutionnelles, de retourner à la Constitution originelle du 14 octobre 1992, adoptée par référendum à plus de 97 % des Togolais. Les OSC [...] estiment pour leur part, que seule cette Constitution ne vise personne. Elle est donc neutre et revêt les caractères cardinaux d'une loi en ce qu'elle est générale, impersonnelle et obligatoire. [...] Les OSC ont clairement soutenu la position exprimée par le peuple qui consiste à retourner à la version originelle de la Constitution du 14 Octobre 1992»<sup>10</sup>.*

### 4.4. Syndicats des employés de l'Etat

Officiellement, les organisations syndicales ne sont pas engagées dans les manifestations réclamant les réformes institutionnelles et constitutionnelles au Togo ni même dans la remise en cause du pouvoir en place. Cependant, les manifestations syndicales ont été

<sup>10</sup> Le Rameau de Jesse – Conférence de Presse des Organisations de la Société Civile Togolaise, 2017.

intensifiées, pour d'une part, contraindre un gouvernement qui cherche les moindres voix et moyens pour avoir une légitimité auprès de la population à améliorer les conditions de vie des travailleurs. D'autre part, les organisations syndicales essaient probablement d'afficher l'incapacité du gouvernement à résoudre les problèmes sociaux notamment à gérer ses employés. Ainsi, que ce soit dans le domaine de la santé avec le Syndicat National des Praticiens Hospitaliers du Togo (SYNPHOT), de l'éducation avec la Coordination des Syndicats de l'Éducation du Togo (CSET) ou de l'enseignement supérieur avec le Syndicat de l'Enseignement Supérieur au Togo, les principales formations syndicales de la fonction publique s'étaient engagées dans les manifestations contre le pouvoir en place.

Cet engagement des syndicats dans la remise en cause à peine masquée du pouvoir en place ne date pas d'aujourd'hui. En effet, même après la Conférence Nationale souveraine de juillet 1991, le Togo était toujours dans la tourmente. Le gouvernement de transition dirigé par Joseph Kokou Koffigoh n'ayant été que d'une courte durée, les forces vives de la Nation, que sont notamment le Haut Conseil de la République dominé par les «forces du changement» réclamaient haut et fort le départ du Président Eyadema du pouvoir. C'est dans ces conditions que les organisations syndicales en accord avec les partis politiques ont décidé de faire pression sur le régime en place à travers les manifestations de rue. Meetings, marches de protestation, la fameuse grève générale illimitée lancée le 16 novembre 1992 par la Confédération des syndicats indépendants et le COD2 (Collectif de l'opposition démocratique) sont autant d'évènements qui témoignent de l'engagement historique des organisations syndicales dans la lutte pour une alternance politique au Togo. Cette grève générale illimitée qui a duré neuf mois, associée à la rupture de la coopération par la communauté internationale notamment l'Union Européenne, ont constitué les principaux éléments qui ont fait pression sur la dictature du Général Eyadema pour l'instauration d'un système et d'un processus électoral plus ou moins démocratique, sans véritable succès.

#### 4.5. Organisations estudiantines

La mobilisation des étudiants lors des manifestations contre le pouvoir actuel ne s'est pas faite de façon formelle avec notamment les organisations estudiantines. Ces dernières étant créées pour défendre les droits des étudiants, elles sont donc souvent de plus en plus restées à l'écart de la vie politique. Pourtant, la Conférence Nationale souveraine tenue en 1991 a vu une participation active des étudiants, qui étant considérés comme les futurs dirigeants du pays, estimaient qu'ils ont le droit de participer à la gestion des affaires politiques. Le début des années 1990 fut très mouvementé au Togo. Jusqu'à la fin des années 1990, le Togo a parcouru tout un processus long qui est allé de l'effort d'instauration de la démocratie jusqu'à la restauration d'une dictature militaire. Et les étudiants n'ont jamais été tant écartés de ce processus qu'ils le sont aujourd'hui. Cela s'explique par les efforts de cooptation des leaders estudiantins par le régime en place qui, de gré ou de force, les amènent à s'aligner sur sa politique. Cependant, les mobilisations récentes ont rallumé les flammes de la lutte estudiantine des années 1990.

Le mouvement «*En Aucun Cas*» dont le nom est inspiré de la fameuse phrase dans la Constitution Togolaise de 1992 qui stipule qu'*«en aucun cas, nul ne peut faire plus de deux mandats»* est un mouvement créé par des étudiants et qui a contribué à la mobilisation de la population dans les soulèvements contestataires. Son premier porte-parole, Foly Satchivi, fut incarcéré, jugé et condamné pour trouble à l'ordre public. Il sera libéré quelques mois plus tard, bénéficiant d'une grâce présidentielle. Plusieurs manifestations

des organisations estudiantines notamment le Mouvement pour l'Emancipation de l'Etudiant Togolais (MEET) ont eu lieu à Lomé et rarement à Kara (principale ville du Nord du pays) depuis le début des manifestations générales au Togo.

L'intensification de ces manifestations estudiantines est-elle exprès ou s'agit-il d'une simple coïncidence? Les organisations estudiantines sont-elles manipulées par les partis d'opposition pour faire davantage pression sur le pouvoir en place?

Ce qui est certain, c'est que les manifestations estudiantines, dans un climat socio-politique assez instable ont fortement contribué à étaler à la face de l'opinion internationale les lacunes du pouvoir en place et à intensifier sa contestation.

En définitive, les soulèvements populaires déclenchés depuis le 19 Août 2017 ne sont pas spontanés. Ils sont

*«la résultante de l'échec d'un processus de démocratisation enclenché depuis les années 1990. Les décisions issues de la Conférence Nationale ont été difficiles à appliquer sur le terrain. Le président Gnassingbé Eyadéma est resté au pouvoir jusqu'à sa disparition le 5 février 2005. Les troubles ayant marqué l'élection de Faure Gnassingbé ont conduit à l'APG dont l'une des principales propositions demeure les réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles. Mais pendant un peu plus de dix ans, l'opposition et le pouvoir n'ont pu s'entendre ni sur le cadre, ni sur le contenu et l'esprit des réformes à opérer» (Tsigbé et al., 2017: 18).*

Par ailleurs, le fait que le Togo soit le seul pays en Afrique de l'Ouest à ne pas avoir connu une véritable alternance politique depuis un demi-siècle constitue un terreau sur lequel se développent les soulèvements populaires. La fatigue et le mécontentement dus à la pauvreté et au chômage des jeunes se font ressentir à tous les niveaux de la société togolaise. C'est ainsi que tous les ingrédients ont donc été réunis pour déclencher la crise socio-politique actuelle qui, en fait n'a pas débuté le 19 Août. Cependant, la question qui se pose est celle de savoir à quels résultats ces soulèvements populaires ont-ils abouti? Quel est l'impact réel de ces manifestations sur la vie socio-politique du pays?

Depuis Août 2017, le Togo est dans une crise socio-politique. Les manifestations ont secoué et continuent de secouer le régime en place, paralysant la vie socio-économique du pays. Mais cela n'a pas arrêté le gouvernement dans ses manœuvres et ses stratégies pour se maintenir au pouvoir. C'est en ce sens que les élections législatives du 20 Décembre 2018 ont été organisées sans la participation des partis politiques d'opposition réunis au sein de la C14. Ces élections ont eu lieu sans des réformes ni du code électoral, ni de la CENI.

Quelques mois après ces élections législatives, la C14 a visiblement commencé par se désintégrer avec notamment le départ de certains partis politiques de la coalition. Du côté du pouvoir, l'inertie de la communauté internationale face aux multiples appels du peuple à la non tenue des élections sans réformes est considérée comme une approbation. Bref, le pouvoir en place se sent davantage renforcé, le pire étant derrière. Mais les causes et les ingrédients de ces soulèvements populaires demeurent. La population n'a plus confiance ni au système en place, ni aux élections comme une voie démocratique pour parvenir à une alternance politique. Depuis l'avènement du multipartisme au Togo, les contestations post-électorales sont légions mais ont toujours du mal à contribuer à l'avancement du processus de démocratisation du pays, même si de négligeables concessions s'obtiennent parfois du pouvoir en place. Toutefois, la rue reste une épée de Damoclès sur la tête du régime en place. Ce rôle est davantage renforcé avec la possibilité de plus en plus croissante, d'accès à l'information, à l'interconnexion entre différents pays et régions du monde à travers les Nouvelles Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication, et surtout, grâce aux conditions de plus en plus vulnérables dans lesquelles vivent les Togolais qui n'ont d'autres choix que de se révolter.

L'analyse de l'histoire politico-électorale du Togo laisse apparaître le fait que ce pays vient de loin. Premier pays à avoir connu un coup d'Etat militaire en Afrique Noire au lendemain de son indépendance, le Togo est tombé dans les mains d'une junte militaire qui tout comme la jeune génération de la classe politique de l'époque, avait très peu d'expérience sur la gestion des affaires du pays. Des années 1990 au début des années 2000, tout comme d'autres pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne, le Togo a été un champ d'expérimentation de la démocratisation du continent. La chute du mur de Berlin, le discours de la Baule et la Conférence nationale souveraine sont autant d'événements qui ont suscité de l'espoir chez les Togolais, l'espoir de vivre une alternance politique leur permettant de choisir librement des dirigeants capables de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre des politiques de développement inclusives. Mais cet espoir a été de courte durée, car les différents acteurs politiques n'ont jusqu'alors pas pu écarter l'armée de la vie politique. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, l'armée est un acteur majeur, voire, même, central de la vie politique togolaise.

## Conclusion

L'introduction du multipartisme et par conséquent des élections multipartites ont été une avancée considérable dans le processus de démocratisation de l'Afrique. Dans les cas où les élections se déroulent avec plus ou moins de transparence, le multipartisme et l'alternance politique sont un exercice réussi. Au contraire – comme c'est le cas du Togo – la population a subi les dérives des régimes autoritaires jusqu'à la disparition physique des présidents qui incarnaient ces dictatures des années 1980. Les successions monarchiques (au Gabon, en RDC, au Togo) ont cependant fait naître au sein des acteurs sociaux et de la population de nouvelles stratégies de lutte pour l'alternance politique. Dans le cas du Togo, ce sont semble-t-il les contestations post-électorales.

Il faut relever le fait que ces contestations post-électorales et les soulèvements populaires auxquels elles aboutissent ne sont pas une génération spontanée d'événements socio-politiques. Au contraire, elles tirent leurs racines des situations d'injustice sociale, de manque de services sociaux de base et d'inégalité d'accès aux emplois vécues par les populations. Aussi sont-elles la conséquence directe de l'échec du processus de démocratisation de l'Afrique devant permettre une alternance politique régulière, ce qui est supposé corriger ou du moins tenter de résoudre les problèmes sociaux ci-dessus évoqués. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la principale remarque est que les élections ne sont pas seulement un événement politique. Elles sont aussi un exercice de proposition aux populations des modèles de sociétés pouvant leur garantir des conditions de vie décentes à travers l'accès aux services sociaux de base, à un emploi décent, etc.

Le Printemps Arabe, les manifestations au Burkina Faso, au Sénégal, etc. qui ont abouti au renversement des dirigeants en place ou qui ont permis d'éviter des modifications constitutionnelles mettent en évidence la force et l'impact que peuvent avoir les manifestations populaires.

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
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# Eleições sob ditaduras: São Tomé e Príncipe antes e após a independência

Augusto Nascimento\*

pp. 81-98

## Introdução

Este texto realça as diferenças e as similitudes do exercício eleitoral sob a ditadura colonialista e, após a independência, no regime de partido único<sup>1</sup>. Mais do que repisar a inabilidade de que a não adoção da democracia em 1975 se deveu à inexperiência no tocante a procedimentos democráticos por causa da feição ditatorial do colonialismo, sublinhar-se-á que a não realização de eleições livres e competitivas foi uma escolha, reservada, dos novos mandantes, que, ao arrepio da literalidade dos seus lemas, tiveram por fito alcançar e preservar o poder, se necessário contra a vontade do povo de cujos interesses se diziam arautos. Noutros termos, a ausência de abertura e de competitividade política no tempo colonial não teria impedido a adoção da democracia representativa, que foi rejeitada, não pela falta de hábitos democráticos<sup>2</sup>, mas por se preferir uma configuração político-ideológica que garantia o poder a um grupo restrito que acabaria apartado do “povo”. Sob as ditaduras, as formalidades das eleições – ou, em rigor, o seu simulacro – tiveram por função ajudar à (ficção da) legitimação do poder colonial ditatorial e do partido único no pós-independência, ambos apostados em obter forçadamente a anuência ou o consentimento dos governados.

## Eleições sob o regime colonial ditatorial

A ditadura implantada em 1926 alterou a representação política das colónias. A estas coube eleger representantes no Conselho Superior das Colónias (doravante, CSC), incumbidos da defesa dos interesses das colónias, na realidade, dos interesses hegemónicos – por exemplo, das roças – que, invocando o bordão do interesse nacional, usuravam o trabalho africano.

No arquipélago, os ilhéus constituíam um grupo económica e socialmente assaz heterogéneo, mas distinto tanto dos serviçais importados para trabalhar nas roças, como dos europeus, os quais, motivados por um racismo difuso congruente com a narrativa do Estado Novo, os depreciavam. Fosse como fosse, os ilhéus, que não estavam sujeitos a regimes jurídicos de exceção aplicáveis aos serviçais, eram considerados cidadãos e participaram nas eleições para a representação do arquipélago em Lisboa.

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<sup>1</sup> Sobre a continuidade dos mecanismos de imposição do mando e do aparente consenso que passaram da era colonial para o regime do pós-independência, ver Nascimento (2013). Este texto pretende ilustrar similitudes no tocante aos condicionalismos e aos objetivos das eleições em ambos os regimes.

<sup>2</sup> Existia uma ditadura, mas em setores circunscritos da vida coletiva sobreviviam instituições em regime de autogoverno por via da aplicação de regras democráticas.

Já depois dos confrontos forjados pelos colonos aquando da eleição em 1926<sup>3</sup> do representante do arquipélago no CSC, o enquistamento da política colonial do Estado Novo, pautada pelo paternalismo ditatorial e, se necessário, pela repressão, afora ter posto termo à acirrada competição política prevalectante na República, apostou em tornar as eleições um ato aparente conquanto vazio no tocante à representação da vontade dos cidadãos, ilhéus incluídos. Se os anseios dos colonos que procuravam angariar um pé-de-meia contavam pouco, menos ainda importavam os dos ilhéus não obstante o seu protestado portuguesismo.

Sem embargo da arquitetura ditatorial, de 1926 a 1974, a aposta do poder colonial na demanda de voto aos ilhéus foi mudando ao longo do tempo. As mudanças, que nunca tocaram a questão da soberania, indiciam a sucessão de diferentes estados de sujeição e, correlativamente, de “deliberação” dos colonizados. Afinal, nem por se tratar de uma ditadura as eleições do deputado à Assembleia Nacional se resumiam necessariamente a um ato inócuo *in loco* ou deixavam de ser pensadas em função das (hipotéticas) repercussões políticas que, embora variando no tempo, tenderam a ser extrapoladas a benefício do governo. Por isso, existia demanda pela participação, nem sempre nem necessariamente sob a forma de uma cominação agressiva para obrigar ao voto. Ainda assim, num meio exíguo, a censura social e o escrutínio da vida alheia faziam o seu papel, mormente quando se requeria aprovação da governação ou, mais propriamente, do governador. Com efeito, ao longo de anos, as eleições constituíram um meio com que os governadores se tentavam fazer aprovar na metrópole pela afluência às urnas nas ilhas e com que, posteriormente, o colonialismo se tentou legitimar, mormente pela suposta aprovação eleitoral da política assistencialista<sup>4</sup>. Estes intentos de governadores e do regime colonial concretizaram-se através de expedientes diversos, desde a coerção, velada ou não, até à aceitação de supostas reivindicações compatíveis com a aposta no progresso material a que, nos derradeiros anos, a soberania portuguesa se quis devotada.

Apesar de ditatorial e corporativo, o Estado Novo manteve uma câmara legislativa e, até 1958, a eleição por sufrágio direto do presidente da República. Porém, Salazar almejava a futura dissolução da Assembleia, destinada a desaparecer num Estado corporativo. Pelos condicionalismos políticos, a atividade parlamentar era minorizada, sendo raríssimas as dissonâncias com o governo<sup>5</sup>. A diminuta representação das colónias era de pouco préstimo no tocante à defesa dos interesses ali sediados – assegurados, quando necessário, em conversas esconsas – e irrelevante quando estava em causa a vida dos respetivos naturais que, ao invés de representados, eram sobretudo tutelados e constringidos. Não obstante, as votações nas colónias tinham de traduzir apreço pelo chefe da Nação.

Nos anos 30, à medida que se adensava o contexto político internacional – dominado pelos ventos autoritários, pela antevisão da II Guerra e pela crença na necessidade de um Estado forte – e que se afirmava o Estado Novo, não seria difícil obter a união em torno da sua mensagem política. Em parte devido a estes fatores, até 1942 as eleições não tiveram oposições.

Na exígua colónia, exaurida por políticas de favor aos roceiros em detrimento dos demais colonos, caso dos comerciantes, a aparente solidez da ordem imperial, comprovada pelo

<sup>3</sup> Acerca dos confrontos então deliberadamente procurados pelos colonos, decerto a isso induzidos pelo governador, veja-se Nascimento, 2005.

<sup>4</sup> Obviamente, na avaliação da governação, não estava em causa o desempenho em prol das populações, antes a habilidade com que os governadores as sujeitavam sem provocar manifestações de desafeição ou, já no ocaso do colonialismo, com que concitavam o apoio, ao menos visível, das gentes.

<sup>5</sup> Salazar preferia a governação através de decretos-lei (Lemos, 2008: 27-28); para Carvalho, Salazar era avesso à instituição parlamentar, formalmente mantida mas esvaziada de poderes pelas revisões constitucionais de 1935 e de 1945, a qual designava o governo de órgão legislativo normal (2002: 12). Adiante-se, a independência não traria uma realidade muito diversa.

destróçar das elites locais (Nascimento, 2005) e vincada pelos constrangimentos de ordem eleitoral – desde os da elaboração dos cadernos eleitorais à injunção ao voto –, tendia a eliminar a hipótese de rejeição e, até, de mera apartação do regime<sup>6</sup> e, de não menor importância, das autoridades. Ao zelo, veladamente racista, do governador Vaz Monteiro, importava sobremaneira a tendencial unanimidade no apoio ao regime em institucionalização.

Em tempo de severas restrições orçamentais, não existia nem ambiente nem atividade política em prol do regime que suscitasse interesse em eleições. Fosse como fosse, Vaz Monteiro pretendeu que as eleições de 16 de dezembro de 1934 – equivalentes a um novo plebiscito do regime – se saldasse pela adesão dos votantes e, nessa medida, por um triunfo do Estado Novo. O governador ponderava que para os eleitores irem às urnas, era necessário terem uma secção de voto à porta de casa e entregar-se-lhes a lista com antecedência. O governador deixava inferir que se referia aos ilhéus quando o alheamento dos colonos era porventura maior. Ao preconceito juntava-se a falácia, porquanto a afluência às urnas era desincentivada pela nula importância das eleições para a determinação das vidas nas ilhas sujeitas à hegemonia dos roceiros. O governador transmitiu verbalmente instruções para que as urnas tivessem farta concorrência, para o que tinha de contar com os ilhéus, a quem tratava depreciativamente. Para além de mobilizar os regedores e de contar com a colaboração dos roceiros, a isso decerto instruídos pelos proprietários absentistas, o governador encarregou o padre Pinto da Rocha, enraizado na ilha e com ascendente sobre parte dos ilhéus, de os fazer cientes do dever cívico de acorrerem às urnas<sup>7</sup>. Em finais de novembro, o governador visitou a ilha do Príncipe, onde condecorou o roceiro Jerónimo Carneiro<sup>8</sup>, com o intuito de garantir um ambiente favorável ao Estado Novo. Na prática, a condecoração equivalia a uma incumbência de arregimentação de votos nas eleições. No fim, Vaz Monteiro congratular-se-ia por as eleições terem tido, a seu ver, uma concorrência extraordinária<sup>9</sup>. Este era o elemento de alguma incerteza pois que o sentido da votação já era sabido.

Em 1935, a 17 de fevereiro, ocorreram eleições presidenciais, cujos resultados, segundo o governador, provavam o apoio da colónia à obra do Estado Novo. Dos 2064 eleitores, aproximadamente repartidos entre ilhéus e colonos, votaram 1943<sup>10</sup>, uma cifra elevada num ambiente de fácil controlo, mas que, por isso, se instituiu como um crivo de juízo sobre o desempenho do governador. Aliás, desde praticamente o início do Estado Novo as eleições se transformaram num dever da população e, sobretudo, numa exigência aos governadores das colónias.

Os anos 30 eram de convulsão económica, de turbulência política e de afirmação de Estados fortes e autoritários. Em 1937, à medida que o regime se consolidava, cuidou-se da formação da delegação da União Nacional (UN). Para o governador, os princípios nacionalistas do Estado Novo já estavam radicados no espírito de grande parte da população. Avente-se, para o governador, estariam em causa os colonos, porquanto nesses anos, embora reservadamente, ele enjeitava a adesão política de ilhéus, eventualmente conducente à participação em organismos do regime, de que poderia ressaltar o cotejo,

<sup>6</sup> Por exemplo, compare-se com a necessidade de repressão em Goa (Alexandre, 2017), sem paralelo com o que se passava em São Tomé e Príncipe onde, para além do peso dos constrangimentos políticos, nenhuma razão de ordem política e cultural parecia justificar a apartação dos ilhéus da nação portuguesa.

<sup>7</sup> AHU, Gabinete do Ministro (GM), ofícios confidenciais reservados n.º 26, 1 de dezembro de 1934, e n.º 27, de dezembro de 1934, do governador Ricardo Vaz Monteiro ao ministro das Colónias.

<sup>8</sup> *Diário da Manhã*, 17 de dezembro de 1934, pp. 10 e 12.

<sup>9</sup> AHU, GM, of. confidencial reservado n.º 27, de dezembro de 1934, do governador Vaz Monteiro ao ministro das Colónias.

<sup>10</sup> AHU, GM, of. confidencial reservado n.º 3, de 17 de março de 1935, do governador Vaz Monteiro ao ministro das Colónias.

desfavorável para os colonos, do (protestado) portuguêsismo de ambos os grupos<sup>11</sup>. Em todo o caso, impunha-se a criação de um organismo de propaganda – uma delegação da UN –, cujos nomes entretimentos propusera ao ministro (Monteiro, 1937: 80). A política resumia-se à propaganda e à obediência.

As eleições de 1938 chegaram quando a conflagração mundial parecia inevitável. A 18 de abril, o governador empossara a comissão local da UN<sup>12</sup> que promoveu os festejos do 28 de Maio. Porventura diferida desde que fora proposta – também pelo desinteresse de colonos que, independentemente do (vago) posicionamento político, não se queriam distraídos do granjeio de um pecúlio, quando não se dava o caso de as roças lhes sugarem a vida, como o faziam aos serviços –, a criação da delegação da UN neste ano talvez se tenha devido mais à intenção de causar boa impressão aquando da visita presidencial do que ao intuito de qualquer trabalho político, ademais dispensável dada a centralização das decisões em Lisboa e o controlo político no arquipélago. Depois da visita presidencial, a 30 de outubro tiveram lugar as eleições, das quais, não obstante um convite da UN à concorrência às urnas<sup>13</sup>, se diria não se terem notado. Na lista geral de deputados estava incluído o proeminente proprietário absentista e comerciante, Carlos Mantero.

Durante o regime ditatorial, os momentos eleitorais eram breves e, na colónia, como que ritualizados. Para as presidenciais de 8 de fevereiro de 1942, a organização das secções eleitorais começou a 23 de janeiro. Entre os incumbidos de tarefas eleitorais estava o ilhéu Januário da Graça do Espírito Santo<sup>14</sup>, que quedava implicitamente responsabilizado pela participação dos seus conterrâneos. A 16 de fevereiro, de Lisboa felicitou-se o governador pela notável prova de patriotismo da população com a sua elevada afluência à reeleição do presidente. Qual extrapolação indevida conquanto corriqueira nesse tempo, mais uma vez se provara a unidade imperial, porquanto na metrópole e colónias o entusiasmo pela reeleição fora semelhante<sup>15</sup>.

A passividade política na colónia era, de algum modo, ratificada pela conflagração mundial. Ainda em 1942, o ministro das colónias visitou Angola e Moçambique, escalando o arquipélago. A 1 de novembro tiveram lugar eleições legislativas, as últimas com uma lista nacional. No arquipélago, as eleições voltaram a ser apresentadas como um êxito, mormente pela comparação com os 86,6 % de votantes a nível nacional. Para o governador, o ato eleitoral decorrera com o maior entusiasmo patriótico. Tinham entrado 2296 listas nas urnas, perfazendo 96,5 % dos eleitores<sup>16</sup>. Não se pode afirmar que houvesse fraude, conquanto não se possa descartar tal hipótese ou a de coação. Porém, pelo marasmo e pela apartação do comum das gentes nas ilhas da política, quando esta não fosse esta a execução de um ditame do governo, não deveria ser difícil obter tais percentagens.

Em 1945, entre homens e mulheres, contar-se-iam 985 colonos<sup>17</sup>. Na sua maioria espartilhados pelas roças, sem enraizamento na terra, quedariam conformados com a sua vida ou desesperançados de melhorias. Por um lado, mesmo se partilhando de ideias do Estado Novo – mormente a da valia da autoridade e a da superioridade racial que lhes garantiam a proeminência local –, não seriam os atomizados e apáticos colonos que veiculariam o

<sup>11</sup> Até à prisão dos dirigentes do Partido Nacional Africano em 1935 (Nascimento, 2005), as mensagens de reivindicação de valorização da ‘raça negra’ pareceram compagináveis com o protestado portuguêsismo dos ilhéus, que Vaz Monteiro aparentava não recusar.

<sup>12</sup> *Diário de Luanda* n.º 1380, 26 de abril de 1938, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> A UN convidou todos os eleitores a concorrerem às urnas por ser necessário dar prova do seu espírito patriótico, “como portugueses que são”, para que fosse “brilhante o resultado do ato eleitoral”, cf. Suplemento n.º 26, ao *Boletim Oficial (BO)* n.º 20, 21 de outubro de 1938, p. 491.

<sup>14</sup> *BO* n.º 4, 24 de janeiro de 1942, p. 26.

<sup>15</sup> *BO* n.º 8, 21 de fevereiro de 1942, p. 59.

<sup>16</sup> *BO* n.º 45, 7 de novembro de 1942, p. 431.

<sup>17</sup> *Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias* n.º 260, fevereiro de 1946, p. 123.

respetivo ideário<sup>18</sup>. Por outro, presentiriam o Estado como alinhado com os interesses dos roceiros, ao serviço de quem governadores se colocavam quase incondicionalmente, em desfavor dos demais habitantes, colonos, incluídos.

Aparentando aderir à condição portuguesa, a população nativa não oferecia preocupações relativamente à sua fidelidade. Afinal, a depauperada elite não só aprendera em 1935 o custo da contestação, como se acomodara à perenidade da ordem imperial. E, quando assim não fosse, decerto presentia de que lado sopravam os ventos.

Por causa do desfecho da II Guerra, não só o intento de encerrar a Assembleia a benefício de uma arquitetura política corporativa quedou inviabilizado, como se impunha afetar um ar de democraticidade nos pleitos eleitorais. Majorando as *chances* de manipulação, Salazar antecipou as eleições para 1945, proclamando-as livres. Tal bastava para assim deverem ser consideradas, mesmo quando tal era uma mentira. Sem embargo, o pós-Guerra trouxe pequenas mudanças, entre elas, o aparecimento de listas distritais e de opositores em vários círculos<sup>19</sup>, conquanto tal não se tenha verificado no arquipélago.

Aqui era difícil, quando não impossível, ser da oposição e politicamente ativo. Porém, o arquipélago constituía um círculo uninominal onde especificidades locais – incluindo a interação pessoal – podiam ditar, se não a vitória da oposição, pelo menos a derrota do candidato da UN e, nessa medida, do governo. No arquipélago, onde o ministro Marcelo Caetano passou poucos dias antes das eleições, de pouco teria importado o falacioso juízo de Salazar sobre a liberdade de urna, não cometesse a UN um erro político. Di-lo-ia mais tarde a PIDE, a 18 de novembro de 1945, a UN sofreu um “estrondoso revés”. Certamente cedendo a pressões, apresentara a candidatura de Júlio Freire, pessoa ligada às roças<sup>20</sup>. Em 1.152 votos, contou apenas com 65. Os candidatos Manuel Beja Corte Real e Joaquim Rosado, talvez mais independentes do que oposicionistas, recolheram respetivamente 679 e 408 votos. Corte Real, nascido em São Tomé, desempenhava ali o cargo de capitão-do-porto, o que lhe terá assegurado a eleição. Não deveria ser um oposicionista – a sê-lo, decerto não seria eleito –, mas a sua eleição foi uma derrota dos roceiros. E um alerta às autoridades para a necessidade de controlo da população.

Ao tempo, o arquipélago passara a ser governado pelo famigerado Gorgulho. Em consonância com a sua depreciativa apreciação dos colonos, Gorgulho também não teria boa opinião da UN, cuja atividade seria negligenciável<sup>21</sup>. A UN resumir-se-ia a grupo de individualidades sem aptidão para a difusão das ideias do Estado Novo, conquanto se predisusessem a isso por razões de conveniência política e social, mormente para afirmação da proeminência local e para agradar ao governador. Fosse como fosse, a ação da UN devia ser despicienda no tocante à promoção da adesão política que, aliás, se queria cingida às votações e à presença nas manifestações laudatórias do chefe.

Na realidade, e independentemente dos matizes de cada conjuntura, um fator de peso era o governador, no caso, Gorgulho. Ora, depois de um período de enleio, deterioravam-se as relações entre a população nativa e o governador, o qual buscava a sua promoção política

<sup>18</sup> Aludindo à falta de personalidade coletiva dos colonos, Gorgulho relacionava-a, embora não o dissesse explicitamente, com o poder indisputado dos roceiros, cf. 1946: 113-114.

<sup>19</sup> Aos da oposição era dado concorrer mas não serem eleitos por força da censura, da repressão das ações políticas avessas ao regime, dos constrangimentos relativos ao ato de votar e, ainda, por força das fraudes no escrutínio dos votos, tudo manipulado a favor do governo, cf. Carvalho, 2002: 48.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. ANTT, PIDE-DGS SC-CI(2)-GU, S. Tomé, NT n.º 8970, relatório extraordinário n.º 15/969, 13 de agosto de 1969, do inspetor Nogueira Branco. (NOTA: *doravante estas anotações serão resumidas a PIDE NT..., respeitando as reticências ao NT, número da pasta, e ao documento em causa*).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Gorgulho, 1946: 120. Mais tarde, matizou a má opinião da delegação da UN, afirmando que esta desenvolvia “uma atividade política interessante”, facilitada tanto por não se debater com influências políticas de qualquer espécie, como por a população, colona e nativa, se interessar pelos assuntos do Estado Novo (*idem*, 1948: 237), o que, para o governador, significava adesão à sua pessoa que ele não cessava de promover.

na consecução de obras públicas com recurso a mão-de-obra arregimentada e na almejada adesão dos ilhéus à sua tentativa de criação de um mercado de trabalho para as roças.

As presidenciais de 13 de fevereiro de 1949 revestiram-se de dramatismo, não pelo ato eleitoral – em si, politicamente irrelevante –, mas pela insânia do governador que o tomou como pretexto para perseguições a ilhéus. As eleições tinham motivado sessões de propaganda, noticiadas no neófito jornal oficioso *A Voz de S. Tomé*, que também publicou um suplemento encomiástico de Carmona, a figura do regime. Das eleições, de que Norton de Matos, candidato da oposição, desistiu na véspera – um facto porventura desconhecido de muitos nas ilhas, tendo Norton de Matos recolhido seis votos, três na cidade e três na vila da Trindade –, resultou o anúncio de 85,8 % de votos a favor de Carmona<sup>22</sup>. Cumpre duvidar dos resultados – 3800 votos contra seis do opositor<sup>23</sup> –, não só pelas possibilidades de manipulação como também pelo espectro do medo que se abatia sobre São Tomé à medida que Gorgulho dava largas ao seu voluntarismo e à sua demencial discricionariedade.

Para se realçar a adesão da colónia ao regime, alegou-se que se observara a liberdade de voto, aduzindo-se a curiosa menção de não se terem notado coações da parte dos partidários de Carmona<sup>24</sup>. Esta narração, que nunca seria verdadeira, pecava pela omissão. Pelo menos na Trindade, a participação foi fraca, supostamente por causa da chuva ou do desconhecimento da condição de eleitores e, quiçá, do desinteresse pelo ato vazio de significado que não o da adesão a um governador que entretimentos enveredara pela hostilização dos ilhéus. Apenas três eleitores votaram e não no candidato oficial, o que terá sido considerado um desaforo intolerável por Gorgulho. Sem risco de erro, dir-se-á que ao governador não importariam tanto os resultados da eleição quanto o que eles denotavam de desatendimento da sua vontade. Diga-se, a abstenção ou o alheamento, ainda que possivelmente denotadores de um difuso significado político, não significariam antagonismo político<sup>25</sup>. Fosse como fosse, o governador aproveitou a ocasião para uma ação punitiva dos ilhéus, o elo mais fraco de sua meça de forças com os roceiros.

Após as eleições, intimado por um acólito de Gorgulho a entregar os cadernos e atas das eleições, Januário Graça, presidente da secção de voto, em vão o fez ciente da responsabilidade em que incorria pela sua exigência ilegal. Na verdade, e congruentemente com a impune violação da lei pelos colonos, Januário acabaria deportado para a ilha do Príncipe onde permaneceu até à exoneração do governador<sup>26</sup>.

Os não votantes foram intimados a comparecer na regedoria. Os europeus foram mandados à sua vida, enquanto os cerca de 300 ilhéus foram arbitrariamente presos durante uma semana, tendo sido obrigados a trabalho correcional. Gorgulho terá igualmente ordenado o corte de energia à vila e a suspensão do subsídio à Associação de Socorros Mútuos<sup>27</sup>.

Nestas circunstâncias, os resultados pouco importavam. Ao invés do comum das interpretações, alvitriaria que a política – não havia como não ser apoiante do Estado Novo, restando como alternativa o prudente alheamento dos ditames do regime – não pesou na conduta de Gorgulho. Este aproveitou os factos para uma intimidação assente na quase

<sup>22</sup> A percentagem foi considerada importante pois que não se procedera à eliminação dos cadernos de eleitores ausentes e falecidos, cf. *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 39, 16 de fevereiro de 1949, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 43, 16 de abril de 1949, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 39, 16 de fevereiro de 1949, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> Para Seibert, o antagonismo às políticas de Gorgulho ficou demonstrado na freguesia da Trindade, quando apenas três votos entraram nas urnas e não no candidato do regime (2001: 77-78). A inferência é possível – e tentadora – mas, por cautela, cumpre duvidar de tamanha assertividade política num tal ato.

<sup>26</sup> Para estas eleições, o recenseamento eleitoral teria sido adulterado, razão para uma queixa de Januário junto das autoridades (Santo, 2003: 133-134). A arbitrária punição dos abstencionistas pode ter sido uma vingança exemplar em razão da demanda de reposição da legalidade por Januário ou podia já estar premeditada. Em todo o caso, o governador fazia alarde da sua impunidade.

<sup>27</sup> Sobre as incidências destas eleições, consulte-se, entre outros, Seibert, 1996: 4; Lima, 2002: 42-43; Santo, 2003: 121 e 133-134; Santo, 2012: 163-164.

absoluta discricionariedade. Num alarde de prepotência, Gorgulho impôs sanções, criminalizando arbitrariamente e impunemente a abstenção ou até o desconhecimento da realização de eleições. Nesses anos de insânia, ele alijou um certo sentido de prudência política e de conveniência social, inventando uma ação criminosa que imputou aos ilhéus para os poder agredir a esmo, num prenúncio da tragédia de 1953.

Ao ambiente daqui decorrente somava-se a influência da Guerra-fria. A criação da NATO em 4 de abril de 1949 dava força ao Estado Novo, tirando veleidades à oposição para as eleições de novembro desse ano (Lemos, 2012: 36). Fosse como fosse, na colónia, o mais importante foi, apesar de queixas de ilhéus, a recondução do governador, que promoveu uma manifestação “espontânea” em seu apoio. Foi neste ambiente de consenso garantido pelo espectro da coação e da violência que se seguiram as legislativas de 13 de novembro. Estava garantida a eleição de Carlos Mantero, filho de um antigo e poderoso roceiro, para representar a colónia, por esse tempo ainda sujeita aos interesses dos roceiros.

Nem sempre as eleições se terão feito acompanhar de coerção sobre a generalidade dos eleitores para os levar às urnas. As de fevereiro de 1949 tiveram consequências gravosas para muitos ilhéus. Porém, tal ocorrência não se terá repetido. E já no ocaso do colonialismo a participação nas eleições pode ter revestido um carácter espontâneo que poucos anos antes – mormente, após a tragédia de 1953<sup>28</sup> – pareciera impensável.

Com o espectro dos eventos de 1953 bem presente, ocorreram eleições a 8 de novembro. Três semanas antes, anunciou-se como candidato a deputado o ex-governador Vaz Monteiro<sup>29</sup>, homem dos roceiros para as costumadas demandas de favores nos corredores do poder, fossem decisões favoráveis à contratação de braços – entretanto interdita em Angola –, fossem outras medidas de proteção dos seus ganhos económicos, que invariável e falaciosamente os roceiros apresentavam como de interesse nacional.

A campanha eleitoral resumiu-se a palestras focadas na obra de Salazar, assim como nas qualidades de Vaz Monteiro, em sessão com a presença do candidato, de figuras locais – o incontornável padre Rocha, os ilhéus Norberto Costa Alegre e José Pedronho, uma das vítimas da sanha de Gorgulho – e do governador. Evitando-se sequer nomear os desmandos de Gorgulho, instou-se ao voto porque, disse-se, a “Pátria não tem culpa”. Estavam recenseados 7136 eleitores, sendo o número de ilhéus superior ao dos colonos. Votaram 6064, 84,09 %. Dos votos, 6058 recaíram no “candidato proposto”<sup>30</sup>. De novo, seis foi o número de dissonantes. Sem embargo das medidas apaziguadoras do governo nos meses precedentes, o medo pode ter levado muitos ilhéus a votar. E, sem dúvida, levou a que se abstivessem sequer de cogitar o apoio à eventual candidatura de Palma Carlos que estivera na ilha para os defender dos desvarios de Gorgulho.

Evidentemente, a minoria estatística de brancos não correspondia a uma minoria sociológica ou política (Balandier, 1966: 45-46). Porém, a situação era algo peculiar porque os colonos não eram, nem sequer aproximativamente, homogêneos, como se apartavam da política: ou viviam sujeitos aos ditames dos roceiros, avessos a qualquer atividade que não fosse ordenada pelos poderosos patrões, ou no amparo do comércio ou de posições na administração, onde, por regra, desfrutavam da primazia sobre os ilhéus sem terem de os confrontar e depreciar aberta e virulentamente, como sucedera por força da competição económica, social e política na República.

No terceiro quartel, à procura da adesão dos ilhéus – procura que deslizaria da cominação (velada) para a política assistencialista – juntou-se a necessidade de vigilância da dissensão que se queria residual e, sobretudo, invisível. A relevância das eleições para órgãos

<sup>28</sup> Da variada bibliografia sobre 1953, assinala-se Seibert, 1996, Lima, 2002 e Santo, 2003.

<sup>29</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 131, 17 de outubro de 1953, pp. 1-2.

<sup>30</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 135, 14 de novembro de 1953, pp. 1 e 4.

locais de governação era mínima, quando não nula. Mas, até pela politização, surda que fosse, de conflitos sociais, as eleições não eram negligenciáveis para a PIDE, polícia política instalada no território após os eventos de 1953. Esta cerceava as expressões de divergência, não só para não medrarem mas para não se desencadearem lances que, insuscetíveis de controlo político, obrigassem a reincidir na violência de má memória e tornada odiosa no cenário internacional. Assim, em 1955, a PIDE – em rigor, o seu responsável – trabalhou para preencher os lugares do conselho de governo com elementos politicamente fiáveis. Ora, na eleição, o candidato governamental foi derrotado pelos comerciantes, a maioria dos eleitores contribuintes<sup>31</sup>, o que denotava a persistência da oposição, não à situação, por tal ser quase impossível, mas ao estendal de favores que durante décadas as roças tinham obtido do poder político.

Nos derradeiros decénios do colonialismo, os ilhéus tinham passado a compor uma maioria potencialmente decisiva, o que só se controlava pela inexistência de liberdade de expressão e de outros direitos, mas sem sujeição ao aguilhão da coerção direta, ainda operante mas menos generalizada porque desnecessária e politicamente inconveniente, até por força da conjuntura internacional. Daí, o trabalho simultâneo de cominação velada e de aliciação, entre outras cautelas, com as eleições nestes anos.

Mais relevante, a partir dos anos 60 passou a considerar-se fulcral a adesão dos ilhéus, como medida de dissipação tanto do ressentimento pelos desmandos de 1953, como, sobretudo, da adensada animosidade internacional ao colonialismo. O confronto não era com os escassos e inativos oposicionistas, mas com a crescente hostilidade internacional, contra a qual só se podia acenar com a adesão dos ilhéus. Nas ilhas, não se receava movimentações políticas adversas, receava-se, sim, a manifestação de desafeição que não se podia controlar pela violência tornada politicamente danosa. Não se queria repetir a tragédia de 1953 – ao invés, procurava-se olvidá-la<sup>32</sup> –, até porque Portugal ingressara na ONU, pelo que aumentava o escrutínio internacional sobre a administração das entretentes designadas “províncias ultramarinas”.

Seguiram-se as legislativas de 1957. Após ter abdicado de concorrer em 1953<sup>33</sup>, Palma Carlos decidiu-se a isso em 1957. Se supôs uma predisposição favorável entre os ilhéus, que ele defendera em 1953, enganou-se rotundamente por não ter calculado o efeito do medo e, adicionalmente, do comodismo. Em finais de setembro, em telegrama ao ilhéu Salustino da Graça do Espírito Santo, Palma Carlos alertava para o fim do prazo para a apresentação da candidatura, pelo que pedia a Salustino celeridade na recolha de assinaturas<sup>34</sup>. Porém, não existia a menor disposição combativa entre os ilhéus e, menos ainda, entre os seus próceres.

A 3 de novembro, após uma campanha que passou despercebida, malgrado a publicação de uma página inteira devotada a encómios ao candidato da UN, este foi eleito com 64,6 % de eleitores inscritos<sup>35</sup>. Segundo a PIDE, a indicação do Dr. Francisco Tenreiro não desagradara, mas também não entusiasmara. A maioria dos ilhéus permanecia ressentida e indiferente aos atos do governo, ao passo que os proeminentes não escondiam a sua descrença na política<sup>36</sup>, leia-se, nas intenções governamentais. Noutros termos, estavam calados mas

<sup>31</sup> PIDE, NT8969, fl. 1103-1104, relatório n.º 9, 30 de setembro de 1955, do subinspetor Aníbal José Lopes.

<sup>32</sup> Na visita do presidente Craveiro Lopes em 1954 foi iniludível a tentativa de fazer esquecer a tragédia de 1953. Na verdade, impusera-se o silêncio, mas, independentemente de reparações pontuais, ainda não se lograra o esquecimento dos desmandos de Gorgulho, um dos propósitos dessa visita.

<sup>33</sup> Acerca da eventual proposta de Palma Carlos para candidato a deputado nas eleições de 1953, veja-se Santo, 2003: 371-372.

<sup>34</sup> PIDE, NT8969, fls. 951-954, relatório n.º 7, de 31 de julho de 1957, do subinspetor Nogueira Branco; fl. 927, telegrama de 27 de setembro de 1957, de São Tomé para a PIDE em Lisboa.

<sup>35</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 309, 9 de novembro de 1957, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> PIDE, NT8969, fls. 918-920, relatório n.º 10, 31 de Outubro de 1957, do subinspetor Nogueira Branco.



avessos às palavras do regime. Pouco lhes importaria que Francisco Tenreiro, ao tempo assistente da Universidade de Lisboa<sup>37</sup>, fosse natural de São Tomé.

Diversamente do sucedido noutras colónias, o sobressalto das presidenciais de 1958 não se sentiu no arquipélago (Nascimento, 1998). Decerto ciente das razões do fracasso da apresentação da sua candidatura no ano precedente, Palma Carlos não depositaria nenhuma fé em votos em São Tomé e Príncipe. Ainda assim, passou pela ilha na viagem para Angola e Moçambique para decerto preparar as eleições presidenciais (Lemos, 2012: 225) em prol de Humberto Delgado.

A dias das eleições, o aniversário da Revolução Nacional foi assinalado com uma sessão de propaganda promovida pela UN no cinema Império, segundo o governador, com o entusiasmo patriótico de milhares de pessoas, nunca antes reunidas em tão grande número. Os oradores – entre eles, o ilhéu Óscar Santos, o padre Rocha, o tenente-coronel Vaz Monteiro e o governador – tinham exaltado a grandiosa obra de Salazar e a alta figura moral de Américo Tomás.

Previsivelmente, o ato eleitoral decorreu com bastante afluência. Os resultados provisórios indicaram 74,3 % de votos a favor de Américo Tomás, não se registando qualquer voto no general Humberto Delgado ou em Arlindo Vicente. Feito o apuramento, dos 7856 eleitores votaram 5458, 5220 deles em Américo Tomás. Este obteve 94,9 % de votos, não tendo os candidatos oposição tido votos<sup>38</sup>.

Eclodida a guerra em Angola, o Estado Novo obrigou-se a uma política de cariz social com que buscou a legitimação da política colonial em eleições que, não sendo livres, não acarretavam nem ameaças nem gravames a quem manifestasse a sua dissidência pelo absentismo, o que nem sempre sucedera nas décadas anteriores.

Nesses anos, os resultados eleitorais aparentavam um consenso que não era difícil de lograr num exíguo espaço insular, onde o ambiente se pautava quer pelo alheamento generalizado da população face à política – parecia que a ditadura não carecia de o ser –, atividade deixada a governadores e aos distintos, quer pela paz social derivada do marasmo, do isolamento e da previsibilidade da vida num cenário onde a ascensão social tinha caminhos codificados, cabendo a cada um o seu lugar natural.

Em 1961, a PIDE reproduziu a notícia, que decerto não passaria de um rumor na cidade, de que o advogado Manuel João da Palma Carlos pretendia candidatar-se às eleições como deputado por São Tomé. Já a UN local pensava indicar o deputado em funções, o ilhéu Francisco Tenreiro<sup>39</sup>, que viria a ser reeleito.

