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ESTUDOS / STUDIES

PHILOSOPHY OF THE CITY

ed. PAULA CRISTINA PEREIRA
MARIA JOÃO COUTO

PAULA CRISTINA PEREIRA
MARIA JOÃO COUTO

INTRODUCTION

This issue follows on from the *Philosophy of the City Conference 2017* (5th edition), organized by the Research Group Philosophy and Public Space of the Institute of Philosophy (R&DU 502), in partnership with the Philosophy of the City Research Group, held at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Porto, from 11th to 13th October. The event brought together a relevant international scientific community, with specialists from different branches of the Humanities and Social Sciences from 40 Portuguese and foreign universities.

The director of the Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities - Philosophy Series, Professor José Meirinhos, invited the coordinators of this volume to organize a thematic issue intended to reflect the success of the *Philosophy of the City Conference 2017* and its contribution to the debate and dissemination of the range of questions covered in this field of research. The papers published here were submitted to a call for papers addressed to Conference participants and selected by a Scientific Committee in an anonymous peer review process.

The Philosophy of the City Research Group is an international community of scholars who are dedicated to understanding the *city* and urban issues in their political, social, epistemological, metaphysical, ethical and environmental dimensions, and is open to all philosophical traditions and to interdisciplinary approaches. The Research Group Philosophy and Public Space, in its turn, is focused on the city as a concept and on the spatial repositioning of Philosophy, through the critical analysis of the notion of public space framed by contemporary political and social representations and dynamics. Research is primarily dedicated to the conceptual trajectory of the notion of public space in its correlation with the city, from the *polis* to its contemporary (global) version of the deterritorialization of political processes.

The city is not a new theme in Philosophy, but the widespread urbanization of our time has given rise to renewed readings regarding relations between citizens, politics, the city and space. Taking into account the historical-philosophical legacy of the notions of city to the new public space of post-industrial society, this Conference aimed to explore the metamorphoses that have revived reflection on the city, and thus, to understand the impact of political, economic and social heterogeneities on the urban condition. This is the latent or manifest object of the selected texts. In a confluence of differentiated approaches to the city, the relevance of several studies that deal with some of the most relevant challenges facing the city is highlighted, which range from questioning the nature, value and ideal of integration in the framework of urban policies (M. Bessone), the discussion on the need for a concept of a *radical* civil society that can serve to think about civil society in the context of globalization (D. García-Marzá), reflection on the right to the city and phenomena of social exclusion (P. Guerra; M. Rodrigues; S. Sousa and R. Saraiva), to the analysis provoked by changes in the meanings of perception and acceptance in public space (G. Spenillo), and the complexity of the struggle for recognition within the city and the construction of the common good (J. L. Gonçalves).

Recognizing also that contemporary reflection is not confined to a presentism void of history, the articles that highlight the writings of renowned and classical authors should be noted, exploring their relevance to current inquiries about the city, public space and urbanity. For example, Aristotle's political works can contribute to another view of the classical city (L. G. Soto) and to explore the analogies between the characteristics of a tyrannical government and the processes of destruction of public space, marked – in the words of Foucault and Jane Jacobs – by segregation and hyper surveillance (Y.

Martinez Rivera). Another essential question within philosophy of the city is the idea of good (and common good), which implies understanding the Aristotelian conception of the (common) good and the contributions of the contemporary Aristotelian naturalists (S. Miguens). John Dewey and George Herbert Mead's thoughts continue to be pertinent to deepen the debate on the transforming vectors in democratic cities in order to develop more liveable communities (D. W. Woods). The reflection on the operationalization of the concepts of *praxis* and *hexis* in Jean-Paul Sartre's later philosophy (M. Müller) serve, in turn, to equate the possibilities and limits of the city as a practical field.

The articles in this volume also provide effective problematizing nexuses about the configuration of urbanity in contemporary times, identifying and analyzing the crisis of space as a measure in the post-metropolis era (J. L. Casero and J. Urabayen), the collective subject as the proper subject of our cities (J. M. Green), and the need for post-disciplinary training to inhabit the city (A. Gramigna and G. Poletti). Finally, another questioning and fundamental dimension concerns the digital configuration of public space, which we build but at the same time builds us, seeking to evince the algorithm as an ontic and ontological feature of experience (B. Ross).