Desde praticamente a sua chegada, a PIDE – na verdade, o seu responsável local – tornara-se um ator político, tanto opinando sobre candidatos, como compondo listas para os órgãos locais. Vetava nomes associados ao revirinho e avessos à situação, mas também criticou duramente propostas de candidatos estritamente associados aos interesses dos roceiros. Por exemplo, em 1965, ano em que na ONU se reconheceu o direito dos povos à luta contra o colonialismo, desaconselhou a candidatura de Vaz Monteiro para evitar uma derrota clamorosa. Para a PIDE, a dita candidatura não seria vista com simpatia por europeus nem por ilhéus. Os europeus sabiam-no a soldo do Centro de Atividades Económicas e dos roceiros, que punham os seus interesses acima de tudo. Ainda segundo a PIDE, os ilhéus votavam um ódio profundo aos grandes proprietários e só o apoiariam se levados a isso pelos seus mentores. Ainda que secundário, o motivo de satisfação para

<sup>37</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 304, 5 de outubro de 1957, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup> Cotejem-se os vários telegramas sobre esta matéria em AHU, GM, Telegramas 1958-1959.

<sup>39</sup> PIDE, NT n.º 8969, fls. 811-813, relatório n.º 11, 1 de setembro de 1961, do chefe de brigada Carvalheiro.

a PIDE era a incómoda situação para Salustino e Januário<sup>40</sup>, ditos condutores das massas nativas, que sempre tinham jurado fidelidade política – deveria dizer-se fidelidade pessoal – a Vaz Monteiro e que teriam de fazer jogo duplo se pretendessem apoiar alguém da sua fação ideológica<sup>41</sup>. Tratava-se de um exercício retórico por tal propósito não poder estar nas intenções dos ditos ilhéus.

O governador propôs o médico Castro Salazar, anunciado como candidato a 2 de outubro. As eleições foram precedidas da melhor propaganda possível para o regime, a saber, uma mobilização de desgarrado contra a abordagem da oposição sobre a questão colonial. Mesmo sem tal mobilização, a votação recairia sempre em Castro Salazar por força dos condicionalismos políticos e, também, das benfeitorias materiais e sociais concretizadas sob a governação de Silva Sebastião.

Em 1969, já com Marcelo Caetano como primeiro-ministro, o discurso político governamental permanecia alheado da realidade. Apesar de a PIDE pretender que, nas eleições de 26 de outubro, o país era chamado a pronunciar-se não só sobre a continuidade do sistema político como também sobre o futuro do Ultramar – uma fabulação acerca do poder decisório das pessoas –, em São Tomé e Príncipe as eleições foram, sim, um indicador da adesão à ação assistencialista do governador. Até para a PIDE, que por vezes aludia à duplicidade dos ilhéus, a enorme afluência às urnas, também devida à ideia de que o voto era um dever cívico, não deixava de ser um reconhecimento pelos melhoramentos realizados na terra<sup>42</sup>.

Por esses anos, as eleições tornaram-se num exercício de adesão à figura providencial do governador e, por essa via, à soberania colonial – que ensaiava não se apresentar como tal –, relativamente à qual apenas alguns jovens manifestavam aversão e, ainda assim, de forma não explícita. Não espanta a afluência de 83,9 % dos 5065 votantes inscritos, maior do que os 61,6 % de votos na metrópole. Castro Salazar, candidato da UN, recolheu 4258 votos<sup>43</sup>.

Após o fim de Salazar, a revisão constitucional de 6 de agosto de 1971 suprimiu a menção à função histórica da colonização, assim como revogou o título VII da constituição de 1933. Alegadamente, perseguia-se uma “autonomia progressiva das províncias ultramarinas, mas mantendo-as no quadro do Estado centralizado”, uma das alterações semânticas que não mudava nada de essencial (Correia, 1999: 139). Seguiu-se-lhe, em 1972, a nova lei orgânica do ultramar e dos estatutos territoriais (Rosas, 1999: 49) que transferia poderes para os órgãos de soberania das colónias mas sob decisão última da metrópole. Afora tratar-se de uma proposta ultrapassada por tardia, não se conferia representação política à esmagadora maioria dos africanos, privados, pois, de capacidade eleitoral (Alexandre, 2000: 197). Embora politicamente negligenciáveis, estas mudanças político-administrativas originaram sucessivas eleições. Todavia, muitos dos europeus e ilhéus estavam à margem do sentido político – quando ele fosse substantivo – de tais alterações, sendo as eleições um ritual pelo qual mostravam adesão ao progresso social, já não apenas material, encetado por esses anos e que muitos, europeus e ilhéus – que não se imaginariam senão portugueses –, julgariam natural, cumulativo e contínuo.

<sup>40</sup> Nas eleições de 22 de março de 1964, para o conselho legislativo, o governador afastou da lista de candidatos o professor Januário Graça que tomara atitudes inconvenientes. E, segundo a PIDE, este não podia alegar racismo, porque a representação dos nativos aumentara, cf. PIDE, NT8969, fls. 586-588, relatório n.º 6, 2 de abril de 1964; fls. 546-549, relatório n.º 18, 3 de outubro de 1964, do subinspetor Nogueira Branco.

<sup>41</sup> PIDE, NT8969, fls. 457-463, relatório n.º 15, 19 de agosto de 1965, do subinspetor Nogueira Branco.

<sup>42</sup> PIDE, NT8970, fls. 488-492, relatório n.º 21/969, 4 de novembro de 1969, do inspetor Nogueira Branco.

<sup>43</sup> Dado assinalado no jornal oficioso. Na metrópole, a UN obteve 88 % dos votos, a CDE 10 %, a CEUD 1,8 % (concorreu apenas em Lisboa, Porto e Braga) e a Comissão Eleitoral Monárquica 0,1 %, cf. *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 914/915, 15 de novembro de 1969, p. 3.

Como se mencionou, também as eleições para os órgãos locais suscitavam preocupações concernentes à suposta adesão à soberania lusa<sup>44</sup>. Nos derradeiros anos do colonialismo, quando se forjavam argumentos para rebater as críticas internacionais, as listas do partido único para os órgãos locais eram diversificadas para serem mais facilmente votadas pelo grosso da população isleña que, uma vez cumprido o dever cívico em fato domingueiro, quedava apartada da política.

Na sequência da nova lei orgânica, a 25 de março de 1973, realizaram-se eleições para os órgãos de governo local. Previsivelmente, o ato eleitoral decorreu na melhor ordem e, disse-se, com extraordinária afluência de eleitores. Em 5881 inscritos, votaram 4781 eleitores<sup>45</sup>.

A 28 de outubro de 1973, foi reeleito o único candidato a deputado. Dos 7206 inscritos, votaram 5772. Castro Salazar recolheu 5763 votos<sup>46</sup>, 80,1 % dos eleitores e praticamente o pleno dos votantes.

Entre cerca de 75 000 habitantes, parte deles serviçais, em 1973 existiriam à volta de 600 filiados na Ação Nacional Popular<sup>47</sup>, sucedânea da UN. Talvez fossem maioritariamente europeus, mas também havia ilhéus. Sem embargo dos liames políticos, nem todos se teriam sentido constrangidos a aderir. Aliás, havia anos que se firmava a perceção do deslocamento da coerção e que avultava a política assistencialista. Na ausência de interpretações mais acutilantes, a situação tendia a ser avaliada pela vivência do momento, em muitos planos assaz diverso do pretérito ambiente de enquistamento racista e colonialista. Quando a afluência dos são-tomenses aos atos eleitorais não traduzisse uma adesão à soberania lusa, denotaria acomodação à previsibilidade da vida organizada pelo Estado, um sentimento prezado numa sociedade pautada pelo imobilismo e pela prevalência de conveniências sociais, aceites porque inferidas da desigualdade observável ou presumida como inerente à condição humana.

Nesses anos, de acordo com a nova linguagem que mascarava o paternalismo eivado de racismo, dizia-se que a população demonstrava “a sua maturidade e o seu indefetível portuguesismo.”<sup>48</sup> Tal só era verdade na medida em que tal propensão não era aferida pelo confronto com outras hipóteses. O pós-25 de Abril mostraria como tal conduta era enganadora, não por não se a observar, mas por resultar da falta de opções, situação que, antecipemo-lo, se repetiria após a independência.

Num Estado definido como unitário e corporativo, nunca as eleições poderiam ter assumido uma feição demoliberal (Lemos, 2012: 19). O regime colonial nunca abdicaria do controlo dos resultados eleitorais, mas, no seu ocaso, conseguiria isso sem coação direta sobre os indivíduos. Ainda assim, num universo micro-insular, o escrutínio dos atos, até privados, constituía um indutor à participação na votação, não para evitar represálias mas para não prejudicar a futura obtenção de eventuais benesses.

## A transição para a independência

Após o 25 de Abril, apesar das garantias das autoridades coloniais demissionárias, o Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) não quis marcar presença nas

<sup>44</sup> Para a PIDE, a eleição da câmara e juntas de freguesia, a 17 de dezembro de 1972, decorreu na maior ordem. Todavia, impunha-se a atualização dos cadernos eleitorais para não prejudicar as percentagens, cf. PIDE, NT8970, fls. 138-139, relatório n.º 24/972, 2 de janeiro de 1973, do inspetor Nogueira Branco.

<sup>45</sup> PIDE, NT8970, fl. 113, telegrama de 26 de março de 1973, da delegação em São Tomé para a sede em Lisboa; ver também *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 1082, 27 de março de 1973, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 1109, 30 de outubro de 1973, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup> PIDE, NT8970, fls. 125-128, relatório n.º 3/973, 16 de fevereiro de 1973, do inspetor Nogueira Branco.

<sup>48</sup> *A Voz de S. Tomé* n.º 1082, 27 de março de 1973, p. 1.

ilhas para se esquivar a um eventual repto eleitoral de grupos políticos que porventura surgissem e que, mercê do conhecimento da terra e de eventuais alianças externas, pudessem ser capazes, se não de o derrotar, pelo menos de dar expressão política e eleitoral à pluralidade social (Nascimento, 2019). Embora à época tal não tenha sido sopesado, tal relutância do MLSTP indicava o receio da incapacidade de arregimentar os conterrâneos por força de divergências acerca dos desígnios políticos, do que os independentistas tinham, pelo menos, uma noção intuitiva.

Celeremente o MLSTP percebeu que às autoridades coloniais demissionárias apenas importava um ato referendário que as ilibasse de eventuais acusações de descaso relativamente às populações. Àquelas não restava dúvida de que a escolha seria sempre favorável ao MLSTP. Fosse como fosse, beneficiando do reconhecimento internacional – que, a despeito dos seus lemas, o MLSTP valorizava mais do que o do “povo” –, do efeito de arrasto da luta nas demais colónias, da posição do MFA e da aceleração do tempo político, o MLSTP rejeitou efetuar sequer referendos sobre a moldura política da independência. A obstinada recusa de um ato eleitoral garantidamente vitorioso derivava do intuito de não reconhecer a pluralidade e de precaver a mínima dissonância.

Nas negociações de novembro de 1974, em Argel, face a tal recusa, a consulta popular foi trocada pela eleição de uma assembleia constituinte. Meses depois, no decreto n.º 30/T/75, de 7 de maio, do governo de transição, dizia-se que, a 7 de julho, pela primeira vez “na sua história” os ilhéus eram chamados a “uma autêntica e livre escolha dos seus representantes aos quais confiam a importante tarefa de elaborar a primeira Constituição Política do novo Estado.” Pretendia-se “garantir aos eleitores uma absoluta liberdade” através de esclarecimentos dos candidatos e de seus proponentes “para que os votos sejam efetivamente uma escolha consciente de um Povo livre”<sup>49</sup>.

Não era o entendimento da época, mas, lembremo-lo, a escolha não era livre porque o mandato já estava delineado e porque o processo era assegurado por quem se identificava com a descolonização, no caso, com o árbitro do MLSTP relativo ao regime político que, de forma reservada, se dissimulava dos futuros concidadãos.

A eleição de uma Assembleia Representativa para proclamar a independência e redigir uma constituição acabou resumida a uma consulta de uma lista de candidatos elaborada pelo MLSTP, o que equivalia à “aceitação de um São Tomé e Príncipe independente sob um regime de partido único” (Macqueen, 1998: 150). A matriz do Estado já estava delineada muito antes de lavrada a constituição e, dir-se-á com escassíssimo risco de erro, antes da assinatura do acordo de Argel.

Implicitamente interpretados como garantes de uma escolha verdadeiramente livre – na realidade, cerceada por reservadas intenções políticas suportadas por verdades conjunturais e pelo voluntarismo político –, os condicionalismos eram patentes: por exemplo, as comissões de recenseamento compor-se-iam de elementos adeptos da descolonização, ao mesmo tempo que se negava aos ilhéus não residentes capacidade eleitoral e, naturalmente, elegibilidade<sup>50</sup>.

A 7 de julho<sup>51</sup> procedeu-se à eleição da dita Assembleia Representativa. Todos os eleitos foram indicados pelo MLSTP (Macqueen, 1998: 151-150). Esse ato, quando o MLSTP já

<sup>49</sup> Cf. fac-símile do decreto n.º 30/T/75, de 7 de maio, in Santos, 2012: 1072-1088.

<sup>50</sup> Almeida Santos caracterizou os limites do acordo: um, o reconhecimento do MLSTP como o único representante do povo das ilhas, um facto da época; outro, a preparação de eleições pelo governo de transição traduzida no reconhecimento da elegibilidade de 300 cidadãos, o que, na prática, significou dar a eleição ao MLSTP. Assim, a escolha dos eleitores ficou previamente limitada, cf. 2008: II, 281-282.

<sup>51</sup> A 7 e a 8 de julho, cf. Santos, 2015: I, 41.

integrava o governo de transição, foi um simulacro de eleições<sup>52</sup>. Mesmo que se consinta que, a ter havido eleições<sup>53</sup>, os resultados não seriam decisivamente distintos, não se pode elidir o diferente conteúdo político de votações plurais em eleições dignas desse nome. Diga-se também, este raciocínio, hoje possível, não tinha cabimento em tempo de exaltação com a independência vindoura. O inebriado apoio popular à independência derivava quer do desejo de *revanche* dos colonos, subitamente ao alcance dos ilhéus, quer da disposição demissionária na política portuguesa e da conjuntura internacional da época.

De tão impetuosa, a força da “luta” importada a destempe vedou aos ilhéus a possibilidade de testar eleições livres como crivo das decisões coletivas. À época, a ilação segundo a qual não existiriam eleições livres enquanto o país não fosse livre parecia irreatável, por derivar da inopinada força de quem o enunciava, e só terá soado a sofisma – aliás, um absurdo em vista das consequências do 25 de Abril, não por acaso revertidas pelo coartar da liberdade dos indivíduos decidido pelo MLSTP – aos poucos ilhéus que intuíram a dissociação operada pelos independentistas entre a liberdade do país e a dos indivíduos.

A tentar-se conferir lógica a processos políticos que, aduza-se, raramente se pautam por ela, corroborar-se-á a ideia de que aos movimentos de libertação faltavam elementos para a atividade eleitoral própria das democracias representativas, sem tradição nas sociedades africanas. Ora, se atido ao arquipélago, este argumento ressoa a indulgência, porquanto, na esteira da “luta” – mais narrada do que real –, o intento foi o da apropriação do poder, a despeito e até contra o celebrado “povo”. A inexistência do hábito de eleições foi um fator de menor peso nas opções dos independentistas. Para estes, não eram as escolhas do povo que contavam, eram as deles, uns tantos independentistas.

Aduza-se, sob o colonialismo pouco ou nada se fizera no tocante à implantação de tradições democráticas. Mas, embora inegável, tal argumento tem pouco a ver com a realidade tecida de vetores contraditórios, a saber, o desejo de independência e de liberdade individual a partir do momento em que tal se tornara possível e, mais decisivo, a condescendência da autoridade demissionária para com os independentistas, que tinham retórica para, ainda que em nome dos conterrâneos, reclamar para si os dividendos pelo acúmulo do capital de sofrimento imposto pelo colonialismo. Ato contínuo, eles constituíram um poder tendencialmente irrestrito sobre os concidadãos a quem furtaram liberdades individuais e, obviamente, a correspondente parcela de uma livre escolha política.

No arquipélago, a questão crucial não era a da falta de hábitos ou instrumentos culturais para a realização de eleições<sup>54</sup>, porque não se inferirá da ausência de eleições abertas e competitivas que não se tivesse noção da sua valia política, nem que os ilhéus, habituados a votar para agremiações, não valorizassem a escolha livre. Assim, o que prevaleceu foi a vontade de tomar o poder que, por conta da revolucionarite, levava os independentistas a desqualificar as eleições para lograrem um poder irrestrito.

<sup>52</sup> Sem se interrogar acerca das condições de realização das eleições, Chabal aduz que estas serviram para demonstrar a legitimidade do MLSTP (2002: 47). A legitimidade do MLSTP advinha de configurações políticas externas e, afinal, da concertação entre Pires Veloso e Pinto da Costa em março de 1975, cf. Nascimento, 2019.

<sup>53</sup> Para Correia, existiram eleições, “ainda que condicionadas” (1999: 208). Todavia, importa dizer que não foram livres, mesmo que se admita que em eleições livres o resultado fosse o de uma vitória esmagadora do MLSTP sobre qualquer outro grupo. Da mesma forma se admite que, ainda que talvez com menor apoio, a independência seria escolhida em detrimento de outras fórmulas políticas.

<sup>54</sup> Apesar de parecer paradoxal em razão do contexto ditatorial, avenge-se a hipótese de as eleições nos derradeiros anos do colonialismo – entre elas, a eleição para o Sindicato dos Empregados do Comércio e Agricultura que à época perdera o viés racial – deixarem incutido o valor da livre escolha de dirigentes de associações representativas de interesses grupais.

## O paternalismo ditatorial após a independência

Após 1975, com frequência, o Estado declarou-se revolucionário, estatuto que se coadunava com uma arrogada democracia de contornos indefinidos e ajustáveis aos mutantes fins da “revolução” ou, cumpre supô-lo, dos interesses dos novos mandantes. A dita democracia era outra que não a do sufrágio direto e universal em ambiente aberto e politicamente competitivo. Suporte de um poder cada vez mais hierarquizado, rígido e irrefutável, a “unidade” demandada ao “povo”<sup>55</sup> era avessa à mínima expressão da competitividade política, que, a insinuar-se – enquanto não foi tratada como traição contra o “líder” –, apenas corria, e já a medo, na “rádio boca-a-boca”.

A democracia dita revolucionária alegadamente implementada no arquipélago revelaria semelhanças com as noções de Estado corporativo ou de democracia orgânica<sup>56</sup>, entre elas, a sujeição do indivíduo à sociedade, ainda que não exigida a todos os indivíduos por igual.

O paternalismo ditatorial da vanguarda dirigente teria dispensado eleições. Mas, a dado passo, também ao MLSTP se impôs o imperativo de eleições, que se realizaram em 1980. Naquele tempo de construção de ficções irrefutáveis, importava apresentar as eleições condicionadas como “verdadeiramente livres”. Os condicionalismos apareciam disfarçados pela mobilização massiva e pela aparente igualdade de circunstâncias em que alegada e, pelo menos, aparentemente se encontravam todos os indivíduos.

Na performance das eleições, pautadas pela arregimentação dos indivíduos em assembleias, não existiam opositores. Num contexto de “luta” contra um imaginado inimigo – e, em concreto, contra o “povo” –, em 1980, dito o Ano de Participação e Controlo Popular, em cumprimento de uma resolução da 1ª Assembleia do MLSTP ocorrida dois anos antes, aprovou-se a lei de 30 de janeiro. Esta previa a eleição, através de “voto livre, direto e público”, das assembleias populares distritais, donde emanava a Assembleia Popular Nacional (APN). Malgrado a alusão a campanha eleitoral, apenas se dizia que o povo ia eleger os seus representantes e que a participação consciente garantiria o sucesso das eleições<sup>57</sup>. De algum modo, este sucesso era encarado de um prisma similar ao da era colonial, requerendo-se, acima de tudo, a adesão dos indivíduos. Analogamente, só se elegeriam indivíduos indicados pelo MLSTP.

Em sucessivas assembleias eleitorais, que deveriam congrega a maioria dos eleitores, a votação dos delegados às assembleias distritais far-se-ia de braço no ar, escolhendo-se um dos candidatos propostos, os quais eram alvo de apreciações sobre as suas qualidades. Naquela conjuntura, o picaresco de algumas das discussões em torno dos candidatos não eliminaria a coação imane a voto de braço no ar.

Ao longo de seis dias, a primeira etapa consistiu na eleição das assembleias distritais, ditos órgãos de soberania a nível de distrito. Seriam, se tanto, órgãos de representação por não terem sobre o que decidir, salvo a indicação dos seus representantes segundo critérios consabidamente manipuláveis pelo fito da chefia. As assembleias distritais, tuteladas pelas direções distritais das organizações de massa, elegeriam os deputados. Por fim, após meses, sob proposta do MLSTP e segundo o método que resolvesse adotar, a APN elegeria o Presidente da República que seria empossado na sessão em que fosse eleito<sup>58</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> Se, segundo o salazarismo, a Assembleia Nacional deveria exprimir o carácter unitário da Nação, quer territorialmente, quer ao nível da consciência do destino histórico (Carvalho, 2002: 33), algo de assaz semelhante seria demandado não apenas aos órgãos (tendencialmente esvaziados) de poder, mas também ao “povo” e aos indivíduos.

<sup>56</sup> Noção emergente após a II Guerra para a qual importava o voto, cf. Lemos, 2012: 33.

<sup>57</sup> Não se noticiou qualquer “Campanha eleitoral” mas apenas o calendário de sucessivas eleições, cf. *Revolução* n.º 62, 29 de fevereiro de 1980, pp. 1 e 5; sobre o processo eleitoral, ver Couto, 1997: pp. 73-75.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Revolução* n.º 63, 15 de março de 1980, pp. 2-4. Na era colonial, após o sobressalto das disputadas presidenciais de 1958, de acordo com a lei n.º 2.100, de 29 de agosto de 1959, a eleição do Presidente da República passou a ser indireta (Lemos, 2012: 25), tal outro dos pontos de contacto entre as duas ditaduras.

Da maratona de assembleias, cuja sucessão facilitava o respetivo controlo contra (improváveis) espontaneidades das “massas”, concluía-se que o povo mostrara ao mundo a determinação em seguir o caminho escolhido pelo MLSTP, vanguarda dirigente da Nação. Segundo o oficioso *Revolução*, as eleições tinham permitido aprofundar a participação popular nos órgãos de direção do país na fase da luta qualificada pelo MLSTP de “etapa de democracia nacional revolucionária”. A participação honesta e consciente – em rigor, condicionada – das “massas” garantiria o sucesso das eleições, que tinham constituído um golpe para os inimigos da “nossa revolução democrática e popular”<sup>59</sup>.

Nesses anos em que o regime não tolerava, ou tolerava muito mal, dissidências, as eleições de 1980 foram realizadas sob um estrito controlo. Ao tempo, montou-se um meticuloso procedimento para afetar uma aura de participação popular e, também, de quase unanimidade que, obviamente, já não existia, como o tinham evidenciado a insurgência de parte da população em agosto de 1979, cruel e duramente reprimida, e a insana prisão de Miguel Trovoadá desencadeada no mês seguinte e cuja motivação não era senão a de anular as rivalidades pessoais no seio de MLSTP.

Tal como na era colonial, as eleições de 1980 sob o regime de partido único socialista foram um exercício de fachada, servindo, pressupostamente, para suporte do poder do MLSTP e do seu chefe. A eleição da figura cimeira do Estado estava pré-determinada, tal como sucedera nos derradeiros decénios do colonialismo, com a diferença de que a (suposta) escolha não era tão irrelevante quanto o fora no tempo colonial para o curso das vidas pessoais entrelaçadas com as demandas políticas.

O intuito a retirar das eleições era análogo ao perseguido pela ditadura colonial do Estado Novo, quando as eleições significavam a adesão ao regime, à prática de “um partido” (Lemos, 2012: 30), a um “chefe”, na circunstância, à soberania portuguesa. Após a independência não existia hipótese de não reconhecer o MLSTP como a vanguarda do “povo”, que só o era na medida em que aderira ao “líder”, a nova designação de chefe.

No tocante à expressão da vontade popular, ainda eram mais enviesadas do que as eleições realizadas no ocaso do colonialismo. Porém, por força dos constrangimentos políticos, dada a barragem ideológica que qualificava de democráticas tais eleições – qual tentativa de as tornar democráticas apenas pela propaganda –, quem afirmaria que não o eram? A expressão das fissuras era ainda menor do que tempo colonial. Melhor dito, de novo a dissonância se confinava a espaços esconsos e se metamorfoseava em duplicidade.

Após as de 1980, faliram as condições para realizar outras eleições com o mesmo grau de mobilização devido quer ao deslascar da militância e da crença, quer ao consequente esboroamento dos mecanismos de controlo. Tornou-se virtualmente impossível obter os resultados de 1980 – isto é, a presença massiva de votantes para um voto já decidido –, o que seria uma derrota para o MLSTP.

Afinal, bem mais decisivas do que as eleições de 1980 seriam eventuais divergências na cúpula do MLSTP, sempre contidas e, possivelmente, expressas de forma enviesada em razão da reverência, do temor e do oportunismo corriqueiros em estruturas rigidamente hierarquizadas e pautadas pela pessoalização do poder. Ao arrepio do que se possa preterir acerca da liberdade de discussão e de crítica nos órgãos colegiais do MLSTP, as reuniões deveriam ser, sobretudo, um aferidor de lealdades ao chefe. A forma como o MLSTP e os órgãos do Estado, subordinados ao MLSTP, foram seguindo o chefe – quer na perseguição aos sucessivos “inimigos” do “povo”, quer mais tarde em surpreendentes inflexões na política económica – não autoriza a supor reflexões e debates, mas, ao invés, um seguidismo para que sobravam sempre justificações aparentemente irrefutáveis, dadas,

<sup>59</sup> *Revolução* n.º 64, 31 de março de 1980, p. 1.

por exemplo, as prementes tarefas da reconstrução nacional, um eufemismo para aludir aos constrangimentos políticos e, sobretudo, à prevalecente vontade do chefe.

A partir de meados dos anos 80, o regime mergulhou numa nebulosa. Se já o era antes, a APN ainda mais decorativa se tornou. Como no tempo colonial, a atividade parlamentar era ritualizada e distorcida. O poder permaneceu centralizado em órgãos partidários restritos e fechados e, ainda assim, cumpre admitir a concertação informal de decisões à margem dos órgãos de cúpula. Não será erróneo afirmar-se que, mesmo quando era patente que o regime entrara num impasse, o presidente não só preservava o essencial do poder como, na prática, se reelegia a ele próprio<sup>60</sup>. Aos demais, para se preservarem na sua *entourage*, cabia secundá-lo nas mais inopinadas piroetas políticas e ideológicas<sup>61</sup>, como as conducentes à adoção da democracia representativa, indubitavelmente mais dependente do seu arbítrio do que da ação de opositores.

## Notas finais

São vários os pontos de contacto entre as eleições em São Tomé e Príncipe antes e imediatamente após a independência, entre eles, a prevalência de uma situação ditatorial assente na prevenção e eliminação da dissidência. Em ambas as épocas, esta capacidade, facilitada pelo isolamento, dependeu de múltiplos meios, da predisposição para o recurso à violência à cooptação das vontades para secundar desígnios de poder.

Assim como na era colonial as eleições significavam a aprovação do governador, também depois da independência, para lá da carga denotativa da retórica ideológica acerca do poder do “povo”, o que se demandava era a adesão ao “líder”. Nas eleições da era colonial, requeria-se a tendencial unanimidade no apoio ao regime – no arquipélago também conseguida pela invisibilidade da oposição – que era medido pela afluência às eleições. Após 1975, também o apoio popular à “vanguarda” constituiu algo que o MLSTP procurou obter, primeiro, em sucessivos comícios de rua, depois, nas eleições de 1980.

No tempo colonial, pelas dinâmicas políticas do regime, e sem embargo das propaladas liberdades concedidas às oposições, as eleições eram um plebiscito, materializado na adesão aos nomes indicados pela União Nacional. As listas da oposição eram permitidas mas consideradas como opostas do “regime corporativo” e à Nação (Lemos, 2012: 25). Sem qualificação jurídica similar mas referido à imperiosa sintonia com os objetivos revolucionários em nome do povo, idêntico maniqueísmo vingaria depois da independência, e não apenas em eleições, com a interditação de qualquer dissonância. Se antes da independência não existia oposição visível ao colonialismo – mesmo se na metrópole lavrava a oposição ao Estado Novo –, após 1975, a crescente oposição ao regime de partido único nunca teve sequer a possibilidade de se expressar, salvo através da “rádio boca-a-boca”.

A diferença relevante não respeita às eleições no período colonial e às realizadas após 1975. A diferença acriticamente minorizada em nome da emancipação dita verdadeira (ou, hoje, de seus sucedâneos panfletários como os lemas da irredutibilidade identitária) traça-se entre eleições politicamente controladas e eleições competitivas e livres, que tanto

<sup>60</sup> Para Couto, ocorreu uma inversão da relação de forças entre Presidente da República e ANP que se viu dependente daquele. Em resultado da hegemonia do MLSTP, prevaleceu “um certo disfuncionamento em todo o ordenamento político-jurídico do país impedindo que cada órgão jogasse plenamente o papel que era chamado a desempenhar” (1997: 78 e 81). A meu ver, não tão dissemelhantemente do sucedido no passado colonial, a ANP já nasceu dependente de Pinto da Costa.

<sup>61</sup> Se, para Salazar, a Assembleia Nacional deveria ser uma no tocante à doutrina política da Nação, além de solidária com o Governo no que exigisse obediência aos princípios basilares do interesse nacional (Carvalho, 2002: 42), após a independência, durante o regime de partido único, a Assembleia revelar-se-ia, a avaliar pelas poucas palavras publicadas, seguidista do chefe, independentemente dos mais impensáveis solavancos políticos e ideológicos na condução do país.



o regime ditatorial colonialista como o regime de partido único quiseram arredadas do cenário político, obrigando-se, todavia, a encenar o suporte popular através de atos eleitorais politicamente controlados.

A partir de sucessivas eleições livres desde 1990 poderá pesar-se o impacto da anterior experiência política na evolução das eleições em democracia. Podia o colonialismo e, em particular, o de feição ditatorial incutir a noção da valia dos atos eleitorais? Cumpre dizer que com as eleições desse tempo não se alterava nada de relevante na sujeição dos ilhéus a um poder colonial cuja autoridade não parecia negociável. E, se algo mudava, não era por força dos atos eleitorais. Logo, face aos circunstancialismos da era colonial, afigura-se difícil, para não dizer paradoxal, elencar como item do legado colonial a valorização de eleições. Diversamente, também por força de um discurso aprendido e banalizado por lógico e plausível, parecerá justificada a asserção de que os ilhéus não tinham hábitos democráticos por o colonialismo não lhes ter proporcionado, donde se infere a inevitabilidade da deriva autoritária subsequente à independência. Indigente e condescendente, este argumento não deixa de subliminarmente justificar uma opção política pretensamente atida a limites apostos à escolha dos ilhéus pelo obscurantismo colonial. Ora, o condicionamento efetivo foi, não o imaginado lastro de alienação colonial, mas a decisão dos putativos dirigentes independentistas que, beneficiando dos ventos da conjuntura política, se quiseram alcandorados ao poder sem o veredito dos conterrâneos.

Se o crivo dos hábitos de eleições e mais formalidades democráticas, ou da sua ausência, fosse pertinente para a determinação dos rumos da sociedade, ela teria de ser equacionado quanto ao momento de passagem do regime de partido único para a democracia representativa, que, relembre-se, foi abraçada pelos ilhéus em 1990.

A deriva dos comportamentos eleitorais nos anos recentes terá que ver com a história do arquipélago, mais do que com a história das eleições, de cuja importância todavia aflora nas sociedades uma quase automática compreensão, mesmo quando não se possui um enraizado historial de instituições e práticas democráticas. Afinal, nem seria preciso citar o hábito de eleições na era colonial, mesmo se de nula competitividade e num contexto de ausência de liberdade, para dizer que os ilhéus estavam preparados para ter eleições competitivas e livres.

A adesão à democracia representativa mostrou que não podia ter sido por inexperiência ou falta de utensilagem política e cultural para o povo discernir os seus “verdadeiros interesses” que se descartaram as eleições após a independência. Aliás, tal era um argumento salazarista... mesmo se os independentistas não tinham disso consciência, acenando, ao mesmo tempo que o reproduziam, com horizontes miríficos.

Em 1990, ao cabo de anos de inimagináveis provações – entre elas, a fome –, a adesão à democracia decerto se relacionava com a abundância nos países ocidentais, um item certamente mais prezado do que a valia dos mecanismos democráticos de representação e de formação das decisões. Porém, a par disso, também se prezavam as liberdades individuais, coartadas no tempo colonial e precocemente garroteadas em 1974 e 1975 pela Cívica e pelo MLSTP, respetivamente (Nascimento, 2019).

Ao cabo de décadas, as primeiras eleições livres – isto é, com espaço para a decisão individual, livre e, se necessário, desafeta ao poder – realizaram-se em 1991, após a aprovação referendária da democracia representativa em 1990. Em sucessivas eleições, a oscilação dos votos e a alternância no poder comprovaram a liberdade individual conferida pelas instituições e pela conduta dos governantes. São Tomé e Príncipe tornou-se uma das referências da democracia no continente africano. Assim tem permanecido, embora atualmente sob a ameaça sombria do acúmulo da deliquescência institucional durante décadas.

A fragilização da representatividade política, dos resultados eleitorais, solapados pela compra de votos e por dependências extremas, e da democracia tem menos a ver com supostos fardos da história, da era colonial ao regime de partido único, do que com a procurada subversão das instituições e com o atropelo dos preceitos legais como expediente de acumulação de poder e de açambarcamento da riqueza. Um facto de agora... que não se elide com diletantes menções ao passado.

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# **EleQta ou ré-examiner les élections à partir des expériences africaines: le cas de l'élection présidentielle de 2016 au Congo-Brazzaville**

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## **Introduction**

Nous commencerons en donnant quelques éclairages sur la confusion, souvent produite, dans l'usage de la notion d'élection. De nombreux analystes la réduisent à sa partie la plus formalisée et quantifiée, c'est-à-dire à la procédure du vote (Schumpeter, 1942; Siegfried, 1913; Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1944; Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Downs, 1957).<sup>1</sup> Cette confusion entraîne plusieurs conséquences, dont trois principales. Premièrement, un effet d'ahistoricité dans la mesure où le vote est posé comme une norme universelle des pratiques de sélection des gouvernants, le/a politique se trouvant ainsi réduit à l'étatique. En effet, cette confusion oblige les chercheurs à adopter, malgré eux, les dispositifs temporels et d'organisation imposés par l'État pour sa propre reproduction, telles que la date officielle du vote et la durée de la campagne électorale. Ces dispositifs deviennent ainsi des limites à l'intérieur desquels l'analyse de l'élection se trouve confinée, ce qui contribue à donner à cette analyse une forme scientifique au détriment de sa valeur heuristique. Cette confusion valorise le côté formel des recherches politiques et ne contextualise pas l'expérience électorale dans l'histoire propre du politique, c'est-à-dire dans la complexité des intrigues qui s'y nouent et qui seules peuvent permettre une pleine compréhension du choix des gouvernants par une communauté. Deuxièmement, par cette réduction de l'élection au simple vote, le scrutin s'impose comme l'expression parfaite du principe d'égalité selon lequel un homme égal une voix, qui assure une égalité d'influence à chaque vote. En se concentrant sur une procédure qui ne se déroule que dans le secret de l'isoloir, on met en avant l'idée du consentement autonome de chacun. La valeur de ce consentement tient à ce qu'il est supposé s'exercer librement, c'est-à-dire sans contrainte, mais aussi à ce qu'il est supposé s'exercer de façon autonome, orienté par la délibération individuelle. Toutefois, les sciences sociales montrent que les comportements électoraux sont largement déterminés par des variables tels que l'appartenance de classe, de sexe, de religion, de lieu de résidence, etc., qui sont associées à des ordres hiérarchiques et de domination qui

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<sup>1</sup> Cette confusion est inscrite dans les fondements des études sur les élections. Par exemple dans les approches écologiques impulsés par Siegfried, dans les approches psychosociologiques autour des modèles de l'université de Columbia élaborés par Lazarsfeld, et de l'université de Michigan établis par Campbell; dans l'approche économique de l'électeur stratège élaboré par Downs. La plupart des modèles de sociologie électorale actuels sont des approfondissements de ces travaux fondateurs.

existent *a priori* dans toute société, à savoir les formes immanentes d'autorité. Ces ordres de domination impliquent aussi des mécanismes de coercition qui influencent le choix des gouvernants, et qui règlent la construction de leur légitimité. Troisièmement, le scrutin est promu comme le seul facteur de légitimation de l'élu par l'application de la règle de la majorité. Or, cette dernière n'est qu'une métaphore, une règle qui ne tient compte que des suffrages exprimés. Faire de cette règle le seul déterminant du processus électoral signifie réduire l'engagement des individus dans la constitution d'une totalité politique à l'expression explicite d'une préférence par le bulletin, qui devient la seule et l'ultime possibilité de choisir et de légitimer. Cela exclue, de fait, les abstenus de la contribution à la légitimation du processus électoral: même si une grande partie du corps politique ne s'exprime pas, les gouvernants sont ceux qui ont obtenu le maximum de résultat par les urnes.

Si on accepte cette confusion entre élection et vote, il n'est pas surprenant d'entendre, en politologie et pour le sens commun, que les élections en Afrique n'ont, véritablement, pas de sens (Otayek, 1998; Hermet *et al.*, 1978; Hermet *et al.*, 1978a; Pedone, 1978). Pourtant, on assiste, depuis les années 1990, à une expansion du nombre des expériences électorales sur le continent africain, qu'il nous semble imprudent de disqualifier en les réléguant tout au plus au rang de «cas» qui ne peuvent être analysés que sous une perspective d'«exceptionnalisme africain». Au contraire, le programme «Ré-examiner les élections à partir des expériences africaines», ou EleQta en logo, que nous développons, plaide en faveur de l'idée que les élections en Afrique peuvent apporter des lumières sur celles qui se déroulent partout dans le monde. Il opère sur les trois niveaux précédemment soulignés, car il problématise la question de l'encadrement temporel de l'élection, il considère l'influence des formes d'autorité immanentes spécifiques à chaque société dans le choix et la légitimation des gouvernants, et il ne se propose pas d'attribuer une valeur heuristique à une élection selon l'efficacité de l'application de la règle de la majorité. En effet, les situations africaines permettent de bien éclairer la nécessité de ré-inscrire l'expérience électorale dans les intrigues historiques précises du politique, en étendant le cadre temporel de l'analyse d'une élection pour inclure tous les préambules et les séquences qui permettent d'en expliquer l'émergence et/ou la résilience des gouvernants. En outre, du fait du hiatus avéré dans différents cas entre celui qui a la faveur des urnes et celui qui prétend être effectivement l'élu, ces situations permettent de bien problématiser la question de la légitimation.

Notre propos sera organisé en deux parties. La première présente le dispositif général du programme EleQta. Dans la deuxième, nous illustrerons les résultats de notre analyse des informations recueillies pendant l'une des premières enquêtes conduites dans le cadre de ce programme, celle sur l'élection présidentielle au Congo-Brazzaville en 2016.<sup>2</sup> Dans la troisième partie, nous présenterons quelques linéaments d'analyse de la contribution, dans la compréhension des élections, des mécanismes de conversion des formes immanentes en autorité politique légitime.

## Le programme EleQta

Le programme de recherche «Ré-examiner les élections à partir des expériences africaines» s'appuie sur un outil, la plateforme numérique EleQta, qui permet de formuler des hypothèses sur la base du contexte spécifique et des intrigues historiques qui se

<sup>2</sup> Dans la suite de ce texte nous allons faire référence à la République du Congo (ou Congo-Brazzaville) par le nom de «Congo».

nouent dans le moment électoral examiné. Cet outil permet aussi d'organiser le travail de terrain, la collecte et le partage des données, et d'effectuer des analyses comparatives.<sup>3</sup> Le programme est pluridisciplinaire: les sciences sociales se confrontent aux sciences humaines et à l'informatique. L'objectif est précisément de recueillir, à travers des enquêtes de terrain de différents types,<sup>4</sup> des données complexes qui permettent de comprendre le sens de l'élection comme expérience politique, de les rendre exploitables en les classant selon un système de référencement, et de les analyser dans le cadre d'études de cas ou de recherches comparatives. Des équipes de recherche ont été constituées dans les pays examinés sous la supervision de chercheurs expérimentés,<sup>5</sup> formées à la méthodologie du projet, préparées et équipées pour les enquêtes de terrain: pendant des ateliers préparatoires, le cadre théorique et les notions fondamentales du projet sont présentés aux équipes, qui prennent part au processus décisionnel sur les modalités de leur application au contexte examiné.<sup>6</sup> Entre 2015 et 2019, EleQta a été déployée dans douze pays de l'Afrique Subsaharienne.<sup>7</sup>

Un premier élément fondamental du programme est la problématisation de l'élection en termes d'intrigue historique afin d'en saisir toute la complexité. S'appuyer sur les ressources heuristiques des approches narratives permet, à la fois, de raconter et décrire l'expérience électorale: nous reconnaissons ainsi à l'élection une structure séquentielle de laquelle les événements eux-mêmes, y compris ceux liés aux pratiques de vote et aux mécanismes de légitimation, reçoivent une intelligibilité dérivée de leur contribution à la progression de l'ensemble. Nous adoptons ici la notion d'« intrigue » dans le sens défini par plusieurs auteurs dont Paul Ricoeur et Paul Veyne. Pour ces derniers, l'intrigue est un outil méthodologique, élaboré minutieusement par le chercheur, permettant de suivre l'enchaînement des événements significatifs et de les lier entre eux par des liens de succession temporelle et de causalité (Ricoeur, 1983: 67-103; Veyne, 1971: 50-85). Il s'agit donc d'explicitier la problématisation du récit afin de préparer l'éclairage que nous souhaitons porter à l'analyse de nos données, à savoir la compréhension du sens de l'expérience électorale à travers son ancrage dans les temps historiques précis. L'argument de l'intrigue soulève d'emblée la question de la mise en sens de l'expérience temporelle, et nous rappelle que l'analyse d'un événement sous-tend toujours des choix précis qui déterminent une « mise en intrigue », à savoir l'attribution de sens aux événements à travers leur insertion dans un ordre temporel et causal. La problématisation de ce choix et l'explicitation de l'intrigue adoptée sont à la base de la méthode de recherche adoptée par notre programme.

Deuxièmement, notre approche s'appuie sur l'hypothèse de *l'externalisme du politique* pour rendre pleinement compte du processus de sélection des gouvernants en tenant compte des mécanismes concrets de commandement et d'obéissance. Cette hypothèse incite à revenir sur les analogies entre les formes de domination sociale et le mode de gouvernement des États. A cet égard, ce postulat invite à reconnaître que ce qui est

<sup>3</sup> Pour avoir plus d'informations sur la plateforme EleQta, consultez le site <http://www.eleqta.org>.

<sup>4</sup> Les enquêtes prévoient une série de missions ponctuelles sur des terrains spécifiques, au cours desquelles les chercheurs conduisent des entretiens semi-directifs et un travail d'observation participative, et aussi la collecte sur une longue période d'informations sur l'élection parues sur les médias «classiques», sur les plateformes de communication et les réseaux sociaux.

<sup>5</sup> Les équipes sont composées de groupes de 6 à 10 étudiants de master ou doctorants. Dans certains pays nous avons constitué plusieurs équipes afin de mieux couvrir le territoire. Le réseau Eleqta compte actuellement 103 chercheurs et 14 superviseurs.

<sup>6</sup> L'adaptation des outils conceptuels et méthodologiques à chaque contexte examiné se concrétise par l'élaboration d'une série d'hypothèses de mise en intrigue et par la création de grilles de recherche spécifiques pour les différentes tâches de collecte d'informations.

<sup>7</sup> Côte d'Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, Kenya, République Démocratique du Congo, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Cameroun, Togo, Madagascar, Swaziland (Eswatini), Afrique du Sud, Sénégal (en ordre chronologique).

premier dans le rapport à l'État n'est pas l'individu mais d'abord son engagement dans des modes de vie communautaire. Cette primauté se manifeste, à la fois, à travers une répartition des tâches, d'un côté, et, de l'autre, par l'instauration d'un ordre hiérarchique qui concrétise publiquement une situation de domination sociale qui opère *a priori* à travers l'acceptation et la soumission. J. Rancière en développe l'analyse en précisant que ces distinctions sont ancrées sur des relations qui reposent sur le savoir, la parenté, le droit d'ainesse, la propriété, la richesse, le sacré, la force, etc. (Rancière 2005). Ces relations se développent à deux niveaux simultanément. D'un côté, elles lient les personnes, en donnant à certaines le droit à commander autrui et à d'autres d'obéir, au-delà de la logique du mandat et de la délégation, donc par un droit qui s'exerce de manière immanente. D'autre part, au niveau de la totalité, ces relations expriment de manière idéalisée des autorités sociales: l'ordre d'expériences dans lequel les relations de pouvoir immanentes se configurent est déterminé par les représentations que l'individu entretient de soi-même et de ceux qui l'entourent. Les relations hiérarchiques immanentes se distribuent donc en termes de parts qui apportent un pouvoir social, et participent ainsi de la représentation du commun. Ainsi, les formes d'autorité immanentes constituent la contribution directe de la représentation du commun à la reproduction de la communauté, reproduction qui en assure la cohésion et le fonctionnement.

Or, comme une communauté qui se dote de structures étatiques constitue une totalité qui englobe plus que la simple somme des formes immanentes d'autorité, sa reproduction renvoie à un ordre extérieur à celui des hiérarchies sociales immanentes: l'ordre du politique. Ces deux ordres d'attribution et d'exercice du pouvoir ne sont pas indépendants. Lorsque les structures étatiques prennent place au sein de la représentation du commun et des hiérarchies qui en assurent la cohésion, cette représentation acquiert elle aussi un ordre politique. Ainsi, la représentation du politique se construit par une transposition des formes de pouvoir préexistantes, et prend donc la forme d'une traduction de formes d'autorité immanentes en pouvoir politique. Toute autorité, à savoir le droit à gouverner, attribuée à un homme politique par ses concitoyens vient donc de l'extérieur, en tant qu'elle repose sur sa prééminence dans un domaine qui assure une autorité immanente: le savoir, la parenté, le droit d'ainesse, la propriété, la richesse, le sacré, la force, etc. Il est donc nécessaire de rendre compte de la manière dont se composent ensemble les formes particulières d'autorités sociales immanentes en une totalité politique sans que chacune ne perde sa spécificité, d'une part, et, de l'autre, que cette communauté ne se dissolve en tant que totalité. Il apparaît donc, en se situant au niveau de la totalité, que s'instaure, au-delà des formes de la domination sociale, une autre modalité d'adhésion à la communauté, qui, cette fois, fait appel au titre à gouverner ou à être gouverné: la modalité de gouvernement est donc *différente* des autres formes d'autorité sociale et de la simple domination. Dans sa différence, elle en appelle à une épreuve, qui fait reconnaître et accepter la possession de ce titre à gouverner et à être gouverné, et constitue donc la base de toute légitimité politique.

Attardons-nous sur cette épreuve nécessaire qui n'est plus seulement d'adhésion directe, mais qui implique de postuler l'existence d'une marge de manœuvre de la part de «tous» les gouvernés; marge qui oblige à tenir compte de leur autonomie et résistance, c'est-à-dire de la nécessité du consentement. Ainsi, l'épreuve invite à s'intéresser concrètement à l'importance de la part supplémentaire de pouvoir concédée par ceux qui consentent. Cette part supplémentaire n'est pas que de discours mais se noue directement en lien avec les formes d'autorité sociale. L'idée d'épreuve oblige donc à identifier, au-delà du couple commandement-obéissance, comment s'opère la participation de chaque personne (sujet ou chef) au souci du gouvernement, une relation qui est formulée au sein même des formes

immanentes d'autorité sociale. Elle montre surtout que, à la différence d'autres formes d'autorité, l'autorité politique nécessite la médiation d'un dispositif supplémentaire où se réfractent les formes immanentes d'autorité. Il s'opère donc, par-là, une double réflexion: celle des formes d'autorité qui se donnent sous la figure de l'immédiat, et celle du politique qui les coupe en elles-mêmes pour les faire devenir autre chose.

Après avoir rappelé ces postulats, il convient maintenant de préciser que notre approche consiste à reconstruire les intrigues historiques qui permettent de cerner les modalités de la sélection et de la légitimation des élus, à partir de la composition politique des formes immanentes d'autorité sociale qu'incarnent les différents concurrents. Dans le cadre du travail collectif au sein du programme EleQta, nous avons reconstruit quelques intrigues historiques permettant de comprendre les processus électoraux retenus, en essayant de rendre compte des situations et tendances communes qui peuvent nous permettre de tracer des comparaisons entre les différents contextes étudiés.<sup>8</sup> Nous en développerons un, *le retour du phénix*, lorsque nous aborderons le cas de la dernière élection présidentielle congolaise.

Ces considérations imposent une révision des notions d'élection, vote et légitimation. Nous proposons de considérer l'élection comme cette épreuve qui opère le passage de l'ordre des formes immanentes d'autorité à celle de gouvernement. En un mot, elle mérite d'être appréhendée comme une dramatisation politique de ces formes. L'élection contribue, à travers les pratiques de sélection des gouvernants, à la conversion des pouvoirs immanents en pouvoir politique. Nous posons que l'élection dramatise ces pratiques en traduisant les mondes spécifiques, dans lesquels s'exercent les formes d'autorité immanentes, dans un monde commun, une totalité politique, qui est sa condition de possibilité (Arendt, 1983: 95).<sup>9</sup> L'idée d'épreuve oblige à identifier, au-delà du couple commandement-obéissance, les manières dont s'opère la participation de chaque personne (sujet ou chef) au souci du gouvernement, en tant que relation formulée au sein même des populations. L'élection, caractérisée de cette manière, décrit comment la société agit historiquement, en s'interprétant et en se donnant une représentation d'elle-même dans le monde.

De cette manière, on peut justifier une approche qui examine et explicite, tout à la fois, les modalités par lesquelles les différentes formes immanentes d'autorité sociale se traduisent dans les articulations du pouvoir étatique et comment cela configure le sens de la totalité. Dans cette mesure, le président ou tout autre élu doit être envisagé depuis la société qui le reconnaît, en se reconnaissant par et dans lui. Par conséquent, il convient de ne pas disjoindre l'acte qui institue les élus de celui, pour la société en question, de se représenter son action, celle par laquelle elle accède à (et maintient) son existence politique.

Par la notion de *vote*, nous proposons d'entendre le mécanisme par lequel la société exprime un choix, parmi plusieurs concurrents, de celui qui occuperait la position de l'élu. Ce mécanisme intègre deux séquences successives séparées par un temps plus ou moins long. Durant la première, il procède au choix en mettant en œuvre, à une date précise, une procédure spécifique. Dans la seconde, il en énonce officiellement le résultat. Le vote se concrétise principalement par la règle de la majorité qui produit un résultat, imposé à tous les membres du groupe, même ceux qui s'y sont opposés et continueront à le faire.

Enfin, nous postulons que dans chaque contexte électoral la *légitimation* des élus est fondée sur des règles d'adoubement spécifiques, qui ne peuvent pas être réduites à la règle

<sup>8</sup> Nous avons élaboré et adopté une série d'intrigues historiques pour chaque élection analysée en construisant d'abord une série de sous intrigues spécifiques par lesquels l'élection peut être appréhendée. Ensuite nous avons soumis à l'épreuve des données empiriques la possibilité de cadrer chaque moment électoral dans l'une des hypothèses d'intrigue principale suivantes: *le retour du phénix*, *le président zombie*, *la solution dynastique*, *l'élection en monarchie*, *l'impossible contournement du vote*.

<sup>9</sup> Monde commun et mondes spécifiques sont empruntés ici la philosophie de H. Arendt qui pense la manière dont l'homme vit son humanité par la médiation du rapport déjà donné avec les autres hommes.

de la majorité. Il devient donc nécessaire d'enquêter sur les pratiques qui confirment et consacrent plus directement l' élu: sa désignation permet de lire comment s'est déroulée la conversion des formes immanentes d'autorité sociale en pouvoir politique lui conférant le titre à gouverner. Il s'agit, par conséquent, d'attirer l'attention sur le fait de savoir, au-delà du vote, comment la société reconnaît son élu dans la mesure où ce dernier s'impose à tous les membres du groupe. Il faut, en d'autres termes, se questionner sur ce qui permet, plus que de dégager un choix par le vote, de cerner par quelle modalité ce choix met en branle les conditions de l'assentiment/acceptation par tous.

La révision des notions d'élection, vote et légitimation, ainsi que l'adoption de l'hypothèse de l'externalisme du politique et l'élaboration des intrigues électorales, qui contribuent à rendre compte de la traduction des formes d'autorité immanente en autorité politique, ont permis de collecter un corpus d'informations remarquable.<sup>10</sup> Ces données, capturent l'évolution des réalités du politique et comment elles se répercutent sur les procédures de légitimation, en donnant une place importante aux informations relayées par des canaux non conventionnels, tels que les plateformes de communication et *Radio trottoir*,<sup>11</sup> ou exprimées par les citoyens (y compris ceux qui n'ont pas participé aux scrutins) pendant des entretiens semi-directifs. Ces informations ont produit une série de travaux d'analyse qui ont été présentés en juin 2019 à la première conférence du programme.<sup>12</sup> Nous allons maintenant présenter l'une de ces analyses, celle de l'élection présidentielle de 2016 au Congo.

### *Le retour du phénix*

L'enquête sur l'élection présidentielle congolaise de 2016 a porté sur la définition de l'intrigue, de la structure temporelle de l'élection et, enfin, des formes immanentes d'autorité et de comment elles sont converties (ou pas) en pouvoir étatique.

Nous avons approché l'élection de 2016 sous l'intrigue du *retour du phénix* car le président sortant, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, «politiquement» mort en 1992, renaît en 1997, et enchaîne une série de retours au pouvoir dont le dernier, en 2016, est passé par la redéfinition de l'ordre constitutionnel et la naissance d'une «nouvelle république» au Congo. En effet, après la fin du parti unique en 1992, la position de Sassou-Nguesso s'affaiblit car son parti perd la majorité parlementaire et lui-même les présidentielles. Le nouveau régime fait face, très rapidement, à des tensions qui se résolvent par une répétition de conflits armés sanglants entre 1992 et 1993. Sassou-Nguesso décide de quitter le Congo, en mi-1995, pour s'installer en France. Il revient dix-huit mois après, le 26 janvier 1997, acclamé et attendu à l'aéroport par une foule immense. Or cette année, des élections pour renouveler les instances et surtout la présidentielle sont censés se tenir. Un conflit armé éclate le 5 juin 1997 et prend fin le 15 octobre 1997, conduisant au retour au pouvoir de Sassou-Nguesso.<sup>13</sup> Justifiant cette guerre comme un acte de résistance contre un tyran et de libération du peuple, ses partisans élaborent une nouvelle Constitution (Dibas, 1998: 300-308; Bakounda 2001 et 2003).<sup>14</sup> Un des points d'accord importants concerne la durée des mandats à sept ans et leur limitation à deux successifs.

<sup>10</sup> Plus de 7000 éléments d'information, dont environ 2300 dossiers sur les acteurs politiques et 1700 éléments audiovisuels (photos et vidéos), recueillis au cours de plus de 200 missions de terrain [septembre 2019].

<sup>11</sup> Le nom par lequel on désigne la rumeur publique dans les pays francophones de l'Afrique Subsaharienne.

<sup>12</sup> Pour plus d'informations, veuillez visiter la page <https://tepsis.io/dispositifs-collaboratifs/ateliers-internationaux-2/dispositifs-collaboratifs-ateliers-internationaux-2-re-examiner-les-elections-a-partir-des-experiences-africaines/> [Consulté le 4 octobre 2019].

<sup>13</sup> Après l'accession au pouvoir, les partisans de Sassou-Nguesso abolissent la Constitution de 1992 et la remplacent initialement par l'Acte fondamental du 24 octobre 1997 qui consacre un régime présidentiel.

<sup>14</sup> La nouvelle Constitution est adoptée par le référendum du 20 janvier 2002, avec un taux officiel de participation de 77,98 % et près de 84,26 % de suffrages favorables exprimés.



C'est en tenant compte de ce contexte que nous avons empiriquement défini le moment du début de cette élection, qui durera jusqu'en 2016. Il est fondamental pour saisir ce moment de considérer que les gouvernants, pour rendre à nouveau le président éligible, se lancent, en 2013, dans une opération de suppression de la clause de limitation du nombre de mandats dans la Constitution. Nous décidons de placer cet événement comme celui qui déclenche l'ouverture de la compétition électorale. A ce moment-là, les gouvernants imposent un débat sur la réforme de la Constitution, dont nous ne pouvons pas ici décrire tous les détails et les oppositions violentes. Concentrons-nous sur quelques points importants. Dans un message à la Nation, diffusé le 22 septembre 2015 sur les chaînes de télévision, le président annonce la tenue prochaine d'un référendum constitutionnel, ce qui provoque des manifestations violentes qui font de nombreuses victimes. Le 27 septembre, la plateforme Front Républicain pour le respect de l'Ordre Constitutionnel et de l'alternance Démocratique (FROCAD-IDC), mise en place par l'opposition, organise, à Brazzaville, un meeting mobilisant une foule impressionnante. Le Conseil des ministres du 5 octobre fixe, au 25 octobre, la date du référendum. Dès le 9 octobre, la même plateforme appelle les populations des différents départements à perturber la campagne électorale et à descendre dans la rue le jour du vote. Le pouvoir réagit violemment à toutes ces contestations.<sup>15</sup> En effet, il convient de noter que, par une fréquentation assidue de ce pays, il est évident que le Congolais savait, par habitus, que celui qui gouverne a le plus de chance de remporter la compétition. Ainsi, à leurs yeux, si le coup de force constitutionnel réussissait, le président remporterait la future élection.

Le 25 octobre 2015, le vote référendaire se déroule dans une atmosphère tendue, en particulier dans la partie sud du pays. Les résultats publiés, le 5 novembre, par la Cour Constitutionnelle donnent une écrasante victoire au «Oui», crédité officiellement de 94,32 % des voix sur un taux de participation établi à 71,16 %. L'opposition les conteste et certains fixent même la participation à moins de 10 %. Toutefois, le Président promulgue la nouvelle constitution le 6 novembre 2015, et s'ouvre, de fait, pour lui la voie pour briguer un troisième mandat.

Après avoir déterminé la date de son commencement, il convient maintenant de restituer comment les gouvernants mobilisent, pour l'organisation du temps électoral, un ordre symbolique régi par la référence à violence et à la mort. Pour en rendre compte, il suffit d'évoquer la signification des dates choisies pour encadrer le vote. En effet, à la veille du Nouvel an, et pour prendre ses adversaires de court, le président Sassou-Nguesso annonce un changement de calendrier. Dans sa déclaration, il précise que le premier tour se tiendra le 20 mars, mais il n'évoque pas la date du second tour. En outre, il fixe la période de la campagne électorale entre les 4 et 18 mars. Or, ces trois dates (4, 18 et 20 mars) sont très significatives. Les deux premières évoquent très clairement des épisodes de violence qui ont marqué les représentations du politique au Congo, et la dernière contient une allusion aux Évangiles combinée avec une tentative pour les gouvernants de se réconcilier avec la base électorale que représentent les Chrétiens.

Le 4 mars se réfère au drame provoqué, en 2012, par l'explosion de l'arsenal militaire à Brazzaville qui détruisit une partie du quartier de M'Pila et fit plus de 200 morts selon la version officielle et près d'un millier pour les organisations de la société civile (Louakima 2014).<sup>16</sup> Pour commémorer cet événement, l'opposition demande et obtient, lors du premier

<sup>15</sup> Parmi les différents épisodes, nous citons celui du 20 octobre, où la réaction des forces de sécurité provoque quatre morts selon la version officielle, une vingtaine selon les forces d'opposition. Voir <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151020-brazzaville-manifestations-affrontement-violent-sassou-pointe-noire-referendum-cong> [Consulté le 7 septembre 2019].

<sup>16</sup> Cette explosion et fut liée par la rumeur à un sabotage mal abouti perpétré par des militaires pour attirer l'attention du gouvernement sur les revendications d'une partie de l'armée. Cette interprétation est aussi basée sur des épisodes antérieures de sabotage de l'infrastructure militaire par des soldats dissatisfaits.

jour de la campagne électorale, l'organisation d'une série de messes, dans les différentes paroisses catholiques de Brazzaville, en mémoire des victimes. Pour la rumeur publique, cette date aurait été choisie à dessein pour mieux rappeler aux Congolais la probabilité que ce feu ressurgisse à tout moment, sous une autre forme mais tout aussi meurtrière.

La date de la fin de la campagne, quant à elle, évoque les traumatismes politiques de l'année 1977: le 18 mars de cette année a lieu l'assassinat du Président Marien Ngouabi, fondateur du Parti congolais du travail (PCT),<sup>17</sup> un événement qui ouvre une série d'éliminations dont les dates serviront aussi de références dans la gestion de la compétition électorale. Le 22 mars a lieu l'assassinat du cardinal Emile Biayenda (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2012) et le 25 mars l'exécution, après leur condamnation à mort par une cour martiale, de l'ancien président A. Massamba-Débat et de ses prétendus acolytes auxquels la responsabilité de l'assassinat de M. Ngouabi fut imputée. On peut dire que ces choix de dates expriment des raccourcis narratifs qui remettent en scène l'histoire sanglante du Congo et les leçons que les Congolais en ont tirées. A l'inverse, la date du 20 mars évoque une tentative de réconciliation avec les électeurs chrétiens, dans la mesure où elle coïncide avec la célébration de la fête des Rameaux. D'habitude, le jour du vote, le pays est soumis à la loi de la «journée ville morte». Cependant, cette fois, le pouvoir accepte d'assouplir son application afin de permettre aux chrétiens de circuler et de remplir leurs devoirs liturgiques avant de voter. En outre, la date du 20 a été aussi choisie car elle met en équivalence l'entrée triomphante de Jésus à Jérusalem et le triomphe de D. Sassou-Nguesso qui renaît en quelque sorte après avoir modifié la Constitution.<sup>18</sup>

Passons maintenant à la situation qui met en branle la procédure du vote afin de saisir les formes d'autorité sociale engagées. Pour ce faire, nous nous sommes concentrés sur les éligibles. Le 19 février 2016, la Cour constitutionnelle valide neuf candidats parmi onze. Ils sont tous des anciens gouvernants et, à un titre ou un autre, des proches du Président sortant. Trois d'entre eux viennent à peine de démissionner de leur position<sup>19</sup> et un est encore député du parti présidentiel.<sup>20</sup> La campagne électorale officielle se déroule dans une ambiance très tendue, marquée par les entraves à la liberté d'expression. Cependant, nos enquêtes nous ont permis de remarquer un climat de désaffection très visible par rapport au président sortant. Par contre, les deux principaux opposants, le général Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko et Brice-Parfait Kolélas, se démarquent si l'on tient compte d'indicateurs tels que le nombre de personnes qui assistaient à leurs meetings et la quantité des messages de soutien qui circulaient dans la rue. Ces messages, ainsi que les affiches et slogans des campagnes des deux opposants et du président sortant nous offrent un aperçu des formes immanentes incarnées par ces candidats.<sup>21</sup>

Un examen minutieux de l'histoire politique du Congo montre l'importance de trois formes immanentes d'autorité sociale: l'intelligence, la force et le sacré. Quant à la première, «doit gouverner», celui qui personnifie avec succès l'autorité accordée par la maîtrise du savoir. Cette forme d'autorité se cristallise sur ceux qui, aux yeux de tous, incarnent de manière exemplaire les compétences scolaires: la rumeur leur impute la capacité de transformer le Pays en appliquant les savoirs scientifiques, administratifs et techniques qu'ils ont acquis.<sup>22</sup> L'autorité liée à la force est, par contre, incarnée par celui qui a gagné le pouvoir

<sup>17</sup> Le PCT est actuellement dirigé par D. Sassou-Nguesso.

<sup>18</sup> D'après nos enquêtes, cela est aussi perçu par les Congolais comme une tentative de s'approprier de l'autorité du sacré.

<sup>19</sup> B.-P. Kolélas, J.-M. M. Mokoko et C. Munari Mabondzo.

<sup>20</sup> A. Okombi Salissa.

<sup>21</sup> Voir les images 1 à 5.

<sup>22</sup> Cette forme d'autorité, enracinée dans l'aura technocratique de l'administration coloniale, a été traduite en pouvoir étatique dans le cadre du socialisme scientifique, dont l'état congolais a adopté les mouvances dans les années 1960 sous la présidence d'Alphonse Massamba-Débat.

à la suite d'un coup d'État.<sup>23</sup> Pour les Congolais, l'homme fort est une figure perçue négativement. En évoquant la figure de l'homme fort, les Congolais saisissent le politique par sa dimension transgressive des autorités sociales immanentes: la figure de l'homme fort se concrétise par la revendication illicite des avantages d'une seule ou de plusieurs autres formes d'autorité à la fois. La dernière forme d'autorité immanente est celle de celui qui incarne le sacré. Elle s'est cristallisée historiquement dans la résistance à l'ordre colonial (Gruénais, 1995),<sup>24</sup> et présente aussi un caractère d'identité ethnique en ce qu'elle est associée aux Kongo, une population originaire du Sud du Congo, numériquement majoritaire dans le pays. Elle se manifeste à travers la revendication, exprimée sous le mode du *cela va de soi*, d'une prédestination à ce que le membre de cette population déterminée occupe la position présidentielle et dirige l'État. Cependant, cette prédiction ne se réalise presque jamais. En vertu de ce fait, l'autorité du sacré prend la forme d'une opposition historique qui confère une dimension tragique à l'agir politique. Elle sert souvent à expliquer l'expérience de la souffrance politique d'une partie des gouvernés, corollaire de ce qu'ils perçoivent comme l'échec de leur élection divine.

Si on revient à la compétition de 2016, Sassou-Nguesso assume la position de l'homme fort. Le président tient le pouvoir depuis la guerre de 1997 aussi à travers la menace que le Pays plonge à nouveau dans les affrontements armés s'il ne sera pas réélu. Cela a été confirmé par nos enquêtes: au-delà des références à l'histoire politique du Congo que nous avons mentionnées, ses slogans tels que «un coup KO», l'adoption du symbole de l'éléphant et les références à la «paix» dans ses affiches nous permettent une caractérisation du président comme incarnation de l'autorité qui émane de la force.

Quant au général Mokoko, il figure le technicien. Ancien Saint-Cyrien et ancien chef d'état-major des Forces Armées Congolaises, il est reconnu par ses pairs comme un officier intègre, et s'est opposé à la révision de la Constitution. Conseiller spécial du Président, chef du département des questions de paix et de sécurité collective en Afrique à son cabinet de 2008 en 2016, il a aussi été le représentant de la présidence de l'Union Africaine (UA), à la mission de l'UA en République Centrafricaine et en Afrique Centrale (MISCA). Le 3 février, il démissionne de toutes ses fonctions et se déclare candidat à la présidentielle. De cette référence à l'ordre global, il profite aussi des bénéfices du résultat du vote intervenu au Nigéria qui a consacré la victoire du général Mahammadu Buhari, pour mettre fin aux horreurs de Boko Haram. De même, les électeurs congolais espèrent que Mokoko facilitera l'installation de l'alternance au Congo qu'ils entendent comme une étape vers la pacification. A cet égard, la rumeur publique lui assigne le surnom de «Moïse» ou de «Sauveur». Le général Mokoko revient à Brazzaville le 9 février 2016, et il est accueilli à l'aéroport par une foule dense. Ce retour est perturbé par des jets de pierres sur son cortège, des tirs de gaz lacrymogène, le tabassage de ses partisans, le vol du matériel des journalistes venus couvrir l'événement et la bastonnade de simples curieux. Originaire d'une ville du nord du pays comme Sassou-Nguesso, le général Mokoko est pris pour un traître par le camp présidentiel. Pour justifier cette accusation, les gouvernants diffusent une vidéo datant de 2007, sur les chaînes de télévision locale, qui le met en scène avec deux prétendus agents des services de renseignement français, en train de fomenter un putsch contre le Président. Depuis, la Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, à la demande du procureur de la République, l'interpelle à plusieurs reprises.

<sup>23</sup> Dans l'histoire politique congolaise, cette figure se traduit en autorité politique par le coup qui a marqué l'accession au pouvoir de Marien Nguouabi en 1968.

<sup>24</sup> Les rassemblements et associations à caractère politique étant prohibées à l'époque coloniale, plusieurs mouvements indépendantistes avaient pris la forme de groupements religieux. Le plus important au Congo est le mouvement Matsouaniste.

Brice-Parfait Kolélas, quant à lui, occupe la position du sacré. Il l'acquiert par naissance en tant que fils de Bernard Kolélas, farouche opposant de D. Sassou-Nguesso qui se rapprocha pourtant de lui au seuil de sa vie. Fondateur du Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement intégral (MCDDI), Kolélas père parvient au second tour de l'élection de 1992 qui vit le président actuel arriver en troisième position. La puissance de son fils, B.-P. Kolélas, évoque, à la fois, un cas de routinisation du charisme et une construction dynastique du pouvoir.<sup>25</sup> Pour consacrer cette routinisation, la rumeur attribue le nom de «Josué» à B.-P. Kolélas.

Avant même que ne débute le vote, le gouvernement décide de bloquer, du 20 au 24 mars 2016, les lignes téléphoniques et les connexions internet. Pour justifier cette action répressive, les autorités invoquent des raisons de sécurité et de souveraineté et surtout la mise en place d'un moyen pour «se prémunir contre la publication illégale de résultats».<sup>26</sup> Or, cela entre dans le cadre des manœuvres sélectives de sécurisation du territoire. Lors de nos enquêtes, nous avons noté un état de siège du 17 au 29 mars, dans les arrondissements sud de Brazzaville, manifesté par la forte présence des forces de sécurité dans plusieurs lieux stratégiques. A l'inverse, les arrondissements nord semblaient moins militarisés. Il convient de souligner que dans les arrondissements sud, certains quartiers (Baongo, Makelekele, Mfilou et Madibou) avaient la réputation de voter massivement pour les candidats de l'opposition.

Le 20 mars 2016, jour du vote proprement dit, nous avons seulement pu constater l'engouement des électeurs en nous appuyant sur l'évaluation rapide de la densité des files d'attente. Dans plusieurs bureaux de vote, le dépouillement entraîna parfois des échauffourées avec les forces de sécurité. Le vote ouvre une guerre de chiffres qu'il importe d'éclairer, en commençant par les tactiques gouvernementales. Rompant de temps en temps le lourd silence qu'ils ont imposé, les gouvernants publient les résultats en fonction d'un rythme contrôlé, par étapes. Ils livrent les informations sous réserve de dépouillement des villes secondaires qui peuvent, à chaque instant, faire basculer les positions des deux concurrents les plus importants de l'opposition: B.-P. Kolélas et J.-M.M. Mokoko. Le suspens qui accompagnait leurs annonces donnait aux gouvernants une réserve tactique, étant donné que, sans la publication des résultats définitifs, ils gardaient toujours la possibilité de changer les rangs du deuxième et du troisième et, éventuellement, d'avoir à leur disposition des moyens de faire pression sur l'opposition.<sup>27</sup> A cet égard, le pouvoir choisit aussi à dessein des dates qui évoquent l'histoire politique du Congo.

La première étape concerne les résultats provisoires. Le président de la Commission nationale électorale indépendante (CNEI) annonce le 22 mars, au journal télévisé, les premiers résultats partiels et provisoires du premier tour de l'élection présidentielle.<sup>28</sup> Ceux-ci donnent le président sortant en tête avec 67,02 % des suffrages. Ces chiffres correspondent aux résultats de 72 des 111 circonscriptions et districts du pays, soit, d'après les estimations, 58 % des votants. B.-P. Kolélas arrive en seconde position avec 16,18 % et le général Mokoko occupe, avec 7,5 % des voix, la troisième position. Ces résultats ne tiennent pas compte, notamment, de Pointe-Noire, la capitale économique du pays.

<sup>25</sup> Cet héritage paternel se scinde à partir des trajectoires en chaise musicale de deux de ses descendants. Lorsque B.-P. Kolélas démissionne du gouvernement, son frère cadet y entre en fanfare, et une lutte juridique autour du droit d'exploiter le nom du MCDDI s'engage. Malgré sa victoire sur le plan juridique, le cadet est battu aux législatives pour le district de Makelekele par le candidat soutenu par B.-P. Kolélas, qui est ainsi consacré comme le plus apte à routiniser le charisme paternel.

<sup>26</sup> Voir l'article de Jeune Afrique à ce propos: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/311531/politique/presidentielle-au-congo-toutes-les-communications-coupees-dimanche/> [Consulté le 7 septembre 2019].

<sup>27</sup> Un exemple similaire de temporalisation stratégique des messages de diffusion des résultats officiels est présenté dans Chan (2019).

<sup>28</sup> Le 22 mars est l'anniversaire de l'assassinat du Cardinal Biayenda, attribué par la rumeur à Sassou-Nguesso.

La seconde étape se rapporte à la proclamation des résultats définitifs par le ministre de l'Intérieur. Le 24 mars vers 1h50 du matin, il commence par préciser l'indisponibilité des chiffres de 3 districts.<sup>29</sup> Il souligne toutefois que la Cour constitutionnelle les prendra en compte et révèle que, compte tenu de l'écart des voix, les résultats ne changeront plus. Les trois candidats les plus importants recueillent les suffrages suivants: D. Sassou-Nguesso: 60,39 %; B.-P. Kolélas: 15, 05 %; et, enfin, J.-M. M. Mokoko: 13,89 %.<sup>30</sup> En vue de ces résultats, Sassou-Nguesso, élu dès le premier tour, réalise la logique prédictive qui caractérise la représentation du politique parmi les Congolais. Par ailleurs, la forte diminution de l'écart entre ses deux concurrents et le maintien du suspens entre eux, du fait de l'absence des chiffres de certains districts, vise à fragiliser l'opposition, car le candidat d'opposition qui emporte le plus de voix sera nommé chef de rang de l'opposition à l'Assemblée Nationale.

Le dernier épisode concerne la validation des résultats par la Cour Constitutionnelle, le 4 avril 2016. Ce même jour, très tôt dans la matinée, les forces de l'ordre interviennent, dans les quartiers sud, contre une prétendue invasion de combattants appartenant au mouvement néo-pentecôtiste des *Bala ba Nsilulu*, qui poursuit une longue tradition de résistance armée (Ngodi, 2013: 19-24). Ces derniers s'engagent auprès du Révérend Pasteur Ntumi, un des alliés de dernière minute de B.-P. Kolélas. Les tirs nourris obligent une partie apeurée de la population à se déplacer vers les quartiers nord et vers les alentours de Brazzaville. Cet état de siège n'empêche pas au Conseil Constitutionnel de confirmer la victoire du président sortant, la deuxième place de B.-P. Kolélas et la troisième de J.-M. Mokoko. Les affrontements du 4 avril seront suivis par une nébuleuse opération militaire des forces armées congolaises dans la région du Pool (les alentours de la capitale), officiellement dans le cadre de la répression des combattants guidés par Ntumi, qui sévira jusqu'en décembre 2016.<sup>31</sup>

Après avoir rappelé la logique de construction et divulgation des chiffres révélés par les gouvernants, passons maintenant à celle de l'opposition. Dans le cadre de leur charte, ils s'étaient engagés à mettre en place un dispositif de sécurisation des résultats qui s'appuyait sur les représentants et délégués à tous les niveaux de gestion de l'élection présidentielle, sous la supervision de leur Commission technique des élections (CTE).<sup>32</sup> Pour faciliter son travail, les délégués de l'opposition envoyés dans les bureaux de vote ont pour charge de collecter les procès-verbaux des résultats en les photographiant à l'aide de téléphones satellitaires.<sup>33</sup> Une fois recueillis, les délégués doivent expédier ces résultats à leur état-major qui se charge de les transférer par la suite à la CTE. Le régime empêche la réalisation de ce travail par une série d'arrestations des personnes qui ramènent ces documents à Brazzaville.<sup>34</sup> Toutefois certains résultats arrivent à la CTE qui réussit, après leur compilation, à fournir ses propres résultats: le général Mokoko recueille 37 % de voix, suivi par B.-P. Kolélas 19 % et de P. Tsaty Mabiala en troisième position avec 17 %. Le président Sassou-Nguesso récolte seulement la quatrième position avec 8 %. La plateforme FROCAD-IDC affirme, dans une déclaration publique, qu'un deuxième tour

<sup>29</sup> Les districts de Boundji, dans le département de la Cuvette, de Louvakou et de Moundoundou Sud, dans le département du Niari.

<sup>30</sup> La compilation de l'ensemble donne pour les autres candidats les résultats suivants: Engambé Anguio Nganguia: 0,20 %; Pascal Tsaty Mabiala: 4,40 %; André Okombi Salissa: 3,96 %; Claudine Munari Mabondzo: 1,65 %; Joseph Kignoumbi-Kiamboungou: 0,24 %; Michel Mboussi-Ngouari: 0, 22 %.

<sup>31</sup> Les organisations de la société civile accusent le gouvernement d'avoir ordonné des bombardements contre les populations civiles qui avaient quitté la ville pendant la période électorale, ce qui a été confirmé par des témoins. La rumeur locale impute au gouvernement la présence de Ntumi et de ses milices, qui sont la cible officielle de cette opération.

<sup>32</sup> La CTE rassemble les directeurs de campagne des candidats de l'opposition.

<sup>33</sup> Pour contourner le *blackout* imposé sur les réseaux cellulaires, l'opposition dote ses délégués de téléphones satellitaires.

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b2badef4.html> [Consulté le 6 septembre 2019].

est irréversible entre deux candidats de l'opposition. Les deux principaux candidats de l'opposition contestent les résultats: B.-P Kolélas dépose un recours pour les mettre en question, et le général Mokoko lance un appel à la désobéissance civile.

## La déception militaire et l'attente messianique

Au vu de tout ce qui vient d'être rappelé, il est évident que la légitimation du Président par la simple application de la règle majoritaire n'a pas totalement opéré, car la proclamation des résultats n'a pas arrêté la procédure électorale. Après la confirmation des résultats et le rejet des recours de l'opposition par le Conseil Constitutionnel, l'indétermination ne porte plus, bien entendu, sur le résultat officiel du vote, mais sur les procédures de légitimation de l'élu. Ces procédures peuvent être éclairées par l'analyse des mécanismes de conversion des formes immanentes d'autorité durant cette élection: nous devons les saisir en relation avec le fait que la représentation politique prend au Congo, depuis la sortie du monopartisme, la forme d'une structure que sous-tend l'opposition entre les trois formes immanentes d'autorité sociale de l'homme fort, du technicien et de l'opposant historique. Le *retour du phénix* se réalise donc à la suite d'un moment électoral qui a continué au-delà du vote. Ce moment concrétise un ordre où s'articule l'entrecroisement de deux mouvements du politique qui contribuent à l'impossibilité d'adouber le vainqueur officiel. Tandis que l'un des mouvements se manifeste sous le registre de la déception militaire, l'autre tend vers l'attente messianique.

Malgré leur insuffisance comme sources de légitimation, le vote et la guerre des chiffres qui suit constituent une étape importante dans la procédure de désignation. Ainsi, le vainqueur, en référence aux résultats officiels, l'homme fort, se trouve en concurrence avec les deux candidats, le technicien et l'opposant historique, qui ont gagné le plus de suffrages dans les comptages non-officiels. Si donc l'arithmétique des résultats du vote n'est pas suffisante, seule la victoire dans cette guerre plus insidieuse autour de la légitimation confirmera réellement le vainqueur. Il nous reste donc maintenant à suivre cette histoire afin de bien cerner les procédures ultimes de légitimation politique dans le cas congolais. On peut constater que, après la divulgation et la confirmation des résultats, les gouvernants ont pendant plusieurs mois couru après l'adoubement national et international du président réélu. Pour illustrer leurs difficultés à l'étranger, il suffit de noter que peu de pays européens ont félicité la réélection de D. Sassou-Nguesso à cause du non-respect des règles de la démocratie électorale.<sup>35</sup> Quant à ce qui concerne l'inachèvement du processus d'adoubement national, nous évoquerons la forte tension qui sévit depuis le rejet des résultats par l'opposition. Les autorités ont, après le scrutin, commencé une série d'arrestations de personnalités dont des cadres des directoires de campagne des candidats de l'opposition, accusés d'atteinte à la sûreté de l'État. En deuxième lieu, une opération militaire de longue durée impose des exactions sur les réfugiés et les habitants de la région du Pool. En outre, les partis de l'opposition, appelant à différentes actions (marches, opérations «ville morte», etc.), provoquent régulièrement un déploiement des forces de l'ordre autour des domiciles de leurs leaders. Ces opérations les assignent, de fait, à résidence chez eux et réduisent leur marge de circulation. La recherche de l'adoubement national se cristallise enfin dans la volonté acharnée des gouvernants de recevoir, à tout prix, la reconnaissance publique de leur victoire de la part de celui qu'ils posent,

<sup>35</sup> Nous évoquons aussi le retard dans l'accréditation de l'ambassadeur du Congo en France, qui ne sera reconnu qu'en novembre 2016, et la réponse négative reçue en mai par le Congo à sa demande de rappel de l'ambassadrice de l'Union Européenne pour ingérence dans les affaires internes, formulée après qu'elle avait exprimé des réserves sur la modification de la constitution et sur la régularité de l'élection.

de manière emblématique, comme le traître par excellence, à savoir le général Mokoko. Contre son obstination, il est assigné à résidence, depuis le 4 avril 2016, et a été écroué, le 16 juin, pour «atteinte à la sûreté de l'État et détention illégale d'armes et de munitions de guerre»; il sera condamné à 20 ans de prison après deux ans de détention. Il importe de cerner la raison, aux yeux des gouvernants, d'aboutir absolument à une abdication du général Mokoko, et faute de cette abdication, d'en assurer la disparition politique. Pour la comprendre, il est nécessaire d'aborder un point qui se rapporte au registre de la déception militaire.

Il convient, pour ce faire, de scruter d'abord les modalités de contrôle des forces de l'ordre. Le président maîtrise parfaitement celles qui sont fondamentales à son régime, à savoir les services de renseignement et la division de la sécurité présidentielle. Par contre, la main mise sur l'armée se révèle plus complexe. Après les affrontements armés des années 90 qui ont parsemé les dynamiques de la fin du Parti unique, les opérations de démobilisation changèrent la composition de l'armée, et beaucoup de recrues ont intégré l'armée sans formation militaire préalable. Ces militaires continuent à appartenir à des réseaux dénommés «écuries», ayant à leur tête un chef auquel ils prêtent allégeance. Cette nouvelle structure fragmente l'armée et la fragilise.<sup>36</sup> Ce qui fait que celui qui dirige les unités de combat les plus importantes contrôle une bonne partie des forces militaires, tandis que les autres restent empêtrés dans leurs propres faiblesses, même s'ils sont les plus nombreux (Bazenguissa-Ganga *et al.*, 2012: 67-73). L'opposition espérait, avec l'aura supposée du général Mokoko, jouer sur le clivage entre les «vrais» militaires et ceux qui sont moins bien formés. En effet, le général Mokoko ne semble pas avoir de troupes derrière lui mais bénéficie néanmoins du respect que les officiers et les soldats mieux formés portent à l'éthique militaire: selon les témoignages recueillis à propos des résultats du vote dans les casernes, une large partie d'électeurs s'y était exprimée en sa faveur.

Quant au peuple qui espérait avant le vote un changement imminent, l'intrusion du général Mokoko dans le jeu politique suscita beaucoup d'espoirs. Il incarnait l'idée de la possibilité d'un affrontement militaire qui arriverait à bout de la «dictature» de Sassou-Nguesso. Ce sentiment était aussi renforcé par le fait que la rumeur publique lui attribuait la même appartenance ethno-régionale du Nord, espérant que cette assignation identitaire réduirait le risque de démobilisation des Nordistes. Dans les représentations courantes, le scrutin avait donc une forte connotation militaire: les électeurs confirmaient symboliquement, par le vote, que l'affrontement armé était envisageable avec le président sortant. Il choisissaient en Mokoko, le candidat qui offrait l'espoir d'un plus grand avantage en termes de mobilisation de puissance pour vaincre. Ce qui peut aussi expliquer que Mokoko remporte le plus de voix selon les calculs de l'opposition.

Or, après le vote, la déception se révèle à la hauteur de l'espoir qui avait été suscité. Aux yeux du peuple, le sentiment d'impuissance du général Mokoko le renforce car il n'agit pas selon les attentes des électeurs et continue à résister pacifiquement. A cet égard, il paraît pertinent de conclure que la prise de position du général montre que la personne qui présentifie le savoir comme forme immanente tend à basculer du côté de la forme du sacré.

Cette dernière remarque nous permet de passer maintenant au scénario de l'attente messianique. Nous avons souligné plus haut que la figure de l'opposant historique met en scène une dimension messianique qui renvoie à une prédiction imaginaire, celle de l'échec alimentant malgré tout l'action politique. Il est très heuristique de confronter cette

<sup>36</sup> C'est dans ce cadre de fragilité qu'a pu se développer l'attribution, répandue dans la rumeur, de l'explosion de l'arsenal de Mpila à un conflit entre certaines parties de l'armée et le gouvernement.

prédiction avec celle qu'impose la structure du vote par la pré-connaissance du résultat du vote ou de la dissolution de la totalité politique. Pour aller dans ce sens, revenons aux représentations du politique. Nous avons déjà noté que le peuple nommait deux candidats Moïse (J.-M. M. Mokoko) et Josué (B.-P. Kolélas), en leur assignant le statut de messie. Si, à la fois, nous adoptons le point de vue des partisans de B.-P. Kolélas et nous nous concentrons sur les deux figures, il est possible de suivre comment ces partisans élaborent une interprétation biblique qui suppose que Moïse, à savoir le général Mokoko, indiquera seulement, de loin, le paradis où seul Josué pourra accompagner les Congolais. Le destin politique du général semble ainsi nécessaire à l'élévation de Josué mais seulement en tant qu'étape vers un futur plus glorieux.

Il est également possible de percevoir que, parallèlement au registre militaire, un ordre narratif qui renvoie au religieux sous-tend cette guerre de légitimation à partir de la lecture de l'acharnement du pouvoir contre le Révérend Pasteur Tata Ntumi. Dans ce cas, l'un des effets de la déception messianique est d'accentuer les clivages entre les Congolais, dont l'horizon est précisément la dissolution de la totalité politique qu'ils constituent et qui les constitue. Ces clivages, très importants, posent des difficultés aux leaders de l'opposition pour mobiliser en faveur d'une cause nationale. Le fait que Ntumi occupe une place disproportionnée sur la scène politique congolaise, par rapport à ses capacités réelles de nuire à l'ordre et d'atteindre le pouvoir, constitue un autre raccourci narratif rappelant aux congolais la possibilité, voire l'existence latente, du conflit armé.

La forme immanente du sacré ouvre ainsi à une prédiction imaginaire du résultat de l'élection, celle de l'impossible prise de pouvoir par le «prédestiné». Cette dimension évoque, par conséquent, l'aspect théologique d'une attente messianique car elle permet de dépasser la déception inhérente à cet échec par l'improbable promesse d'un succès dans l'avenir. Cette figure justifie quand même l'inéluctabilité d'un engagement politique pour choisir un président.

L'analyse, à partir du cas congolais, de la déception militaire et de l'attente messianique permet aussi d'éclairer une des modalités d'incertitude que comporte l'expérience du vote lorsque le résultat des urnes est connu d'avance. Dans ces dynamiques électorales, la représentation intervient comme le moyen par lequel la société se donne, dans l'histoire, une forme politique à travers des corps propres. Il apparaît que les deux registres de représentation que nous avons mentionnés, déception militaire et attente messianique, se reversent l'un dans l'autre. Ainsi, les formes du savoir et du sacré ne se comprennent pas comme des types isolés. L'un se convertit constamment en l'autre. Le savant devient le sacré en accentuant une trajectoire de martyr, et vice-versa, le sacré devient savant en mobilisant des troupes de guerriers. Ainsi, la résistance militaire se transforme en guerre religieuse: ces conflits affaiblissent la légitimité de l'élu et l'obligent à chercher l'adoubement national et international pour une période qui s'étend au-delà des dates pour le déroulement des procédures de vote. Tous ces croisements contribuent à signifier que l'élection entretient toujours quelque part un lien avec une réalité d'ordre transcendant, même divin.

## Conclusion

La situation congolaise actuelle permet de scruter, de manière comparative et heuristique, la spécificité du phénomène électoral tel qu'il a cours dans plusieurs pays africains. Par ce détour, il est possible de le saisir à travers le cas où les procédures de légitimation politique ne se résolvent pas complètement par le vote tout en l'impliquant cependant. Très souvent, le résultat des urnes est connu d'avance en Afrique: le gagnant est le



président en exercice. Envisager de ne pas l'élire est, dans une grande mesure, faire courir le risque de sombrer dans l'affrontement armé qui peut conduire à la disparition de la totalité politique elle-même. Il s'agit donc pour ces sociétés de conjurer tout le temps ce risque. Pour ce faire, à la magie de l'arithmétique du vote, une procédure supplémentaire de désignation se surajoute pour résoudre la menace de dissolution. Ainsi, nous avons montré comment à la suite du vote du 20 mars 2016, une guerre des chiffres s'est ouverte au Congo-Brazzaville comme la métaphore de la continuation de l'élection par d'autres moyens. Cette continuation de l'élection, en plus de la constante mobilisation des forces de l'ordre, met en scène la confrontation des formes immanentes d'autorités sociales incarnés par les candidats, et est combattue à travers des dynamiques d'affirmation, d'appropriation, et de conversion de ces formes d'autorité en pouvoir politique.

## Acronymes

CNEI – Commission nationale électorale indépendante (Congo-Brazzaville)  
 CTE – Commission technique des élections (Congo-Brazzaville)  
 FROCAD-IDC – Front républicain pour le respect de l'ordre constitutionnel et de l'alternance démocratique  
 MCDDI – Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement intégral  
 MISCA – Mission de l'Union Africaine en République Centrafricaine et en Afrique Centrale  
 PCT – Parti congolais du travail  
 UA – Union Africaine

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# Ethnicization of Kenyan Presidential Elections in 2017

Maria Piotrowska\*

pp. 115-132

## 1. Introduction

Republic of Kenya is the Eastern-African multicultural and multiethnic country. The demography of Kenya has been influencing its modern development since independence and was especially persuasive election periods. The regular elections has been taking place in Kenya since reintroduction of the multiparty system in the 1992. Country has strong presidential system – on the grounds of Constitution elected President is not only the Head of State, but also the Head of the Government. President is given wide range of the prerogatives, therefore Kenyan presidential elections have always been substantial political event influencing relations in country itself, as well as in the East African region. Due to its multiethnicity, Kenya was facing difficulties in appointing candidate with nation-wide support, even though in 1992 the power-sharing solution – territorial distribution requirement – was introduced in order to secure this. Despite detailed electoral regulations Kenya faced several internal crisis and significant ethnical clashes following presidential election in 2007. Consequently, after two-year reform debate, the new Constitution was introduced in 2012 and further reinforced the centripetalism together with devolution resulting in creating 47 counties that replaced eight provinces. In this article I investigate the efficiency of power-sharing solution and devolution in Kenya and to what extent adapted judicial solutions strengthen the pan-ethnic character of President office. My attempt is to answer, whether introduced solutions failed or succeeded in guaranteeing its neutral character. I conduct the analysis of presidential elections results taking into account administrative, ethnical and geographical divisions of Kenya with particular focus on 2017 elections.

The structure of this article is as followed – firstly I make brief introduction of Kenya, with the emphasis on its social and ethnical structure, later I explain what is the aim of power-sharing solution. Subsequently, I describe each elections since 1992 emphasizing if and how results echoed ethnic partition. I argue, that despite the recent constitutional changes and introducing the power-sharing solutions in Kenya, its citizens continue to vote alongside ethnic lines.

## 2. Overview of Kenyan ethnic and socio-linguistic situation

In Kenya there live 48 millions people, what makes it 29<sup>th</sup> biggest country in the world in terms of country's population; in terms of its area it is 50<sup>th</sup> country in the world (580,367 square km). Kenya is distinguished by its complex social structure. Over 83 %

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


Ilustração 01 - Kenya map.

of its citizens declare themselves as Christians (Catholics, Evangelicals, Protestants and other), 11,2 % are Muslims, 1,7 % are traditionalists, 1,6 % declare themselves as followers of other religions and 2,4 % of all declare themselves as atheists. The religious diversity exists alongside the ethnic diversity, as Kenya is inhabited by people with multiple ethnic affiliation and nationalities. The biggest among them are Kikuyu (21,6 % of the population), Luhia (51,3 %), Kalenjin (12 %), Kamba (11,7 %), Luo (11 %), Kisii (5,8 %), Meru (5,7 %), Mijikenda (5,3 %), Somalis (2,5 %), Maasai (1,9 %), Turkana (1,2 %), Taita (1 %) and Embu (1 %), with the rest of the ethnic groups constitutes for 4 % of the whole population<sup>1</sup>. For centuries Kenya has been home to people of different origins, though its multi-ethnic character has also led to disputes and disagreements in terms of access to public wealth, power and social privileges. Arend Lijphart (1995: 853) define ethnic group as the group of people sharing common cultural values i.e. language, culture, kinship and physical features. Members of this group identifies themselves not only based on shared principles and ideas, but also on shared reluctance towards other group or groups. Coexistence of multiple cultural groups within Kenyan borders led to tensions especially, but not limited to election period. Kenya is characterized as 'deeply divided' (Sisk, 1996: 116), composed from many separate segments (multi-ethnic, multi-religious), and disagreements among those segments result in periodic tensions and clashes.