We are convinced that the multiplicity of approaches presented here poses a challenge and, simultaneously, an opportunity for the development and consolidation of research in this field of study.

Support for the revision and preparation of the texts included in this monographic issue has been provided by the Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto (UI&D 502), funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, through Portugal's national funds, strategic project reference FIL/00502.

MAGALI BESSONE*

WHAT IS WRONG WITH INTEGRATION?

Abstract

The paper will first retrace the main arguments of the debate about the ideal of social, political and urban integration as it occurred in the United States after the publication of Elizabeth Anderson's *The Imperative of Integration*; it will show that while the critics of Anderson's ideal of «integration» raise important methodological and normative points, the alternative ideal of «differentiated solidarity», proposed earlier by Iris Marion Young, is not solidly grounded from a normative point of view. Then, taking the requirements of a non-ideal contextualist theorization seriously, I'll propose to test the arguments for and against «integration» when they are translated, both conceptually and geographically, to a French context. In France, the concept of integration is part of a different semantic field and of another history of social relations. The minorities concerned by the issue of integration in France are immigrant racialized minorities: they are immigrant, unlike Anderson's main African American focus, and racialized, as opposed to merely cultural groups – Young's

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focus. To conclude, I'll propose some qualified defense of a concept of integration in the French context and in a critical republican perspective, in which it is better conceived not as an imperative, but as an «essentially by-product» of deracialization.

Keywords: Integration; Inclusion; Non-ideal theory; Colonization; Racial city.

Pourquoi refuser l'idéal d'intégration ?

Résumé

L'article commence par présenter les principaux arguments mobilisés dans le débat suscité par la parution de l'ouvrage d'Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, sur la nature et la valeur de l'idéal d'intégration. Si les critiques de cet idéal soulèvent d'importants points méthodologiques et normatifs, on se propose de montrer que l'idéal alternatif de «solidarité différenciée», proposé auparavant par Iris Marion Young, n'est pas plus satisfaisant d'un point de vue normatif. Prenant ensuite au sérieux les exigences méthodologiques d'une théorisation contextuelle non idéale de nos idéaux, l'article se propose de tester les arguments promouvant ou critiquant l'intégration en les situant dans un contexte français. Le concept d'intégration en français relève d'un champ sémantique et d'une histoire sociologique très différents de ceux du contexte nord-américain. Les minorités concernées par le problème de l'intégration en France sont des minorités immigrantes, contrairement à ce qui constitue le cœur de l'analyse de Anderson, mais racisées et non pas culturelles, contrairement à ce que propose Young. Le problème de l'intégration se pose d'abord au niveau local de la racialisation des politiques urbaines. L'article proposera pour conclure une défense qualifiée du concept d'intégration dans un contexte français et dans une perspective républicaine critique: il n'est pas conçu dans cette perspective comme un «impératif» mais plutôt comme un «effet essentiellement secondaire» de la déracialisation.

Mots-clés: Intégration; Inclusion; Théorie non idéale; Colonisation; Ville raciale.

Introduction

In 2010, Elizabeth Anderson published an important book, *The Imperative of Integration*¹. The meaning and uses of the idea of integration she for-

¹ Anderson, Elizabeth, *The Imperative of Integration*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.

mulates in it have triggered a wide debate in North American philosophy². Many issues were raised, possibly leading one to conclude that there is something wrong with integration as a political or moral imperative. Ten years earlier, in *Inclusion and Democracy*, Iris Marion Young had already proposed what she called a «Critique of the ideal of integration» in her chapter on «Residential segregation and regional democracy»³. She opposed to it «an ideal of differentiated solidarity» as an alternative «ideal of social and political inclusion»⁴. The formulation of this ideal builds on some elements which had been presented in her chapter «City life and Difference» in *Justice and the Politics of Difference*⁵: in this earlier book, she contrasted an «ideal of community», «deny[ing] and repress[ing] social difference» by «privileging face-to-face relations», with «an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference».