There are 68 different ethnic languages spoken in Kenya and 60 of them are local ethnic languages, but only Kiswahili (being original name of the language Swahili) and English are official languages, which are widely spoken and understood. Kiswahili language is not a language of a particular ethnic group. It has a special status in Kenya – starting from VIII century it was used for pan-ethnic communication and helped people to create unique identity consisting of Bantu and Arabic components. Language first used as trade tool for costal merchants, later expanded into interior and followed by expansion on then city-states, but most importantly with the growth of economic relations, it has become regional *lingua franca* until the British colonial rules in XIX century. Britons, being aware of its special status, firstly forbidden teaching Kiswahili at school and promoted ethnic languages, but after 1947<sup>2</sup> they were promoting education of Kenyan people in English. Kenya proclaimed independence in 1963 and initially its linguistic policy was very similar to British one – education was in English, which also served as the only official language in the country, while Kiswahili was used only for broadcasting<sup>3</sup>. It was not till 1974, when Kiswahili became second official language of the Republic and was later introduced as the working language of the Kenyan Parliament in 1979. Further amendments to the Constitution required the running candidate to prove his or her proficiency in written and spoken both English and Kiswahili. Twenty years after proclaiming the freedom, when Kiswahili was finally introduced into school curriculum basics (Mazrui and Mazrui, 1993: 279-280).

The current status of Kiswahili language is guarantee by Kenyan Constitution adapted in 2010. The 7<sup>th</sup> states Swahili is not only official language, but also Kenyan national language, while English is described as 'official' language only. Above this, Republic is given the special task in promoting its multilinguistic (and therefore multicultural) character, which is straightforwardly expressed in the same paragraph n.º 7:

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>. Note that data may vary from Kenyan national census from 2009: <https://www.knbs.or.ke/ethnic-affiliation/>.

<sup>2</sup> Year when India re-established its independence.

<sup>3</sup> Though Kiswahili has not become official language immediately, broadcasting was and is still considered as one of the most important medium used for communication in African countries, therefore presence of an African language in this sector was crucial in the given circumstances.

*The State shall:*

- (a) *promote and protect the diversity of language of the people of Kenya; and*
- (b) *promote the development and use of indigenous languages, Kenyan Sign language, Braille and other communication formats and technologies accessible to persons with disabilities.*

The policy of promoting English as the main language of communication in Kenya with simultaneous downgrading status and pan-ethnic usefulness of Kiswahili language was decades-long. It led to recognizing English as the empowerment language facilitating success of the individual, suitable not only for administration, but also public debate. Promotion of English without stressing the importance of Swahili, led to fragmentation, reinforced regional identity liaised with ethnic provenience and strengthen tribalism. Kenyan policy after independence was based on notion that access to public wealth and national resources should be granted based on ethnicity, rather than shared on fair, transparent and most importantly inclusive rules. Ethnic division served individual, political interests. At the time of first president Jomo Kenyatta from 1964 till 1978, the benefits were granted mainly to Kikuyus, as he was Kikuyu himself. Same pattern applies during presidency of Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002), when Kalenjin people – same group as the president – were among biggest beneficiaries, and again at the time of presidency of Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013) and Uhuru Kenyatta (2013 until now) Kikuyus has been benefiting from the fact, that president of the state belongs to the this particular ethnic group. Effectively, the political identification in Kenya is based on ethnic provenience, and pragmatic, political agenda is mostly irrelevant for voters.

### 3. Centripetalism as a power-sharing solution

There are multiple solutions crafted for segmented, multi-ethnic societies in order to help them secure the fair and balanced political representation, one of them being centripetalism. Centripetalism is the democratic instrument designed to serve in the societies that are ‘*conflict-prone*’ (Reilly, 2010: 288). Centripetalism is a form of power-sharing institution and is designed to promote stable democracy in the highly-divided societies and ethnic division. The main goal of centripetalism is not to simply reflect the societies ethnic pluralism in those mentioned institutions, but rather make efforts to reduce the significance of ethnic factor in public life with the emphasis on democratic institutions including political parties, electoral systems, governments, cabinets. Detailed explanation of what is centripetalism could be found in numerous works (i.e. Trzciński, 2016, Dobrzeniecki, 2016, Reilly, 2010).

*For instance, rather than focusing on the fair representation of ethnically defined political parties, centripetalists place a premium on promoting multi-ethnic parties and cross-ethnic activity instead. In so doing, they emphasize the importance of institutional designs which encourage co-operation, accommodation and integration across ethnic divides, thus working to break down the salience of ethnicity rather than fostering its representation institutionally. In direct opposition to consociational theory, centripetalism maintains that the best way to manage democracy in divided societies is not to replicate existing ethnic divisions in the legislature and other representative organs, but rather to depoliticize ethnicity by putting in place institutional incentives for cross-ethnic behavior, in order to encourage a degree of accommodation between rival groups (Reilly, 2010: 290).*

Centripetalism solutions are designed to push local and national stakeholders to seek alliances and gain support from voters not limited to those with common ethnic origin. The politicians in the country where centripetalism is introduced are given new, special task – they need to search for support outside their own circle, outside their region (which most often is inhabited by people belonging to the given ethnic group), and outside their “comfort zone”. In order to win elections, they need to obtain supra-ethnic support not along, but across ethnic lines.

Reilly (2010: 291), mentions all of the most important components facilitating implementation of this solution: electoral incentives, multi-ethnic arenas of bargaining (parliamentary and executive forums), aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties or coalitions of parties. He argues, that if parties and candidate taking part in the electoral race adopt those positions and are willing to first and foremost compromise, the election result outcome could be to accept to all interested stakeholders. In order to doing so, they need to welcome cross-ethnic cooperation, because only by doing so, they could access the power. Further Reilly (2010: 291-295) comprehensively describes the specific institutional solutions facilitating applying centripetalism principles in countries like Fiji, Indonesia, Nigeria, Lebanon and many others. The Kenyan ethnic mosaic makes this state particularly vulnerable to tensions and therefore specific institutional solutions were implemented. There are different forms of centripetalism solutions – ‘distribution requirement’ introduced in Kenya is only one of them.

*The ‘distribution requirement’ applied at presidential elections in Nigeria, Kenya and Indonesia is an example of the first kind of approach, which seeks to encourage cross-regional politics by requiring winning presidential candidates to gain not just a majority of the vote, but a spread of the vote across most parts of the country, in order to be elected (Reilly, 2010: 291).*

To the date this solution was introduced only in two other countries – besides Kenya in Those three countries share few characteristic features – they are all multi-ethnic, developing countries, their societies are deeply divided and consequently ethnic-clashes and tensions took place on election occasions. In all cases distribution requirement was implemented in order to avoid internal conflicts. Its goal is to facilitate the victory of those candidates, whose political agenda and deeds are of moderate rather than of radical character, so that their choice accelerate multi or pan-ethnic cooperation. In broader sense distribution requirement is designed to promote combined effort in governing the country not alongside, but across the ethnic lines (Trzciński, 2016: 117).

In Kenya distribution requirement is guaranteed by Constitution. In 1992 the distribution requirement was added to the Constitution adapted in 1969. At that time two amendments were voted in order to change the procedures of voting for the President – this were Act no. 12 from 1991 and Act no. 6 from 1992. According to those amendments, the president of Kenya was elected with the simple majority of votes form any other candidate, but at the same time also at least 25 percent of valid votes from at least five out of eight (at that time) provinces. Additionally, elected president must have been previously elected as a member of National Assembly.

According to current regulations president is elected for five-year term and can serve maximum two terms (art. 136 ([1], [2] [a])). Candidates are appointed by the political parties or they can take part in the presidential elections as the independent candidates, in both cases they must receive the nomination of at least two thousands voters from each of the majority of the counties (art. 137[1] [c] and [d]). The distribution requirement is discussed in article 138[4]:

A candidate shall be declared elected as President if the candidate receives

- (a) more than half of all the votes cast in the election; and
- (b) at least twenty-five per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties.

The distribution requirement is mandatory only in case of the first round of presidential elections, when no candidate receives the mandatory support. If so, 'fresh elections' must take place within 30 days after the first round and only two candidates with the highest support can run (art. 138[5]). The winner must obtain simple majority in the second round. The law seems to guarantee the solid pan-ethnic character of the presidential mandate. In following paragraphs I analyze results of the elections from the first period of political pluralism (1992-2007) and the second period (2013-till today), with special focus on territorial distribution requirement.

#### 4. Kenyan elections between 1992-2007

The Republic of Kenya after proclaiming its independence in 1963 was relatively calm and peaceful country, especially after violent Mau Mau Uprising in the 1950s. Yet, quickly after independence the internal conflicts emerged and political scene was dominated by two main parties: Kenyan African National Union run by Jomo Kenyatta (KANU) and Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), formed by his former Luo ally, Oginga Odinga. The latter was dissolved by state in 1969 and since then Kenya has become *de facto* one party state. After Kenyatta's death in 1978 Daniel arap Moi became president and held the office until 2002.

Daniel arap Moi due to the external and internal pressure for democratic changes in the beginning of 1990s agreed to reintroduce multiparty system and run elections.



Ilustração 02 – Administration division in Kenya in 1992.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> <https://pasaporteelectoral.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/kenya-map-tribes.gif>.



The presidential election in December 1992 took place in highly divided political environment, but with opposition incapable of cooperation. The political dominance of Daniel arap Moi was limited mainly to Rift Valley, but due to fragmentation of the opposition he won by getting 36 percent of the votes. The opposition, unable to build consolidated block lost the first ‘democratic’ popular vote, though they could have altered the regime. The results of this elections are presented also in the form of graphic below (Ilustração 03):




Ilustração 03<sup>5</sup> – Results of the presidential election.

In their analysis of Kenyan election in 1992 Foeken and Dietz (2000), point multiple abnormalities, that influenced the outcome of elections, including ‘gerrymandering’, locally called ‘*Moimanderring*’. Effectively, in KANU’s and incumbent president’s strongholds, even with smaller number of voters, they obtained higher number of seats (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 131). Also, KANU and arap Moi had strong influence on state and private media, consequently they effortlessly shaped the public discourse in their favor. This election was marked by the large-scale intimidation of opponents, as well as harassment of electoral officials and was criticized by different observation groups, both local and international (Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 135-141). Though Moi retained the power, election was a turning point in Kenyan politics and marked the beginning of the end of Moi’s era, though it was not until 2002 he finished his 24-year old presidency.

In 1997 presidential elections division of the opposition was even more profound – there were 14 opponent candidates for the seat of the president. The pre-election period was marked by massive irregularities, bribery, vote buying, chaos, although the election day

<sup>5</sup> Foeken and Dietz, 2000: 128.

itself was relatively calm and voting was conducted in a satisfactory way, despite the bribes occurred also during so called 'e-day'. There were two major ethnic conflicts in the electoral time-spam: one took place right after the 1992 election in Rift Valley Province and the second took place shortly before election in 1997 in the Coast – both resulted in hundreds of death, they both seemed well organized, having similar pattern, though the cases were never solved and the public opinion has never learned who was responsible for organizing the riots.

President Moi received 40 % of the votes and was for the second time the only candidate who received minimum 25 % support in five out of eight provinces – 63,09 % Coast, 72,96 % North Eastern, 35,4 % Eastern, 69,37 % Rift Valley, 44,67 % Western. The second best candidate Mwai Kibaki received 30 % of the votes with the required 25 % endorsement in only three out of eight provinces – Nairobi, Central and Eastern. In case of both elections in 1992 and 1997 (especially the latter), the result of the elections was easily predicted before the votes were counted. Not only the shape of the provinces, but also the shape of the constituencies enabled voting alongside ethnic lines. The overwhelming support for Daniel arap Moi in Rift Valley and Western provinces both in 1992 and 1997 elections was attainable mainly due to the fact that those provinces are dominated by the ethnic groups supporting the incumbent president – Kalenjin. Elections both in 1992 and in 1997 had ethnic character and centripetalism solution has not help elect pan-ethnic President.

In 2002 Daniel arap Moi resigned from running for the third term, accordingly to the Kenyan Constitution. Two main candidates were of Kikuyu origin – designated by KANU Moi's successor Uhuru Kenyatta and the leader of National Rainbow Coalition – Mwai Kibaki. The latter was well known public figure who entered into politics in 1961, later becoming Member of Parliament and Kenya's finance minister between 1968 and 1983 in the Moi's cabinet. He was later marginalized by the ruling party, so that since 1988 he has started building the multi-party opposition. Despite close cooperation with arap Moi, he gained reputation of efficient and integrated politician (Anderson, 2003: 334). The second candidate had limited experience and his nomination came as surprise even to KANU politicians. His biggest assets were Moi's support and family lineage – he was son of Jomo Kenyatt and his fourth wife, Mama Ngina.

Unsurprisingly, Mwai Kibaki won the 2002 elections with '*remarkable, crushing victory*' (Anderson, 2003: 335). He obtained 62,3 % general support, with more than 35 % of the support in all of eight provinces. His strongest support was noted in Nairobi (76,6 %), Western (74,9 %), Eastern (73,4 %), Central (69,25 %), Coast (64 %). Only in Nyanza and KANU's strongholds he received less than 60 % of support. In Nyanza he noted 58,9 % of support. He lost to Kenyatta only two provinces, which are traditional not only Kikuyu, but also KANU strongholds – he got 43 % in Rift Valley, while Kenyatta got 53 % there and 37,1 % in North Eastern, where his opponent got 61,8 %. The Kenyatta's results were considered low – he got 1,7 million votes (30,6 %), while the winner received 3,5 million. The third candidate Simeon Nyache managed to gather 6,5 % of overall support, what gave him 374,730 votes, yet following candidates managed to obtain less than 0,5 %.

Kibaki's victory was possible not only due to KANU's internal issues, but also due to building strong coalition. He created National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) with his former opponents – it was composed from politicians from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – rebelled fraction of KANU, and National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) composed from different opposition politicians, including Raila Odinga. In memorandum signed in October 2002 Odinga and Kibaki agreed their parties would run for Parliament separately, but they decided to propose common candidate for the presidential office and

this strategy brought them undisputed success. Nonetheless, the post-election disputes over the composition of Kibaki's cabinet ruined pre-election agreement (Anderson, 2003: 339-342).

*The failed review process had three significant consequences. Firstly, the election of 2007 was contested under the highly centralized constitution inherited from the one-party era. Secondly, Kibaki's manipulation of the process undermined what little trust had developed between the Kenyan political elite. Finally, many of the key members of the NaRC coalition, including Odinga, Ngilu, and Kalonzo Musyoka, moved into opposition to campaign against the government in the constitutional referendum (Cheeseman, 2008: 173).*

At this point main political stakeholders in the country managed to discontinue disagreement, yet after the elections in 2007 it magnified and emerged as the most devastating internal crisis in Kenya since proclamation of independence.

## 5. Kenyan elections between 2007-2017

### 5.1. Presidential Elections in 2007 and its consequences

Mwai Kibaki was reelected as the president of the Republic in Kenya in December 2007. In the post-election period his former ally Raila Odinga (who initiated Orange Democratic Movement, ODM) accused him of fraud. Two months of violence erupted in Kenya, resulted in as many as 1500 people killed and estimated 600,000 turning into Internally Displaced People (IDPs).

The post-election violence was proceeded by unique campaign – citizens were using new technologies to gather information about i.e. candidates, process, results. Also, the ethnicity was not solely decisive factor in establishing the results – Raila Odinga's memorandum signed with the representatives of Muslim community is seen as the triggering event that activated open presence of religious leaders on political scene. This highly competitive race seen two candidates addressing first-time voters. The campaign was present in media, two main candidates were seen campaigning in every district, fighting for the best score of numerous elections pools, showing 'head-to-head' character of this race. Political scene has changed – former allies in 2002 election were now opponents – Mwai Kibaki was now afresh supported not only by KNAU and the former president Daniel arap Moi, but also by his future-to-be successor Uhuru Kenyatta, while Raila Odinga, opposition leader represented Orange Democratic Movement supported by combination of former Kibaki's allies including Orange Charity Ngilu, Najib Balal and Musalia Mudavadi, while the third visible candidate was Kalonzo Musyoka (Cheeseman, 2008: 331-333).

Mwai Kibaki received 46,52 % of the votes, second best Raila Odinga got 44,07 % of the votes and third Kalonzo Musyoka 8,91 % (Ilustração 04), and Odinga contested those results. The map (Ilustração 05), shows the presidential results from the counties (results are applied into current counties borders). Figures shows that Mwai Kibaki won in Central (97,4 % over Odinga's 1,9 %), Eastern (54,7 % vs. 6,4 %), both had similar results in North Eastern (Kibaki 47,9 % vs 49,6 %) and Nairobi (Kibaki 41,5 % vs. Odinga's 53,3 %), while Odinga had major victory in Nynza (85 % vs. 14,6 %), Western (69,2 % vs. 30 %), Coast (58,95 % vs. 34,4 %). Musyoka noted high score only in Eastern with 38,8 % of the votes.




Ilustração 04<sup>6</sup> – Poll breakdown – Kibaki vs Odinga.




Ilustração 05<sup>7</sup> – Kenya presidential election 2007.

Both international and national observers noted massive irregularities in this elections, in some constituencies turnout reached 115 %, discrepancy in presidential and parliamentary elections reached in some of the constituencies up to 2 %<sup>8</sup> and frauds were observed in both blocks. Due to major procedural errors during counting and tallying, recount to establish accurate result was impossible<sup>9</sup>. Event that triggered post-election violence was time-frame of Kibaki’s swearing to the office – it took place approximately one hour after the preliminary results were announced and it was not broadcasted by media – only state Kenya Broadcasting Corporation got permission to broadcast it (Cheeseman, 2008: 166-167). Two-month riots ended mainly due to the international mediation. African Union

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.kenya-advisor.com/kenya-election-results.html> (access 15.06.2019).

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/k/kenya/kenya-presidential-election-2007.html> (access 10.06.2019).

<sup>8</sup> In December 2007 Kenyans were voting in two types of election – parliamentary and presidential, yet in this article I analyze only presidential results, as in all cases.

<sup>9</sup> 2007 election was criticized by European Union Election Observation Mission, see: *EU EOM Kenya 2007 Final Report*, 2008.

sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in late February 2008. This intervention resulted in power-sharing accord bringing Odinga into the government as prime minister. This dispute had longstanding aftermath that influenced the political scene in Kenya: William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta were prosecuted for crimes against humanity for their alleged role in post-election violence by International Criminal Court<sup>10</sup>, they allied and initiated new political party 'Jubilee Alliance'.

## 5.2. Kenyan election in 2013

General election in Kenya in 2013 took place in entirely different legal environment. The power sharing accord from 2008 included constitutional reform. In August 2010 Kenyans adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power, devolution of power to 47 newly created counties (Ilustração 06) and position of Deputy President, and eliminated the position of prime minister.




Ilustração 06<sup>11</sup> – Counties of Kenya.

<sup>10</sup> In case of both politicians charges were withdrawn in 2014 by the prosecutor based on lack of evidence to hold a trial.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.tuko.co.ke/277256-list-county-numbers-kenya.html#277256> (access 10.06.2019).

2013 general elections were run by Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), also created under the 2010 Constitution. In December 2013 voters elected the President, members of National Assembly and new Senate, as well as County Governors, members of County Assemblies and Women Representatives. The presidential election was a contest between Uhuru Kenyatta (National Alliance Party) and Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement). It was first elections, when candidates had their 'running-mates', candidates for Deputy President post. William Ruto from Kalenjin run with Kenyatta and Odinga with Kalonzo Musyoka from Kamba group.

Uhuru Kenyatta won in the first round with 50.5 % of the votes and Odinga received 43.7 %. The graphic below shows the territorial distribution of support for two main candidates (Ilustração 07). Uhuru Kenyatta met the territorial requirement – he received not only minimum 50 % of the overall support, but also in 20 out of 47 counties he got minimum 50 % support. Kenyatta and Ruto recorded crushing victory over their opponents in many counties. In Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Keiyo-Marakwet, Kericho, Baringo, Bomet and West Pokot they received accordingly 81.52 %, 74.26 %, 90.07 %, 90.74 %, 87.93 %, 92.68 % and 73.33 % – all counties are dominated by Kalenjin ethnic group. In Kikuyu dominated counties Mandera, Nakuru, Laikipia, Embu, Kirinyanga, Kiambu, Nyeri, Murang'a, Nyandarua, Tahraka and Meru they received accordingly 92.93 %, 80.19 %, 85.49 %, 89.00 %, 95.99 %, 90.21 %, 96.33 %, 95.92 %, 97.11 %, 92.38 % and 89.41 %. Odinga's support varied from 22.95 % to 4.6 % in Kalenjin dominated provinces, whilst in Kikuyu dominated provinces his support ranged from 1.21 % up to only 17.14 %. In Luo dominated provinces Kisumu and Siya Odinga got accordingly 96.64 % and 98.47 % of the support, in Kamba dominated provinces like Machakos, Makeni, Kitui he received respectively 85.89 %, 90.73 % and 79.53 % of the votes, he also noted high support in Mijikenda dominated provinces – Taita Taveta (81.56 %), Kwale (80.74 %), Kilifi (83.74 %).




Ilustração 07<sup>12</sup> – Kenya's presidential results 2013.

<sup>12</sup> <https://mcimaps.com/kenyas-presidential-results-were-fair-but-its-ethnic-divide-is-concerning/> (access 05.06.2019).

Kenyatta's triumph in this elections, though he met all the formal requirements, was heavily influenced by the 'ethnic' support he managed to acquire from his alliance with William Ruto. Their opponents implemented similar tactics – they merged into the alliance hoping to get the support from the largest number of counties by drilling and instrumentalising ethnic sentiment, instead of seeking for genuine pan-ethnic support. This elections were called peaceful and calm, despite numerous technical shortcuts and failures in results transmission and general delays. Cheeseman (2013: 1-2) suggests, there are four main factors procuring this peaceful environment: Ruto's and Kenyatta's alliance prevented potential clashes between Kalenjins and Kikuyus, 'peace narrative' omnipresent in discourse, implementation of democratic reforms and creation of 47 counties with their own regional assemblies. Those elements helped decentralized tension coming from largely unexpected result, that left country extremely lopsided.

### 5.3. Kenyan elections in 2017

Kenya held its General Elections on 8<sup>th</sup> August 2017 with national-level elections of president, members of the National Assembly and the Senate and county-level races for governors, members of County Assemblies and women representatives. Not only elections took place under new constitution introduced in 2010 and they were also "(...) *the first to take place in a context in which politicians and voters had practical experience of the powers of the new devolved elected posts and operations of the new political dispensation*" (Cheeseman *et al.*, 2019: 215).

It was mainly 'two-horse race' between incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta with William Ruto as his running mate and Raila Odinga with running mate Kalonzo Musyoka. Musalia Mudavadi joined forces with Odinga that time and they formed National Supreme Alliance (NASA). Mudavadi was expected to bring much-needed support in Western Kenya as well as in Rift Valley, traditional Kikuyu strongholds.

The electoral campaign was highly competitive with its biggest focus on presidential race, though other elections stayed in the center of the public interest. According to European Union Election Observation Mission, candidates could generally campaign freely, including in the strongholds of their opponents, freely exercising their freedoms of association, assembly and movement, though overall assessment of the campaign period indicated tensions, mutual accusations, violent incidents (including brutal murder of IEBC IT manager Chris Msando<sup>13</sup>) and misuse of state resources<sup>14</sup>.

Election results announced 11<sup>th</sup> August gave victory to Uhuru Kenyatta, who received 8 203 290 votes (54.27 %). Raila Odinga got 6 762 224 votes (44.74 %), what gave him second best position. Turnout reached 77.48 %. Odinga questioned results and challenged them at the Supreme Court. He especially criticized transparency of the transmission procedures from polling stations to the regional tally center (from form 34A into 34B), that were later sent to national tally center. After the trial Supreme Court nullified elections – this was first ruling of this kind not only in Kenya, but also in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fresh elections were set for 26<sup>th</sup> October. Period in between those two events was marked by uncertainty, hate speech, mutual accusation, protests and most importantly undermining IEBC capability to conduct fresh elections. NASA politicians launched "no reforms, no elections" campaign and threatened to boycott the elections, what eventually took place when Odinga withdrew his candidacy days before 26<sup>th</sup> October. Kenyatta won

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40807425> (access 25.06.2019, published 02.08.2017).

<sup>14</sup> European Union Election Observation Final Report, 2018.

fresh elections with 98,3 % support and 39 % national turnout. In the turmoil period between August and October, despite the violence and tensions, there were no major security breakdowns and the overall performance of most crucial stakeholders (including institutions) in this highly demanding period was evaluated with careful optimism:

*The aftermath of the polls demonstrated that devolution has also generated new political structures that can be used to channel dissent against the state, most notably when some opposition governors raised the prospect of their counties seceding from Kenya.11 Finally, the Supreme Court demonstrated its capacity to act as an independent institution to defend the quality of democracy when it became only the third court ever to annul the election of a sitting president. However, this ultimately did little to sustain the legitimacy of the election because the court immediately faced criticism from the government and was unable to ensure the implementation of much needed reforms ahead of the ‘fresh’ poll (Cheeseman et al., 2019: 217).*

This analysis of annulled results can still provide a meaningful data in terms of researching voting patterns and assessing the efficiency of Kenyan power-sharing solution, especially that no major misconduct was noted during election day, but rather during transmitting the results. Map (Ilustração 08), shows the regional distribution of votes during the first elections for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta.




Ilustração 08<sup>15</sup> – Kenya's presidential results 2017.

Uhuru Kenyatta again would effortlessly meet territorial requirement and voting pattern was largely repeated from previous elections. Kenyatta noted crushing victory in both Kikuyu and Kalenjin dominated provinces – Nandi (86.80 %), Uasin Gishu (78.20 %), Keiyo-Marakwet (94.70 %), Kericho (92.90 %), Baringo (84.905 %), Bomet (87.00 %). Odinga's support in those provinces ranged from 4.80 % up to 34.60 %. Similar pattern

<sup>15</sup> <https://mcimaps.com/kenyas-presidential-results-were-fair-but-its-ethnic-divide-is-concerning/>.



is noted in other KANU / Jubilee Alliance strongholds where Kenyatta noted impressive score – Nakuru (84,70 %) Laikipia (89,10 %), Embu (92,20 %), Kirinyaga (98,60 %), Kiambu (92,70 %), Nyeri (98,50 %), Murang'a (97,90 %), Nyandarua (98,90 %), Tharaka (93,30 %) and Meru (88,90 %). In thirteen out of mentioned provinces Kenyatta noted increasing support in relation to his result from 2013, In Marsabit Kenyatta managed to almost double his result and got 83,60 %, while in 2013 48,78 %. The same territorial support scheme is noticeable in case of Odinga– he noted highest rates in his own strongholds, as well as at those 'brought' by his running mate, Musyoka. In Kamba dominated counties like Machakos, Makueni, Kitui he got respectively 80,90 %, 91,00 %, 79,90 %, while in Luo, Kisii and Luhya dominated provinces Kisumu, Siya, Migori, Homa Bay, Bungoma, Kakamega and Busia he received accordingly 97,90 %, 99,10 %, 85,30 %, 99,30 %, 68,10 %, 87,40 % and 86,80 %. In relation to 2013 elections Kenyatta noted drop in only six out of 47 provinces – Baringo, Bomet, West Pokot (Kalenjin), Mandera (Kenya Somali), Meru (Kikuyu) and Isiolo. Repeatedly, in 2017 Kenyans voted alongside, not across ethnic lines. Political alliances were carefully designed, so that they can bring support of precise ethnic groups. There was no single political power in Kenya seeking for pan-ethnic leadership, therefore elected candidate despite meeting constitutional conditions will doubtfully introduce pan-Kenyan governing policy. Events that took place in after fresh elections provide observers with evidence to support this thesis.

'Fresh elections' results were upheld by Supreme Court and Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn into office on 28<sup>th</sup> November 2017. Pre- and post-ceremony period was filled with tensions, protests, riots and violent engagements in Nairobi and other major cities especially in the west regions. European Union Election Observation Mission reported election violence in Kawangware (NASA stronghold), Kibera slum, but also in Kondole, Muhuroni, Nyalneda, Namasraia, Bugoma, Busia, Machakos, Migoria and Vihuga counties as well as in Mbuta in Homa Bay and there were 30 casualties reported (EU EOM Final Report, 2018: 35-36). NASA and Odinga were continuously calling repeated election 'sham election', undermining its legitimacy. Jubilee argued, that even with alarmingly low turnout in October elections, Uhuru Kenyatta managed to obtain 7,4 millions votes (comparing to 8,5 million in August) – result exceeding Odinga's score from August – 6,8 million. Government craved with all costs to stop manifestations and support for Odinga. During his return from high-profile tour to United States, police banned gathering in Nairobi to greet opposition leader – event ended with larger turmoil and victims. Despite the general circumstances, Raila Odinga organized 30<sup>th</sup> January 2018 his own mock presidential inauguration. The event was highly anticipated in the capital and in the province and private TV stations planned to live broadcast this uncommon event. Yet, Kenya's Communication Authority (and allegedly Kenyatta personally<sup>16</sup>), threatened them to block broadcasting license of four TV channels – Citizen TV, Inooro TV, NTV and KTN News and ten radio stations<sup>17</sup>. This deed was highly criticized by international public opinion. Kenyatta was accused of disrespecting basic human rights and democratic standards including media freedom of expression, freedom of speech and right of access to information and this incident dangerously reminded media censorship after 2007 elections. Lingering crisis ended unexpectedly 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018, when president Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga appeared together at the stairs of Harambee House (Kenyan Parliament in Nairobi) shaking hands as a sign of termination of their political disagreement.

<sup>16</sup> <https://fr.africanews.com/2018/01/31/kenya-le-bloquage-de-chaines-de-tv-a-viole-le-droit-a-l-information-hrw/> (access 30.06.2018, published 31.01.2018).

<sup>17</sup> <https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-urges-kenya-end-broadcast-ban-four-tv-channels> (access 20.06.2019, published 01.02.2018).

## 6. Conclusion

Power-sharing solution was introduced in Kenya to address particular needs of multi-ethnic and highly divided country in the time of establishing multi-party system. It was carefully designed to help elect candidate capable of gaining pan-ethnic support and consequently serve as the country's highest official in possibly most ethnically unbiased and inclusive manner.

The analysis of the election results from different periods between 1992 till 2017 proved, that despite detailed regulations in two Constitutions from 1969 and 2010 (the latter introduced jointly with devolution reform), the territorial distribution requirement failed to enable electing impartial leader, although in each of the polls winning candidate met the prerequisite. After each elections tension, mutual accusations and severe discontent and even rejection of the results were noted. In order to sustain peace and stability, other requirements must be fulfilled by all political stakeholders. Especially after 2007 elections it was palpable, that other factors led to the clashes. Hate speech spread by local media and Kibaki's failure to comply with his own terms of political agreement with Odinga, led to severe internal crisis. Cheeseman (2008: 170) claims, that Kenyan apprehensions from that time must be seen in the broader framework and territorial distribution of voted was not sufficient to sufficiently address social expectations:

*It is important to underline that, though political violence was triggered by the election, the spread of the conflict reflects long-term popular frustrations. The Kenya crisis needs to be placed in the context of local understandings of citizenship, belonging, and exclusion. The anger of ODM supporters at the perceived theft of the 2007 election cannot be separated from their perception that they have been excluded from the political process for many years; the declaration of Kibaki as president was such a powerful trigger for the violence precisely because it tapped into a rich mine of strong historical grievances.*

My further analysis proved, that implementation of reforms started in in 2010 – reinforcement of territorial distribution requirement and devolution – have not led to election of pan-ethnic president. Uhuru Kenyatta, the winner from 2013 and 2017 met the constitutional prerequisite, but the majority of his support came from constituencies dominated by Kikuyu or Kalenjin – this own and his political ally ethnic groups. Similarly, Odinga's and Musyoka's support was from Luo or Kamba dominated constituencies. Moreover, political polarization within multiple constituency is remarkably high and disproportion in support are colossal – for one candidate it can exceed 95 %, while for the opponent in the same constituency it can be 1 to 3 %. This can be only explained and understood by comparison counties' boundaries ethnical with ethnic layout – first roughly accords with the latter. The alteration of voting pattern from 'ethnic' into 'pan-ethnic' is principally impossible with this administrative conversion Devolution itself might be perceived as the reform softening and diffusing tensions in the country through creation of entirely new space of political competition – national losers might become local winners (see more Cheeseman, 2019: 224). Survey conducted by Cheeseman and co-authors indicates, that the office of Member of the County Assembly is second important elected post in the country (Cheeseman *et al.*, 2019: 226).

The Kenyan politics are shaped by 'winner-takes-all' rule and lack of rotation above two political, each ethnically united blocks. Constitutional territorial distribution requirement failed to transform this over last 27 years of multi-party system. Different solutions could be proposed to terminate this impasse i.e. reorganization of constituency borders and proposed in 2017 reestablishment of Prime Minister boycotted by Jubilee politicians

(EU EOM Final Report, 2018: 37). The recent years have also seen Kenyans initiating the debate on the essence and meaning of the ethnicity in their country. There are journalists and academics undertaking the subject of 'tribes', its colonial character and the role of independent government in bolstering the ethnic division of Kenya in 1960s and 1970s. Patrick Gathara discusses the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya<sup>18</sup>, Philip Ochieng claims that '(...) *ethnic debris choke [Kenyan] minds*<sup>19</sup>', while Ndii depicts Kenya as '*cruel marriage*' that reached divorce moment, by what he understand splitting Kenya into several ethnic sub-countries.

At the time of writing this article the Kenyan media discourse is already dominated by the discussion about presidential election in 2022 and debating who would be Uhuru Kenyatta's successor. Kenyans on a daily basis hear information about William Ruto searching for running mates in Kikuyu dominated counties, as well Raila Odinga seeking for his own successor capable of bearing his political heritage. Kenyan politics are noticeably still focused on ethnic alliances enabling meeting territorial distribution requirement, rather than cross-ethnic interests.

Throughout the decades Kenyan governments and judicial powers were taking actions in order to secure the ethnically unbiased positions of the president of the Republic with centripetalism solutions and devolution as the most important instruments reinforcing it. Despite those efforts, presidential elections in Kenya are represented in the discourse and comprehended by observers and analysts as a race between two major, affronted political forces associated with particular ethnic groups or alliances of the ethnic groups. Recent events in Kenya and carefully observed public discourse allow to make cautious presupposition, that no radical changes will be observed in the overall electoral approach and performance neither at the politician side, nor at the civic one.

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<sup>18</sup> <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/03/05/what-is-your-tribe-the-invention-of-kenyas-ethnic-communities/> (access 30.06.2019, date of publishing 05.03.2018).

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# Zimbabwe Elections

Vladimir Shubin\*

pp. 133-140

The elections that opened the way for the independence of Zimbabwe took place in February 1980 according to the Lancaster House agreement. They were internationally recognized and acclaimed by many, but not by everybody. In particular the pressure on the voters, exercised by the armed persons who had not been confined to assembly points, was reported. Besides, apart from Commonwealth forces, deployed in the country according to that agreement, six thousand armed South Africans (Moorcraft and McLaughlin, 2008: 125) and at least 500 Mozambicans (Moorcraft, 2011: 40) were allegedly present there.

The results were critically assessed by leaders of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), including its president Joshua Nkomo who just did not believe his party could receive just 20 seats in parliament. One of its former military leaders even told the author: "There was no election in 1980" (Discussion).

During the next two decades the elections in Zimbabwe were less controversial, though it was difficult to call them always really "free and fair", especially under the conditions of mass repressions in Matabeleland in 1983-1987.

The obvious problems began on a threshold of the 2000. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was founded in 1999, an opposition party, led by Morgan Tsvangirai and formed from members of the broad coalition of civic society groups in particular the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. Unexpectedly for the leadership of the ruling party, ZANU-PF, it failed in a referendum on the draft of the new constitution in February 2000 opposed by the MDC. But this failure was also "a blessing in disguise" for the ruling party – since the prospect of defeat at the parliamentary elections scheduled for June of the same year was real, it made them mobilize all their resources – from the party structures at different levels to the security forces; it was reported that during the election 29 MDC supporters were killed (Chan, 2003: 158).

Having received just 2 % more of the votes than the MDC, ZANU-PF retained a reliable majority in parliament only at the expense of additional members appointed by president and elected by the Zimbabwe Council of Chiefs. At the same time, there was a clear difference in the electoral preferences of the urban and rural population of Zimbabwe: the opposition received all seats in parliament from the largest cities, Harare and Bulawayo.

The parliamentary elections were followed in 2002 by presidential ones; Robert Mugabe won with 56,2 % of votes over Morgan Tsvangirai (42 %) among new accusations of election rigging. Dr Ibbo Mandaza, head of the SAPES Trust NGO in Harare even claimed (though many years later) referring to a senior official of the Zimbabwe Election Commission that "during the presidential election in 2002, Mugabe only polled 18 percent of votes while Tsvangirai amassed the remaining percentage" (The Zimbabwean).

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The 2005 election were more successful for ZANU-PF, probably because MDC had split by that time. Much more problematic were next elections in March 2008. They were held in the atmosphere of the deep economic and financial crisis with galloping inflation and were preceded by political talks between the government and the opposition mediated by the South African President Thabo Mbeki. They resulted in certain improvements of the electoral procedures and the President was no more able to appoint additional members to the House of Assembly, be it directly or through the Council of Chiefs.

This time the level of violence during the elections was much lower, but the tension increased after the elections due to the long delay in publication of their results. After the recount and the verification of the results, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced on 2 May that Tsvangirai won 47.9 % of the vote and Mugabe 43.2 %, necessitating a second round which was to be held on 27 June 2008.

Moreover, ZANU-PF for the first time lost majority in the National Assembly; it received only 99 seats, less than MDC-T (100 seats). Besides, ten seats went to MDC-M headed by Arthur Mutambara and one to an independent candidate.

The period following the first round was marked by political violence. ZANU-PF and the MDC each blamed the other's supporters for it. On 22 June 2008, Tsvangirai announced that he was withdrawing from the run-off, but it was too late and his name remained on the ballot. So, the second round of elections went ahead and Mugabe, the only actively participating candidate, received 85,5 % of votes.

The tension was growing but in July the talks began between ZANU-PF and two "formations" of MDC, led by Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara. Their success was achieved due to the mediation of Thabo Mbeki and his team on behalf of the Southern African Development Community. Finally on 15 September 2008, the leaders of the SADC 14 member states witnessed the signing of the Global Political Agreement by three main political forces in Zimbabwe. According to it, Mugabe remained president, Tsvangirai became prime minister, and Mutambara became deputy prime minister.

The inclusive government (the word "coalition" was not used by ZANU-PF) survived till July 2013, when after the adoption of a new constitution, general elections finally took place after three year delay. The success of ZANU-PF was expected, but the results went beyond such expectations. Mugabe received 61,9 % of votes and Tsvangirai just 33,94 %; in parliament the gap was even larger – 197 seats for ZANU-PF and just 70 for MDC-T and 2 for another MDC formation.

This time the elections took place in a quiet and peaceful atmosphere and the difference was so evident that Tsvangirai limited his protest actions by loud complains. The attitude of Tsvangirai's sponsors can be seen from such titles of British publications as "Zimbabwe inconvenient election truth" (The Guardian, 5 August 2013) and "Facing an uncomfortable truth" (Economist, 6 August 2013).

The defeat in the elections caused confusion in the ranks of the opposition. Their culmination was the "overthrow" of Tsvangirai and even his exclusion from the party. In response, he and his supporters expelled their opponents, including Tendai Biti, who served as general secretary of MDC-T, and he had to create one more "formation", MDC – Renewal Team. When the author asked one of the Zimbabwean politicians about the reasons for such a sharp rapture, he replied: "Everything is very simple. There is less money from outside, so the quarrelling is more".

As distinct from the opposition, Robert Mugabe remained an undisputed leader of ZANU-PF, however a bitter struggle began for his heritage, and dismissals and expulsions of prominent members took place here as well as consequences of personalities' struggle for power.

The new elections were expected in July 2018, but dramatic developments took place in Zimbabwe earlier. For many years, the Western countries, and especially the former metropolis Great Britain, have set themselves the goal of a “regime change” in Zimbabwe, applying sanctions and leading a constant information war. Nevertheless, the changes, when they did happen, were caused mainly by internal dynamics, moreover they took place outside the election process.

Although the departure of the 93-year-old leader was then inevitable, Mugabe was in no hurry to resign and, on the contrary, was going to run for president again in the elections in 2018. Moreover, many believed that he and his party ZANU-PF would win again in particular due to splits in the opposition.

However, the developments in November 2017 led to a drastic change in the political configuration in Zimbabwe. These events are well covered in academic literature and the author will limit the narrative to few main points.

The immediate cause of the internal political crisis was a sharp intra-party conflict in ZANU-PF. By this time, two opposing factions had been formed: the so called Lacoste<sup>1</sup>, representing veterans of the national liberation movement, led by Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the Generation 40 (G40), a group of younger politicians, mostly between 40 and 50 years. It is believed that the G40 faction was created by the then Minister of Education Jonathan Moyo and informally led by Robert Mugabe’s wife Grace.

Between the two factions, there began an open struggle for the place of the successor of the still living president. Mugabe’s wife seemed to be winning: on November 6, 2017 Mnangagwa was removed from his post as vice-president on charges of attempting a coup d’état, expelled from the party by its Central Committee and forced to flee to South Africa via Mozambique. It was expected that his rival, Grace Mugabe would be elected ZANU-PF vice-president at the party congress scheduled by the end of 2018, and then the country’s vice-president, becoming the successor of the noticeably fragile leader.

The removal of Mnangagwa, who was close to the Zimbabwean military, forced the army command to act. On November 13, at a press conference, General Constantino Chiwenga, the commander, accompanied by some 90 senior military figures, bluntly stated that “if comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in” (The Telegraph, 2017) if the purges did not stop.

In response, on the same evening, the then Minister of Information and the ZANU-PF spokesperson, Simon Khaya-Moyo, on behalf of the leadership, called the conduct of the general “treasonable” (This is Africa, 2017), but it was already late. On the night of November 14, 2017, the military took control of the strategic points in Harare, including the official residence and the house of Robert Mugabe.

However, in an official statement early on the morning of November 15, Major-General Subisiso Moyo, the military spokesperson (who is now Minister of Foreign Relations) stressed on behalf of the Zimbabwean Defence Force that these actions were not a coup: “We wish to assure the nation that His Excellency, the President Robert Gabriel Mugabe and his family are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes” (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2017).

No doubt, the ZDF Command was well aware that the illegal overthrow of the president and violence would seriously weaken the position of the military in the international arena. Of particular concern to the military was the position of the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which do not recognize the change of power by force.

<sup>1</sup> The grouping was named Lacoste after the French clothing company whose logo is a crocodile because Mnangagwa is commonly known in Zimbabwe as ‘Crocodile’ (*Ngwenya* in the Shona language).

The army actions were broadly supported by Zimbabwe's population. The demonstration for the resignation of Mugabe held at the call of the Association of War Veterans on November 18 was peaceful. Thousands of jubilant people, both black and white Zimbabweans, representatives of various political forces, in the spirit of unity, without party slogans, took to the streets in the country's major towns demanding Mugabe's resignation. So, these dramatic developments took place outside the electoral competition between the major political parties.

On the evening of November 19, Mugabe, who was accompanied by the commanders of the armed forces, spoke on television, and his speech was in a conciliatory spirit: he stressed that the events of previous week were no challenge to his authority as head of state. However, instead of the expected resignation, he assured that he would preside at the upcoming congress of his party (Mail and Guardian, 2017), warning of the inadmissibility of violation of party rules and procedures. So Mugabe refused to resign in an "amicable" way, instead he (or was it his wife?) clung to power.

Following this, a party leadership meeting was held on November 20 in which 201 of the 300 members of the ZANU-PF Central Committee participated and the same people who two weeks earlier expelled Mnangagwa, elected him President and First Secretary of ZANU-PF instead of Mugabe, who was "unanimously" recalled. It is noteworthy that this decision was announced by the same party spokesperson S. K. Khaya-Moyo. In this situation, the opponents of Mugabe in ZANU-PF decided to resort to impeachment, and given that both the majority of parliamentarians from ZANU-PF and the opposition were against Mugabe, they would be able to get the necessary two-thirds of votes.

The drastic change of the situation became clear when as head of state, Mugabe appointed a government meeting on the morning of November 22, but it was attended only by five ministers and the prosecutor general, while the remaining 17 ministers preferred to participate in the meeting in parliament on impeachment. It seems that for Mugabe this was a "moment of truth", a confirmation of the loss of real power and finally prompted him to resign.

In a letter, received by the Speaker of the National Assembly on the same day, Mugabe stressed that his decision to resign was voluntary and was caused by "concern for the welfare of the people of Zimbabwe" and his "desire to ensure a smooth, peaceful and non-violent transfer of power" (Al-Jazeera, 22 Nov. 2017). The news abruptly halted an impeachment hearing that had already begun against him.

The immediate successor to Mugabe was Mnangagwa, who returned to Zimbabwe on November 22 and delivered his first speech as the future president. He was sworn in as the new President of Zimbabwe on November 24, 2018 and Chiwenga became Vice-President. The latest presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Zimbabwe on July 30 last year, the first elections after the resignation of Robert Mugabe and after the death of Morgan Tsvangirai, who had led the opposition for almost two decades.

ZANU-PF won the parliamentary elections, having received 145 seats in the National Assembly (though 14 seats less compared to the last elections in 2013) of the possible 210 (another 60 seats are women's quota elected by proportional system). 63 seats were received by the Movement for Democratic Change – Alliance, a coalition of several of the 125 (!) parties that were registered in Zimbabwe after Mugabe's resignation.

The presidential election was won by the incumbent head of state Emmerson Mnangagwa, just with 50.8 % of the vote while the leader of the Alliance, Nelson Chamisa, scored 44.3 %. While earlier, in 2013, Mugabe scored 61.1 % of the vote against 33.9 % of Tsvangirai and such a convincing result did not allow the opposition to launch a protest campaign, Mnangagwa's victory was less impressive.



It should be noted also that other opposition candidates completely failed. The third place in the presidential election was taken by Tokozani Khupe (head of the faction that broke away from the main opposition, but retained the name of the party of the times of Tsvangirai – MDC-T), gaining only 0.9 % of the vote.

Apparently, the main reason for the good result of the main opposition was its new leader. The relatively young (40 years old) and energetic Chamisa contrasted strongly with 75 year Mnangagwa. It may sound strange, but it looks like the departure of Tsvangirai who for almost two decades failed to bring his party to power, did not worsen the chances of the opposition, especially in the eyes of young voters. In particular Chamisa managed to bring into MDC-Alliance some prominent opposition members, like Tendai Biti, who had earlier split from Tsvangirai.

The second reason for this result is the absence of a large number of violations that were observed in the 2013 elections not to say about the earlier ones. Finally, it is noteworthy also that during the election campaign Chamisa positioned himself more left-wing than the incumbent president. If earlier Mugabe accused the opposition of working for the West, during the 2018 election campaign Chamisa blamed Mnangagwa for concessions to the West. In addition, the opposition leader spoke critically about the role of China in Zimbabwe promising to expel Chinese investors if he wins the due in July (BBC News, 2018), and that was positively perceived by many voters dissatisfied with the “domination of the Chinese”.

However the main surprise of the election campaign was Mugabe’s international press-conference on July 29, on the eve of the election. He stated that he could not vote for Mnangagwa as he was among “those who have tormented” him while Chamisa was “doing well judging by his rallies” (Quartz Africa, 2017). However, given that Mugabe became a discredited figure, it is difficult to say whether his support for Chamisa helped the opposition leader, or on the contrary, pushed some voters away from him.

Unlike the previous elections, the government allowed observers from Western countries, in particular from the European Union) to attend the elections. More than 600 foreign and 5,541 local observers have been accredited (The Guardian, 27 Jul. 2018), and visas were issued given to international media. This time even hardened MDC activists talked of the “strangely peaceful atmosphere”, however soon the situation turned to worst.

According to Zimbabwean legislation, the election commission had the right to announce the results of the elections no later than August 5 and these terms were not violated. But the opposition, dissatisfied with the coming results of the parliamentary elections, organized protest events in Harare on August 1, demanding the early announcement of the results of the presidential elections. Apparently, they remembered well the experience of the 2008 elections, when, according to the opposition, the delay in announcing the results of the first round and the fraud led to Mugabe’s subsequent victory in the second round. When dispersing demonstrators who used violence and created chaos in the Central Business District of the capital, six people were killed. In this case, the authorities used not only and not so much the police but the army, whose soldiers fired live ammunition.

The main complaints concerned the fact that in 20% of polling stations the results of the voting were not posted immediately after the counting of votes (as required by law), which could affect the representativeness of the elections. Given the small margin between Mnangagwa and Chamisa, this fact caused doubts about the election results. It is believed that two different explanations can be given for delays in publicizing presidential results. First, ZANU-PF’s opponents believe the results were distorted in order to ensure the victory of Mnangagwa in the first round. Secondly, the desire to delay as much as possible the announcement of Mnangagwa’s “weak” results against the background of the “strong” results of ZANU-PF in parliamentary elections in order to psychologically “fix” the victory of the ruling party.

It should be noted, however, that according to representatives of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), which is a coalition of 36 local non-governmental organizations, the official results of the presidential election generally correspond to their sample from polling stations (50.8 % against 50.7 % for Mnangagwa and 44.3 % versus 45.7 % for Chamisa), (Zimbabwe Election Support Network, 2018: 63).

As in the previous elections, there was a big gap in political preferences between the city and the village. The largest cities in the country, Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru, preferred Chamisa. Thus, in Harare, Mnanganva won 27 % of the vote, and Chamisa 71 %. At the same time, in the neighbouring rural province of Central Mashonaland, Mnangagwa received 76 % of the vote, and Chamisa 20 %. Indeed, apart from redistribution of land, smallholder farmers in rural areas receive from the government inputs, loans, and services and that makes many of them staunch ZANU-PF supporters.

In spite of the change in the leadership, the opposition resorted to its spoiling tactics: though this time the Western election monitors were on the ground well before the elections, Chamisa's MDC-A was setting the scene in advance to reject the election results as not "free, fair, and credible", if it loses. Then, after several days of delay, Chamisa filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court on August 10 to annul the results of the presidential elections. He failed but this circumstance led to the delay for two weeks to August 26 the inauguration of Mnangagwa, scheduled initially for August 12.

The forceful suppression of the opposition undermined Mnangagwa's desire to look different than Mugabe, especially in the eyes of foreign investors. However, perhaps even more damage was caused by the accusation that he is just a "puppet of the military who overthrew Mugabe".

Carrying out the "damage control" Mnangagwa apologized for the behaviour of the security forces. In addition, S.K. Moyo as minister stopped on the spot the police's attempt to disperse the opposition press conference.

As distinct from "Mugabe's era" Mnangagwa, having promised to investigate the events, asked Khalema Motlanthe, highly respected former president of South Africa to head the Commission of Inquiry into the Zimbabwe post-election violence, comprised of both Zimbabwean and foreign prominent persons.

The MDC Alliance and their supporters in the media immediately denounced the composition of the commission and expressed doubt in its capacity to produce a credible report (The Patriot, 2018). Then, after he was subpoenaed to testify before the Commission, Chamisa branded the demonstrators "stupid", adding that their actions were uncalled for (The Herald, 2018) and trying to dissociate them from his party. Naturally therefore he could not be satisfied with the report that stated: "On the basis of the evidence presented, the Commission found on a balance of probabilities that the protest were pre-planned and well-organised as shown, for example, by the evidence of the pre-election speeches of the MDC Alliance leaders and the evidence of all of the events that took place on the 1st of August 2018 including the fact that groups arrived with an assortment of objects such as containers of stones, bricks, logs and posters, which they used in their demonstrations" (Zimbabwe. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 2018: 45). Nevertheless Chamisa claimed: "The Motlanthe findings were not backed by any fact" (The Standard, 2018).

The Commission confirmed that six people died and thirty-five were injured as a result of actions by the military and the police but concluded that "on the basis of all the prevailing circumstances, and in the light of all the evidence presented including the rapid escalation of the situation in a very short space of time, the decision to deploy the Military to assist the Police in the containment of the riots was justified" and, "in accordance with the Constitution and the applicable law". However "the operational framework" in terms

of Public Order and Security Act “was not fully followed in that the deployed troops were not placed under the command of the Regulating Authority” (Zimbabwe. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 2018: 46) and “the use of live ammunition directed at people especially when they were fleeing was clearly unjustified and disproportionate” (Zimbabwe. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 2018: 47).

In conclusion the report regarded the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry, with a majority of international members, as the confirmation of “President Mnangagwa’s determination to ensure a non-repetition of such an unwholesome national experience in future”. They believed “that President Mnangagwa is determined to open a new chapter in the policies and activities of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, including the restoration of the country’s diplomatic and commercial relations with the international community.” (Zimbabwe. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 2018: 55).

The developments of the later period of Zimbabwe’s history are beyond the theme of this paper. Unfortunately we have to say that both political and especially economic problems of the country remain<sup>2</sup>. A new wave of protests began in Zimbabwe on 14 January 2019 following a 130 % increase in the price of fuel; and the confrontation with police resulted in hundreds of arrests and several deaths and new problems for Zimbabwe’s “diplomatic and commercial relations”.

### Conclusion (perhaps, controversial)

With due respect to the “universal values of democracy”, we have to say that the major changes in the political history of independent Zimbabwe, be them positive or negative, took place outside the election process.

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# The Fetishised Role of External Actors in Zimbabwe's 2018 Elections: Implications for the Future Plebiscites

Gorden Moyo\*

pp. 141-157

## Introduction

This article focuses on the fetishised role of key external actors in the electoral value chain of Zimbabwe's 2018 elections. The powerful global actors namely, the UK, the EU, the U.S., China and Russia renewed their geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in Zimbabwe following the ouster of Robert Mugabe as the President of that country in November 2017. While the direct involvement of Brussels, London, Washington, Beijing and Kremlin in the military coup of 2017 in Zimbabwe is yet to be investigated, their interest in the first post-Mugabe elections was palpable as will be explained anon.

It is common knowledge that the relationship between the Mugabe regime and the key Euro-American powers especially the UK, the EU and the U.S. was acrimonious over the past two decades. Apparently these Euro-American powers accused Mugabe's regime for gross human rights violations, corruptocracy and electoral smithing among the other economic, social, and political ills (see Kurebwa, 2019; Crisis in 2018, 2019). In turn, and as a counterpoint, Mugabe routinely lashed out on the excolonisers and neoimperialists for what he considered to be their overt and covert regime change agendas. The protracted feud over these and other issues resulted in the severing of international relations between Zimbabwe and the rest of the Euro-American countries and their economic juridical institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see for example Zimbabwe Democracy, 2001).

In the context of these frosty relations, for almost two decades, the Euro-American investors, financiers, creditors, traders, donors, corporations, and entrepreneurs watched from the terraces while their erstwhile global geopolitical competitors, particularly the Chinese and the Russians increased their footprints in Zimbabwe's economic and political spheres. Observably, Beijing and Kremlin were specifically courted by the Mugabe regime in order to spite London, Brussels and Washington together with their transAtlantic allies. Clearly, the duo of China and Russia who are both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were also invited to Zimbabwe to act as a geopolitical and geoeconomic counterweight to the alleged Euro-American regime change agendas. In this regard, Zimbabwe was by default, if not by design, entrapped in the broad global

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geopolitical competition between the Global North and the Global South interests (for a more nuanced discussion on global geopolitical competition see Freedom House, 2019; Shullman, 2019; Jones and Taussig, 2019; Ursu and Berg, 2018; National Intelligence Council, 2018; Grant, 2012).

In this context, the departure of Robert Mugabe was billed by the Euro-American powers as the turning point and significant moment for them to commercially and diplomatically re-insert themselves back into Zimbabwe after two decades of frozen relations (see Knoppert, 2019). Paradoxically, Beijing and Kremlin also welcomed Mugabe's departure and his replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa as an opportune time for them to reconsolidate their South-South cooperation as well as protect their investment, trade, and finance interest in Zimbabwe (see for example Dube, 2019; Zwicewicz, 2019). It is hardly surprising therefore that the key global players across the North-South divide tempered their reaction to the military coup which removed Mugabe from power conveniently preferring to call it a 'military-assisted transition' (see also ICG, 2017; Pigou, 2017).

Apparently, it was in the interest of the new government of Zimbabwe to sanitise the political and military events of November 2017 by preaching the gospel of political, economic and electoral reforms as well as embracing the global juridico-economic agenda of neoliberalism, democracy, rule of law and zero-tolerance to corruption (Raftopoulos, 2019; Rupiya, 2018; Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Lewanika, 2018; Dore, 2018). It is argued here that this narrative was largely directed more at the international audiences and less at the domestic constituencies. The new authorities in Harare specifically identified the elections slated for July 2018 as the ideal platform for them to showcase their reform agenda to the rest of the world.

It is therefore not surprising that the 2018 elections were the most internationally monitored and observed elections in Africa with 46 countries and 15 regional and continental bodies involved plus a legion of international and regional media houses including the CNN, the SABC, the BBC and the Al Jazeera (see Raftopoulos, 2019; Rupiya, 2018; Zimbabwe Election Support Network, 2018). Not entirely unexpected, these landmark elections saw the beneficiary of the November 2017 military coup, Emmerson Mnangagwa of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) controversially elected President of Zimbabwe defeating his main rival Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance.

In light of these dynamics, this article grapples with three interrelated questions. First, what role did the external actors play in the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe? Second, what were their intentions and interests? Third, how did their motivations complement or compete with those of the ruling party and/or the opposition? In responding to these questions, the article seeks to make a humble contribution towards the emerging debate on the spectres of increased external influence in the future elections in Zimbabwe.

For reasons of brevity, space and time, the article does not broach the role played by major regional and international organisations such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the United Nations (UN), all of which continue to be powerful political and development actors in Zimbabwe. However, given my particular focus on the fetishised external actors, I chose to limit the scope of this article to the study of the key global economic governance actors namely, the UK, the EU, the U.S., China and Russia (all except the EU, are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). But while an exhaustive account cannot be provided here, an indicative sketch of the activities, intentions, and interests of the key global powers are illuminated in the article.

For the purposes of clarity of analysis, the article is portioned into seven sections that try and shed light on the activities, intentions and interests of the key global actors in the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. Section II presents the idea of global convergence that characterised Mugabe's exit from Zimbabwe's politics in 2017. Section III provides a snapshot of Zimbabwe's foreign policy realignment ahead of the elections. Section IV retraces the Euro-American footprints in the 2018 elections while Section V sketches out the contours of Beijing and Kremlin interventions in the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. Section VI imagines the implications of the foreign influence to the future elections in Zimbabwe while Section VII stacks the conclusions of the article.

### **Global convergence on Mugabe's exit**

To provide a clear-eyed analysis of the role of the key global interlocutors in Zimbabwe's 2018 elections, the discussion here is premised on the discursive context of the removal of Robert Mugabe from power by the military in November 2017. This largely unexpected end of Mugabe's rule was hailed by Zimbabweans from all climes of life as well as by the international community as the end of a dark era and the beginning of a new dawn for the country (see also Chikwawawa, 2019; Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018). In this regard, the removal of Mugabe was characterised by a rare moment of global convergence.

It is striking to note that even regional, continental, and international multilateral institutions such as the SADC, the AU and the UN also conveniently chose to ignore the unconstitutional means through which Mugabe was removed. One can only surmise that this was a case of 'the end justifying the means' (for a more nuanced analysis of SADC's position on unconstitutional change of governments see Chigara, 2018; Crisis Coalition, 2018). While there was an illusion of global consensus on Mugabe's exit, it is important to note that the different actors had their different set of reasons for wanting him out.

Notably, the ousting of Mugabe was seen by some Euro-American powers, investors, corporations, financiers, creditors, donors and diplomats as offering an opportunity to recover the geoeconomic space that was lost to China and Russia during the past two decades of their tenuous relationship with the Mugabe regime (Knoppert, 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019; African Development Bank, 2019; Chikwawawa, 2019; Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018).

However, unlike the widely documented cases of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Patrice Lumumba of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, and Luis Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and many other luminaries across Africa where the Euro-American security institutions were the master-minders of these coups and assassinations (see Wrong, 2000; Stoleroff, 2013; Powell and Chacha, 2019), there is no evidence as yet that directly implicates the external actors in Mugabe's toppling. Nevertheless, there are some observers who posit that the involvement of the Chinese in Zimbabwe's coup cannot be ruled out without a critical inquiry. What gives credence to this claim is that the former Commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces and now the Vice President of Zimbabwe General Constantino Chiwenga was in China barely a week before the November 2017 coup (Raftopoulos, 2019; Canvas, 2017).

However, it is not without irony that Beijing and Kremlin also did not oppose the removal of Mugabe by the military establishment. To be sure, Mugabe considered the Chinese and the Russians as his 'all-weather friends', 'strategic development partners' and bulwarks against the Euro-American neo-imperial interests in Zimbabwe and Africa. As such,

Mugabe allowed China and Russia to gain access into Zimbabwe's lucrative extractive sectors of the economy such as gold, diamond, platinum, coal, and chrome mining as well as contract farming (see Dube, 2019; Zwicewicz, 2019; Olivier and Suhkov, 2015; Chigora and Goredema, 2010). As realists have long observed, like all states, China and Russia are self-interested actors who saw Mugabe's failure to manage his succession conundrum as a threat to their national and geopolitical interests. For them, Mugabe's replacement by his long time ally (Mnangagwa) represented continuity, stability and protection of their commercial, economic and political interest in Zimbabwe (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018 and 2019).

That aside, Mugabe's exit was also received by the ordinary Zimbabweans as a vista of opportunity for the betterment of their lives (Chikwawawa, 2019; Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018). Accordingly, the majority of the people expected the post-Mugabe authorities to constitute a government of national unity charged with the responsibility of creating conditions for economic take-off, international re-engagement, and democratic elections (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018). The envisaged government of national unity was to be composed of the ruling party, the opposition, civil society, academia and business. A unity government was viewed as particularly important because public confidence in ZANU-PF government was at its nadir.

Yet, instead of capitalising on the illusion of global convergence presented by Mugabe's departure to establish a unity government, Mnangagwa and his allies opted for the electoral route slated for July 2018. Their decision was arguably informed and bolstered by the fact that the opposition was weak and divided by internal wrangles and that the main leader of the opposition Morgan Tsvangirayi was bed-ridden (he subsequently died on 14 February 2018 – before elections), (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018). Buoyed by these factors, ZANU-PF strategists believed that they could easily win the elections and then get down to the business of rehabilitating the economy with all the key global players on their side.

Thus, upon assuming power on 24 November 2017, Mnangagwa spoke of his government's commitment to free and fair elections and his willingness to re-engage with the international community (Chikwawawa, 2019; Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018). Notably, this narrative was a major departure from the Mugabe's acerbic rhetoric and anti-Western antics. To this end, the new narrative was sweet music to the Global North capitalists who were eager to have their foothold back in Zimbabwe. As a result, the global actors were almost uniform in their public support for the Mnangagwa administration. However, this optimism has now been tempered down by concerns over the post-election violence as well as the continued free fall of the economic as will be explained anon.

## Foreign policy realignment

It will be noted that in the lead up to the July 2018 elections, the Mnangagwa administration sought to realign itself directly with global powers through careful balancing and re-orienting itself towards the neo-liberal policy framework in order to appeal to the Euro-American audiences. Moreover, Mnangagwa made it his business to seek to re-engage and cultivate closer relations with the Euro-American powers while consolidating Zimbabwe's relations with its traditional allies including China, Russia and the rest of the Global South (Raftopoulos, 2019; Rupiya, 2018; Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; Lewanika, 2018; Dore, 2018).



In line with the public opinion at the time, Mnangagwa set out to distance himself from the Mugabe era by declaring his administration the 'New Dispensation' and alternatively the 'Second Republic'. In a bid to lure international investors, financiers, creditors and donors Mnangagwa adopted the slogan 'Zimbabwe is open for business'. At the same time, the new administration expressed its intentions to rejoin the Commonwealth as well as re-engage the rest of the international community (see House of Commons Library, 2019; African Development Bank, 2019; Dore, 2018). All this signalled that Mnangagwa was ready to embrace the neo-liberal policy orthodox as stipulated by the global juridico-economic programme of the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Economic Forum (WEF). In this way the Mnangagwa administration sought to portray itself as a reformist government.

Not surprisingly, Mnangagwa pledged that his administration would carry out various economic stabilisation measures including ensuring the safety of foreign direct investment, and compensation for white commercial farmers who lost their land during the Mugabe inspired Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme of the 2000s (Mnangagwa, 2018). The leitmotif of this narrative was to appeal to the Euro-American powers that had imposed targeted measures and sanctions on the Mugabe regime in the 2000s. This was also a signal to the global capitalists that Harare was abandoning the anti-Western and the radical populist policies pursued by the Mugabe regime over the last two decades.

In order to attract the much needed foreign direct investment (FDI), the new regime in Harare made changes to the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act, decreeing that in the mining sector the 51 percent local ownership requirement would only apply to diamonds and platinum (Raftopoulos, 2019; African Development Bank, 2019; Rupiya, 2018). It is important at this point to note that the Mnangagwa government has recently removed the requirements on diamond and platinum subsectors. To its credit, FDI improved following the ousting of Mugabe, with US\$1 billion in investment projects approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority in the first quarter of 2018, compared to just US\$150 million for the same period in 2017 (European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018). Clearly, the initial Mnangagwa's economic thrust resonated with some global capitalists, investors, financiers and creditors alike.

Besides, the new government emphasised that it will guarantee adequate investments in people, establish a competitive environment for private enterprises, open the economy to international trade and sustain macroeconomic stability (Mnangagwa, 2019; African Development Bank, 2018). It also promised to repay its sovereignty debt thereby portraying itself as a responsible member of the international community deserving trust and respect (Mnangagwa, 2018). In this regard, the new government was inviting the juridical economic institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Davos Forum to become partners of Zimbabwe in its bid to rebuild the battered economy.

Additionally, the Mnangagwa administration committed itself to combating corruption which is now endemic in Zimbabwe. The Transparency International places Zimbabwe high (Number 157 of 180 countries) in its Corruption Perception Index in 2017 and estimates the country's losses inflicted by corruption at US\$1 billion annually, making it one of the most important threats to the country's social and economic development (Mnangagwa, 2019; African Development Bank, 2018; European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018). The rhetoric on combating corruption also came against a backdrop where Mugabe had lamented about the disappearance of US\$15 billion.

On the electoral front, Mnangagwa publicly and repeatedly committed to holding free, fair and credible elections in 2018. In order to concretise his rhetoric Mnangagwa signed

the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which Mugabe had refused to sign over the years. To further enhance his reformist agenda, Mnangagwa ended the ban on the Euro-Western observation of Zimbabwean elections introduced by Mugabe in 2002 (Knoppert, 2019; European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018; Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, 2018).

At the same time a battery of electoral reforms were implemented including, creating a fresh voters roll based on the Biometric Voter Registration process; an enhancement of citizen access to the inspection process; ZEC Outreach and Communications; barring traditional leaders from partisan politics; and enacting a Political Party Code of Conduct as well as improving the Integrity of Assisted Voting (also Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; Raftopoulos, 2019; European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018; Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, 2018). These represented important departures from the past and the conduct of the former president Mugabe.

Predictably, the 2018 elections were won by Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF. The election process received endorsement from several Election Observation Missions including the AU, SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Association for Free Research and International Cooperation (AFRIC) as well as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) among others. These bodies described the 2018 elections as orderly, relatively free, fair, and credible. Although the international observers and monitors from the U.S. and the EU observer missions also expressed contentment on the election processes, they however pointed out some worrying electoral flaws such as the use of state resources and intimidation, manipulation of traditional leaders, and partial coverage in the state media in favour of ZANU-PF (European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018; IPSS, 2018; IRI/NDI, 2018).

Whereas, the Heads of Mission of the UK, the EU, the U.S., Canada, and Switzerland noted with concern the eruption of post-election violence which left at least six protestors dead, they fell short of outright censure of Harare. This was because these actors had hoped for democratic transition and they did not want to antagonise themselves with Mnangagwa and his associates. However, there was a palpable sense of anger on the streets of Harare, Bulawayo and other major towns and cities in Zimbabwe. There was also a sense of disenchantment among Zimbabwean diaspora communities across the globe. To manage the unfortunate events of 1 August 2018 and to placate both the general populace of Zimbabwe which was shocked by the killings and the external players including SADC and the AU, Mnangagwa constituted an Independent Inquiry led by the former president of South Africa, Kgalema Montlante (Rupiya, 2018; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018; Raftopoulos, 2019).

Not entirely unexpected, Montlante Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2018 was well received by the Euro-American powers. For example, during her visit to South Africa in September 2018 the then British Prime Minister Teresa May stated that she was pleased with Mnangagwa's Commission of Inquiry into the election violence viewing it as 'an important step for Zimbabwe' (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018).

## The Euro-American Footprints

The discussion here subscribes to the oft-proved proposition that states often intervene in the affairs of other states in order to balance or hedge their own interests and ideally, to gain power and influence with that state. It is widely documented that the UK, the EU and the U.S. and other transAtlantic powers have devoted much diplomatic resources,

financial resources, and political pressure over the last two decades purportedly to promote democratic transition in Zimbabwe. There are also claims that the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair tried to persuade the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki to support a British led military action against Mugabe in the 2000s (see *The Guardian*, Wednesday 27 November 2013).

Notably, the Euro-American powers ratcheted up their technologies of democracy promotion in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s against a backdrop of serious human rights violations by the Mugabe regime. Their strategy consisted of sanctions and targeted measures (Kurebwa, 2019). This included embargo on arms trading, restrictions of entry and freezing of personal assets of high-ranking members of the Mugabe regime, and suspension of development cooperation with the central government (see *Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act*, 2001). By the same token, the Global North powers, creditors, and donors supported the democracy campaigners including the civil society and the opposition ranged against Zimbabwe's tyrannical rulers. Revealingly, all these methodologies of intervention fell short of delivering the much desired regime change in Zimbabwe. Instead, this failure created political and economic opportunities for China and Russia to reinsert themselves in Zimbabwe's economic curvatures.

Still, it should be noted that at this crucial geopolitical juncture, the Euro-American actors are under increasing strain from an interconnected set of internal challenges including the residues of the 2008/9 global financial crisis, international terrorism and extremism, uncontrolled immigration into Europe, Euroscepticism, the difficult Brexit, the potential Grexit, populism and the rise of ultra-right wing political parties in France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Czech Republic (Freedom House, 2019; Galston, 2018: 8). With all these domestic problems, the UK, the EU and the U.S are currently unable even if they were willing to directly intervene, interfere or influence in a profound way the political and electoral landscape in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa.

Some critics argue that the global influence of the Euro-American actors has further been lobotomised by the weakening bonds between Europe and the U.S. partly as a result of President Donald Trump's populism, isolationism, protectionism, economic nationalism, jingoism and nativism (Freedom House, 2019; Magsame *et al.*, 2018; Stremmler, 2017). Arguably, Trump has very little regard for his transAtlantic allies. Instead, he admires some illiberal leaders including Kim Jong Un of North Korea, Vladimir Putin of Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, Viktor Orban of Hungary, Mohammed Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, and Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and other democracy backsliders and authoritarians (Freedom House, 2019; Magsame *et al.*, 2018). Coupled with many other factors, this has led to the reification of autocratisation processes across the globe and serious democratic deconsolidation in the North transAtlantic region.

Given these Euro-American existential challenges, Zimbabwe, has been sporadically appearing, disappearing, and reappearing on the geopolitical radar of the transAtlantic powers. Viewed as a whole, Zimbabwe is only a sideshow in the Euro-America's strategic thinking, albeit one that should not be underestimated. For the UK in particular, the problems in Zimbabwe were putting an extra weight to its difficult Brexit. It is therefore scarcely surprising that the removal of Mugabe from power was expressly welcomed by the British as well as the EU (House of Commons Library, 2019).

For example, Boris Johnson the then UK's Foreign Secretary (and now the Prime Minister) described Mugabe in the House of Commons as a power hungry despot who would not be missed (House of Commons Library, 2019). Thus, following Mugabe's departure from power, the UK was very quick to respond positively to the Mnangagwa regime by sending the Minister of African Affairs Roy Stewart as envoy to his inauguration as the

new President of Zimbabwe on 24 November 2017 (House of Commons Library, 2019; Knoppert, 2019). This gesture provided the much needed endorsement of the new rulers of Zimbabwe which they needed to shrug off the coup tag and signal Zimbabwe as entering a new era of change and reforms.

At the same time, the EU showed its willingness to re-engage and assist Zimbabwe under the leadership of Mnangagwa. It noted that the Mnangagwa administration had the potential to open the way to a full return to the rule of law within the constitutional framework, and under civilian rule, allowing for a preparation of the much-needed political and economic reforms (Knoppert, 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019). As such, the EU committed itself to supporting the Mnangagwa's re-engagement programme based on a clear and time-bound economic and political reform programme (European Union, 2018). It is therefore reasonable to argue that both the EU and the UK tacitly supported the Mnangagwa presidency ahead of the elections. Presumably the British were looking for new markets and investment frontiers in the event of Brexit. This has somewhat changed as a result of the embarrassing post-election violence of 1 August 2018 which left six people dead and millions of dollars lost as a result of arson and looting of retail shops and supermarkets (Raftopoulos, 2019; Knoppert, 2019; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018).

Interestingly, the EU and the UK began flirting with Harare after the 2013 elections which were overwhelmingly won by ZANU-PF. The extent of victory, the nature and size of the parliamentary opposition and the ability of the then Mugabe regime to stay in power meant that the regime change agenda was in doubt. For these reasons, both London and Brussels warmed up to the re-engagement overtures led by the former Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Patrick Chinamasa through the Lima process of 2015 (see Knoppert, 2019; Kurebwa, 2019; Chigumira, Mupunga and Chipumho, 2018). Since then the UK government has been doling out huge amounts of funds to Zimbabwe (also see Chitiyo and Kibble, 2014). For example, between 2014 and 2019 UK committed to spend 24 million pounds on civil society in support for transparency, accountability, human rights and citizen engagement in Zimbabwe. This included 5 million pounds announced in February 2018 specifically directed to international and local election monitoring initiatives (House of Commons Library, 2019).

More importantly, in May 2018, the Commonwealth Development Group—the UK government's development finance institution—announced an investment facility, in partnership with Standard Chartered Bank, that would lend up to US\$100 million to growing businesses in Zimbabwe (this was reportedly the first commercial loan by a British entity to Zimbabwe in over 20 years) (House of Commons Library, 2019; Knoppert, 2019). Similarly, the EU provided financial support to Zimbabwe to the tune of Euros 234 million under the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund with priority being health, food security and governance for the period between 2014 and 2020. It also committed to provide Euros 2 986 169 for a pre-election study of the political environment (House of Commons Library, 2019; Knoppert, 2019; Kurebwa, 2019).

Some opposition leaders such as Tendai Biti and Vincent Musewe were furious with the UK and the EU claiming through their routine Tweets that these two were bent on bailing out the repressive regime of ZANU-PF. The former ambassador to Zimbabwe Catriona Liang was particularly criticised for allegedly being too close and supportive of Mnangagwa and his associates in ZANU-PF (see Knoppert, 2019). To make the matters worse, the EU funded the strategic planning workshop of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) as well as insisted that Civil Society and the Opposition parties should engage with ZEC. Conversely, compared to the previous elections very little funding was availed by the EU and other traditional donors for voter education in the 2018. This was interpreted by some observers as the West's tacit support for the Mnangagwa administration.

Additionally, the role of the U.S. in Zimbabwe's 2018 elections was less clear. This discussion mentions the role of the U.S., but only insofar as it remained ambivalent actor. With Trump at the helm and with confusion over his administration's priorities, the U.S. policies and strategies in the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe remained unknown and unpredictable. It should however be noted that the U.S. set out some benchmarks for the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. These included the independent, nonpartisan administration of the vote by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC); voter roll transparency; freedom to campaign and equal access to state media for all parties; and an absence of security force participation in voter intimidation or election administration (Congressional Research Service, 2018).

In spite of the conditions above, the ambivalence of the U.S. towards Zimbabwe was evident when a few days before the elections, the U.S. Senate and House passed a Bill to amend the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (Congressional Research Service, 2018). Apparently the amendments sought to foster improved Zimbabwe-America bilateral relations in the event that the 2018 elections passed the test of integrity among the other conditions. To some observers this signalled the U.S. receptivity to the possibility of a ZANU-PF victory which a number of surveys had predicted at the time including the Afrobarometer.

More curiously, just before the 2018 elections, the U.S. and the UK officials suspended funding for Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (Zimrights), Grace to Heal, and the Election Resource Centre (ERC) all of which were on the forefront of voter education in 2018 (Reuters, 5 July 2018). This withdrawal of financial support to strategic organisations just before the elections sparked speculations that the UK and the U.S. were tacitly crippling civic education. It is generally believed that a well conscientised electorate has some capacity to exercise their right to vote even against intimidation.

It is an open secret that in the past the opposition election campaigns were supported by the Euro-American financiers but since the removal of Mugabe from power these financiers were no longer willing to support the opposition which they saw as unable to unseat the military anchored government of Mnangagwa. To be clear, the death of Morgan Tsvangirayi a colossal opposition figure in Zimbabwe created some further fault-lines in the main opposition MDC Alliance creating doubts on the capacity of the opposition to unite against the ruling party ZANU-PF (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018). Given these factors, the Euro-American actors were not averse to a ZANU-PF victory in the 2018 elections.

Be that as it may, the Euro-American observer missions were both appreciative and critical of the electoral processes. For example, the U.S. observer mission under the joint banner of the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute was critical of the 2018 elections. It noted that even though it found notable improvements in the political environment and electoral preparations for 2018 as compared to the previous elections, a number of significant opportunities to break with the past and restore confidence in advance of the polls were missed (IRI/NDI, 2018; Raftopoulos, 2019: 19). Their joint statement further noted that Zimbabwe has not yet established a tolerant, democratic culture that enables the conduct of democratic elections (Shekhovtsov, 2018). This was corroborated by the report of the EU Observer Mission (European Union Parliamentary Research Service, 2018; European Union, 2018).

Given these dynamics, it is perhaps reasonable to argue that the Euro-American powers went into the 2018 elections with a non-coherent strategy. Clearly they departed from their previous approach whose import was regime change in favour of the opposition. Presumably, this was necessitated by the changed political landscape in the country which

included the removal of Mugabe, the death of Morgan Tsvangirai, the divided opposition, and the reformist narrative of the Mnangagwa administration.

Whatever, intentions and interests of the UK, the EU and the U.S., it is the argument of this article that these powers were keen to mend their relations with Zimbabwe in order for them to recapture their geopolitical space that had slipped off their hands in the last 20 years.

## The Chinese and Russian Influence

It is argued here that the geostrategic agendas of the key global actors who have strategic investments in Zimbabwe like the Chinese and the Russians compel these powerful countries to have interest in the political and electoral affairs of the country as a means of safeguarding their investment, trade, and finance. It is the argument of this article that both Beijing and Kremlin used their soft-power to advance their interests in Zimbabwe, particularly through no-strings attached, mutual respect, and win-win principles of South-South cooperation.

To begin with, it will be noted that as relations with the Euro-American powers strained in the 2000s, the then government of Zimbabwe adopted a Look East Policy which led to the deepening of political and diplomatic relations with China, Russia, and the other Asian and Euro-Asian economies. Dating back to the liberation struggle era, Beijing and Moscow supported Zimbabwe's liberation fighters financially, materially, diplomatically and politically (see Mhanda, 2011). It is therefore by no means superfluous to assert that the Mugabe administration embraced both Beijing and Moscow as anti-imperialist partners in its fight against the Euro-American designs.

To be clear, Mugabe's Look East Policy was launched at a time when both Beijing and Kremlin were strongly opposed to the unilateral tendencies of the U.S. across the globe. As a consequent, both Russia and China supported Mugabe as they deployed their veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to block the Euro-American alliance from taking decisive action against the autocratic regime in Harare (Moyo, in press). Even after Mugabe's departure, both China and Russia have continued to invest in several important sectors of the economy including energy, transport, telecommunications and mining, and agriculture as will be explained anon.

To be sure, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has extended its global reach, increasing its efforts to influence political and economic elites, media, public opinion, civil society and academia globally (Czirjak, 2019; Shullman, 2019; Were, 2018). By many measures, China's current engagement blitz with Zimbabwe has made it the most significant foreign actor in the country's economic spheres in recent years. It's lending, trade, investment, and commercial diplomacy in Zimbabwe have dramatically increased over the past two decades thereby outstripping the major global powers such as UK, the U.S. and the EU. According to the AidData center for Global Development, Zimbabwe was one of the top ten recipients of Chinese finance between 2000 and 2011 (see API, 2018). As a result Zimbabwe is currently saddled with a high debt burden to China whose actual quantum has curiously remained a matter of guess work for the public and this has left Harare exposed to the Chinese geopolitical agenda.

It is evident that the Chinese diffusion into Zimbabwe has been phenomenal. Apart from investments in the agriculture, infrastructure, telecommunications and mining sector, China has also invested in vanity projects such as the National Defense College, a residential home for Mugabe, and a conference facility for the ruling ZANU-PF party (Moyo, 2018). To some observers, it did not come as a surprise that the government of

Zimbabwe announced a battery of Chinese funded projects during the pre-election period. These included funding for the expansion of Kariba Hydro-power Station, Hwange Thermal Power Station (US\$1 billion), and the new Parliament Building (US\$77 million), and Robert Mugabe International Airport (US\$153 million) (Moyo, in press). All in all, the pledges of Chinese funding to Zimbabwe during the pre-election season stood at US\$2.5 billion (Dailynews, February 2019). Arguably, these pledges aimed at presenting ZANU PF under Mnangagwa as the party that has the capacity to mobilise massive resources for social and economic development of the country. Writing just before Zimbabwe's 2018 elections, David Gadiel was probably correct when he noted that:

*subject to the outcome of the next election China will remain the main source of funding for future reconstruction of Zimbabwe's infrastructure, its agricultural rehabilitation and continuing investment in mining (Gadiel, 2018: 42).*

Furthermore, press reports were (during the campaign period) awash with claims that China was responsible for the financing of ZANU-PF campaign machineries in the run-up to the 2018 elections (see for example Zimbabwe Independent, 4 March 2018). Allegedly, the Chinese electoral assistance to ZANU-PF included vehicles for its 210 parliamentary candidates; vehicles for women and youth wings of the party in all the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe; and vehicles for the senior Politburo members of ZANU-PF. The Press also reported that China provided ZANU-PF with regalia and other party paraphernalia for the 2018 election campaign (Zimbabwe Independent, 4 March 2018).

In response to the alleged Beijing's electoral interference, the opposition candidate Nelson Chamisa of the MDC alliance used strong anti-Chinese rhetoric in his campaign speeches. Like the late Michael Chilufya Sata of the Patriotic Front in Zambia, Chamisa promised to expel Chinese businesses upon winning the election. Unfortunately for him, the impact of his pronouncement may have strengthened the resolve of Beijing to ensure the victory of its preferred candidate-Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF party (Aidoo, 2018).

Some of what I have said about China can be said about Russia. To be clear, Zimbabwe and Russia share some common interests. As noted, Zimbabwe is on the drive to seek investments to revive the disarticulated economy after her fall out with the Euro-Western powers in the 2000s. This plays out very well for President Vladimir Putin who is pushing to raise Russia's geopolitical and geoeconomic profile globally (also see Jones and Taussig, 2019; Polyakova and Boyer, 2018; Shekhovtsov, 2018; Brattberg and Maurer, 2018; Narayanan, Howard, Kollanyi, and Elswah, 2017).

In Zimbabwe, Kremlin is interested in economic investment in the mining, agricultural, power, and telecommunication sectors as well as defence industries (also see Ndimande and Moyo, 2018; Chigora and Goredema, 2010). It also maintains close ties with the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. In return, Harare is hoping to enhance its food security, agricultural technology, military and defence cooperation. As such, the two countries have signed mega investment agreements ranging from platinum exploration, agricultural as well as industrial revitalisation support (see Ndimande and Moyo, 2018: 15). However, in absolute terms and relative to other actors such as the China, South Africa, and India, the volume of trade is still small, but there is note-worthy trend of increasing Zimbabwe-Russia cooperation.

That said, it is important to state at this moment that Kremlin is alleged to have been interfering with politics and elections in a number of countries globally (see Spalkova, 2018; Brattberg and Maurer 2018; Nolan 2017; Narayanan, Howard, Kollanyi and Elswah, 2017). In their seminal paper titled '*The future of political Warfare: Russia, the West, and the Coming Age of Global Digital Competition*', Polyakova and Boyer (2018) provide some

details on the alleged Russian political interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, attempts to influence the Brexit referendum and the ongoing financing and tactical support for ultra-right wing parties in France, Germany, and Italy as well as meddling in the elections of many other countries including, Ukraine, Cambodia, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and Zambia (also see Jones and Taussig, 2019: 27). However, it should be noted that the Kremlin through its ambassadors across the globe has strongly protested these claims describing them as baseless, unfounded and provocative (see McCarthy, 2018).

While there is no evidence that Kremlin directly deployed technologies of electoral manipulation such as cyberattacks/cyberespionage and disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing electoral outcomes as it is claimed to have been the case in the U.S. Presidential elections in 2016 (see Muller, 2019), some observers note that Kremlin was involved in Zimbabwe's 2018 elections in more indirect, subtle, and insidious ways to help achieve an outcome that is in line with its geostrategic interest (Zwiczewicz, 2019). For instance, media reports claimed that up to 64 Russian political advisors were operating in Harare during the election season presumably to assist in Mnangagwa's electoral campaign (BBC News, 3 August 2018). However, this claim was dismissed by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who visited Zimbabwe in March 2018. Lavrov stated that:

*We insist that African problems need African solutions, and the international community should respect the Africans choice of resolving a conflict, and support them morally, politically and financially in training staff which Russia has been actively doing (cited in Frey, 2018).*

Even though the Russian Foreign Minister repudiated the electoral influence claims, the opposition continued to lash out on Mnangagwa's perceived cosy relationship with the Russians, throughout the campaign period thereby creating a negative impression about Russia in Zimbabwe (Hayward, 2018).

In short, it is probably correct to argue here that the actions of both Kremlin and Beijing may have directly or indirectly affected Zimbabwe's 2018 elections. If so, Beijing's and Kremlin's support for Mnangagwa may have emanated less from an affinity for the man and more from their wish for continuity and stability as well as for their geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Interestingly, after winning the 2018 elections, President Mnangagwa prioritised a bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping which was held on 5 September 2018 during the Beijing Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and also visited President Vladimir Putin in Russia on 15 January 2019. These bilateral meetings were important because they symbolised the acceptance of President Mnangagwa by these two world leaders at a time when the Zimbabwean leader was still smarting from the post-election violence of 1 August 2018.

## **Implications for Zimbabwe's future elections**

In the opening pages of this article it was noted that the current global world order is characterised by shifting geographies of power and economy from the Global North to the Global South (Freedom House, 2019; Shullman, 2019; Jones and Taussig, 2019; Ursu and Berg, 2018; National Intelligence Council, 2018). As part of this global geopolitical competition, it was shown that all the key global actors have at least attempted in one form or another to influence the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe for their own national and geoeconomic agendas. This penultimate section argues that the ambitions of these key global actors will have huge implications for the future elections in Zimbabwe as explained below.



First, the fetishised global actors in the 2018 elections may have strengthened the spectre of militarised competitive authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. The fact that out of political expediency the key global players endorsed the military induced transition in November 2017 means that these players tacitly supported coup leaders yet evidence has shown that coup leaders have little if any credentials of administering free, fair and credible elections (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2018 and 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019). If the recent electoral history of Zimbabwe is anything to go by, then, it is likely that in future elections the military establishment will continue to underwrite the electoral victories for its preferred party and candidates (see also Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019; Moyo, 2015; Rupiya, 2011; Masunungure, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007).

Second, it is noteworthy recalling here that the post-election violence which led to loss of life and property was 'covered up' through a Commission of Inquiry which was supported by the Euro-American powers. Apparently 1 August 2018, etched a bad birthmark to the Mnangagwa regime and to Zimbabwe's electoral futures. The failure by Mnangagwa to punish the perpetrators of violence, arson and murder may mean that Zimbabwe's future elections will likely continue to be characterised by fear and intimidation (Amnesty International, 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2019; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2018), one is inclined to be sceptical about the future elections in Zimbabwe unless fundamental reforms take place before the next elections are held.

Third and final, given the current weakening of the Euro-American powers, it is likely that the influence of the UK, the EU, and the U.S. in elections will be further eroded in Zimbabwe. This is likely to consolidate the rise of neoliberal authoritarianism anchored on the emerging Beijing Model of development and governance. In fact, given the determination of both Beijing and Kremlin to expand their geopolitical influence in Africa and around the globe in general, (see Jones and Taussig, 2019; Shullman, 2019; Zwicewicz, 2019; International Republican Institute, 2019; Polyakova and Boyer, 2018; Shekhovtsov, 2018; Brattberg, and Maurer, 2018; Narayanan, Howard, Kollanyi, and Elswah, 2017), it is the argument of this article that these countries will continue to consolidate their bilateral relations with Zimbabwe in the future. In the end, as mentioned earlier, the global geopolitical competition between the traditional powers and the re-emerging economies is likely to continue holding sway in the future elections in Zimbabwe.

## Conclusion

This article has attempted to examine the activities, interests and intentions of key external actors in Zimbabwe's 2018 elections. It was argued here that the geopolitics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, marked by the strengthening of Russia and China, and the weakening of the Euro-Western powers has created a complicated environment for Zimbabwe's futures. The overall observation is that all the key global actors have developed their individual foreign policies towards Zimbabwe in order to fulfil their own national and geopolitical interests. While the 2018 elections constituted a turning point and a critical juncture that could have allowed Zimbabwe to look forward to social and economic development, instead, those elections entrenched the practice of electoral authoritarianism in the country. The article concludes that the global geopolitical competition between the traditional powers and the re-emerging economies is likely to hold sway in the future elections in Zimbabwe, Africa and globally.

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1 UNITA

2 Aliança Popular Nacional

3 Partido da Frente Social

4 MPLA

5 Frente Nacional Libertação de

6 Convergência de Angola


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# Entrevista

**ADALBERTO COSTA JÚNIOR**  
O governo atual não tem qualquer vontade de abraçar uma mais do que necessária reforma do estado partidário





# Adalberto Costa Júnior

*O governo atual não tem qualquer vontade de abraçar uma mais do que necessária reforma do estado partidário*

Entrevista conduzida por **Maciel Santos**

5 de novembro de 2019

O eng.<sup>o</sup> Adalberto Costa Júnior (1962) é o novo secretário-geral da UNITA. Natural de Quinjenge (Huambo) e militante na UNITA desde 1975, licenciou-se em Engenharia Eletrotécnica, no Porto. Em 1991 foi nomeado representante da UNITA em Portugal e mais tarde em Itália, com funções igualmente junto do Vaticano. Após o fim da guerra civil, teve um papel crescente no maior partido angolano da oposição: secretário Provincial em Luanda, secretário para a Comunicação e Marketing, para o Património, membro do mecanismo bilateral UNITA-Governo, porta-voz do partido e deputado, tendo sido eleito presidente do grupo seu parlamentar. Em novembro de 2019, quando já era candidato a secretário geral do partido, aceitou responder a esta entrevista. Foi eleito para esse cargo a 15 de novembro no XIII congresso da UNITA, realizado em Luanda.

**Maciel Santos (MS):** A UNITA é um partido da oposição num país petrolífero que tem um salário mínimo entre 60 € (agricultura) e 90 € (indústria extrativa e função pública) e onde a esperança média de vida é de 41,5 anos para os homens e 39 para as mulheres. Como se explica que tenha nestas condições obtido apenas 26 % dos votos nas últimas eleições?

**Adalberto Costa Júnior (ACJ):** A transparência e a democratização dos processos eleitorais representam um dos maiores desafios que temos em Angola. Há uma enorme pressão pública no sentido da revisão da lei eleitoral, bem como da lei da comissão nacional eleitoral, organismo que tem na sua administração uma maioria de membros nomeados pelo MPLA, que chegados a quaisquer períodos eleitorais retardam o credenciamento dos fiscais, admitem pessoal partidário, anunciam resultados finais não tratados no centro nacional de escrutínio, entre tantas outras anomalias. Ora nessas condições os conflitos eleitorais tornam-se

frequentes e o MPLA tem tido sempre maiorias qualificadas, construídas artificialmente. Em todas as eleições o partido de regime tem sempre mais de 2/3 dos votos, para impedir uma revisão da constituição. Acresço o facto de que nas últimas eleições, de 2012 e 2017, a UNITA remeteu aos tribunais processos com mais de 100 elementos de prova de corrupção eleitoral e de irregularidades! Os tribunais nos dois momentos arquivaram os processos sem sequer iniciar a sua avaliação!

**MS:** Qual é hoje a principal base social da UNITA? Historicamente, foi o campesinato. Um jornalista, Ilídio Manuel, disse recentemente sobre o Adalberto: «É um candidato que goza de muito apoio no meio urbano, o que pode até certo ponto trair determinadas expectativas, uma vez que a UNITA tem fundamentalmente como seio de apoio o eleitorado rural. É aí onde terá algumas dificuldades em afirmar as suas pretensões». No entanto, segundo os dados oficiais a UNITA teve mais de 700 mil votos em Luanda nas últimas eleições (2017).

**É portanto nas classes populares urbanas e jovens que assenta a sua candidatura e onde pensa que a UNITA está a crescer?**

**ACJ:** A base social de apoio da UNITA tem crescido bastante, de tal modo que é voz corrente que a UNITA terá vencido as eleições de 2017 em Luanda! O eleitor é cada vez mais pertencente a uma maioria de cidadãos jovens, tanto no meio rural como no meio urbano. As redes sociais têm contornado o mau trabalho dos órgãos de comunicação do regime, totalmente partidarizados e o *Facebook* e o *WhatsApp* têm contribuído para a um maior conhecimento e partilha da informação. Na verdade a atual liderança da UNITA, tem gozado de uma grande popularidade no seio dos jovens e não só, em todo o país.

**Não houve qualquer mudança do pessoal político no seio dos governantes**

**MS:** A corrupção da classe dirigente angolana tem sido denunciada externamente e nos últimos tempos serviu até de legitimação para uma mudança de pessoal político. Um dos implicados no caso BES, o empresário angolano Álvaro Sobrinho processou o Adalberto por crime de difamação. Faz parte da sua estratégia – e da UNITA, se for eleito no congresso – centrar-se na denuncia destes casos, à semelhança do atual poder em Angola? Ou propõe à UNITA alterar verdadeiramente a redistribuição do rendimento de Angola?

**ACJ:** Não houve qualquer mudança do pessoal político no seio dos governantes. Os que governaram com José Eduardo dos Santos, continuam exatamente os mesmos a governar com João Lourenço, com os mesmos vícios e procedimentos negativos.