In this presentation, I'll first retrace the main arguments of the debate about the ideal of social, political and urban integration as it occurs in the United States. Then, taking the requirements of a non-ideal contextualist theorization seriously, I'll propose to test the arguments when they are translated, both conceptually and geographically, to a European, and more specifically, French context. In France, the concept of integration is part of another semantic field and of another history of social relations. Iris Young is right when she states: «In Europe, the issue of integration is discussed today most often in terms of the situation of members of groups who have migrated to European countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean»⁶ – that is from former colonized regions or countries. However, I'll argue that she is wrong to infer: «The arguments I have offered against an ideal of integration (...) apply as much to the situation of cultural minorities in Europe, I suggest, as to the context of the United States»⁷. I'll rather propose some defense of a concept of integration in the French context and in a critical republican perspective, in which it is better conceived as an «essentially by-product» of non-domination. On these terms, there is nothing wrong with integration.

² See notably the Review Symposium Anderson on Integration, on the blog Gender, Race, and Philosophy (<http://sgrp.typepad.com/sgrp/fall-2013-symposium-anderson-on-integration.html>) or the Symposium in *Political Studies Review*, 12(3), 2014, p. 345-382.

³ Young, Iris Marion, *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 216.

⁴ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 221.

⁵ Young, Iris Marion, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990, esp. p. 227.

⁶ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 219.

⁷ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 220.

1. The imperative of integration: a means toward social relational egalitarian justice

Anderson's book is best understood as an intrinsic part of her driving question in moral and political philosophy, that can be summarized by the title of her 1999 *Ethics* paper, «What is the point of equality?»⁸. In the paper, Anderson defends what she calls a « theory of democratic equality » against a theory of «equality of fortune». In a nutshell, she defends the idea that luck egalitarians, by focusing on correcting accidental inequality, due to brute luck, have lost sight of the «distinctively political aims of egalitarianism»⁹. She contrasts the structure of social justice grounded on relational equality, enabling equals to be free from oppression to participate both in the goods of society and in self-government, with the double institutional scheme of distributive justice grounded on equality of fortune: free markets, governing the distribution of goods for which individuals are deemed responsible, and the welfare state, that governs the distribution of goods that are beyond individuals' control. The democratic theory of equality gives substance to the formal principle that the state should treat individuals with equal respect. Against luck egalitarianism' unavoidable paternalism, Anderson's relational theory suggests both that we ask what oppressed people themselves demand on their own account in the name of justice, and that we use objective tests, not subjective evaluations of well-being, to determine unjust disadvantage. One of the practical gains is that we find ourselves in a better position to match the remedy to the injustice: «if the injustice is exclusion, the remedy is inclusion»¹⁰.

The imperative of integration exemplifies the theory of democratic, relational, equality when it is applied to racial issues and to the marginalization and segregation of Black populations in American cities. The first part of the book shows that objective measurements all converge to document the impact of racial segregation on inequality and injustices; it concludes, «if racial segregation is the problem, it stands to reason that racial integration is the remedy»¹¹. Anderson defines integration as «the negation of segregation» (not simply its opposite, which would be mere desegregation, but its actual, and so

⁸ Anderson, Elizabeth, «What is the Point of Equality?», *Ethics* 109/2 (1999), p. 287-337.

⁹ Anderson, «What is the Point of Equality?», art. cit., p. 288.

¹⁰ Anderson, «What is the Point of Equality?», art. cit., p. 334.

¹¹ Anderson, Elizabeth, *The Imperative of Integration*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010, p. 112.

to speak active, negation): it consists in «the free interaction of citizens from all walks of life on terms of equality and mutual regard in all institutions of civil society, and on voluntary terms in the intimate associations of private life»¹².