Na semana em que formalizei a minha candidatura à Presidência da UNITA, foi amplamente divulgada uma ação junto da PGR

contra a minha pessoa, movida pelo ex-PCA do Banco Espírito Santo Angola. Não foi certamente uma coincidência o processo surgir no momento da candidatura! Interpretei esse ato como uma ação do regime e não apenas de Álvaro Sobrinho, pois há 6 anos que faço as mesmas acusações à gestão nada transparente do BESA. Fiz a entrada formal, enquanto Presidente do Grupo Parlamentar da UNITA, do pedido de constituição de uma Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito ao BESA, em documento bastante fundamentado dos indícios de má gestão, com nomes e a verdade é que a CPI não avança e este pedido continua fechado a sete chaves nas gavetas dos dirigentes da Assembleia Nacional.

O que facilitou os enormes assaltos ao erário público foi o não funcionamento das instituições. A Assembleia Nacional tem restrições à fiscalização e os tribunais funcionam com ordens políticas. O combate à corrupção tão propalado pelo atual governo, é dirigido: os processos são levantados aos próximos do antigo Presidente da República, ao mesmo tempo que se protegem outros atores. O balanço final é muito penalizador ao interesse dos angolanos, pois não tem havido retorno dos capitais roubados.

**MS:** Angola tem uma taxa de 30 % de desemprego, que para os jovens é de 56 %. O Fundo Monetário Internacional acertou com o governo um empréstimo de 3,7 mil milhões de dólares que vai certamente ser acompanhado de mais políticas recessivas. Mas o que faria a UNITA de diferente? Ou, como diria a senhora Thatcher, não há alternativa e a UNITA, como em geral os partidos africanos da oposição, distingue-se do governo pela posição que ocupa e não pela ideologia?

**ACJ:** Desde 2017, não há infelizmente nenhum sinal de melhoria económica ou social. As famílias e as empresas estão num total desespero. Sou de opinião de que mais do que reformas económicas, o nosso país carece de reformas políticas que reponham o funcionamento das instituições de controlo,

de fiscalização, de justiça, de regulação do sistema financeiro (por exemplo, o Governador do Banco Nacional de Angola tem de deixar de ser tratado como um membro do executivo e deixar de se sentar no conselho de ministros, deixando também de receber ordens do chefe do governo! Hoje ele não regula coisa nenhuma, porque vai sempre atuar em conformidade com os interesses de quem governa. E nós todos sabemos que há membros do governo que são donos de bancos e estamos a decidir em causa própria, com elevadas perdas para o interesse público. O governo atual não tem qualquer vontade de abraçar uma mais do que necessária reforma do estado partidário. A melhor opção que encontrou foi convidar o FMI e atirar para o Fundo as medidas que tanto têm penalizado o cidadão: desvalorização permanente da moeda, aumento da carga fiscal, instabilidade total do mercado cambial, tudo isso quando o OGE surge com um serviço da dívida a consumir 61 % da despesa pública. Tudo a acontecer num momento em que os empresários angolanos estão totalmente descapitalizados e não têm capacidade de levarem avante os seus projetos e assim não existe nenhuma geração de empregos, nem diversificação da economia.

**MS: Num país em que o petróleo representa mais de 20 % do PIB e onde o agro-negócio progride, o que pode dizer um partido de oposição sobre a transição energética e o ambiente? A UNITA também pensa que a ecologia é uma questão dos países ricos ou, considerando a sua base rural, já integrou essa questão na agenda política?**

**ACJ:** A estatística em Angola não é muito fiável. O agro-negócio progride? Certamente esse não é um indicador real que esteja a acontecer em Angola, infelizmente. A economia continua totalmente dependente da importação de bens. O ambiente é um tema muito importante e uma realidade que toca a vida de todos nós: ainda temos imensas áreas urbanas a conviverem com grandes

quantidades de lixo; com valas híper poluídas a céu aberto (qual viveiro de moscas, de mosquitos e de morte); o abate indiscriminado das florestas e o tráfico de madeira, que tanto nos preocupa. O uso universal dos geradores que poluem sonoramente e ambientalmente, porque tarda a normalização do fornecimento de energia. O avanço muito veloz do deserto, tardando imenso quaisquer medidas de contenção. Os planos de reflorestação não são visíveis. Portanto a ecologia é um assunto de absoluta importância e atualidade e apesar de termos um ministério do ambiente, a sua ação é muito reduzida. A UNITA tem efetuado intervenção pública regular sobre questões ambientais.

## **Temos 164 municípios e o MPLA quer realizar eleições em 35 apenas**

**MS: Como se relaciona (ou deve relacionar) a UNITA com os restantes partidos da oposição? Isto porque face à debilidade da sociedade civil angolana (sindicatos, igrejas e associações) não seria prioritário para os partidos da oposição organizar um programa comum, à semelhança da esquerda europeia em várias épocas e países?**

**ACJ:** A UNITA tem tomado imensas iniciativas partilhadas com os partidos na oposição, mas também tem levado propostas de interesse nacional ao próprio MPLA. Na verdade as frentes existentes com os outros partidos têm sucumbido a uma atuação do MPLA sempre mais virado para as ameaças e para a compra dos partidos e menos para uma real abertura ao diálogo.

**MS: Face ao controlo político do governo, a estratégia poderá ser reforçar a posição regional do partido, como afirma o candidato José Pedro Cachiungo que diz que vai preparar a UNITA para a vitória nas primeiras eleições autárquicas? Ou isso é reforçar a “bienzeição” da UNITA?**

**ACJ:** Nunca ouvi qualquer dirigente da UNITA apelar ao reforço de posições regionais! Como acima os senhores afirmaram, a UNITA só em Luanda teve mais de 700 mil votos, o que vem destruir essa imagem “Biena” ou “sulana” de implantação do partido. Nós temos sido defensores da realização de eleições autárquicas em simultâneo e em todo o país, ao contrário do MPLA que quer adiar ao máximo a realização das autarquias e pretende limitar ao mínimo de municípios as eleições, trazendo uma muito impopular proposta de realizar autarquias por fases, gradualmente! Temos 164 municípios e o MPLA quer realizar eleições em 35 apenas. A Igreja Católica já veio dizer que o gradualismo vai fazer aumentar a pobreza! Estou seguro que o angolano vai punir estas fugas ao direito de todos os cidadãos serem tratados por igual. O nosso lema é estarmos o mais próximo das comunidades, sairmos o máximo dos gabinetes e conhecermos bem os seus problemas, as suas dificuldades e as suas expectativas. Esperamos ter sucesso na revisão da lei eleitoral e assim estaremos em condições vantajosas para abraçarmos as autarquias.

**MS:** Cinco candidatos para a direção de um partido de oposição é uma prova de vitalidade interna ou aumenta o risco de fragmentação-satelitização da UNITA, à semelhança de certos episódios da década de 1990?

**ACJ:** Cinco candidatos concorreram à liderança da UNITA como uma afirmação da liberdade que cada um teve. Na verdade a UNITA saiu a ganhar desta campanha, pois cada um dos candidatos escolheu o seu destino de campanha e durante 30 dias viajamos pelo país, atualizando o conhecimento do mesmo, contactando militantes e cidadãos. No final, como todos acompanharam, o país festejou a eleição do Presidente da UNITA. Nos bairros de Luanda e nas diversas províncias houve caravanas a festejar e isso nunca tinha acontecido antes.

**A grave crise económica, com três anos seguidos de recessão não nos permite a ilusão de sermos uma potencia regional!**

**MS:** A burguesia angolana tem beneficiado de uma grande cobertura internacional devido aos negócios petrolíferos e financeiros, especialmente em Portugal, França e China. Uma nova política em Angola que alterações traria às relações com os tradicionais clientes e parceiros internacionais?

**ACJ:** A alternância do poder em Angola não traria qualquer ameaça aos interesses dos países citados, nem aos mercados financeiros. Pelo contrário assumo que estamos muito mais preparados para garantir mais liberdade económica e menos intervenção do Estado. Ao contrário do MPLA que tem a escola soviética, com uma permanente ação do Estado Central, defendendo a competição entre as empresas deixando ao Estado apenas o papel de regulador e garante da liberdade económica. E como temos franjas amplas de pobreza, teremos a necessidade de garantir incentivos dirigidos aos mais desprotegidos.

**MS:** Os EUA privilegiaram a posição de Angola como polícia dos Congos e até co-vigilante na região dos Lagos. É bom para Angola manter este tipo de “confiança”, que a obriga a um enorme orçamento militar?

**ACJ:** Não é verdade que existe de facto esse acordo com os Estados Unidos. Aconteceu há 15/10 anos atrás. Angola hoje vai alterando com outros países responsabilidades nos aspetos da segurança na região dos Grandes Lagos. Ora somos nós, ora cabe à África do Sul ou ao Zimbabwe. A grave crise económica, com três anos seguidos de recessão não nos permite a ilusão de sermos uma potencia regional!

**MS: Que relações existem entre as oposições em África, numa época em que os regimes parecem privilegiar as mudanças de pessoal para se consolidarem (Argélia, Zimbabwe, Moçambique, Zaire)? Há condições para, à semelhança do que aconteceu na fase da luta anti-colonial, se consolidar uma alternativa ideológica das oposições à escala pan-africana – ou pelo menos na África Austral?**

**ACJ:** As alianças entre os movimentos/partidos independentistas ainda é uma realidade na África Austral. Vejamos os casos de Angola, Namíbia, África do Sul, Moçambique e Zimbabwe, com continuidades ideológicas. Creio, no entanto, que estamos a abordar o

fim dessa realidade. Não fossem as debilidades democráticas, transferidas para as administrações eleitorais em muitos destes países teria já havido alternâncias políticas.

Há um diálogo profícuo entre os partidos dos diferentes países. A UNITA tem boas relações com os partidos na oposição na África do Sul, Moçambique, Zimbabwe, Namíbia, Botswana, RDC, bem como somos parte de famílias políticas que nos colocam regularmente a dialogar em fóruns em todo o continente africano. Também no que respeita aos Palop's temos boas relações com os partidos que governam a maior parte destes países, pois somos membros da mesma família política, o IDC.





# África em debate

**SIFUNA  
IVOTERS ROLL  
EHLUZEKAYO!!**

Poderes e identidades



CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti;  
REASON: 1.4(D)

1. (C) SUMMARY. U.S. security firm, Blackwater Worldwide (BW), has received permission from the Government of Djibouti to operate an armed ship from the port of Djibouti, to protect commercial shipping from pirates off the coast of Somalia. Blackwater's U.S.-flagged ship is expected to arrive in early March, and will have a crew of 33 AmCits, including three 6-man armed teams who will operate in continuous shifts. The Djiboutian Navy will secure Blackwater's weapons (i.e., .50-caliber machine guns) while ashore in Djibouti. Blackwater does not intend to take any pirates into custody, but will use lethal force against pirates if necessary; it is developing an SOP that is currently under legal review and will be shared with the USG. Blackwater's counter-piracy operation does not have any clients yet, but Blackwater expects business to develop following a public launch in Djibouti in March with GODJ officials. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) On Feb. 8, ex-FSO Robert Emmett Downey, Blackwater Worldwide's Development Manager for Africa, provided the following update to Amb. Swan, DCM, and Bob Patterson (TDY from Embassy Nairobi):

a) Hassan Said Khaireh--triple-hatted as Djibouti's national security advisor, head of the security/intelligence service, and director of President Guelleh's Military Office--has given BW permission to operate its armed ship in Djibouti. BW met with Hassan Said on Feb. 7, following an earlier meeting in WashDC between BW's CEO Erik Prince and Cofer Black with Djiboutian Amb. to the U.S. Robleh Olhaye. This is the only such arrangement so far that BW has made with a host government in the region, but BW will likely engage Oman and Kenya in the future (e.g., in the event of a mechanical malfunction, the only facilities capable of repairing BW's ship are located in Mombasa.) Within the USG, BW has briefed AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and Embassy Nairobi officials.

b) BW's ship is the 'McArthur,' a U.S.-flagged 183-foot ex-NOAA vessel. While it has landing space for two helicopters, it will have an unarmed UAV, but no helicopters (which BW considers too expensive). The ship will be armed with .50-caliber machine guns, and is able to protect a 3-ship convoy. The Djiboutian Navy will secure BW's weapons, once ashore, and will inspect BW's weapons lockers. According to Downey, BW's business concept--having its armed ship escort other ships requiring protection--is consistent with recent IMO/industry recommendations discouraging the carriage of firearms, or the presence of embarked armed security teams, aboard commercial ships themselves (e.g., see reftel, on the 85th session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee). The 'McArthur' will dock in Djibouti for 36-72 hours every 30 days, to replenish its stores. According to Downey, BW is the only such firm with its own ship.



# Private Military Contractors in Africa: The Case of Erik Prince

Mourad Aty\* and Abdelhak Elaggoune\*\*

## Introduction

The private military industry has been very lucrative during the last two decades. The business flourished after the US and its allies' invasion of Afghanistan and witnessed a boom after the Iraq war in 2003. Private military contractors undertook every single task that was related to state armies when the mastery of violence was exclusively a governmental issue. Plenty of US, Russian, French, British and South African private contractors have been reported to be major actors in different hot spots around the world such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, South Sudan and other countries in central and west Africa. Companies like the American Blackwater, DynCorp, CACI, the Russian Wagner Group, and the South African Executive Outcomes made the news almost on a daily basis. Although the African Union (AU), successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), passed the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa in 1977 (entered into force in 1985) (OAU Convention), Africa is still the Eldorado of soldiers of fortune and warlords.

Profit driven soldiers are not a new phenomenon for Africa. Bob Denard in Congo (RDC) and his long mercenary career tightly linked to Jacques Foccart's *Françafrique* and Simon Mann who attempted a coup against President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Zimbabwe are two figures that have marked the African history. During the 1980s, Libyan leader Moamar Kaddafi hired Touaregs from Mali and Niger for his military interventions in Lebanon, Tchad and Sudan. One decade later Moboto recruited Africans and Europeans for his war against the rebels of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The involvement of the South African company Executive Outcomes in Angola during the 1990s and the Liberian mercenaries used in the time of the imbroglio that followed the 2010 election in Ivory Coast are other examples (Boutellis, 2019). Africa has always been mercenaries' favorite territory; history recounts the use of both African and European mercenaries but always at the expense of other Africans. This paper examines the role played by Erik Prince and his PMCs (Private Military Companies) in several African countries. It delves to provide an understanding for the reasons which led him to shift to this part of the world and the way he has conducted business there.

## 1. Major Actors in the Private Military Business in Africa

When the Department of Defense released an unclassified video depicting the events of the 4 October 2017 ambush in the village of Tongo Tongo in Niger, no one expected

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the presence of private contractors within the task force in charge. The team that was ambushed consisted of eight US Special Forces soldiers, two US special operations support soldiers, one intelligence contractor, one Nigerian interpreter, a three-men Nigerian reconnaissance team and a thirty-one men Nigerian partner force. The team was assembled by AOB-Niger which is the Advanced Operations Based in Niger that exercises the tactical command and control over multiple Special Forces, it is located in Niamey, Niger (*DOD Briefing on Ambush*, 2017). Through different levels of command, the AOB-Niger is under the strategic responsibility of AFRICOM, this same team had a private contractor in charge of the most sensitive task in the mission, intelligence. AFRICOM, the US Africa Command headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, has a strategic responsibility for all US military operations in Africa. However, it depends on private contractors to do major sensitive functions.

The Americans are not the only private contractors in Africa, media reports have been dealing with a Russian firm called Wagner Group. The company is linked to the Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who has been indicted by special counsel Mueller (Taylor, 2018). The company was reported moving to Central Africa Republic (CAR), Libya and Sudan. Russians have been repeatedly seen fighting in south Darfur, a claim that was confirmed later on by the ousted president Omar Bachir. In a meeting between minister Sergey Lavrov and General Khalifa Haftar, Prigozhin was present to discuss sending more contractors to Libya (Gricius, 2019). Wagner Group is believed to be working with both belligerents in Central Africa Republic. A unit was filmed by three assassinated journalists operating in the territory held by the rebels to the contrary of Russia's official stance that backs the authorities (Hauer, 2018). Press reports recount the involvement of French and British private contractors as well, mainly in central and west Africa.

The United Nations has adopted and opened for signature the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries on 4 December 1989. It has entered into force only on 20 October 2001 (UN OHCHR). According to the convention, states whose armies are considered to be the largest in the world (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) did not ratify the document. Although the UN has passed this convention on the use of mercenaries, the organization is found to be an important client of PMCs. This is not a new trend for the United Nations. During the 1990s the UN mission in RDC was under the protection of Defense Systems Ltd, Lifeguard provided protection for World Vision in Sierra Leon, Hart Security did so for the World Food Program, and DynCorp, KwaZulu Natal Security and Empower Loss Control Services undertook a wide range of tasks in East Timor (Isenberg, 2009). Fundamental human rights have been breached by a large number of PMCs, mostly perpetrated in Africa and the Middle East. The UN report on Mercenarism and Private Military and Security Companies titled "overview of the work carried out by the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination" mentions as key achievements two major elements; first, regulating the UN use of private military and security companies, and second, bringing a human rights perspective to the issue of foreign fighters.

## 2. Erik Prince

Erik Prince is one of the richest soldiers who have ever served in the US Navy. Along with his fellow Navy Seal colleague Al Clark, Prince started his notorious company called Blackwater in 1997 (Scahill, 2007; Simons, 2009). The first tasks Blackwater has been contracted to do were in Afghanistan in 2001 then in Iraq in 2003. The US declared War

on Terror has been vital to the prosperity of PMCs. The business boomed during that period and enabled them to make profit of the situation. The existence of Blackwater and some other PMCs in the Iraqi scene went unnoticed till the world woke up on the images of the four Blackwater contractors being killed, burned, mutilated and then two of them being hanged from a Euphrates Bridge on 31 March 2004 (Chan, 2004).

Three years later media reports issued from the most known press agencies were talking about a massacre that took place in Nisour Square, Baghdad. On 16 September 2007, Blackwater contractors on board of four armored vehicles opened fire on Iraqi civilians, the attack left 17 dead and 24 wounded (Glanz and Robin, 2007). Prior to this event only little was known about Prince. He appeared publically for the first time during a Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on 1 October 2007. After that Prince immediately engaged in a campaign to clear the name of his company on several media corporations.

The company became notorious. Consequently, it kept changing its name and has adopted the following: Blackwater USA, Blackwater Worldwide, Xe Services LLC and finally Academi. “Juggernaut” Blackwater as Labeled by Adam Ciralsky from Vanity Fair, who also called Prince “Mr. Fix-It” in the war the US waged on terror. Ciralsky confirms that Prince led a kind of a double life. Publicly he acts as Blackwater’s chairman and secretly he has been doing the “CIA’s bidding, helping to craft, fund, and execute operations ranging from inserting personnel into “denied areas”—places U.S. intelligence has trouble penetrating—to assembling hit teams targeting al-Qaeda members and their allies” (Ciralsky, 2009).

On 20 August 2009, Jeremy Scahill, author of the book *Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army* wrote in *The Nation* revealing information about Blackwater being paid \$5 million dollars in April 2002 to deploy a team in Afghanistan. Scahill says that one month later Prince went to Afghanistan as part of the team. Scahill confirms that Blackwater worked for the CIA’s stations both in Kabul and Shkin and operated from a fortress called the Alamo.

In 2010, Prince sold the business as he told Mehdi Hassan in an interview on Al Jazeera English (*Blackwater’s Erik Prince*, 2019 7: 23). Prince moved to the UAE where his name was linked to a new PMC called R2 Reflex Responses which was headquartered there (Cole, 2019). Erik Prince, the brother of the US Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, was making the news again. He was in a hearing testifying before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on 30 November 2017 on the Trump Transition Team and Russia connections. Recently his name appeared in the Mueller Report; he held several meetings with the Trump Campaign Team as well as with Russian and Russian-related individuals. He was deeply involved in this issue.

Prince clearly lied under oath in his testimony before the HPSCI on 30 November 2017. On April 30 2019, Adam Schiff, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a criminal referral to the Department of Justice for a potential criminal prosecution for “false testimony that Prince provided the committee in 2017 as a part of its investigation into Russian interference in the US political process”. According to the Mueller Report, one of the most important things Prince lied about was the reasons of meeting the Russian Oligarch Kirill Dmitriev in the Seychelles, a meeting that was arranged by the Emiratis.

Recently, Erik Prince’s name has been associated with the region of Xinjiang where plenty of atrocities and human rights breaches are taking place (the Uyghur Muslim minority). In the region that is considered as an integral part of the Belt and Road network of infrastructures, Prince and FSG (Frontier Services Group) are building a training base in a deal that was signed with Kashgar Caohu for 40 million Yuan (over \$6 million) (*Erik Prince Company*, 2019).

Prince's interest in Africa started after selling Blackwater. He was the fund manager for his private equity firm Frontier Resource Group (FRG). The company was dealing in early stage oil and mineral exploration in South Sudan (Eisenhammer, 2014). Later, the interest became related to his business with the Emiratis and most importantly the business he has initiated with FSG and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative where Africa is considered to be essential.

### 3. Somalia

By early 2011, Erik Prince and his Xe Services (Blackwater renamed) were involved in a multimillion-dollar program to train and recruit around 2,000 Somali contractors to stop the Somali piracy in the region. This trained task force was supposed to take over and end piracy in the region as well as to fight against Islamist insurgents (*AP Enterprise Blackwater*, 2011). In an article on 20 January 2011, *The New York Times* said that Prince had secretly backed a South African PMC to be part of the scene by safeguarding Somali officials, recruiting and training militias and fighting Islamist groups. According to its sources, Erik Prince funded Saracen International, the South African PMC (Executive Outcomes was reflagged Saracen International) to be granted contracts by the Somali government. The operation was financed from a Middle Eastern country, which several sources confirmed to be the UAE (Mazzetti and Schmitt, 2011). *Forbes* reported that Prince had a future plan for Somalia; it was the patrolling of its coasts to prevent illegal fishermen (Kirsch, 2018).

On January 2014, in an interview to *The Wall Street Journal*, Erik Prince revealed that he was the CEO of Frontier Services Group (FSG), the security and logistics firm with a focus on Africa. The firm is linked to the state owned CITIC Group (China International Trust Investment Corporation). Knowing that China has a \$1 trillion planned spending for infrastructures, Erik Prince headed toward Africa for potential profit (Feith, 2014). The company was listed on Hong Kong's stock market and headquartered in Nairobi. It has employed 340 staff in the head office and regional affiliates in Hong Kong, Beijing, Dubai, and Malta. The priority was to provide facilities management and workforce accommodations. It was also to build and maintain "infrastructures, installations and platforms" all what was necessary for the clients in the continent (Lee and De Clara, 2016). The company was granted a contract by South West State of Somalia to organize its new Free Zone Investment Authority (FZIA). The deal was negotiated with President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, and covered a wide range of areas, including an integrated solution for the air-land-sea logistics capabilities and security management. The contract consisted of building "seaport, airport, as well as residential areas and agricultural zones". Prince said about this: "FSG has a proven track record of being able to manage complex projects across challenging terrains and is therefore perfectly placed to provide support for this important new project in Somalia". He added: "With the team's experience and expertise, FSG will provide the best possible logistics and security services to ensure that the project can operate safely and on time" (*Contract Win FSG*, 2017). Along with private security, Erik Prince's interest shifted to logistics, infrastructures and complex projects.

### 4. South Sudan

Airborne Technologies is a company which is headquartered in Vienna, and is working in the field of design and equipment of small airplanes with wireless surveillance tools. The company has worked for four months on the American-made crop duster Thrussh 510G

to add the characteristics required by a client known for *Echo Papa* who turned out to be Erik Prince, the owner of around a quarter of the company. Workers on that plane were instructed to refer to him as *Echo Papa* while discussing specific modifications to that plane. On April 2016, *The Intercept* revealed all these details adding that the modifications were not only surveillance and laser-targeting equipment, the aircraft was outfitted with “bulletproof cockpit windows, an armored engine block, anti-explosive mesh for the fuel tank, and specialized wiring that could control rockets and bombs”. They also “installed pods for mounting two high-powered 23 mm machine guns”. By doing so, Airborne Technologies broke plenty of Austrian laws. When the business became very lucrative, the Bulgarian-based company LASA Technologies was established (Scahill and Cole, 2016). The modification brought to this aircraft fit well to fight small armed groups and militias. It was directed initially to fulfill the contract FSG had with South Sudan. Amidst an ongoing civil war, Erik Prince was sent by CITIC Group to South Sudan in 2014 to meet with Salva Kiir Mayardit who was fighting against Riek Machar, his former vice-president. The aim of this mission was the reestablishment of the oil flow from the Chinese owned oil reserves which were shut down because of the war in the Upper Nile region of South Sudan. Prince put on the table an offer that consists of surveillance flights, providing infrastructure and securing the reserves. The \$150 Million contract was halted for it violated several international laws (Gannon, 2017). This came during the period of the release of the 2015 AU Commission report. The commission was under the chairmanship of Olusegun Obasanjo, and it confirmed that rape and cannibalism among other forms of violence were perpetuated by both sides of the conflict. The US has also issued the Executive Order 13664 of April 3, 2014 on “Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to South Sudan”.

According to the report made by *The Intercept*, the aviation authorities of San Marino cancelled the plane registration because it turned out to be an aircraft that is not for civilian endeavors contrary to the certificate that was issued. In February 2014, as the company chairman, Prince ordered the purchase of two Thrush 510G. The purpose was Project Mike, a proposal from the Mali government for its war against al-Qaeda affiliate. Later that year, the aircraft was transported to an eastern African country and remained there. By late 2014, the government of South Sudan stopped the contract. The company officials could not understand the reason behind this move (Scahill and Cole, 2016). *The Intercept* said that: “...one South Sudanese official told an FSG employee in the country that Prince had promised to provide the government with attack aircraft. The South Sudanese, according to a person with knowledge of the encounter, were initially confused, and then angry, when the militarized planes never arrived”.

Such a kind of assistance would be a violation of US arms exports. In 2010, Prince’s company, Blackwater, reached a settlement for the violation of plenty of US export control regulations. According to Blackwater and US officials, the violations were mainly about illegal weapons exports to Afghanistan, unauthorized proposals made to the government of South Sudan to train troops and sniper training provided for police officers of Taiwan (Risen, 2010). In 2012, another settlement was reached; it covered unauthorized sales of satellite phones to Sudan among many other violations (*Academi/Blackwater Charged*, 2012).

## 5. Kenya, Congo and Guinea

When Erik Prince became the chairman of Frontier Services Group by early 2014 (owned 9 % stake by then), the company already had some planes and an airstrip in Kenya with

a will to build a pan-African aircraft network. Prince told *Reuters*: “We’re starting in the aviation space because I believe if you’re going to operate in Africa you’ve got to be able to move by air. Commercial airlines are limited, roads get washed out”. He added: “If you’re drilling in some remote area and your rig goes down and you need a new part for your rig; that’s 10s if not 100s of thousands of dollars a day. How do you get that thing quickly and with no excuses?” The aviation business was vital for Blackwater which was operating 70 aircraft (Eisenhammer, 2014).

After DVN Holdings had acquired the Kilifi-based aviation company Kijipwa Aviation (Prince bought 49 % stake), Prince wanted access to different services the company could provide, from the provision of passengers and freight to multinational companies’ transportation logistics to remote places in East Africa. Being in the business shows how important the discovery of oil in Kenya’s northern region is and beyond for multinational corporations (*Prince of Terror*, 2014). The aviation sector was very lucrative to Prince’s nascent company, primarily for getting the benefit this sector offers, but mainly for boosting his own business. The FSG owned Phoenix Aviation secured the go-ahead by the Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) for chartered passenger flights and freight to China. Kijipwa Aviation, however, was refused the renewal of the Air Services Licence (ASL) on 21 October 2014 by the KCAA (*State Denies American*, 2014). The reason for the revoked ASL was due to ownership-related issues and the non-compliance with Kenyan laws according to *Business Daily* and due to offering non-scheduled passenger and freight within/out flights from its Kijipwa base using Cessna (single turboprop) I72 aircraft according to *ch-aviation*, the airline intelligence provider. *Business Daily* reported that “The decision by KCAA, the aviation industry regulator, deals a heavy blow to the private security baron’s plans to offer logistics, aviation and risk management services

to multinationals operating in mining, oil and gas in eastern Africa”. It added “Mr Prince had lined up 25 aircraft delivered to Kijipwa’s airstrip located on the grounds of Bamburi Cement in Mombasa, to provide specialised aviation services and aerial survey of installations such as oil pipelines to players in the extractive industry”.

Along with his FSG Company, Prince registered an affiliated small business company in the Democratic Republic of Congo where he intended to explore minerals and many other activities. FSG has been the owner of a small Congolese firm of transportation called Cheetah Logistics since 2015, but the new firm, Frontier Service Group Congo, is bigger. Documents show that FSG Congo was registered on 20 August 2018 and finally established on 13 November 2018 (qtd. in *Carta de Moçambique*, 2019). Along with Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, Congo is present in the FSG annual report list of countries it is related to. Congo has almost 60 % of the world’s cobalt production and is Africa’s largest output of



**Ilustração 01** – Plane carrying US Special Forces gets stuck on a sandy airstrip in a remote area in Kenya near the Somalia border. The US-registered aircraft belonged to Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, Trump’s unofficial war advisor. (Note men in the bushes) #AlShabaab #USSF #Somalia #Kenya.

Twitter, 2 Apr. 2018.

copper (Ross, 2019). Prince was trying to raise up some \$ 500 million for a new investment fund to deal in cobalt, copper and lithium needed for electric car batteries (qtd. in Ross, 2019). Relying on his Chinese network and connections, Prince's mine in Guinea was granted an agreement to supply the Chinese state-owned Chalco with bauxite, the main source to produce aluminum (Sanderson, 2019). The mining field was important for Prince who did not want to miss any business opportunity in Africa.

## 6. Libya

In an interview to the Italian daily newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, Erik Prince pushed a plan to the EU to help stop illegal immigration to the southern shores of Europe. For him, human trafficking in countries like Sudan, Chad and Niger is “an industrial process”, it needs to be encountered with special measures. According to him, “To stop it, you need to create a Libyan border police along the southern border. Gaddafi loved the landing strips, they are everywhere, just build three police bases and send 250 foreign trainers to each side of Libya, just as Blackwater did with the Afghan border police”. He added: “They will provide leadership, intelligence, communications support, surveillance aircraft, a couple of helicopters: traffickers have to drive for vast distances, so it is easy to locate their trucks full of migrants, intercept them, arrest the driver”. For the immigrants who are going to be arrested, Prince says: “We will take them to refugee camps in the bases, they will receive food and medical assistance and will be repatriated without ever arriving at the coast. I imagine that Europe wants to block the flow of migrants in the most humane and professional way possible” (Mazza, 2017). The European immigrant crisis was merely another business opportunity for Prince.

The Libyan conflict was triggered by foreign powers and the Libyans themselves. The split within the Libyans is characterized by Gen. Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya and Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and his government in Tripoli. Foreign powers ranging from UAE, KSA, Egypt, Russia, France and recently the USA are backing Haftar. Turkey and Qatar in the other camp back the internationally recognized al-Sarraj government. By early 2017, several sources reported about connections Erik Prince had with the Emirati involvement in the Libyan conflict. On 11 January 2017, *Intelligence Online* reported that, along with some other private contractors, Prince is a major player in the Emirati-led operations in Libya.

*War Is Boring* has relied on some sources that confirmed the involvement arguing that pilots flying the Emirati Air Force IOMAX AT-802 Air Tractors are contractors. The Emirati AT-802 was first seen at a Libyan air base (unidentified) with its national markings hidden in June 2015. In November 2016, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) published a video showing an Emirati AT-802 in the sky conducting an air strike on the Ganfouda area of Benghazi (Delalande, 2017). Mercenaries with ties to Erik Prince travelled secretly from Kurdistan (Iraq) to Libya. The mercenary group which is affiliated to a company that is active in Iraq and the UAE, went to Libya to fight among Haftar's militias according to the London-based *العربي*. Haftar did not only receive military assistance in his struggle against al-Sarraj government, but he was also provided political and financial support by the Emiratis in a wider struggle that has been characterized by an intense polarization in the whole MENA region.

## Conclusion

Erik Prince's practices are not different from the old times mercenarism. In Africa, his declared business was mainly part of China's Belt and Road global development strategy. With FSG, he dealt in security and minerals in South Sudan, Kenya, RDC and Guinea. However, his business in Somalia and Libya was mainly security-related. He has been reported to be proposing different types of services. He proposed a plan for a Libyan coastal guard police to the EU and a fishing patrol force to Somalia. Prince also claimed having other ambitious plans that have not seen the light, such as: the Mike Project in Mali and the Iron Fist in South Sudan.

Not so far from Africa, reports linked him to the conflict in Yemen along with the Emiratis. Prince has more global plans for the future; his proposal of an international network of private spies to the Trump Administration was disclosed in December 2017. He also openly expressed his willingness to go back to doing business in Afghanistan. Despite all the atrocities perpetuated under his watch and the breaches to US and International laws, there were no direct accusations for Prince. Only one referral was made, however it has no relation to Human Rights. It is related to his involvement in the Trump-Russia connections, and it is on the United States National Security. Furthermore, the 2010 and 2012 Blackwater/Academi settlements were dealt with as administrative issues, there were no criminal charges.

## Acronyms

AFRICOM – United States Africa Command  
 AOB-Niger – Advanced Operations Based in Niger  
 ASL – Air Services Licence  
 AU – African Union  
 BRSC – Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council  
 CACI – (originally) California Analysis Center, Inc., (then) Consolidated Analysis Center, Incorporated  
 CAR – Central Africa Republic  
 CITIC – China International Trust Investment Corporation  
 DynCorp – Dynalectron Corporation  
 FRG – Frontier Resource Group  
 FSG – Frontier Service Group  
 FSG Congo – Frontier Service Group Congo  
 FZIA – Free Zone Investment Authority  
 HPSCI – House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
 KCAA – Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority  
 OAU – Organization of the African Unity  
 PMC – Private Military Company  
 R2 – Reflex Responses  
 RDC – République Démocratique du Congo

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Handwritten Arabic calligraphy in a dense, overlapping style, likely representing a list or a collection of names and titles. The text is written in black ink on a light-colored background. The script is highly stylized and difficult to decipher due to the extreme density and overlap of the characters. The text is oriented vertically, reading from top to bottom. The overall appearance is that of a historical document or a manuscript page.

The background of the image is a dense, repeating pattern of Arabic calligraphy in a cursive style, overlaid on a grid of horizontal lines. The text is written in black ink on a light-colored background. A solid black horizontal bar is positioned across the middle of the image, containing the text 'Notas de leitura' in white, bold, sans-serif font.

## Notas de leitura



# Modes, fashionistas, dérives et dérivés

René Pélissier

pp. 183-196

N'en déplaise à ce génie de la haute couture parisienne qu'était Karl Lagerfeld en son temps, ce n'est pas de mannequins, d'ourlets et de taffetas que l'on parlera ici. Ni de dentelles non plus (ou si peu). Les modes qui intéressent peut-être plus les lecteurs de la revue ce sont celles que les universitaires africanistes suivent dans leurs travaux, d'abord aux Etats-Unis puis, par percolation et facilité, ailleurs dans les micro-mondes anglophones et linguistiquement vassaux que sont ces milliers d'enseignants des études supérieures qui n'ont qu'une seule lanterne, celle qui éclairait la Statue de la Liberté.

Quant à nos «*fashionistas*» ce sont en ce «*globish*» envahissant qui nous régent ce qu'on désigne en français sous le nom de suivistes. Pâles et pauvres candidats à un Ph. D, obéissant à leurs directeurs de thèse, alors qu'autrefois on exigeait qu'ils soient profonds mais originaux. En certains pays, naturellement! C'est le prix à payer maintenant si l'on veut être à la pointe de la mode du jour. Pointe largement émoussée d'ailleurs, puisqu'en moins de soixante ans on a adoré des idoles aussi provisoires que la résistance primaire anticoloniale, les routes commerciales, la traite négrière atlantique, la dénonciation des corrupteurs et des corrompus, l'accaparement des richesses, les pandémies, le présidentielisme, le semi-présidentialisme, le *patrimonialism*, l'*empowerment*, le genre, tout enfin ce qu'on range sous la bannière du *postcolonial* (si vaste que même dans certains pays européens qui ont vendu ou perdu leurs anciennes colonies depuis des siècles, ou n'en ont jamais eu, les historiens et les sociologues vont fouiller dans l'éphéméride de leur histoire nationale pour voir si leurs ancêtres n'étaient pas de vilains racistes en plus de sales colonialistes). Les écologistes ont déjà montré qu'eux aussi ont une vision de l'Afrique *sui generis*. Nous ne serions donc pas surpris si un jour les défenseurs de la cause animale vont inclure dans leurs revendications les plus extrêmes (végans, antisépécistes, etc.) la découverte de l'Afrique, à leur tour, et pas seulement pour des cornes de rhinocéros aphrodisiaques. La littérature cynégétique a déjà ouvert la voie en occupant des rayons entiers dans certaines bibliothèques. Le thème enrichit même certains éditeurs actuels, prompts à se spécialiser dans la grande chasse, bien que le temps des émules de Selous soit passé, encore que souvent cité comme un modèle chez les anglophones amants de la gâchette facile. Même les études sur l'évangélisation chrétienne attirent encore quelques auteurs, bien qu'en perte de vitesse. Bref, dans notre filet, plusieurs dérivés du carnaval universitaire vont apparaître et le lecteur saura probablement mieux que nous les identifier et les classer. En vérité, il n'y a que la violence et les guerres qui survivent à toutes les modes et si vous n'aimez pas sauter de l'une à l'autre, lancez-vous dans le comparatisme intercolonial, transfrontalier, voire intercontinental, et son héritage actuel, mal cicatrisé en maints endroits. Vous aurez une chance de devenir un pionnier si vous choisissez bien vos sujets. Lanceur de mode, c'est quand même mieux que *fashionista* répétitif.

## Généralités et regroupement de plusieurs pays

Ne tombons pas dans le sectarisme de certaines exaltées et sachons rendre hommage à un travail de recherche pur et dur. On commencera donc par un travail original et même remarquable d'une féministe hispano-africaniste britannique<sup>1</sup>. Son texte, issu d'une plume habile, apporte en effet une masse d'informations sur un sujet pratiquement ignoré des auteurs masculins de nombreux travaux antérieurs sur le nationalisme local. Son érudition exceptionnelle a pour but de valoriser (et même parfois de survaloriser) le rôle des femmes africaines dans les mouvements anticolonialistes au Sahara occidental et en Guinée. C'est ainsi qu'on la voit disséquer leur participation au sein du POLISARIO contre le Maroc et, sous l'équateur, contre deux régimes installés par un clan de Fangs du Rio Muni, qui depuis plus d'une génération et demie ont phagocyté l'ancienne Guinée espagnole. Après une dizaine d'années consacrées à l'absorption d'une littérature vraiment abondante, et au recueil de témoignages sur le terrain, cette néo-Pasionaria affirme que les femmes ont été au cœur même des efforts du POLISARIO et y ont encore une influence majeure (inattendue dans un contexte musulman), dans la lutte des indépendantistes sahraouis contre les pouvoirs qui ont succédé aux Espagnols. Ensuite, elle arrive à la conclusion que leurs sœurs guinéennes ont eu et conservent un rôle beaucoup plus effacé pour renverser la famille des deux dictateurs «dynastiques» qui ont accaparé les richesses nationales, à partir de Malabo, depuis 1968.

Joanna Allan accorde, certes, selon nous, une importance et une fiabilité disproportionnées aux traditions orales qu'elle a rassemblées patiemment. Soit! Mais ce n'est pas tout, car on lui doit aussi la mise au jour et l'exploitation de sources écrites (pièces d'archives inconnues avant elle). C'est là une avancée incontestable, bien qu'il s'agisse avant tout d'une ligne de défense qui permet à cette militante virulente de démolir la forteresse colonialiste dans le désert et dans la double jungle de la Guinée. Certes, elle aurait peut-être pu se montrer moins unilatérale et dégager de façon plus nette la différence historique entre les deux types de colonisation espagnole en Afrique: **a)** une purement «stratégique» et militaire (au Sahara); **b)** l'autre, marquée par l'emprise religieuse, qui servait de justificatif aux entreprises capitalistes d'un colonat trié sur le volet (à Fernando Poo et au Rio Muni), et qui était censée civiliser des sociétés bantoues traditionnelles où l'importance de la femme est réputée être secondaire, contrairement à la condition féminine dans le monde des nomades, même parmi ceux en voie de sédentarisation accélérée.

A propos des sections consacrées à l'anticolonialisme initial apparaissant dans les années 1940-1960/75, l'auteure n'a utilisé aucune de nos publications pertinentes, sauf celle qui se rapproche le plus de la propagande franquiste de l'époque, laissant ainsi de côté un opuscule rarissime, René Pélissier, *Etudes hispano-guinéennes*, Editions Pélissier, 78630 Orgeval, 1969 et, beaucoup plus répandu et étonnant, René Pélissier, *Don Quichotte en Afrique. Voyages à la fin de l'Empire espagnol*, *Idem*, 1992. Quoi qu'il en soit, au carrefour de l'historiographie, de la science politique et de la sociologie, le livre de cette Croisée en campagne ouvre une fenêtre. Prenons garde cependant de ne pas trébucher sur les nombreuses références à Gramsci, Fanon, Foucault, etc., devenues quasiment obligatoires dans les universités anglophones pour les postulantes à un emploi dans l'enseignement, et quittons ce festival dantesque où des tortionnaires en uniforme et des violeurs impénitents traquent les femmes autant que les hommes, les unes et les autres réclamant leur liberté et leur dignité. Même si ces grands mots sont démonétisés depuis longtemps, cela peut faire chaud au cœur de certains de savoir que la jeunesse y croit encore. Pas toute, malheureusement.

<sup>1</sup> Allan, Joanna (2019), *Silenced Resistance. Women, Dictatorships, and Genderwashing in Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea*, Madison (Wisconsin), The University of Wisconsin Press. Distribué en Europe par Eurospan, pp. XIV-338, photos noir et blanc.



On sera plus succinct avec un auteur juriste antillais qui s'est spécialisé dans le thème inépuisable de la guerre récente en Afrique australe, en quelque sorte un tenant de la guerre froide, examinée dans sa variante «tiède» ou «brûlante», avec le conflit MPLA-Cuba-URSS *versus* Savimbi-Afrique du Sud-Etats-Unis en Angola au temps de l'apartheid. Dans **Guerrilla Warfare**<sup>2</sup> il décroïssonne et élargit donc ses intérêts puisqu'il examine pour le grand public – c'est surtout un vulgarisateur – quelques figures ayant conduit des actions armées dans l'Histoire de plusieurs continents. Il les qualifie de révolutionnaires et cela donne lieu à de brèves monographies allant de William Wallace en Ecosse à Savimbi (pp. 123-135) en passant par George Washington, Simon Bolivar, Giap, Mao, ou Velupillai Prabhakaran au Sri Lanka. Pour Savimbi qu'il n'aime pas, il insiste naturellement sur sa maîtrise de la guérilla et, pour faire bonne mesure, dans son programme de démolition du mythe, il rappelle quelques noms de généraux de l'UNITA exécutés par Savimbi. En matière de guérilla on s'étonne un peu qu'il n'ait pas inscrit dans son tableau d'honneur le grand Amílcar Cabral.

## Guinée

A la fin du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, la Guinée portugaise était le simulacre (*dixit*) d'une colonie européenne en Afrique, comme l'admettait l'un de ses propres gouverneurs. Un siècle plus tard, Mário Beja Santos, reprenant et amplifiant l'opinion quasi générale des auteurs qui ont publié sur la Guinée-Bissau, nous montre que ce pays «indépendant» est devenu – en pire – le «simulacre» inviable et avorté d'un de ces Etats faillis siégeant dans la plupart des instances internationales. Ils existent donc puisqu'ils sont capables d'y discourir doctement sur l'avenir du monde. Toutefois, ils ne survivent que grâce aux aumônes accordées par de bons samaritains non encore fatigués de leur maintenir la tête hors de l'eau. Ils sont parfois aidés dans leur générosité par des trafiquants en tout genre qui ont nécrosé certains détenteurs des pouvoirs locaux. En ce début du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, ceux de ces «bienfaiteurs» qui sont encore en vie, parmi ces anciens «bisounours» des années 1960-1980, continuent à alimenter indirectement ces moulins à paroles creuses. D'autres, plus lucides, ne croient plus à l'efficacité de leur assistance, mais font comme si de rien n'était pour ne pas céder la place à leurs concurrents.

Au-dessus du champ de ces batailles perdues en Guinée-Bissau, Beja Santos survole les décombres, désespéré qu'il est, car il compatit aux malheurs de ses anciens colonisés qui n'ont pas encore déserté la lutte en émigrant. A qui destine-t-il ses **História(s) da Guiné-Bissau**<sup>3</sup>? Probablement à un public qui n'a pas fait la guerre coloniale en la maudissant, ainsi qu'aux anciens combattants qui y ont passé 20 à 26 mois à déjouer les mines. Donc, pas de développements intempestifs: il résume les faits en s'appuyant sur de longs extraits de politologues généralement étrangers. C'est suffisamment didactique et efficace dans l'ensemble, avec une forte empathie à l'égard des populations rurales, sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'y ajouter des complications conceptuelles qui entraveraient la narration. En marge des modes postcoloniales, son texte est en définitive une introduction à l'ensemble des erreurs commises par d'ambitieux arrivistes qui se sont abrités ou s'abritent encore derrière la stature d'Amílcar Cabral pour s'enrichir personnellement. Beja Santos est leur chroniqueur inconsolé.

<sup>2</sup> Polack, Peter (2018), **Guerrilla Warfare. Kings of Revolution**, Casemate Publishers UK, pp. 160, photos noir et blanc.

<sup>3</sup> Santos, Mário Beja (2016), **História(s) da Guiné-Bissau. Da Luta de libertação aos nossos dias**, V. N. Famalicão, Edições Húmus, pp. 399.

Dans un autre registre, devenu le vulgarisateur intarissable de la Guinée, ce même auteur dans un nouveau volume<sup>4</sup> revendique le mérite d'avoir été le découvreur d'archives inexploitées avant lui. Cette prétention est, semble-t-il, justifiée. Consacrer tout un livre à mettre au jour les richesses *guineenses* des Archives du Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU) rapproche Beja Santos du podium où se tiendront un jour les érudits les plus féconds de la Guinée, cette prolixité étant la preuve de la fascination qu'elle exerce sur certains allogènes. En quoi consiste cette nouvelle source? Essentiellement, des rapports envoyés à leur maison mère à Lisbonne par les responsables des agences du BNU à Bolama (ouverte en 1903) et surtout à Bissau (à partir de 1917). Les collections conservées sont très incomplètes, mais ce qui subsiste a une certaine valeur pour qui voudrait construire une histoire économique ou générale de la colonie. Elles apportent une masse inattendue de documents concernant l'Administration, son personnel, les relations à l'intérieur du microcosme commercial et parfois militaire, etc. Conformément à quelques traits «moyens» de l'Européen sous les tropiques, on découvre en maintes pages la face la plus hideuse des intrigues et rivalités entre fonctionnaires, entre hommes d'affaires et parfois, plus généralement, entre Blancs et Africains. En certaines années, abondent les dénonciations *ad hominem*, les attaques pour incompétence, immoralité, haines recuites, etc., toutes choses qui, normalement, n'ont pas leur place dans les activités internes d'une grande banque.

Le premier document conservé date de 1916 et en principe on devrait trouver des éléments jusqu'en 1974, mais il y a des vides énormes. Schématiquement, Beja Santos, explorateur émerveillé, résume ce qu'il lui semble le plus utile et fournit alors des extraits tirés de plusieurs pièces. De ce fait, on peut, par exemple, sonder l'opinion d'un banquier sur les campagnes de Teixeira Pinto et la situation de la Guinée pendant la Première Guerre mondiale (y compris aux Bissagos en 1917). La révolte des Felupes en 1933 est également couverte. Tel quel, le livre surprend par sa franchise venimeuse à l'égard des autorités, quand le représentant de la BNU a une querelle à vider avec elles, mais il ne donne évidemment qu'un aperçu des richesses du fonds. Reste maintenant à les exploiter systématiquement, à titre de complément aux archives traditionnelles, notamment à propos du début des troubles, au tout début des années 1960.

## Angola

L'Angola – contrairement au Mozambique – n'a jamais accueilli beaucoup de touristes internationaux. Pourquoi? Colonie d'exploitation intense et séculaire de la part de quelques Portugais (généralement pauvres initialement), puis mis sous cloche politique par l'Estado Novo, avant et pendant la guerre de 1961-1974/75, et rendu inabordable de par le chaos de la guerre civile jusqu'en 2002, l'Angola n'était traversé que par quelques téméraires faisant le tour d'Afrique en camping-car ou en moto, voire vélo. La réputation exécrationnelle des autorités de Luanda, de ses agents extérieurs et de sa bureaucratie locale était un repoussoir. Malgré tout, plusieurs milliers d'étrangers solvables (Ex: dans le pétrole, les ONG, la diplomatie) vivaient dans la capitale et auraient mérité un guide touristique digne de ce nom. Or le premier texte sérieux date seulement de 2009. Il est naturellement rédigé dans un anglais châtié et, dès le début, il obtient un public enthousiaste qui s'en sert comme d'un manuel de sa survie à Luanda et quelques capitales provinciales, pas toutes accessibles, sinon par les airs. Une première réédition et actualisation date ensuite

<sup>4</sup> Santos, Mário Beja (2019), *Os cronistas desconhecidos do canal do Geba. O BNU da Guiné*, V. N. Fimalicão, Edições Húmus, pp. 358.

de 2013 et les auteurs se mettent à trois pour la compiler, dont un Italo-Britannique, Oscar Scafidi, qui déjà accumulait les années (cinq de 2009 à 2014) d'enseignement (histoire) à Luanda. Finalement, six ans plus tard, en 2019 cet intrépide baroudeur assume à lui seul la paternité de la deuxième réédition/actualisation. Et c'est un chef d'œuvre<sup>5</sup> de minutie et d'utilité. Nous dirons mieux, c'est le vade-mecum que tout angolais devrait posséder, sans parler des élites angolaises soucieuses de faire connaître leur pays à l'étranger sous un jour favorable. Scafidi c'est l'anti-Paul Theroux voyageant en Angola. Ce dernier, saturé de tropiques, vomissait l'Angola et ses fonctionnaires. Scafidi passe l'éponge – semble-t-il – sur l'imbécilité de certaines hautes autorités qui – selon nos sources – voulaient le déporter pour ... «espionnage» le long du fleuve Kwanza ou Cuanza! Il est vrai qu'en 2016 la police secrète ou publique était encore un Etat dans l'Etat. Même à Cuba il y avait des fonctionnaires caribéens plus soucieux de favoriser le tourisme qu'en Angola. Scafidi salue en passant les bonnes intentions du nouveau président Lourenço. Reste à voir s'il réussira à changer l'inertie et le blocage de certains services officiels. Pour résumer notre pensée: nous ne regrettons pas d'avoir ouvert notre section angolaise par un ouvrage qui est plus qu'un simple guide. Il faut être du métier pour le situer à sa vraie place: la première car il est le plus utile aux Angolais.

Autre texte éloigné d'une quelconque mode, postcoloniale ou non. Un compte rendu des **Recherches archéologiques à Baia Farta**<sup>6</sup> dépasse largement les compétences du critique. Nous ne l'avons admis dans cette chronique qu'en souvenir de notre bref passage dans l'une des pêcheries comprises entre la Baia Farta et Benguela en 1966. Souvenir purement olfactif du poisson séchant qui nous avait dissuadé de rester plus longtemps. Intenable! C'est un texte bilingue dont on est sûr qu'il ne soulèvera aucune tempête diplomatique. Indispensable outil de coopération franco-angolaise, financé par les deux parties, les ambassades en raffolent, car l'archéologie, tout comme l'ethnologie préhistorique, intéressent moins que les touristes. Là où cela va se corser, c'est lorsque l'on se rapprochera de l'*empowerment* historique et de ses *fashionistas* érudites. Mais nous en sommes encore très loin avec ce travail luxueux destiné à quelques spécialistes qui montrent ainsi que les autorités locales ont des préoccupations culturelles et scientifiques. Bien.

Entrons sans préjugés dans un domaine qui réconcilie avec les études de genre lorsqu'elles ne sont pas arrogantes mais, au contraire, traitées par des historiennes et des historiens compétents. Avec **African Women in the Atlantic World**<sup>7</sup> nous sommes à un carrefour entre la traite des esclaves et le rôle souvent occulté qui y ont joué les Africaines négrières, tout au moins en certaines régions de la côte. Le volume a été dirigé de main de maîtres par: 1.<sup>o</sup>) une spécialiste de l'exportation des êtres humains, à partir de Benguela, et 2.<sup>o</sup>) ce prodigieux connaisseur des sources européennes à ce sujet qu'est l'Anglophone ex-enseignant en Allemagne, Adam Jones. Les concepteurs ont divisé leur volume en trois parties thématiques (Property, Vulnerability, Mobility), puis géographiques (Sierra Leone, Gambie, Nigeria, Sénégal) et cette répartition aboutit à donner la prépondérance à l'Angola. Les trois chapitres (sur treize) qu'ils lui accordent renversent une tendance fréquente chez les Anglophones: minimiser l'importance des Lusophones, par ignorance

<sup>5</sup> Scafidi, Oscar (2019), **Angola. The Bradt Travel Guide**, Chesham (Angleterre), Bradt Travel Guides Ltd, pp. XI-372, nombreuses photos couleur sur 16 pages hors texte.

<sup>6</sup> Gutierrez, Manuel & Benjamin, Maria Helena (éditeurs du volume) (2019), **Recherches archéologiques à Baia Farta (Benguela-Angola)**, Paris, L'Harmattan, pp. 203, nombreuses photos noir et blanc et couleur.

<sup>7</sup> Candido, Mariana P. & Jones, Adam (éditeurs du volume) (2019), **African Women in the Atlantic World. Property, Vulnerability & Mobility, 1660-1880**, Woodbridge (Angleterre), James Currey/Boydell & Brewer, pp. XIV-290, illustrations noir et blanc.

ou désintéressé de leur part. Ici, cela est suffisant pour éviter au livre d'être classé dans notre section «Regroupement de plusieurs pays». C'est avant tout un texte angolaliste! Centrés sur ce territoire, les trois chapitres pertinents se déclinent ainsi: 1.°) les femmes et l'agriculture, la démographie et les propriétés foncières à Catumbela au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle; 2.°) les richesses matérielles des femmes de l'élite à Benguela au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle; 3.°) conjoints, conjointes et partenaires commerciaux à Luanda de 1831 à 1859. Ce qui frappe dans ces micro-monographies, c'est le soin apporté aux sources bibliographiques (30 pages) et archivistiques enfin rendues partiellement accessibles en Angola, tant officielles, à Luanda ou dans les provinces, que religieuses (catholiques). C'est véritablement du labourage en profondeur, même si les femmes étudiées n'ont pas joué – semble-t-il – un grand rôle politique en Angola aux 18-19<sup>èmes</sup> siècles. La plupart d'entre elles sont des métisses qui, par leur habileté et leurs réseaux, atteignent des niveaux élevés dans les affaires (essentiellement l'esclavage local et la traite des noirs, jusqu'à la disparition effective de la seconde). Certaines pages, notamment celles fondées sur les testaments et les inventaires après décès des intéressées, auraient pu servir d'inspiration à un gourou de la haute couture, tel Kaiser Karl [Lagerfeld]. A ce rythme, dans quelques années, on va finir par tout savoir sur certaines aïeules, à l'origine des grandes familles *crioulas* actuelles de Luanda, Malanje et Benguela, conclusion timidement subversive non exprimée. A noter l'éveil des historiens/historiennes du Brésil qui creusent – dans les universités américaines – leurs relations avec l'Angola esclavagiste, sans sentimentalisme excessif.

Avec **Angolan War of Liberation**<sup>8</sup>, Al J. Venter a fait un effort de condensation qui lui est inhabituel. C'est un essai de contextualisation (les partis politiques) et surtout de vulgarisation (armement, aéronefs, troupes d'élite) de la guerre coloniale, avec en renfort les travaux de John P. Cann. Puis, finalement, l'auteur revient sur son expérience de journaliste de terrain (non datée) engrangée dans ses reportages antérieurs le long du Cuando et surtout au Cabinda, ici particulièrement développée. L'objectif est de fournir des éléments concrets susceptibles d'informer un lecteur censé ignorer tout de l'Angola, et qui ne voudrait pas se contenter des habituels récits héroïques de Venter. Les illustrations sont pour la plupart tirées du fonds iconographique de l'auteur. Un effort d'analyse objective est à souligner.

Bien que le nom du co-auteur (Tom Cooper) de cette collection militaro-angoliste figure sur certaines publicités de son distributeur (Casemate UK), il semble que le Suisse (Adrien Fontanellaz) soit le seul auteur de ce Volume 2, comme c'est indiqué sur la couverture du *livrinho*<sup>9</sup>. Peu importe, car ces deux amis ne sacrifient à aucune mode postcoloniale décelable et poursuivent leur chemin à travers les péripéties «chaudes» de la «guerre froide». Ce sont des minutieux. Ils sont indifférents aux thèses nationalistes respectives des anciens adversaires ou alliés. Ils reconnaissent aisément que sans l'aide en armements et matériels fournie par l'URSS et ses satellites est-européens, l'armée du MPLA (FAPLA) n'aurait pas pu se professionnaliser aussi vite. Même observation pour l'UNITA et les généraux de l'apartheid dans le camp opposé. A elle seule, jusqu'en 1990, l'URSS avait envoyé plus de 10 000 conseillers militaires, dont plus de 7000 officiers. Ce sont des statistiques officielles qui comptent. Selon Fontanellaz, le point faible des FAPLA se situait dans la mauvaise qualité de ses officiers. Surtout aux grades moyens et supérieurs, déjà

<sup>8</sup> Venter, Al J. (2018), **Angolan War of Liberation. Colonial-Communist Clash, 1961-1974**, Barnsley (Angleterre), Pen and Sword Books, pp. 127, nombreuses photos noir et blanc et couleur (+ 8 pages de planches).

<sup>9</sup> Fontanellaz, Adrien (2019), **War of Intervention in Angola. Volume 2. Angolan and Cuban Forces at War, 1976-1983**, Warwick (Angleterre), Helion & Company (Distribué aussi par Casemate UK, Oxford), pp. 80, nombreuses photos et cartes noir et blanc et couleur.

ravagés par la corruption et l'incapacité à veiller au bien-être de leurs troupes recrutées pour la plupart de force.

Il montre que, quoi que l'on dise maintenant à Luanda, il faut accorder une importance primordiale au rôle joué par le corps expéditionnaire cubain sur le déroulement des opérations. Malgré l'armement soviétique fourni aux FAPLA, seuls les Cubains pouvaient tenir tête aux coups de boutoir de l'armée de Pretoria qui, elle, ne voulait ou ne pouvait pas, pour des raisons politiques, s'engager massivement sur un terrain aussi éloigné du *laager* des Afrikaners. Limiter ses pertes n'était pas une priorité absolue de Fidel Castro, perdu dans sa course à la notoriété internationale. On le verra peut-être dans le Volume 3 de la collection où l'on doit atteindre à partir de 1983 le niveau d'une guerre moderne et «en grand».

Signalons quelques passages forts du Volume 2: 1.°) les Cubains interventionnistes dans le sauvetage d'Agostinho Neto lors du putsch de mai 1977; 2.°) la déroute de Savimbi au début de 1976, sa «longue marche» et sa renaissance sur le plateau central; 3.°) la reprise provisoire par les FAPLA des postes frontaliers à l'extrême sud. On ne peut évidemment pas citer toutes les localités surgissant dans la mer événementielle de l'auteur dont l'impartialité reste impeccable, à travers les «montagnes russes» de la propagande mensongère des services du MPLA et de l'UNITA. La richesse de la documentation mise en œuvre, le souci chronologique adopté ensuite donnent une tonalité que l'on ne retrouve plus ailleurs dans la littérature actuelle. Pendant les années couvertes dans le Volume 2, l'Angola est devenu un ring où les deux camps rivaux survivent aux chocs les plus violents, au point où l'on se demande s'ils ne sont pas immortels. Les batailles, grandes ou minuscules, s'accumulent donc et se neutralisent jusqu'à ce que les lecteurs crient grâce. Avec ce maigre opuscule sur deux colonnes, on dispose enfin d'une sorte de guide pour vieux pèlerins funèbres et fantômes nés dans les champs de mines et de famines ou sous les bombardements (toxiques en certains cas). Impitoyables devant des villageois qui quittèrent la brousse pour aller se réfugier dans les villes encore épargnées, les boxeurs détruisirent leur propre pays. Il semble bien que le déminage prendra encore des années: le temps peut-être que les anciens combattants étrangers décident sur place si leur jeunesse contrainte a été victorieuse ou non (Ex: à Cangamba). Le temps aussi que les fantômes apprennent à lire l'anglais. On est arrivé en 1983 bien loin des Ph. D à la mode universitaire sur des sujets explorés jusqu'à ce qu'ils tombent dans la poussière postcoloniale.

Voyons maintenant un texte inattendu pour connaître subsidiairement Luanda sous un angle imprévu par son sous-titre, bien tentateur pour un lecteur potentiel attiré par Corinthe<sup>10</sup> et non rebuté par la proximité de l'auteur qui s'est arrangé pour rédiger dans ses souvenirs une centaine de pages luandaïses. C'est un cadre supérieur du plus grand groupe pétrolier français qui, à l'époque, contribuait à la survie économique des autorités régnant dans la mégapole africaine, avant la pénétration chinoise, puisque nous sommes dans une partie de la deuxième moitié de la décennie 1990-2000. Son style est plutôt agréable ce qui permet de ne pas trop s'égarer dans ses multiples activités. Les domaines couverts par cet auteur basque sont les suivants: 1.°) le fonctionnement interne d'une macro-entreprise étrangère qui a dû adapter sa bureaucratie exotique aux «mœurs» locales (y compris les revendications salariales du personnel africain); 2.°) la vie d'un millier environ d'expatriés qui, avec leur épouse, doivent cohabiter avec le chaos et le dénuement local (l'entreprise a installé pour ses employés deux cabinets, un médical, l'autre dentaire, une bibliothèque, etc.). La description indirecte de cette sorte de colonie exogène, compacte, vivant en

<sup>10</sup> Saubadine, Philippe (2019), *La marche haute. Il m'a été donné d'aller à Corinthe. Tome 2*, Paris, Vêrone Editions, pp. 787.

autarcie, nécessairement coupée d'un milieu ultra-pauvre, donc dangereux, est l'une des forces du récit. Rappelons que nous sommes ici dans les années qui voient la consolidation – tout au moins dans la capitale – du pouvoir militaire du MPLA et l'enrichissement de certains de ses dirigeants. C'est ce qui se rapproche le plus de la Diamang de naguère.

Abordons ensuite un texte encore plus ambitieux. Comme les Géants des anciens Grecs entassant Pélion sur Ossa en espérant toucher l'Olympe, son auteur<sup>11</sup>, qui est aussi général des Forces Armées angolaises, n'a pris aucun risque pour mériter son poste actuel: il s'est entouré de diplômés conquis de haute lutte en trois pays rassurants (Cuba, Espagne, Portugal) et dans des matières telles que le génie (télécommunications), les techniques de l'Information, la géostratégie au niveau des états-majors et peut-être d'autres disciplines qui l'ont conduit à un doctorat à l'ancienne Ecole coloniale (ISCSP) portugaise. Tout cela pour en arriver au poste de Secrétaire exécutif adjoint pour les questions politiques de la Commission du Golfe de Guinée dont chacun sait, ici bas, qu'elle représente les pays riverains de l'Atlantique central jusqu'au Cunene. Cela lui a permis d'utiliser en exergue une citation de 2008 de ce stratège suprême qu'a été le président José Eduardo dos Santos, et l'appui financier de trois organismes pour la présentation graphique de sa thèse; elle est particulièrement réussie.

Mais revenons à ladite Commission. Il n'y a presque plus de négriers professionnels dans ses eaux placentaires, seulement quelques pirates amateurs et facilement découragés. Donc, ce qui rassemble les pays membres de la Commission, c'est l'odeur du pétrole chez les «riches» ou l'espoir d'en trouver qui soit rentable chez les «pauvres». Qu'a voulu faire le général? Il le définit mieux que quiconque. Son travail «cherche à contribuer à l'explication du contexte stratégique dans lequel la région veut entamer son processus de développement intégré, et plus particulièrement, à la contribution que la République d'Angola pourra apporter à l'établissement du cadre de paix et de sécurité [nécessaires]», p. 46. C'est un parfait exemple de ce jargon onusien, ronflant et consensuel, dans lequel les diplomates se manifestent pour arrondir les angles. On va donc voir défiler plusieurs leçons de géostratégie africaine, très savantes pour le non-initié. Elles dispenseront le simple lecteur de poser la question embarrassante: quels sont les moyens à la disposition des intervenants? Naturellement, l'orateur n'est pas là pour répondre car, sous le bouclier d'une bibliographie exubérante, il a remonté à l'Afrique précoloniale et va progresser sur des centaines de pages qu'il a pris soin de soumettre à ses capacités de conceptualisation, lesquelles sont indéniables.

Mais, en fin de compte, quand les éléphants voyagent, les fourmis attendent la fin de l'orage. Ou presque. Ne nous laissons pas intimider par les ambitions du titre<sup>12</sup> d'un livre d'un Cabindais de la diaspora, politique au Congo-Brazzaville, devenu Secrétaire général du Front de Libération de l'enclave du Cabinda (FLEC). Lequel? Malgré les bonnes intentions de l'auteur et sa lucidité quant à la fiabilité, à l'envergure et à la probité de la plupart des indépendantistes, il n'a pas réussi à dresser un relevé complet et cohérent du marigot dans lequel ils se débattent depuis plus de cinquante ans. Pourquoi? Parce que c'est une tâche surhumaine tant la complexité du sujet peut conduire vers une attaque cérébrale l'imprudent qui s'y engagerait à fond. On a donc des lambeaux de certitudes, ou plutôt d'incertitudes, disputés par des crocodiles impuissants, aux dents plus ou moins usées ou aiguisées. Et l'occupation militaire des Angolais dans l'enclave, de même que l'efficacité de leurs services de sécurité pourront s'y exercer aussi longtemps que le pétrole «cabindais» coulera au profit du Sud.

<sup>11</sup> Veríssimo, Gilberto (2016), *Geopolítica do Golfo da Guiné. A posição estratégica de Angola*, Lisboa, Ler devagar, pp. 453, diagrammes noir et blanc et couleur.

<sup>12</sup> Tchissambou, Patrick-André (2018), *La problématique géostratégique de l'enclave du Cabinda. Esquisse de gouvernance pour une paix durable*, Paris, Vérone Editions, pp. 158.

Voilà un thème qui, lui non plus, n'est pas à la mode. Mais c'est dangereux d'y tremper ne serait-ce qu'un orteil. Au crédit de l'auteur on inscrira son pacifisme, la nouveauté de certaines de ses informations et son réalisme en général. Il mise beaucoup sur le nouveau président João Lourenço à Luanda et le «vent du changement» qu'il a promis pour le Cabinda. Gare aux corrompus qui souhaitent le maintien du statu quo car il est rentable pour plusieurs acteurs majeurs et même probablement pour d'autres qui souhaitent les remplacer.

## Mozambique

Dans cette livraison, le nombre de titres fournis à propos du Mozambique est inférieur à celui des textes angolaises, sans que cela marque un essoufflement définitif des auteurs mozambicanistes, encore que l'on note un léger accroissement des *fashionistas* dans le choix des sujets traités. **Bound for Work**<sup>13</sup> prend chronologiquement la suite d'Eric Allina, *Slavery by Any Other Name* qui examinait la vie des *contratados* sous le régime de la Compagnie à charte. Kagan Guthrie, lui, traite à peu près le même thème mais sous la gestion de l'Administration coloniale de Lourenço Marques appliquée à l'ensemble du Mozambique de 1940 à 1965. Il insiste donc sur le vécu des anciens *contratados* du Manica e Sofala (environ 150 interviews utilisés), notamment sur leur mobilité entre leurs différents employeurs, tant en deçà de la frontière qu'en Rhodésie ou en Afrique du Sud. En fait, il y a peu de différences entre les contraintes de l'ancienne Compagnie de Mozambique et les règles de l'Administration quant à leur application au niveau du *posto*. L'exploitation de l'*indígena* vise à développer une colonie pauvre en pressurant l'Africain qui préfère un patron plus généreux chez les Anglophones, plutôt qu'un colon portugais employeur qui cherche à survivre économiquement même chichement.

On ne saurait compter le grand angolais qu'était John A. Marcum et son admirable *The Angolan Revolution*, 2 vol., 1969, 1978, au nombre des suivistes et de leurs productions de second ordre. Seulement, dévoré par des tâches administratives toujours plus absorbantes, l'auteur a probablement voulu répéter son coup de maître avec le Mozambique, mais fatigué et vieillissant (il meurt en 2013 largement octogénaire), il laisse un texte conçu dans les années 1960, mais sans qu'il ait pu l'entourer des soins exigeants nécessaires pour le hisser au niveau de son *Angolan Revolution*. Il en résulte qu'en ces nombreuses décennies de latence, la connaissance du nationalisme mozambicain a dépassé les informations qu'il avait pu amasser dans sa maturité. C'est une partie du drame des enseignants et des chercheurs à qui l'on confie ou impose des activités qui nuisent à leur vocation initiale.

Son **Conceiving Mozambique**<sup>14</sup> n'est pas un livre inutile car, ayant connu personnellement la plupart des cadres supérieurs du FRELIMO en exil et, parfois, leurs adversaires, Marcum fournit des détails introuvables ailleurs, mais on peut constater en raison de la relative rareté des notes (par rapport aux bombardements de minuscules détails rassemblés pour l'Angola) que les deux livres ne sont pas de la même cuisson. Même si certains bureaucrates évaluent la qualité d'un chercheur à la seule multiplicité de ses publications, c'est un mauvais service qu'ils rendent à la qualité de la recherche. L'exemple en est venu encore une fois, hélas, des Etats-Unis et il est néfaste à long terme. Il est dommage que Marcum, lui aussi, ait sacrifié malgré lui à cette mode irresponsable.

<sup>13</sup> Kagan Guthrie, Zachary (2018), **Bound for Work. Labor, Mobility and Colonial Rule in Central Mozambique, 1940-1965**, Charlottesville & London, University of Virginia Press, pp. XI-225, photos noir et blanc.

<sup>14</sup> Marcum, John A. (auteur) & Burke III, Edmund & Clough, Michael W. (éditeurs) (2019), **Conceiving Mozambique**, Heidelberg (Allemagne), Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature, pp. XXXII-199, photos noir et blanc.

En fait, son histoire du nationalisme mozambicain est avant tout celle du FRELIMO vue par un activiste touche-à-tout et engagé. Il était pourtant en bonne voie sur le chemin d'un luso-africanisme impérial en Amérique.

Voir ensuite réapparaître à quelques pages de distance la «mobilité» parmi les nouveaux slogans à la mode ne nous rassure pas, mais s'il est difficile à suivre pour un profane, un autre livre est tenu pour important par les spécialistes américains des études religieuses. Novateur même pour certains. Pour nous **Faith in Flux**<sup>15</sup> est un texte d'anthropologie religieuse, élaboré dans plusieurs villages macuas du district de Mauá (province du Niassa). L'auteur est né au Sri Lanka, mais il a été élevé aux Etats-Unis. Il s'y est lancé dans la nouvelle tarte à la crème à la mode: le pentecôtisme importé du Brésil au Mozambique. On apprend qu'il était sur place avec sa femme en 2011-2012 puis qu'il y est retourné seul. Il a un style tropical agréable à lire lorsqu'on le découvre décrivant des séances de guérison des fidèles. Il a même un talent narratif indéniable (enterrement d'une petite fille tuée par un serpent) dans une cérémonie où l'on assiste à une confrontation entre la tradition et le pentecôtisme. Outre ses développements sur les rites, il donne de nombreuses pages sur les Macuas ruraux face aux injonctions et regroupements lancés par le FRELIMO. Quelques-uns résistent en s'enfuyant loin des pistes et des villages car les promesses des autorités du Sud-Mozambique n'ont pas été tenues. Parfois il reconnaît que la tradition est victorieuse dans sa lutte contre la modernité, et que le pentecôtisme recule au Niassa. Tout cela fera les délices des ethnologues et c'est aussi bien qu'ils soient contents.

Plus original nous paraît être **The Middle Class in Mozambique**<sup>16</sup>. En apparence, il s'agit d'un travail d'anthropologie politique, voire de sociologie, centré sur la petite et la moyenne bourgeoisies à Maputo, dépendantes et bénéficiaires du FRELIMO. Certes, il faut survivre à l'ésotérisme de l'Introduction où le moindre auteur ayant précédé Sumich est rituellement évoqué, cité ou contesté. La suite est beaucoup plus accessible puisque l'on passe par les différents paliers que cette ou ces classes ont dû franchir: les origines, la montée en puissance de l'«homme nouveau» (1974-1983), l'effondrement (1983-1992), la démocratisation (1992-2004) et l'effritement (2005-2015). Sumich a sondé son terrain dans la capitale dès 2002 et, à bien des égards, il examine l'évolution du Parti qui a engendré les nouveaux maîtres de la ville du ciment de l'époque coloniale. Ces derniers ont dû subir les contrecoups de l'inflation et de la détérioration de l'économie qui ont affecté davantage encore les plus démunis.

En un certain sens, le livre est aussi la sociologie d'une minorité africaine privilégiée par le nationalisme et sa dégénérescence corrompte. Selon l'auteur, elle est égoïste. Le livre peut également être considéré comme une manière de géographie urbaine de la capitale. De ce qui s'est passé dans les autres villes et en brousse on n'apprend pratiquement rien. En fait, c'est l'histoire du triomphe puis du «déclin» des Sudistes qui ont tiré leur épingle du jeu. La conclusion atteint 2016. Le style redevient alors plus obscur. Contrairement à Luanda, Maputo a vu naître une petite élite intellectuelle issue d'un enseignement supérieur local d'une assez bonne qualité, renforcé par l'envoi d'étudiants à l'étranger. Une sorte d'indépendance d'esprit à vu le jour. Elle diverge naturellement de l'habituel catéchisme naguère en honneur à Maputo. Elle s'exerce surtout contre la corruption. On ne peut accuser Sumich d'avoir noyé le poisson. Malgré l'apparence anodine du titre et surtout de son sous-titre, il s'est affranchi de conventions trop fréquentes sous la plume

<sup>15</sup> Premawardhana, Devaka (2018), **Faith in Flux. Pentecostalism and Mobility in Rural Mozambique**, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 221, photos noir et blanc.

<sup>16</sup> Sumich, Jason (2018), **The Middle Class in Mozambique. The State and the Politics of Transformation in Southern Africa**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. XIV-174, photos noir et blanc.



de plusieurs commentateurs encore obnubilés par les prétentions révolutionnaires d'une microsociété imaginaire. Son livre est celui d'un réaliste, donc d'un pessimiste quant au présent. Pour l'avenir on verra plus tard.

Beaucoup plus modeste dans ses intentions scientifiques, le rapport de Richard Obinna Iroanya<sup>17</sup> ne s'encombre pas d'objectifs universitaires. Il analyse les différentes formes du trafic d'êtres humains sévissant en Afrique du Sud et au Mozambique sous la direction de mafias qui l'organisent et en profitent. C'est un méthodique qui démontre aisément que l'emprise de cette criminalité institutionnalisée constitue une menace directe pour la sécurité des deux pays, d'autant plus que la police des deux Etats n'a plus l'efficacité des polices des deux anciens régimes (le colonial et l'apartheid). Dans un style d'ONG, il examine donc les différentes variétés que ce trafic peut revêtir à partir du Mozambique: sexuel (prostitution des femmes et des enfants), exportation d'une main-d'œuvre clandestine vers l'Afrique anglophone, trafic d'organes humains à des fins médicales ou pour des sacrifices rituels. On se rappelle les scandales ayant alerté les presses locales à propos des enlèvements au Nord-Mozambique de jeunes mineurs destinés à être découpés en morceaux, selon les commandes des clients. Il ne semble pas que l'auteur fasse le rapprochement avec la chasse aux albinos dans d'autres pays plus au nord. C'est déjà assez saugrenuement pour ne pas s'enfoncer plus avant dans le sordide et le macabre. Là, avec Obinna Iroanya, on est devant un auteur qui ne suit aucune mode ancienne ou présente. Sous son style émiétté, c'est un subversif bon teint qui s'exprime. Il fait froid dans le dos, mais des centaines de coupures de journaux ou de rapports d'entités privées ou publiques sont implacables. C'est un lanceur d'alertes qui fouille dans les bas-fonds de l'humanité, et la puanteur qui s'en dégage nous incite à clore cette section au plus vite pour aller respirer autre chose que le fétide de l'horreur tropicale.

## Ifni et Sahara occidental

Aussi loin que puissent remonter nos souvenirs d'Ifni en 1967, nous ne pouvons associer notre bref passage dans l'enclave hispanique à une odeur spécifique, sinon celle d'un air marin plutôt agréable. Nous voici donc revenus à la fin de l'Empire espagnol avec un livre<sup>18</sup> curieux. Et son sous-titre l'est encore plus car, profitant d'une victoire sur les Marocains en 1860, les Espagnols du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle jugèrent nécessaire de reprendre pied sur le littoral faisant face aux îles Canaries, et pour justifier cette revendication invoquèrent l'existence d'une ancienne tour (à Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña). L'ennui est qu'on avait l'embarras du choix pour déterminer quelles ruines (du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle) correspondaient à l'authentique Santa Cruz. Les Marocains soutinrent qu'ils n'avaient plus d'autorités dans ce Sud et firent leur possible pour localiser cette tour oubliée, loin de leurs domaines. Les Espagnols, pour leur part, disaient que c'était Agadir où ils avaient un consul. Finalement, les uns et les autres s'accordèrent pour accepter le village de Sidi Ifni qui était pratiquement inabordable en venant de la mer, et pendant des décennies on en resta là. Ainsi naquit le projet de la future possession espagnole d'Ifni!

L'ouvrage se compose d'une anthologie de textes rédigés avant, pendant et après la prise de possession effective de cette «colonie» incertaine (occupée en 1934 seulement) qu'on élargit aux dimensions d'une enclave taillée dans le protectorat français au Maroc. Ces extraits sont précédés de présentations historiques. Ils émanent de militaires, de

<sup>17</sup> Obinna Iroanya, Richard (2019), **Human Trafficking and Security in Southern Africa. The South African and Mozambican Experience**, Heidelberg (Allemagne), Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature, pp. XV-253.

<sup>18</sup> Dalmases, Pablo-Ignacio de (2019), **Viajes a Ifni. Tras las huellas de Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña**, Madrid, Sial/Casa de África, pp. 340, photos noir et blanc.

journalistes et de rares voyageurs. Tous sont espagnols, sauf René Pélissier dans son *Don Quichotte en Afrique*, Editions Pélissier, Orgeval, 1992, qui donne ses impressions de voyage de 1967, à propos de la fin de cette aventure coloniale de Madrid. Et là les surprises recommencent car on ne s'attendait pas à trouver les militaires franquistes dans le rôle du Père Noël des Berbères à Ifni, surtout après avoir subi une sanglante attaque (1957-1958) des Marocains sur l'enclave et au Sahara espagnol.

Ce fut donc un paternalisme efficace qui fit pleuvoir sur le reliquat microscopique de l'enclave et de sa population (quelques milliers) des investissements et des bienfaits directs sur ces nouveaux citoyens espagnols par la grâce d'un décret en 1958. Cette provincialisation artificielle dura de 1958 à 1968 (abandon officiel et définitif du camp retranché de Sidi Ifni et de l'intérieur). Tout porte à croire que la présence espagnole, si brève fut-elle, est considérée par les Ifniens actuels comme l'âge d'or du développement et de la bonne entente entre militaires et Ifniens, comparés à leur grande pauvreté depuis que le Maroc administre la région. Cette ultime décennie hispanique constitua ce qui se rapproche le plus d'un comptoir de l'Inde, rétrocedé à d'ex-voisins avides.

De là, on saute sur un Sahara beaucoup plus coriace où l'enjeu était économiquement et politiquement beaucoup plus important. **Showdown in Western Sahara**<sup>19</sup> dérangera peut-être les ONG espagnoles qui ont oublié – ou jamais su – que le POLISARIO initialement se tourna contre les Espagnols et leurs troupes recrutées localement. Evidemment, la censure franquiste n'en dit jamais rien en métropole. Ce livre met avant tout l'accent sur la participation de l'aviation, et ses auteurs, spécialistes de la guerre aérienne, font remonter l'origine des troubles à la guerre du Rif (1921-1927), ce qui peut laisser songeurs d'autres éminents chercheurs centrés sur le Sahara. Au pire, ce découpage entre opérations en l'air et à terre ne facilitera pas la compréhension par le grand public qui aurait probablement apprécié des cartes détaillées, car la toponymie ouest-saharienne n'occupe pas les loisirs des vacanciers. On va voir ce qu'on nous prépare avec le Volume 2.

## Guinée équatoriale

Rien ici qui bouleversera nos connaissances de ce pays qui n'a pas une réputation à la hauteur de l'excellent guide touristique que lui a consacré le bienveillant Oscar Scafidi. On remarquera cependant qu'un spécialiste anglophone du Gabon vient de lancer un nouveau concept qui pourrait susciter une nouvelle mode chez les politologues, celui du «gouvernement dynastique» en Afrique, soit «*Dynastic Rule*» en anglais. Douglas A. Yates<sup>20</sup>, son initiateur, devrait choisir des éditeurs «mainstream» s'il veut que le concept des «familles au pouvoir» prospère parmi les faiseurs d'opinion universitaires américains. Selon lui, il s'applique en Afrique aux pays suivants: RDC, Djibouti, Gabon, Togo et aussi en Guinée équatoriale, encore que dans ce pays nous ne sachions pas si la troisième génération dans cette famille montera sur le trône. Sous forme d'une mince plaquette, l'espace a manqué à l'auteur pour apporter des éléments nouveaux sur ce pays, sauf peut-être sur le «harem» du président actuel et ses descendants à Malabo.

Serons-nous mieux éclairés sur le «côté obscur» du pouvoir à Bata et à Malabo par Jacques Vincent de Paul Mebiam'émame<sup>21</sup>? Probablement, car il nous invite à un tour (vécu de

<sup>19</sup> Cooper, Tom & Grandolini, Albert (2018), *Showdown in Western Sahara. Volume I: Air Warfare over the Last African Colony. 1945-1975*, Warwick (Angleterre), Helion & Company (Distribué aussi par Casemate UK, Oxford), pp. VIII-64 + 8 p. de planches couleur, photos.

<sup>20</sup> Yates, Douglas A. (2018), *Dynastic Rule in Equatorial Guinea*, Beau Bassin (?) (Maurice), LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, pp. 49, photos noir et blanc.

<sup>21</sup> Mebiam'émame, Jacques Vincent de Paul (2018), *Entre Africains. Le malheureux destin des migrants en Guinée équatoriale*, Paris, L'Harmattan Cameroun, pp. 242.

l'intérieur) de l'appareil répressif équato-guinéen, lequel est alimenté en permanence par la cupidité des policiers qui s'enrichissent par les «amendes» ou plutôt les «razzias» qu'ils infligent en toute illégalité à leurs victimes, puisque des centaines d'internés sont simplement en garde à vue. Elle peut durer des mois, tant qu'ils n'ont pas payé leurs geôliers. L'auteur est un juriste camerounais, de la même ethnie (Fang) que les maîtres du pouvoir à Malabo. Il a émigré en Guinée équatoriale et a voulu s'installer – dit-il – dans le pays, en infraction à la législation locale. Nous ne savons pas s'il s'agit d'un récit authentique ou romancé, car ses incarcérations à maintes reprises ne sont pas suffisamment expliquées et nous ne comprenons pas l'acharnement des autorités contre un juriste fort capable de se défendre seul devant un tribunal. Il parle du commissariat central de la police à Bata comme étant un véritable camp de concentration (y compris avec tortures). Il faudra qu'un auteur intrépide rédige un jour un guide à l'usage des touristes vicieux qui veulent connaître l'univers carcéral en Afrique.

Ce qui est clair, c'est qu'il ridiculise la prétention à la fraternité africaine à travers les frontières, cet auteur, détenteur d'une maîtrise en droit international public, mais chômeur au Cameroun. Ses compatriotes clandestins en Guinée sont – dit-il – abandonnés par les diplomates camerounais en poste. L'appel d'air chez les hispanophones a des odeurs entêtantes de pétrole. Après la lecture de ce livre étrange on comprend mieux l'attrait de l'Europe pour ces candidats au départ, coûte que coûte.

## Timor

On doit signaler deux livres contrariant les idées reçues dans les milieux bien pensants qui ont fini par tisser une toile de fond irénique rejetant les malheurs des Timoriens sur le colonialisme portugais puis indonésien. **A revolta de 1959 em Timor-Leste**<sup>22</sup> a pour auteur un magistrat portugais envoyé en missions de coopération à Timor dans les années 2000 et 2014. Il a cherché à élucider une très mystérieuse révolte de juin 1959 contre les autorités coloniales. A l'issue de ses enquêtes privées, il en vient à faire de ce soulèvement très confus la première manifestation sanglante de la lutte anticolonialiste, c'est-à-dire le début de la *Guerra do Ultramar*. Ayant découvert très peu de documents écrits à l'époque, il s'est rabattu sur des témoignages oraux d'anciens participants ou de descendants des insurgés de 1959. Et ce qu'il en ressort, c'est le manque d'unanimité sur les buts à atteindre. Une partie soutient qu'il s'agissait d'une jacquerie anti-administration portugaise, d'autres mettent en avant l'ingérence et les conseils du consul d'Indonésie à Dili, agissant de sa propre initiative ou sur instructions de son Ministère à Djakarta. On patauge dans les incertitudes et il est devenu difficile pour les Timoriens, «collabos» des Indonésiens, d'avouer qu'ils s'étaient révoltés en faveur des massacreurs ultérieurs de leurs voisins. Certains le reconnaissent malgré tout, tandis que d'autres évacuent les stigmates les plus infâmants. Quant aux représentants de l'Estado Novo, ils ne pouvaient admettre que cette rébellion avait été montée – piètrement – contre eux par de petits auxiliaires n'en pouvant plus d'être pressurés et exploités non par des colons civils quasi inexistantes, mais bien par des fonctionnaires qui les administraient comme au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, par la *chicote!*

Il y a d'autres facteurs issus de l'histoire coloniale locale et de la division ethnique des insulaires, mais l'auteur n'a pas utilisé la traduction portugaise de notre *Timor en guerre...*, Editions Pélessier, 1996, notamment à propos de la dureté de la répression de la révolte du

<sup>22</sup> Gonçalves, João Luís (2018), *A revolta de 1959 em Timor-Leste. Uma história desconhecida sobre o início da Guerra do Ultramar*, Lavra (Portugal), Letras e Coisas, pp. 137, photos noir et blanc.

Manufai, ce qui le conduit à minimiser les milliers de morts massacrés en 1912-1913. Cette ignorance le conduit à donner une fourchette «nécrologique» prudente, comprise entre les «plus de 500 morts en 1959» et les «30 morts» admis par un nouveau gouverneur. Ce dernier chiffre nous paraît de loin le plus vraisemblable, vu la stricte localisation des événements (surtout à Viqueque et alentours). Ce titre est un premier pas vers une étude en profondeur conduite par un historien ou un anthropologue professionnel s'entourant d'écrits d'époque et non seulement de souvenirs oraux provenant d'acteurs aux mémoires défaillantes et qui ont peut-être de bonnes raisons d'être réticents aux confidences.

Le lecteur attentif de *Divided Loyalties*<sup>23</sup> découvrira peut-être pourquoi Viqueque fut un foyer de collaboration avec les Indonésiens qui, eux aussi, eurent à protéger leurs propres partisans timoriens en les évacuant en 1999 pour les installer d'abord dans des camps, puis dans des villages neufs au Timor occidental, c'est-à-dire sur un territoire qui d'abord néerlandais, est tombé dans le giron indonésien. Ces miliciens représentaient les supplétifs de l'Armée d'occupation indonésienne, à partir de 1975. Dégraissés par le retour au nord des Timoriens orientaux qui avaient été contraints de s'exiler involontairement, sont restés sur le territoire indonésien des noyaux qui craignent pour leur sécurité s'ils rentrent sur le territoire du Timor oriental ou qui estiment que leur avenir économique passe par une intégration ou une cohabitation avec les Timoriens occidentaux. Et cela, nonobstant leurs origines «orientales». Certains sont dans un dilemme: ils ne veulent pas quitter l'île de Timor mais continuent à se considérer comme des «orientaux» vivant en exil chez les «occidentaux». Ils cultivent la nostalgie de l'ancienne «patrie». Que fera la prochaine génération née loin des terres ancestrales? Un livre qui pose beaucoup d'interrogations. Rien n'est simple dans cette île aux héritages multiples et parfois antagonistes.

<sup>23</sup> Damaledo, Andrey (2018), *Divided Loyalties. Displacement, Belonging and Citizenship among East Timorese in West Timor*, Acton (Australie), ANU Press, pp. XXII-204, photos couleur.

**Resumos**

**Abstracts**

**Resumés**

**ملخصات**



## África: o esgotamento das democracias eleitorais face ao ressurgimento das de um 3.º mandato presidencial?

Martin Revayi Rupiya

Em África, no período de democracia multipartidária depois dos anos 1990, houve múltiplas tentativas de presidentes em exercício no sentido de permanecerem no poder após um segundo mandato. Usando uma teoria em construção para casos de estudo, este artigo examina o progresso verificado no continente desde que se adotou a democracia multipartidária após a década referida. Com base na estagnação democrática no Togo, Gabão, Camarões e outros estados afins, esta pesquisa demonstra que os regimes em vigor passaram a dominar a arte de realizar atos eleitorais constitucionais sem alterar as situações vigentes, fenómeno que parece ter escapado à atenção de investigadores e analistas. Conclui-se que a tentativa por parte de presidentes em exercício e alguns familiares de prolongarem os mandatos presidenciais para além do segundo mandato mostrou ser um sintoma de ‘estados profundos’ (deep states) enraizados que permanecerão inalterados perante os desafios eleitorais num futuro previsível.

**Palavras-chave:** Política africana, eleições em África, "Terceiro-mandatismo".

## Africa: the Exhaustion of Electoral Democracy against the Resurgence of Presidential Third Termism and beyond?

In the post 1990s era of multiparty democracy in Africa, concerted attempts towards power retention by incumbents through 'Third-termism' has presented the most daunting challenge. Employing the development theory of testing case studies, this article examines progress made on the continent since the adoption of competitive multiparty democracy since the 1990s. Citing democratic stagnation in Togo, Gabon, Cameroon and other related states, the research reveals that sitting regimes have mastered the art of undertaking constitutional electoral processes without changing the outcome. This is a phenomenon that appears to have escaped the attention of researchers and analysts. The conclusion drawn is that, the quest for 'Third-terms extending periods in power by long-serving incumbents and some surviving siblings has become the syndrome that reflects the embedded deep states

which are immune to electoral challenge for the foreseeable future.

**Keywords:** African politics, African elections, "Third termism".

## Afrique: l'épuisement de la démocratie électorale face à l'émergence des essais d'un 3<sup>ème</sup> mandat présidentiel

Après les années 1990, époque de la démocratie multipartidaire en Afrique, plusieurs essais concertés de maintien au pouvoir par des candidats à un tiers mandat présentent un défi assez suspect. Cet article, tout en employant la théorie du développement pour tester des *case studies*, examine le progrès vérifié dans ce continent au moment où la démocratie multipartidariste compétitive a été adoptée. Envisageant la stagnation démocratique au Togo, Gabon et au Cameroun et chez d'autres États similaires, cette recherche démontre que les régimes actuels ont réussi à maîtriser l'art d'entreprendre des actes électoraux constitutionnels sans aucun changement des résultats, phénomène qui semble avoir passé inaperçu des chercheurs et des analystes. On conclue que l'essai mis au point par les présidents au pouvoir et quelques membres de leur famille de faire prolonger leurs mandats présidentiels au-delà d'un second mandat a démontré être un symptôme d'appareils d'état profondément enracinés qui demeurent toujours face aux défis électoraux dans un avenir prévisible.

**Mots-clés:** Politique africaine, élections, Tiers Mandat.

لأفريقيا: بين استنفاد الديمقراطية الانتخابية وعودة فكرة المهدة الثالثة وما بعدها

مفاتيح رئيسية: ديمقراطية

في حقبة ما بعد التسعينيات من التعددية الحزبية في أفريقيا، شكلت المحاولات المتصاعدة من أجل الحفاظ على السلطة من قبل شامليها للحالين من خلال "المهدة الثالثة" لتحدي الأكثر صعوبة باستخدام نظرية الحالة لاختبار دراسات الحالة، يبحث هذا المقال لتتعمق لتحرز في الفترة منذ اعتماد الديمقراطية والتعددية الحزبية للتساوية في فترة التسعينيات. بالتركيز على جمود السنية الديمقراطية في توجو، الكامرون وبنون أخرى ذات صلة، يكشف البحث أن الأنظمة القائمة قد أثبتت فن إجراء التسميات الانتخابية الديمقراطية. هذه الظاهرة يبدو أنها لم تكن محل ترحيب المواطنين والمحليلين، ومنه نستنتج أن البحث عن عودة فكرة لتمديد الفترات للرئاسة من قبل أصحاب المناصب وبعض الألقاب السابقين على قيد الحياة أصبح المعتاد التي تعكس الحالات الصعبة المتأصلة والمقاومة لتحدي الانتخابي في المستقبل المنظور.