The imperative of integration is an example of non-ideal philosophy. There are arguably many interpretations of the ideal vs. non-ideal theory divide. I shall use here the notion of non ideal theory in a broad sense, following Anderson's suggestion: «I do not advance principles and ideals for a perfectly just society, but ones that we need to cope with the injustices in our current world, and to move us to something better»¹³. Non-ideal theory is concerned with theorizing the principles and norms that ought to guide us — i.e. historically and culturally situated, limited, rationally and affectively biased individuals — in non-ideal, or less than ideal, circumstances. In order to come up with these principles, normative philosophy needs empirical knowledge, i.e. empirical facts *and* their interpretations from various human and social sciences, sociology, economy, psychology, history, necessary to propose a coherent diagnosis of our current unjust condition. The remedy can only arise from an accurate diagnosis of the situation, but the work of philosophy is not done once the diagnosis is made: in order to avoid both abstract, idealized theory *and* merely descriptive social critique, an alliance between social sciences and normative philosophy is indispensable.

Anderson's specific non-ideal perspective belongs explicitly, here as elsewhere, to pragmatism as a mode of critical theorization: she insists in several passages on the importance of democracy as «a mode of collective inquiry»¹⁴, or as a «society of equals»¹⁵, both dimensions being derived from John Dewey's pragmatist emphasis on cooperation, on «personal day-by-day working together with others» as the core cultural meaning of democracy. Importantly, the collective social inquiry she calls for is based on a demanding ideal of inclusive participation: it supposes a kind of scientific and intelligent cooperation, which should be considered as a principle of epistemic democracy. In other words, social consensus cannot be considered as a given starting point of the normative labor; the inquiry supposes an epistemic pluralism that allows for disagreement and confrontation between different social perspectives. Moreover, if democratic non-ideal theorization is concerned with

¹² Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 95.

¹³ Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁴ Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 95.

¹⁵ Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 102.

«moving us to something better», then we need to be concerned with developing the arguments that can be successfully employed by real protagonists in this debate about «current problems» in order to transform our social world. Then another criteria for non-ideal theory should be considered: whether the theorization is able to formulate the normative foundational premises which all protagonists (dominants and dominated) can accept and use as a common grounding basis for their commitment to improve the unjust, less-than-ideal situation.

2. Methodological and normative issues with the ideal of integration

If theoretical knowledge springs from empirics and if we understand non-ideal theory as the result of a collective inquiry, in which we must at least together come to an agreement on the terms of our inquiry (speak the same normative language), then the theorist has to be particularly careful to listen to the demands and perspectives of all ordinary citizens about segregation and integration. In this perspective, two difficulties arise in Anderson's project:

First, objective measurements and subjective evaluations of segregation and integration are not on a par. According to Cara Wong, «[i]n general, people tend to perceive the environments in which they live as more diverse than they are 'objectively' speaking»¹⁶. The objectivity of objective measures is of course questionable: in social sciences as in natural sciences, the nature of the studied object is actually dependent on the instruments used to study it and on the observer, her situation and the goals she pursues in her analysis. But in a relational equality perspective, subjective representations matter, regardless of objective measures, since they reveal the perceived relations between individuals and groups, and individuals and their environment, when the individuals are differentially positioned on social hierarchies. A study that Cara Wong conducted with colleagues in 2012 shows that «ordinary citizens have idiosyncratic definitions of their local community that do not coincide with the official boundaries of administrative units used to calculate segregation indices, and that vary a great deal in size and are often not contiguous»¹⁷.

¹⁶ Wong, Cara, Bowers, J., Williams, T. and Simmons, K. «Bringing the Person Back in: Boundaries, Perceptions and the Measurement of Racial Context», *Journal of Politics*, 74/4 (2012), p. 1153–1170.

¹⁷ Wong, Cara, «Would We Know 'Integration' if We Were to See It?», *Political Studies Review*, 12 (2014), p. 356.

We rather need to take subjective perceptions of the city or of the neighborhood, and of their limits and delineation, into account, if we want to have a clearer and inclusive idea of our desired or required level of integration, and if we want citizens to endorse public policies designed to achieve this desired integration. Hence while objective measures are necessary, they are definitely not sufficient and, contrary to Anderson's method, our theorization process should rather be discursively and subjectively initiated.