الكلمات المفتاحية: إفريقيا الانتخابات، المهدة الثالثة، الإخوة في السلطة

## A UE como observadora das eleições em África: objetivos, métodos e consequências (década de 2000)

Olga S. Kulkova

Este artigo analisa os esforços levados a cabo pela União Europeia nos anos 2000 no sentido de promover a democracia em África. Com estas diligências pretendia-se garantir eleições transparentes, livres e justas nos países deste continente. Nessa perspetiva, a UE tem enviado missões de observação eleitoral com o objetivo de monitorizarem as eleições em África e de apoiarem várias iniciativas suplementares. O artigo examina os objetivos e métodos usados por estas missões de observadores, socorrendo-se dos exemplos de vários países (Quênia, Libéria, Zimbábwe, Angola, Nigéria), e debate as consequências que estas missões poderão ter tanto para a UE como para os governos e sociedades destes países.

**Palavras-chave:** União Europeia, missões de observação eleitoral, democracia, ajuda pública.

### The EU as an Observer of Elections in Africa: Aims, Methods and Consequences (2000s)

The article analyses the efforts of the European Union in the 2000s to promote the democracy in Africa by ensuring that elections in the countries of the continent were transparent, free and fair. Therefore, the EU sends its election observation missions to monitor African elections and supports a range of various supplementary initiatives. The article looks at the aims and methods used by the EU observer missions, on the examples of various country cases (Kenya, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Nigeria), and discusses the consequences which such missions might have both for the EU, the government and society of a given African country.

**Keywords:** The European Union, election observation missions, democracy, aid.

### L'UE en tant qu'observateur aux élections en Afrique : objectif, méthode et conséquences

L'article analyse les efforts déployés par l'Union européenne dans les années 2000 pour promouvoir la démocratie en Afrique en veillant à ce que

les élections dans les pays du continent soient transparentes, libres et équitables. Par conséquent, l'UE envoie ses missions d'observation électorale pour surveiller les élections africaines et soutenir diverses initiatives complémentaires. L'article examine les objectifs et les méthodes utilisés par les missions d'observation de l'UE, à l'aide d'exemples de cas nationaux variés (Kenya, Libéria, Zimbábwe, Angola, Nigéria) et examine les conséquences que de telles missions pourraient avoir à la fois pour l'UE, le gouvernement et la société d'un pays africain donné.

**Mots-clés:** L'Union européenne; missions d'observation électorale; la démocratie; aide publique.

### الاتحاد الأوروبي كمراتب للانتخابات في أفريقيا: الأهداف، الأساليب والنتائج خلال العقد الأول من القرن الواحد والعشرين

أولغا كوكوفا

يحتل المقال الجهد التي بذلها الاتحاد الأوروبي خلال العقد الأول من القرن الواحد والعشرين لتعزيز الديمقراطية في أفريقيا من خلال ضمان شفافية ونزاهة الانتخابات في بلدان القارة. لذلك يرصد الاتحاد الأوروبي بطلته لمراقبة الانتخابات الأفريقية ويدعم مجموعة من المبادرات للتكامل المختلفة. يبحث المقال في الأهداف والأساليب المستخدمة من قبل بعثات المراقبة التابعة للاتحاد الأوروبي أخذًا حذو أمثلة من دول مختلفة (كينيا، ليبيريا، زيمبابوي، أنغولا وإيجيريا). كما يناقش العواقب التي قد تترتب عن مثل هذه البعثات بالنسبة لكل من الاتحاد الأوروبي، الحكومة والمجتمع في بلد إفريقي معين.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاتحاد الأوروبي، أفريقيا، بعثات مراقبة الانتخابات، الديمقراطية

### As eleições em África e a posição da China: a opinião dos africanos

Tatiana Deych

Quase metade dos conflitos em África são pós-eleitorais, causados por reivindicações que dizem respeito à legitimidade dos processos, nomeadamente quando os dirigentes pretendem permanecer no poder para além do limite de dois mandatos. Uma grande parte da população africana mostra-se cética em relação à qualidade das eleições, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à manipulação dos votos, à falta de transparência dos órgãos de supervisão das eleições e à corrupção. Processos eleitorais deficientes podem desencadear desconfiança, protestos e violência por parte do público.



O problema considerado mais sério é a ingerência de forças externas neste processo. Os Estados Unidos levam a «democracia» à África através de uma rede de organizações com fins não lucrativos e de peritos dos meios políticos. O modelo de Pequim é conhecido por defender a não ingerência. A China advoga uma liderança económica e política forte, que constitua a base do crescimento e da estabilidade, enquanto o modelo ocidental destaca o papel dos direitos do homem e da democracia. A maioria dos africanos considera que a alimentação, o alojamento e a saúde são questões mais importantes que o direito ao voto. Por esta razão, preferem o modelo de Pequim ao Consenso de Washington. A Zâmbia tornou-se um dos primeiros países africanos em que o papel da China se transformou num grande problema político. A sensibilidade anti-China de Michael Sata ajudou-o a vencer o presidente Rupiah Banda por ocasião das eleições de 2011. As eleições presidenciais na Zâmbia transformaram-se, assim, num referendo sobre a China.

**Palavras-chave:** África, China, eleições, intervenção externa.

### **Elections in Africa and China's Position: African Opinion**

Almost half of African conflicts are “post-electoral”, aroused by disputed claims over legitimacy of the elections, including leaders staying in power past a designated two-term limit. Substantial proportions of the population in Africa are skeptical about the quality of their elections. They talk about vote manipulation, lack of transparency of election monitoring bodies and corruption. Poor electoral process produces public mistrust, protest, and violence. The most serious problem is interference of external forces into election process. The US brings “democracy” to Africa through a network of non-profit organizations and the experts in political quarters. The Beijing Model is known for its non-interference in policy of other countries. China advocates strong economic and political leadership, which is essential to growth and stability, while the West model places a premium on human rights and democracy. Most Africans believe that food, shelter and health are more important than the right to vote. So they make a choice for the Beijing Model instead of the Washington Consensus. But Zambia has become one of the first African countries where China's role turned into potent political issue. Michael Sata anti-Chinese sentiment helped him to defeat President Rupiah Banda on the elections of

2011. On the eve of Zambia's presidential elections one of the most common tropes about the vote was to describe it as a referendum on China.

**Keywords:** Africa, China, elections, external interference.

### **Les élections en Afrique et la position de la Chine: l'opinion des Africains**

Près de la moitié des conflits africains sont “post électoraux”, provoqués par des revendications à propos de la légitimité des élections, y compris les intentions des dirigeants de rester au pouvoir au-delà d'une limite de deux mandats. La grande partie de la population en Afrique est sceptique quant à la qualité des élections. On parle de la manipulation du vote, du manque de transparence des organes de surveillance des élections et de la corruption. Un mauvais processus électoral peut engendrer la méfiance, des protestations et la violence de la part du public. Le grave problème est l'ingérence de forces extérieures dans le processus électoral. Les États-Unis apportent la “démocratie” en l'Afrique par le biais d'un réseau d'organisations à but non lucratif et d'experts des milieux politiques. Le modèle de Beijing est connu pour sa non-ingérence dans la politique des pays étrangers. China prône un leadership économique et politique fort, qui est la base à la croissance et à la stabilité, tandis que le modèle occidental met l'accent sur les droits de l'homme et la démocratie.

La plupart des Africains pensent que la nourriture, le logement, la santé sont plus importants que le droit de vote. Ils ont donc choisi le modèle de Pékin au lieu du Consensus de Washington. Mais la Zâmbie est devenue l'un des premiers pays africains où le rôle de la Chine dans cet état s'est transformé en un grand problème politique. Le sentiment anti-chinois de Michael Sata l'a aidé à vaincre le président Rupiah Banda lors des élections de 2011. Les élections présidentielles en Zâmbie se sont transformées en un referendum sur la Chine.

**Mots-clés:** Afrique, la Chine, les élections, intervention externe.

الانتخابات في إفريقيا وموقف الصين: آراء إفريقية

تكميلاً دولياً

ما يقرب من نصف الصراحت الأفريقية متكررة بمرحلة ما بعد الانتخابات، والتي تثار عادة بمزاعم لتلاعب للشرعية بما في ذلك الزعماء الذين بقوا في السلطة بعد فترة زمنية محددة. تتكهن نسبة كبيرة من السكان في إفريقيا في شائكة لتدخلهم. لشكرهم تحريم عادة حول التلاعب بالأصوات وتقص الشفافية

في هذات مراقبة الانتخابات والفساد. ينتج عن العناية الانتخابية التي تشوبها التبعات عدم ثقة المواطنين مما يؤدي في النهاية إلى الاحتجاج والحلف، أما المشكلة الأخطر فتكمن في تدخل القوى الخارجية في العناية الانتخابية. تجلب الولايات المتحدة "الديمقراطية" إلى إفريقيا من خلال شبكة من المنظمات غير الربحية والخبراء في الأوساط السياسية. نموذج بكنن محروف بعدم كفته في سياسة الدول الأخرى. تدعو لتصديق إلى وجود فجوة اقتصادية وسياسية قوية، وهو أمر ضروري للنمو والاستقرار، بينما يضع الغرب نموذجًا يركز على حقوق الإنسان والديمقراطية. يعتقد معظم الأفرقة أن الغذاء والمأوى والصحة أهم من الحق في التصويت. لذا فيقيم باحثون نموذج بكنن بدلاً من ذلك الذي تقدمه واشنطن. لكن زامبيا أصبحت واحدة من أوائل الدول الأفريقية التي تحول فيها دور الصين إلى هندية سياسية قوية. ساعد خطاب ميكل سقا الملائن لتصديق على هزيمة الرئيس رويبا باندا في انتخابات عام 2011. عملية الانتخابات الرئاسية في زامبيا، كانت إحدى أكثر المبادرات شيوعًا حول التصويت هي وصفه بأنه استثناء على الصين.

الكلمات المفتاحية: إفريقيا، الصين، الانتخابات، التدخل الخارجي

## The Results of the Presidential Elections in Egypt in 2018 and of the Constitutional Referendum in 2019

The Arab Spring emphasized the extraordinary importance of the youth policy for ensuring the national security in the countries of North Africa. President al-Sisi placed the youth perspective in the center of his domestic policy. The article's aim is to analyze the main tools of the youth policy of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, including policy in the field of party-building, tightened control over the activity of the non-governmental organizations, organization of the regular youth conferences, increasing efforts towards the solution of the main economic problems of the Egyptian youth – namely, a housing problem and the problem of the youth unemployment. The certain success achieved by the leadership of Egypt in these areas generally explains the results of the presidential elections in Egypt in 2018 and of the constitutional referendum of 2019 which are considered in this article. They testify that the opponents of the current government are mainly the residents of large cities, whose protest is not politically organized yet.

**Keywords:** presidential elections, constitutional referendum, Egyptian policy, youth policy.

## Les résultats des élections présidentielles en Égypte en 2018 et du référendum constitutionnel de 2019

Le «Printemps arabe» a souligné l'importance extraordinaire de la politique de la jeunesse pour assurer la sécurité nationale dans les pays d'Afrique du Nord. Le président al-Sisi a placé la perspective de la jeunesse au centre de sa politique intérieure. L'objet de l'article est d'analyser les principaux outils de la politique de la jeunesse d'Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, y compris la politique en matière de formation de partis, le contrôle renforcé de l'activité des organisations non gouvernementales, l'organisation de conférences régulières de jeunes, l'accroissement des efforts en vue de la solution des principaux problèmes économiques de la jeunesse égyptienne – à savoir, un problème de logement et le problème du chômage des jeunes. Le succès certain des dirigeants égyptiens dans ces domaines explique en général les résultats des élections présidentielles en Égypte de 2018 et du référendum constitutionnel de 2019 examinés dans le présent article. Ils témoignent que les opposants au gouvernement actuel sont principalement des habitants

## Os resultados das eleições presidenciais de 2018 no Egito e do referendo constitucional de 2019

Sergey N. Volkov

A «Primavera árabe» fez ressaltar a importância extraordinária das políticas dirigidas à juventude como forma de garantir a segurança nacional nos países do Norte de África, políticas essas que o presidente al-Sisi colocou no centro da sua política interna. É objeto deste artigo a análise das principais ferramentas da política para a juventude desenvolvidas por aquele presidente. Estas incluem a questão da formação de partidos, o controlo reforçado da atividade das organizações não governamentais, a organização de encontros regulares de jovens, o incremento dos esforços com vista à solução dos principais problemas económicos da juventude egípcia – nomeadamente os problemas de alojamento e o desemprego. O êxito garantido dos dirigentes egípcios nestes domínios explica de um modo geral os resultados eleitorais das presidenciais de 2018 e do referendo constitucional de 2019 naquele país, analisados neste artigo. Estes resultados mostram que a principal oposição ao atual governo vem das grandes cidades, nas quais o protesto não está ainda politicamente organizado.

**Palavras-chave:** eleições presidenciais, referendo constitucional, política egípcia, política para a juventude.

de grandes villes, dont leurs manifestations ne sont pas encore organisées politiquement.

**Mots-clés:** élections présidentielles, référendum constitutionnel, politique égyptienne, politique de la jeunesse égyptienne.

**نتائج الانتخابات الرئاسية في مصر عام 2018 والاستفتاء الدستوري في حلم 2019**

سيد جهي غولوفات

أكدت موجة "الربيع العربي" على الأهمية البالغة لسياسة وطنية للشعب لضمان الأمن القومي في بلدان شمال إفريقيا. وضع الربيع السياسي قطاع الشعب في صلب سياسته الخطية. ويهدف المقال إلى تحليل الأدوات الرئيسية لسياسة عبد الفتاح السيسي التي تلحق بالشعب بما في ذلك تأسيس الأحزاب، تنفيذ الرقابة على فئات المنظمات غير الحكومية، تنظيم المظاهرات الشعبية الدورية وزيادة الجهود المبذولة من أجل حل المشاكل الاقتصادية الرئيسية للشعب المصري وهي مشكلة الإسكان البطالة، يسر النجاح الذي حققته قيادة مصر في هذه المجالات بشكل عام نتاج الانتخابات الرئاسية في مصر عام 2018 والاستفتاء الدستوري لعام 2019 اللذان تمت دراستهما في هذا المقال. كخلاصة فن معترضين الحكومة الحالية هم بشكل رئيسي سكان المدن الكبرى، الذين لم يتم تنظيم احتجاجهم سياسياً بعد.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الانتخابات الرئاسية، الاستفتاء الدستوري، السياسة المصرية للشعب

presidential election campaign with the election due to take place in October 2020. The country might be led to another socio-political crisis. The events might be influenced by ethnic and religious factors and also the problem of president Ouattara's third term of office. Another issue that should not be overlooked is the destabilizing role that might be played in the electoral process by the Ivorian army.

**Keywords:** Côte d'Ivoire, presidential election, electoral crisis, opposition.

## Le problème du leadership politique et le processus électoral en Côte d'Ivoire

Cet article analyse la situation politique actuelle en Côte d'Ivoire dans le contexte de la prochaine élection présidentielle de 2020. Ce pays peut plonger dans une nouvelle crise socio-politique. Des facteurs ethniques et confessionnels peuvent intervenir dans le développement des événements. L'une des causes de la situation explosive est le problème du troisième mandat du président. Le rôle déstabilisant que l'armée ivoirienne peut jouer dans le processus électoral ne peut être ignoré.

**Mots-clés:** Côte d'Ivoire, élection présidentielle, crise électorale, opposition.

## A problemática da liderança política e o processo eleitoral na Costa do Marfim

Lubow M. Sadvovskaya

Este artigo analisa a situação política atual na Costa do Marfim face às próximas eleições presidenciais de 2020, considerando que estas poderão vir a ser afetadas por fatores étnicos e confessionais, mergulhando este país numa nova crise sociopolítica. Uma das causas desta situação explosiva é o problema do terceiro mandato do presidente Ouattara e não se pode ignorar o papel destabilizador que o exército costa-marfinense poderá desempenhar no processo eleitoral.

**Palavras-chave:** Costa do Marfim, eleição presidencial, crise eleitoral, oposição.

## The Problem of Political Leadership and the Electoral Process in Côte d'Ivoire

The article focuses on the analysis of the current political situation in Côte d'Ivoire in the face of the

## الحالة القوية السياسية والسياسة الانتخابية في كوت ديفوار

أبوف سفوفسكوا

يركز المقال على تحليل الوضع السياسي الحالي في كوت ديفوار في ظل الحملة الانتخابية الرئاسية مع الانتخابات المقرر إجراؤها في أكتوبر 2020. قد تكون البلاد اكتفت إلى أزمة اجتماعية سياسية أخرى كما قد تتكرر الأحداث بالعوامل الإثنية والدينية وليحتملنا مشكلة ولاية الرايس والتأثير للثقل بالاضافة إلى ما سبق، هناك مشكلة أخرى لا ينبغي إغفالها وهي الدور المزعج للاستقرار الذي قد يلعبه الجيش الإيفواري في العملية الانتخابية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: كوت ديفوار، الانتخابات الرئاسية، الأزمة الانتخابية، المعرضة

## Contestações pós-eleitorais: uma alternativa no processo de democratização em África? Exemplo do Togo

Abdou-Wahabi Abdou

Após o início do processo de democratização em África, as populações acreditaram que as eleições

assegurariam uma renovação regular dos regimes políticos. No entanto, alguns regimes em vigor desenvolveram estratégias de manutenção no poder. É o caso do Togo, onde o regime dos «Gnassingbé», no poder há mais de meio século apesar de eleições ditas transparentes organizadas periodicamente, usou compromissos não respeitados e alterações constitucionais como manobras para se fazer representar nas eleições. Perante esta situação, os partidos políticos na oposição bem como a população em geral recorreram com frequência a manifestações de rua. Estas contestações remontam aos primeiros tempos do multipartidarismo no Togo e estão muitas vezes na base de múltiplos avanços democráticos, ainda que marginais, obtidos junto do poder político em vigor. Este contributo propõe-se analisar as manifestações pós-eleitorais no Togo e o seu impacto no processo de democratização do país.

**Palavras-chave:** C14, contestações, reformas, eleições, Togo.

### Post-electoral Contestations: An Alternative in the Process of Democratization in Africa? The example of Togo

After the beginning of the African continent's democratization process, the people had confidence in elections which were supposed to ensure a regular renewal of the political regimes. However, some regimes in place have been developing strategies to stay in power. For example in Togo, unfulfilled commitments or constitutional amendments to represent in elections are the maneuvers of the "Gnassingbe" regime, which is still in power for more than half a century, despite so-called transparent elections held periodically. As a result, the opposition political parties and the population often resorted to the street demonstrations. These demonstrations date back to the early days of multiparty politics in Togo and are often at the root of several democratic advances, albeit negligible, obtained from the political power in place. This contribution aims to analyze the post-election contestations in Togo and their impact on the country's democratization process.

**Keywords:** C14, demonstrations, reforms, elections, Togo.

### Contestations post-électorales : une alternative dans le processus de démocratisation en Afrique ? Exemple du Togo

Après le début du processus de démocratisation en Afrique, les populations avaient eu confiance aux élections qui devraient assurer un renouvellement régulier des régimes politiques. Cependant, les régimes en place ont toujours développé des stratégies pour se maintenir au pouvoir. Des engagements non respectés ou des modifications constitutionnelles dans le but de se représenter aux élections, telles sont les manœuvres du régime des «Gnassingbé» au Togo, qui est toujours au pouvoir pendant plus d'un demi-siècle malgré des élections dites transparentes organisées périodiquement. Face à cette situation, les partis politiques d'opposition et la population ont souvent fait recours à la rue. Ces contestations remontent aux premiers jours du multipartisme au Togo et sont souvent à la base de plusieurs avancées démocratiques, quoique négligeables, obtenues auprès du pouvoir politique en place.

Cette contribution se propose d'analyser les manifestations post-électorales au Togo et leur impact sur le processus de démocratisation du pays.

**Mots-clés:** C14, contestations, réformes, élections, Togo.

صراحت ما بعد الانتخابات: هل هي بديل صالحة للتحويل الديمقراطي في أفريقيا؟ توغو أموجها

عبد الله وعيسى عبيد

بعد بدء عملية إرساء الديمقراطية في القارة الأفريقية، كان لدى الناس ثقة في الانتخابات التي من المفترض أن تضمن التجديد المنتظم للنظام السياسي. ومع ذلك، فإن بعض الأنظمة الحاكمة منذ ذلك الحين وضعت دافعا لسراخيلها لتبقى في السلطة. على سبيل المثال، الانتخابات غير المنجزة أو التعديلات الدستورية هي مآزق نظام "غناسينجبي" في توغو والتي لا يزال يحكم لأكثر من نصف قرن، على الرغم من ما يسمى بالانتخابات الشفافة التي تُجرى دورياً.

في هذه الحالة، لجأت أحزاب المعارضة السياسية والسكان غالباً إلى الشارع. تعود المظاهرات إلى الأيام الأولى للتعددية الحزبية في توغو. وعلاوة على ذلك، لم أصل للحديد من التطورات الديمقراطية التي تم التزاعها من السلطة السياسية القائمة. تهدف هذه المساهمة إلى تحليل نزاع ما بعد الانتخابات في توغو وتكثورها على عملية إرساء الديمقراطية في البلاد.

الكلمات المفتاحية: المظاهرات، الإصلاحات، توغو، من 14

## Eleições sob ditaduras: São Tomé e Príncipe antes e após a independência

Augusto Nascimento

Este texto visa realçar as diferenças e as continuidades do exercício eleitoral sob a ditadura colonialista e, após a independência, sob o regime de partido único em São Tomé e Príncipe.

A não adoção da democracia aquando da independência, em 1975, não se deveu à inexperiência no tocante a procedimentos democráticos por causa da feição ditatorial do colonialismo. Diferentemente, a não realização de eleições livres e competitivas foi uma escolha, reservada, dos novos dirigentes cujo objetivo era alcançar e preservar o poder, se necessário contra a vontade do povo de cujos interesses se diziam defensores.

Sob as ditaduras, as formalidades das eleições – ou, em rigor, o seu simulacro – tiveram por função ajudar à ficção da legitimação do poder colonial ditatorial e do partido único no pós-independência. Ambos os regimes apostaram em obter forçadamente a anuência ou o consentimento dos governados.

**Palavras-chave:** São Tomé e Príncipe, eleições, colonialismo, regime de partido único.

## Elections under Dictatorships: São Tomé and Príncipe before and after Independence

This text aims to highlight the differences and continuities of the electoral exercise under the colonialist dictatorship and, after independence, under the one-party regime in São Tomé and Príncipe.

The non-adoption of democracy at independence in 1975 was not due to inexperience with democratic procedures caused by a dictatorial character of colonialism. By contrast, the failure to hold free and competitive elections was a reserved choice of the new leaders whose aim was to achieve and preserve power, if necessary against the will of the people whose interests they claimed to be defenders.

Under dictatorships, the formalities of the elections – or, strictly speaking, their simulacrum – were meant to aid the fiction of the legitimation of dictatorial colonial power and the single post-independence party. Both regimes bet on forcibly obtaining the consent or consent of the governed.

**Keywords:** São Tomé and Príncipe, elections, colonialism, one-party regime.

## Elections sous dictature: Sao Tomé-et-Príncipe avant et après l'Indépendance

Cet article envisage de mettre en relief les différences et les continuités de l'exercice électoral sous la dictature colonialiste et, après l'indépendance, sous le régime de parti unique à Sao Tomé-et-Príncipe. Le manque d'adoption de la démocratie, au moment de l'indépendance en 1975, n'est pas dû à l'absence d'expérience concernant les procédures démocratiques dues au caractère dictatorial du colonialisme. Tout autrement, l'absence d'élections libres et compétitives a été un choix exprès des nouveaux dirigeants dont l'objectif était d'atteindre et de préserver le pouvoir, au besoin contre la volonté du peuple dont les intérêts ils disaient être les siens. Sous les dictatures, les formalités des élections, ou à la rigueur son simulacre, ont fonctionné comme un aide à la fiction d'une légitimation du pouvoir colonial dictatorial et du parti unique après l'indépendance. Les deux régimes ont choisi d'obtenir d'une façon forcée l'acceptation, ou bien, le consentement de ceux qui sont gouvernés.

**Mots-clés:** Sao Tomé-et-Príncipe, élections, colonialisme, multipartidarisme.

الانتخابات في ظل الدكتاتوريات: São Tomé e Príncipe قبل الاستقلال وبعده

أوغستو ناسيمينتو

يهدف هذا المقال إلى تسليط الضوء على الاختلافات والاستمرارية في العملية الانتخابية في ظل الدكتاتورية الاستعمارية وبعده الاستقلال في زمن نظم الحزب الواحد في São Tomé e Príncipe. إن عدم تبني الديمقراطية عند الاستقلال في عام 1975 لم يكن بسبب قلة الخبرة في الإجراءات الديمقراطية بسبب الطابع الدكتاتوري للاستعمار. على النقيض من ذلك، كان الإخفاق في إجراء الانتخابات حرة وتنافسية خياراً مقصوداً للجدد الذين كان هدفهم بلوغ السلطة ثم الحفاظ عليها إذا لزم الأمر حتى ولو كان ذلك ضد إرادة المواطنين الذين ادعوا الدفاع عن مصالحهم. في ظل الدكتاتوريات كان المقصود من الإجراءات الشكلية للانتخابات أن تساعد في تحقيق شرعية السلطة الاستعمارية الدكتاتورية وحزب ما بعد الاستقلال. يراهن كلا النظامين على حصولهم على موافقة واحتراف المحكومين بالقوة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: São Tomé e Príncipe، الانتخابات، الاستعمار، نظم الحزب الواحد

## **EleQta ou o reexame das eleições a partir das experiências africanas: o caso da eleição presidencial de 2016 no Congo-Brazzaville**

Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga e Pietro di Serego Alighieri

Este artigo visa, em primeiro lugar, apresentar o método aplicado no âmbito do projeto de pesquisa «Reexaminar as eleições a partir das experiências africanas»: recorrendo à plataforma numérica *EleQta*, permite recolher e analisar mais de 5000 elementos informativos sobre as eleições realizadas em 12 países da África subsaariana entre 2015 e 2019. Descrevemos a abordagem que foi adotada, tendo como ponto de partida os resultados do inquérito organizado sobre as eleições presidenciais de 2016 na República do Congo (Congo-Brazzaville). Seguidamente, defendemos que o estudo dos processos eleitorais em África conduz a uma redefinição de certos conceitos e, desta forma, ao desenvolvimento de ferramentas conceituais que permitam uma melhor compreensão dos processos eleitorais em todo o mundo, incluindo nos países ocidentais.

**Palavras-chave:** eleições, voto, legitimidade, Congo-Brazzaville.

## **EleQta or the Reexamination of Elections Starting from the Practice in Africa: the Case of the Presidential Election in Congo-Brazzaville in 2016**

This article presents the method applied within the research project “Re-examining elections after African experiences”: this project allowed to gather and analyze through the *EleQta* digital platform more than 5,000 pieces of information about elections held in 12 countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa between 2015 and 2019. It will make use of the results of the enquiries conducted on the 2016 presidential elections in the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) to describe the approach adopted and the fundamental assumptions of the project. Furthermore, it will defend the idea that the analysis of African electoral processes leads to re-define basic notions and to develop conceptual tools which can be applied to electoral processes in the West.

**Keywords:** Elections, vote, legitimacy, Congo-Brazzaville.

## **EleQta ou ré-examiner les élections à partir des expériences africaines: le cas de l'élection présidentielle de 2016 au Congo-Brazzaville.**

Cet article vise, en premier lieu, à présenter la méthode appliquée dans le cadre du projet de recherche «Ré-examiner les élections à partir des expériences africaines»: à travers sa plateforme numérique *EleQta*, ce projet a permis de recueillir et analyser plus de 5000 éléments d'informations sur les élections tenues dans 12 pays de l'Afrique Subsaharienne entre 2015 et 2019. Nous allons décrire l'approche adoptée dans du projet à partir des résultats de l'enquête menée sur les élections présidentielles de 2016 en République du Congo (Congo-Brazzaville).

Ensuite, nous allons argumenter en faveur de l'idée que l'étude des processus électoraux africains amène à une ré-définition de certaines notions et, par ce biais, à développer des outils conceptuels permettant une meilleure compréhension des processus de désignation des leaders partout dans le monde, même en Occident.

**Mots-clés:** Élections, vote, légitimité, Congo-Brazzaville.

التكنولوجيا أو إعادة النظر في الانتخابات بدءاً من الممارسة في أفريقيا: حالة الانتخابات الرئاسية في الكونغو برازافيل في عام 2016

ريمي بالينغويسا جانجا و بيتر دى سيريجو أليغيري

يحرص هذا المقال الطريقة للمطبقة في مشروع البحث "مرحلة تحليلية للانتخابات بعد التجارب الأفريقية". هذا المشروع سمح بجمع وتحليل من خلال منصة رقمية أكثر من 5000 معلومة حول الانتخابات التي أجريت في 12 دولة في جميع أنحاء أفريقيا جنوب الصحراء الكبرى بين 2015 و 2019. سيتم الاستفادة من نتائج التحقيقات التي أجريت بشأن الانتخابات الرئاسية لعام 2016 في جمهورية الكونغو (الكونغو برازافيل) لوصف النهج الذي تم تبنيه والافتراضات الأساسية للمشروع. حلالة طوى فقه، مبداء المقال عن فكرة أن تحليل العمليات الانتخابية الأفريقية يؤدي إلى إعادة تعريف المفاهيم الأساسية وتطوير أدوات مفاهيمية يمكن تطبيقها على العمليات الانتخابية في الغرب.

الافتراضات المفاهيمية: الانتخابات، التصويت، للشرعية الكونغو برازافيل

## **A etnicização das eleições presidenciais de 2017 no Quénia**

Maria Piotrowska

O artigo examina a eficácia da imposição da repartição territorial centrípeta dos votos nas eleições

presidenciais no Quênia. Esta tenta ter em conta a divisão étnica no país e os confrontos eleitorais, o tribalismo e a polarização da cena política. Após análise dos resultados das eleições presidenciais a partir de 1992, defende-se que as soluções judiciais introduzidas (incluindo a reforma constitucional) não conseguem alterar o modelo de escrutínio étnico e eleger um presidente pan-étnico.

**Palavras-chave:** Centripetalismo, Quênia, grupo étnico.

### Ethnicization of Kenyan Presidential Elections in 2017

The article investigates the efficiency of the centripetal requirement of the territorial distribution of votes in the presidential elections in Kenya. This is power-sharing response to ethnic division in the country and its electoral clashes, tribalism and polarization of the political scene. By analyzing the presidential election results since 1992, I argue that the introduced judicial solutions (including Constitutional reform in 2010), fail to alter ethnical voting pattern and elect pan-ethnic president.

**Keywords:** centripetalism, elections, Kenya, ethnic group.

### L'ethnicisation des élections présidentielles de 2017 au Kenya

L'article examine l'efficacité de l'exigence centripète de la répartition territoriale des votes aux élections présidentielles au Kenya. C'est une réponse à la division ethnique dans le pays et à ses affrontements électoraux, au tribalisme et à la polarisation de la scène politique. En analysant les résultats des élections présidentielles depuis 1992, je soutiens que les solutions introduites (y compris la réforme constitutionnelle de 2010), ne parviennent pas à modifier le modèle de scrutin ethnique et à élire un président pan ethnique.

**Mots-clés:** centripétalisme, élections, Kenya, groupe ethnique.

### التصنيف الإثنية للانتخابات الرئاسية الكينية في عام 2017

ملويها بيواترواسكا

يبحث المقال في ضرورة مركزية التوزيع الإقليمي للأصوات في الانتخابات الرئاسية في كينيا. يظهر هذا استجابة وتصدياً لمطلب للتقسيم العرقي للمنطقة في البلاد وما يتبعه من حنف تولد العملية الانتخابية للأزعة القبلية والاستقطاب الذي يميز المشهد السياسي بشكل عام. من خلال تحليل نتائج

الانتخابات الرئاسية منذ عام 1992، أزدع أن الحلول التصنيقية المستحثة (بما في ذلك الإصلاح الدستوري في عام 2010) دائماً ما تفشل في تغيير نمط الاقتراع العرقي وانتخاب رئيس لجماعة عرقية.  
القطاعات الملتصقة: المركزية، الانتخابات، كينيا، المجموعة العرقية

### Eleições no Zimbabwe

Vladimir Shubin

O artigo relata a história das eleições no Zimbabwe independente. Dá-se especial atenção à crise política neste país nos últimos anos, bem como aos resultados e consequências das eleições “híbridas” (presidenciais e parlamentares) realizadas em 2018. O autor conclui que as principais mudanças na história política do Zimbabwe, tanto as positivas como as negativas, ocorreram fora do processo eleitoral.

**Palavras-chave:** Zimbabwe, eleições, ZANU-PF, MDC.

### Zimbabwe Elections

The article is devoted to the history of elections for the years of independence of Zimbabwe. Particular attention is paid to the political crisis in this country in recent years, the results and consequences of the “hybrid” (presidential and parliamentary) elections held in 2018.

The author concludes that the major changes in the political history of independent Zimbabwe be them positive or negative, took place outside the election process.

**Keywords:** Zimbabwe, elections, ZANU-PF, MDC.

### Elections au Zimbabwe

L'article fait le rapport des élections au Zimbabwe, en tant que pays indépendant. On y fait remarquer la crise politique survenue au pays pendant les dernières années. Tout aussi bien que les résultats et les conséquences des élections hybrides (présidentielles et parlementaires) réalisées en 2018.

L'auteur conclut que les principaux changements dans l'histoire politique du Zimbabwe, soient-ils positifs ou négatifs, ont pris place dehors du processus électoral.

**Mots-clés:** Zimbabwe, élections, ZANU-PF, MDC.

### الانتخابات في زيمبابوي

فلايمير شوين

يبحث المقال تاريخ الانتخابات لمنوت استفتاء زيمبابوي، يتم إلقاء اهتمام خاص للأزمة البوسنية في هذا البلد في السنوات الأخيرة، ونتائج وحولاب الانتخابات "الهجينة" (الرئاسية والبرلمانية) التي عقدت في عام 2018. يخلص المؤلف إلى أن التغييرات الرئيسية في للتاريخ المؤسسي لزيمبابوي المنقطة سواء كانت إيجابية أو سلبية، حدثت خارج الصلوة الانتخابية.

القطاعات المنفتحة: زيمبابوي، الانتخابات، حزب الاتحاد الوطني من أجل الديمقراطية، الجبهة الوطنية من أجل الديمقراطية، موهاني، منغورا، تشنبراي، تشنبراي

### O papel fetichizado dos atores externos nas eleições de 2018 no Zimbabwe: implicações em plebiscitos futuros

Gorden Moyo

Este artigo investiga os perfis geoeconómicos dos atores externos nas controversas eleições de 2018 no Zimbabwe. Segue os principais atores globais, sobretudo do Reino Unido, da UE e dos EUA, que se manifestam para além dos paradigmas de promoção da democracia publicamente expressos. Debruça-se também sobre as atividades, intenções e interesses de potências (re)emergentes como a China e a Rússia no contexto discursivo das eleições de 2018 naquele país. Defende que aqueles atores externos estiveram profundamente envolvidos nas eleições pós-Mugabe em função de interesses geoeconómicos, geopolíticos e geoestratégicos e que o interesse renovado por estas eleições foi ocasionado pela retirada de Robert Mugabe da cena política após 37 anos de governação ininterrupta. O artigo conclui que as eleições de 2018 ficaram comprometidas pela competição geoeconómica e geopolítica global mais alargada entre as potências em relativo declínio do Norte Global lideradas pelos EUA e as (re)emergentes do Sul Global lideradas pela China. Genericamente, o artigo alega que é presumível que as potências globais continuem a manifestar interesse nos processos eleitorais no Zimbabwe e que Pequim e o Kremlin terão provavelmente um papel dominante no futuro daquele país.

**Palavras-chave:** Zimbabwe, elections, ingerência externa, neoliberalismo autoritário.

### The Fetishised Role of External Actors in Zimbabwe's 2018 Elections: Implications for the Future Plebiscites

This article retraces the geoeconomic contours of the external actors in Zimbabwe's controversial 2018 elections. It surfaces the footprints of the major global actors especially the UK, the EU, and the U.S. beyond the publicly expressed democracy promotion paradigms. It also looks closely at the activities, intentions and interests of the re-emerging powers of China and Russia in the discursive context of the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. It is the argument of this article that the external actors were deeply involved in the first post-Mugabe elections in Zimbabwe for geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Arguably, the renewed interest in these elections was occasioned by Robert Mugabe's exit from the political scene in Zimbabwe after 37 years of uninterrupted rule. The article concludes that Zimbabwe's 2018 elections were caught up in the broader global geoeconomics and geopolitical competition between the relatively declining Global North powers led by the U.S. and the re-emerging Global South powers led by China. Overall, the article argues that global powers will most likely continue to have interest in the electoral processes in Zimbabwe and that Beijing and Kremlin are likely to hold a dominant sway in the future of that country.

**Keywords:** Zimbabwe, elections, foreign powers, authoritarian neoliberalism.

### Le rôle fétichisé des acteurs externes aux élections de 2018 au Zimbabwe: implications pour les futurs plebiscites

Cet article étudie les profils géoéconomiques des acteurs externes dans les controverses élections de 2018 au Zimbabwe. Il suit le chemin des principaux acteurs globaux, surtout le Royaume Uni, la U.E. et les E.U.A., qui se manifeste bien au delà des paradigmes de promotion de la démocratie publiquement proclamés. Il concerne aussi les activités, intentions et intérêts des puissances qui, à nouveau, émergent comme la Chine et la Russie dans le contexte discursif des élections au pays. L'argument essentiel est que les acteurs externes sont profondément impliqués dans les premiers élections au Zimbabwe post-Mugabe à cause d'intérêts géoéconomiques et



géostratégiques. Très probablement, le renouveau de l'intérêt à propos de ces élections-là a été occasionné par la sortie de Robert Mugabe de la scène politique après 37 années au pouvoir. L'article conclut que les élections de 2018 ont été prises par la grande compétition globale entre les dites déchéantes puissances du Nord conduites par les États-Unis et les pouvoirs émergents du Sud sous la direction de la Chine. Cet article soutient que les pouvoirs globaux continueront très certainement à se mêler aux procès électoraux au pays et que Pékin et le Kremlin vont fort probablement continuer à jouer des rôles prédominants dans l'avenir du Zimbabwe.

**Mots-clés:** Zimbabwe, élections, puissances étrangères, néolibéralisme autoritaire.

### الدور المتمكن للجهات الخارجية الفاعلة في انتخابات زيمبابوي 2018 والآخر المترتبة على الاستقطاب المتقيد

جورمان موير

يسترجع هذا المقال المسالم الجغرافية والاقتصادية للجهات الخارجية الفاعلة في انتخابات 2018 المشهورة للجل في زيمبابوي. وكذلك يكتفح آثار الفاعلين الدوليين للرئيسين خاصة المملكة المتحدة، الاتحاد الأوروبي، والولايات المتحدة بما يجاوز النتائج المعلنة للترويج للديمقراطية. كما ينظر عن كثب في أنشطة ونوايا ومصالح القوى الثلاثة مثل الصين وروسيا في السياق الخليجي لانتخابات 2018 في زيمبابوي. إن الحجية في هذا المقال هي أن الأطراف الخارجية كانت منخرطة بسبق في أول انتخابات بعد موغابي في زيمبابوي من أجل المصالح الجيوإقتصادية، الجيوبوليسية والجيوإستراتيجية. كما يمكن القول إن الاهتمام المتجدد بهذه الانتخابات كان بسبب خروج روبرت موغابي من المشهد السياسي في زيمبابوي بعد 37 عامًا من الحكم المتواصل. يضمن المقال إلى أن انتخابات زيمبابوي لعام 2018 قد انخرطت في المناقشة الجيوإقتصادية والجيوبوليسية الدولية الأربع بين قوى الشمال العالمية المتراجمة نسبياً والتي تقودها الولايات المتحدة والقوى العالمية الجنوبية الفاعلة التي تقودها الصين. بشكل عام، يحاول المقال بأن القوى الدولية ستستمر على الأرجح في الاهتمام بالمعاملات الانتخابية في زيمبابوي ويكف من المرجح أن تستمر ولكن وموسر على مستقبل هذا البلد.

الكلمات المفتاحية: انتخابات زيمبابوي 2018، الجهات الخارجية الفاعلة، السلطوية الانتخابية، التمييز الإقليمي

### Contratantes militares privados em África: o caso do senhor da guerra Erik Prince

Mourad Aty e Abdelhak Elagoune

Erik D. Prince, uma figura proeminente da indústria militar privada, tem sido alvo de investigação

ao longo das duas últimas décadas. Prince definiu um plano para o continente africano durante este período, que começou com a criação, no final dos anos 90, da Blackwater, conhecida empresa militar, e se estendeu até à controvérsia que rodeou a equipa de transição de Trump e as relações com a Rússia. As empresas militares privadas fornecem aos atores do estado um recurso para se livrarem dos custos políticos em caso de perda de vidas humanas entre o pessoal militar. Os estados instáveis e fracos, sem tradição política na área da transição pacífica do poder, são um terreno fértil para as potências internacionais exercerem a sua influência e tentarem estabelecer-se. Este artigo faculta uma compreensão da natureza da indústria militar privada ao tomar Erik Prince como caso de estudo.

**Palavras-chave:** Erik Prince, mercenário, empresas militares privadas.

### Private Military Contractors in Africa: The Case of Erik Prince

Erik D. Prince, a prominent figure in the private military industry, has been under scrutiny for almost two decades now. From Blackwater, the notorious company he created by late 1990s to the Controversy of the Trump Transition Team and Russia connections, Prince has set a plan for Africa at some time during this period. Private military contractors provide a plausible denial for state actors to avoid the political cost in cases where the loss of lives within the operating personnel is highly expected. The unstable and weak states with no political traditions in peaceful transition of power are the favorite arena for international powers to exert their influence and attempt to have a foothold there; they are all in a scramble for the region. This paper provides an understanding of the nature of the private military industry in Africa with a major focus on Erik Prince.

**Keywords:** Erik Prince, Mercenarism, private military companies.

### Entrepreneurs privées en Afrique: le exemple du seigneur de guerre Erik Prince

Erik D. Prince est une figure importante de l'industrie militaire privée. De Blackwater, la fameuse société militaire qui a créée à la fin des années 90, à la controverse entourant l'équipe de transition de Trump et les relations avec la Russie, Prince a défini un plan pour l'Afrique à un moment

donné au cours de cette période. Les entreprises militaires privées fournissent aux acteurs de l'État une solution pour éviter les coûts politiques dans les cas de perte de vies humaines au sein du personnel militaire. Les États instables et faibles, sans tradition politique en transition pacifique du pouvoir, sont le terrain préféré des puissances internationales pour exercer leur influence et tenter de s'y établir; ils sont tous dans la course pour la région. Cet article fournit une compréhension de la nature de l'industrie militaire privée en prenant Erik Prince comme une étude de cas.

**Mots-clés:** Erik Prince, Mercenariat, Sociétés militaires privées.

### المتعمدون العسكريون الخراس في إفريقيا: إريك برنس النموذج

مراد عتي و عبد الحق الطون

ظن إريك برنس، وهو شخصية بارزة في الصناعة العسكرية الخاصة تحت الترخيص والتفويض منذ ما يقرب من عشرين من الزمن. من بلاكووتر، للشركة سيئة السمعة التي أنشأها في أواخر التسعينيات إلى الجبل لتقدم حوث الفريق الانتقالي كترامب والاتصالات مع المسؤولين الروس، وضع برنس خطة للفترة الأرويقية في وقت ما خلال هذه الفترة. يوفر المقاولون العسكريون الخاصون تغطية فاعلة للمجهدات الحكومية لتفادي أي مساهمة سياسية في الحالات التي يتوقع فيها حدوث خسائر كبيرة في الأرواح في صفوف القوات العسكرية العاملة. إن الدول غير المستقرة والضعيفة التي لوست لها تقاليد سياسية في الانتقال السلمي للمنطقة هي الميدان المفضل لتفويض الدولية لممارسة نفوذها ومحاولة الحصول على موطنهم قديم هناك؛ لهم جميعاً في سياق محموم للسيطرة على للمنطقة. توفر هذه الورقة شرحاً لطبيعة الصناعة العسكرية الخاصة في إفريقيا مع التركيز بشكل رئيسي على إريك برنس.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** إريك برنس، المراقبة، المتعمدون/الشركات العسكرية الخاصة

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1. Voting in Lubumbashi. Democratic Republic of Congo, 30<sup>th</sup> December 2018. Database EleQta.
2. Votação (eleições em Angola antes de 1974). Número ID: 17496. Cedida pelo Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino – AHU.
3. Polling station in the outskirts of Antananarivo. Madagascar, 19<sup>th</sup> December 2018. Database EleQta.
4. Nigerian elections, 2019. Commonwealth Secretariat, CC by 2.0.
5. Sede nacional da CNE: reunião de trabalho da direção. Angola, agosto de 2017. Foto de Adelino Ndongué.
6. Police at a electoral rally in Nairobi. Kenya, June 2018. Database EleQta.
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12. Comício eleitoral (UNITA), Huambo. Angola, agosto de 2017. Foto de Adelino Ndongué.
13. Adalberto da Costa Júnior. Angola, novembro de 2019.
14. Demonstration in Nairobi, Kibera neighbourhood. Kenya, August 2017. Database EleQta.
15. Confidencial Telegram. Accessed in May 2019. Wikileaks.

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- Cada artigo será acompanhado de resumos em **duas línguas** escolhidas do seguinte conjunto: português e/ou inglês e/ou francês e/ou árabe. Cada resumo não poderá ultrapassar um máximo de 1000 caracteres do alfabeto latino. O resumo deverá incluir um conjunto de palavras-chave (máximo de quatro).
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- Os autores terão a possibilidade de rever provas dos seus trabalhos.
- Os autores comprometem-se a devolver as provas uma semana após o seu envio. Em caso de indisponibilidade, deverão declarar por escrito que prescindem dessa revisão de autor.
- As referências a autores, no texto, seguem a norma (autor, ano: página).  
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Ex: (Rodrigues, 2000a: 15).
- Se a referência citada for de vários autores ficará:  
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  - Coletâneas: Rodrigues, Carlos, Matos, A. e Silva, António (orgs.), (2002), *Os novos poderes em África*, Porto: Campo das Letras.
  - Artigos em revistas: Rodrigues, Carlos (2001), *Os novos poderes em África*, *Africana Studia*, n.º 8 (ou vol.), pp. 12-35.
  - Artigos/capítulos em coletâneas: Matos, A. (2002), “Os novos políticos africanos”. In: Rodrigues, Carlos, Matos, A. e Silva, António (orgs.), *Os novos poderes em África*, Porto: Campo das Letras.
- As traduções deverão indicar sempre que possível o ano da primeira publicação.
- Nas Referências bibliográficas eletrónicas deverá indicar-se sempre o site/path, a data do artigo e a data da consulta.  
Ex. Portal da Língua Portuguesa, 2011. *Vocabulário ortográfico do português* [Em linha]. [Consult. 21.mar.2012]. Disponível em: <http://portaldalinguaportuguesa.org>.

- As referências das fontes primárias deverão vir em notas de rodapé e começar pelo acrónimo do arquivo/instituição, seguindo-se as unidades de arquivo numa ordem do geral ao particular.  
Exemplo: AHU, maço 1665.1 – Governo de Angola, SNI, Nota n.º 136, 02-01-1935.
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  - Articles/chapters in collective books: Matos, A. (2002), Os novos políticos africanos, in, Rodrigues, Carlos, Matos, A. e Silva, António (orgs.), *Os novos poderes em África*, Porto: Campo das Letras.
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


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