Second, there is disagreement about the meaning and value of segregation and integration, depending on the situation of the respondents. What an integrated environment refers to in people's mental representations, both in terms of what constitutes the ideal number or percentage of diversity or demographic mixity, as well as in terms of what social gains or benefits are to be expected from integration, is heterogeneous depending on the racial, social, geographic and urban situation of the actors. Besides disagreement on the *numbers* and on the *value* of integration, there is even a more profound disagreement on the *meaning* of the concept. In Ron Sundstrom terms, «some might stress integration as combination, making whole, unity, and homogeneity, while others put greater emphasis on access, connection, and equal participation and membership»¹⁸. What's more deterrent, and again in Ron Sundstrom's terms,

what one hears when one listens to the voices of the diverse communities, is that sometimes integration does come up [...], but it is not a prominent demand; rather, more often one hears claims for affordable, safe and decent housing, community-based development, and reference to principles such as community, democracy, accountability, equity, and inclusion¹⁹.

Lastly, some commentators suggest that not only is the concept of integration ambiguous and the language of integration mostly unheard among dominated groups, but the term itself is «sufficiently toxic to substantial segments of the black community as to disqualify it as a name for an ideal that they might find inspiring»²⁰. Integration is taken as a substitute for assimila-

¹⁸ Sundstrom, Ronald, «Commentary on E. Anderson's *The Imperative of Integration*», *Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy*, 9/2 (2013), (<http://web.mit.edu/sgrp/2013/no2/Sundstrom0913.pdf>), p. 2.

¹⁹ Sundstrom, «Commentary on E. Anderson's *The Imperative of Integration*», *art. cit.*, p. 2.

²⁰ Anderson, «Reply to My Critics», *Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy*, 9/2 (2013), (<http://web.mit.edu/sgrp/2013/no2/Anderson0913.pdf>), p. 2.

tion. The (privileged) theorist found herself in the position of translating the demands of groups negatively impacted by segregation into an «integration» discourse that may have largely twisted the nature of the claims.

Anderson bites the bullet and concedes that the term «integration» is inadequate to refer to the ideal she had in mind: she replies to her critics «I therefore propose, as a provisional remediation, to use the term ‘inclusion’ for what I call ‘integration’ in my book»²¹. Indeed, *prima facie*, inclusion can do all «integration» was supposed to do in Anderson’s view – it affirms the same goal: achieve free interaction between all citizens on terms of equality and mutual respect; *and* it avoids carrying the implicit meaning that it entails the dissolution of black community life. If inclusion, as opposed to integration, is the remedy to segregation, then at least part of our political commitment to justice should consist in encouraging ways to foster black solidarity and community building.

3. An alternative ideal of inclusion: the ideal of «differentiated solidarity»

The concept of inclusion, however, is rather vague and needs to be specified: Iris Young’s ideal of «differentiated solidarity», precisely offered as an ideal of «social and political inclusion» alternative to the «ideal of integration», could be a precious resource. Young, like Anderson, formulates her ideal by focusing on an analysis of residential segregation, both because «it is a major cause of other segregations» (school or employment segregation) and because «its spatial and jurisdictional aspects» make it a far-reaching phenomenon «for democratic practice»²². But according to Young, segregation should not be confused with «group clustering»²³: the problem with segregation rather lies with the processes of «exclusion from privileges and benefits» it entails, not with group differentiation itself. Young lists four such specific wrongs of residential racial segregation: first, it constrains groups in their housing options, thus «wrongly limits freedom of housing choice»; second, because of stigmatization processes and lack of investment in racially concentrated neighborhoods, it «reproduces and reinforces structures of privilege and disadvantage»; third, by creating social worlds that never meet, it «obscures the

²¹ Anderson, «Reply to My Critics», op. cit., p. 2.

²² Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 198.

²³ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 204.

privilege it creates», making it invisible to the privileged groups; and fourth, as a result, it «impedes political communication», rendering «inclusive communicative democracy»²⁴ impossible. The ideal of integration does not offer the right remedy to these wrongs, precisely because it wrongly focuses on group clustering instead of confronting the issue of exclusion from privileges. It takes «clustering itself as the problem and mixing as the solution»²⁵. Because dominant groups «set the terms of integration to which the formerly segregated groups must conform», it denies the «validity of people's desire to live and associate with others for whom they feel particular affinity»²⁶. Integration considers that the main issue with segregation is that groups are spatially and institutionally distinguished, whereas, according to Young, there is nothing morally or politically wrong *per se* in such grouping and distinction; and mixing is unable to address the real issue for a theory of justice, i.e. the processes through which dominant groups retain symbolic and material privilege.

By contrast, the ideal of differentiated solidarity «allows for a certain degree of separation» between groups, based on «affinity group differentiation», favoring «particularist and local self-affirmation and expression»²⁷. Young takes pains to distinguish this ideal of differentiated solidarity from an ideal of community she had already rejected in «City life and Difference» in the name of what she called at the time «an ideal of city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference»²⁸. Solidarity and community, as normative ideals, should be carefully distinguished. The ideal of community, says Young, rests on the metaphysical illusion of an immediate co-presence of subjects in a local face-to-face direct democracy: it denies the unavoidable difference, and distance, between subjects; as a political consequence, «it often operates to exclude or oppress those experienced as different»²⁹. There is now extensive scholarship about the risks associated with what Kwame Appiah called the «Medusa syndrome»³⁰, the reification of group boundaries and excessive affirmation of internal uniformity or homogeneity within ethnic, cultural or religious groups, leading to marginalization and oppression of internal minorities or hybrid groups. Instead of favoring inclusion, it enhances a

²⁴ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 208.

²⁵ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 218.

²⁶ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 216.

²⁷ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 221.

²⁸ Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, op. cit., p. 227.

²⁹ Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, op. cit., p. 234.

³⁰ Appiah, Kwame Anthony, *The Ethics of Identity*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2004.

logic of camps, of friends and foes, and does not bring about the possibility of a common language or discourse. The ideal of differentiated group solidarity, that justifies and pushes forward the formation of affinity social groups in a city, should avoid these dire political consequences of the ideal of community.

This *caveat* presses an important point: the concept of solidarity is normatively dependent. It needs to be grounded on a more foundational norm that allows the theorist to differentiate between exclusive and inclusive, oppressive and emancipatory, just and unjust, solidarity groupings based on affinity. While clustering may not be a problem *per se*, some clusters are; and a non-ideal theory of democratic justice has to have normative criteria, shared and endorsed by all members of the political community, in order to discriminate between adequate and inadequate affinity groups. Young concedes this point: according to her, solidarity cannot simply be based on «fellow feeling and mutual identification», for that would confuse solidarity and community. She rather suggests that the only «moral basis» for solidarity is «that people live together»³¹, which she understands in a pragmatic, Deweyan, sense, although the reference to Dewey remains implicit: she suggests that to «live together» means that people's activities are causally and institutionally related to one another and affect each other, even when people are strangers to each other. In this sense, which allows for social distance and «challenges conceptual and spatial boundaries»³², the scope of solidarity is the sphere of all those affected by our decisions and actions – something akin to what John Dewey had in mind when he advocated for a «great community»³³. And such should be the sphere of our obligations of justice. However, in this case, the ideal of solidarity, backed by some non actual version of the «all-affected principle», potentially extends to the whole of humanity through mass media communication and economic relations, and becomes very tenuous, psychologically less convincing, or extremely demanding from a moral point of view. So while «fellow feeling and mutual identification» does not provide a normative grounding for solidarity, «that people live together» proves hardly consistent.

To sum up, it seems difficult to advocate for an ideal of «differentiated solidarity» that responds to the limits of the ideal of integration in the name of a better inclusion, but does not endorse a strong ideal of community. What if, in a renewed non-ideal perspective, «integration», not as an imperative, but as a by-product, could prove more inclusive than in Anderson's view?

³¹ Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 222.

³² Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 225.

³³ Dewey, John, *The Public and Its Problems*, Henry Holt, New York 1927.

4. Integration, assimilation and community in France

In Europe in general, and in France in particular, the concept of integration primarily refers to the issues of integrating immigrant groups. Contrary to Iris Young's terms however, these groups are not merely «cultural» minorities, but deeply racialized minorities. For historical reasons, mainly because of the central role of imperial and colonial European states in shaping a massively unequal global order through race-based domination practices (through grabbing of natural resources and labor power, political marginalization or powerlessness, and cultural imperialism), migration phenomena today are still associated with a reproduction of disadvantage that is both racialized and racializing. Minority groups who are immigrating into European countries are, in their great majority, people from former European colonies who were placed in a position of political and economic disadvantage by colonizing countries, and they are received in the guest countries through a asymmetrical relation that reproduces the colonizer/colonized relationship. Sarah Fine summarizes the growing political theory literature on this point as follows: «[i]n short, race, racism, and racial and ethnic discrimination are embedded in the history of migration, in public responses to immigrations, in the apparatus of immigration controls, and in migration flows. And this is not just a regrettable historical fact; it remains true, even pervasive»³⁴. Hence, understanding issues of integration in a European context with a cultural lense, or in multiculturalist terms, is deeply misleading: it undermines the inherent politically racialized dimension of the groups and of the relation between the national majority and immigrant minorities.

In France, the notion of integration was introduced at the end of the 1980's both as a tentatively political substitute to the rightly depreciated notion of assimilation, and as an injunction to develop a French model of inclusion that would not reproduce the failures of the American so-called «melting pot» which was viewed as rigidifying ethnic identities. In 1989 it was institutionalized, not only as a word or a political objective, but as an administrative process³⁵: a «Haut Conseil de l'intégration» (High Council of Integration) was created at the initiative of socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard, directly under the authority of the Prime Minister; the Council delivered annual

³⁴ Fine, Sarah, «Immigration and Discrimination», in S. Fine and L. Ypi (eds.) *Migration in Political Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, p. 131.

³⁵ Gaspard, Françoise, «Assimilation, insertion, intégration: les mots pour devenir français», *Hommes et Migrations*, 1154 (1992), pp. 14-23.

reports until 2012, when it was dismissed. In its first report, it proposed the following definition of integration:

Without negating differences, knowing how to take them into account without exalting them, a politics of integration puts the emphasis on similarities and convergences, so that the various ethnic and cultural components of our society may live in solidarity, in the respect of equal rights and obligations, and so that it provides anyone, regardless of his origin, with the possibility to live in this society whose rules he accepted and in which he then becomes a constitutive element³⁶.

The same year, famous sociologist Dominique Schnapper published *La France de l'intégration: sociologie de la nation en 1990*³⁷, in which she argued that the French nation did successfully integrate its immigrants. She defended a middle ground position between those who feared that foreigners may represent a threat for the French national identity, and those who advocated for a «multi-ethnic France». Hence the language of integration was constructed to oppose on one hand the identitarian nationalist vocabulary of assimilation, in which immigrants are supposed to be swallowed and disappear within the universalist and color-blind French body politic, and on the other hand the vocabulary of «communitarianism» and its perceived exaltation of sub-national group identities that threaten French cohesion and French republican principles. Integration, in the official French discourse (emanating both from political and intellectual authorities), was supposed to mean both the respect of differences and the sharing of Republican values.

As early as 1994, sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad wrote an important article, in which he denounced some aspects of this official semantic of integration³⁸. He argued that the meaning of the concept of integration was the result of previous sedimented layers of assimilationist meaning, originating in colonial context: hence, formulating an imperative of integration, or even an invitation to integrate, was always also a way to formulate a veiled accusation for a deficit of integration – the expression of a kind of suspicion attached to

³⁶ Haut Conseil à l'intégration, *Pour un modèle français d'intégration*, La Documentation française, Paris 1991, pp. 11-12.

³⁷ Schnapper, Dominique, *La France de l'intégration : sociologie de la nation en 1990*, Gallimard, Paris 1991.

³⁸ Sayad, Abdelmayek, «Qu'est-ce que l'intégration? [What is integration?]», *Hommes et Migrations* 1182 (1994) 8-14.

«any presence perceived as foreigner»³⁹. Moreover, foreigner, in this integrative rhetoric, does not refer to a clear juridical status: suspicion is attached to «immigrants», those who are created as the object of «politics of integration»; and immigrants can be said «of second generation», i.e. born in France and with French nationality.

Despite his criticism however, Sayad didn't dismiss integration altogether. Indeed, if one of the objectives of a non-ideal theorization of justice is also to formulate arguments that may be heard by dominant groups and incite them to renounce some of their privileges, in the French context where «communitarianism» is systematically considered as the acme of political evil, maintaining integration as a political concept is probably an efficient strategy. But Sayad's point is more specific: he builds on Jon Elster's analysis of some social and psychological states as «essentially by-products» of rationally oriented intentional actions undertaken for other ends⁴⁰. Sayad suggests that integration is one these social objects that can't be pursued consciously. He compares integration to forgetfulness or sleep: to want to forget something is precisely placing oneself in a mental state in which forgetfulness is impossible; to want to fall asleep prevents the occurrence of sleep. Likewise, integration can't be an explicit democratic goal: it can only be the essentially by-product of actions and efforts aiming at something else. This is why integration «can't be a predictive discourse», says Sayad⁴¹; to use it within a normatively prescriptive discourse comes down to a fallacy: integration can only be part of a descriptive discourse that occurs in retrospect, and with some delay, about the social reality it qualifies.

5. Integration: the essentially secondary effect of deracialization in a theorization of justice as non-domination

In this perspective, I want to suggest in my concluding section that integration can be conceived as the essentially by-product of the political aim of deracialization of the French political institutional order, by which I mean the visibilization of institutionalized hierarchies of racial subordination inherited from colonization, and their dismantling. The grounding norm of

³⁹ Sayad, «Qu'est-ce que l'intégration? [What is integration?]', art. cit., p. 14.

⁴⁰ Elster, Jon, *Sour Grapes*, Cambridge University Press, Harvard 1983; «States that are essentially by-products», *Rationality and Society*, 20/3 (1981), p. 431-473.

⁴¹ Sayad, «Qu'est-ce que l'intégration? [What is integration?]', art. cit., p. 12.

such deracialization is non-domination in a critical republican perspective: an integrated society is what we can achieve if we pursue the distinctly political objective of racial non-domination as freedom from all racial arbitrary interference. And urban desegregation is the immediate political means to this political aim: French cities are, albeit this is denied in the French republican official discourse, racial cities, and reciprocally, racial issues are more easily heard when formulated in spatial terms.

Let me be clear: my goal here is not to defend a French version of Anderson's ideal of integration. Not only, following Sayad, do I think that integration cannot be any kind of explicit «imperative», but I also contend that Anderson's account of integration is grounded on a flawed principle that becomes apparent when the paradigm of integration is translated from a US to a French context. Anderson's argument in favor of integration depends too heavily on the suggestion that racial segregation can be dissolved into a broader national identification or identity. Against Young, she thinks that «a sense of fellow feeling or mutual identification» is needed for citizens to join «in a common project of living together», and urges the Left «to put behind its preference for racial identities at the expense of national identities»⁴² that have to be constituted in order for racial justice to obtain. But the translation of the ideal of integration into a French context shows that the emphasis on a national «we» does not in itself generate cross-racial solidarity. On the contrary, it justifies «heightened antagonism toward immigrants, non-citizens and anyone seen as 'foreign'»⁴³.

What's more, these «out-national-group» identities are racialized, and actively so through segregation processes that occur at the level of «racial cities»⁴⁴. Race is space in the French context, although the racial dimension of urban segregation remains largely invisible or silenced. Anthropologist Giovanni Picker shows that the national state delegates racial enforcement to local authorities, to be conducted at a local level of space management and urban life regulation. Picker convincingly argues that this municipalization of race is a distinctive heritage of colonialism, in continuity with «the colonial experiments of race-space intersections as among the first modern regulatory mechanisms of territorial rule», when it was experimented in colonized cities, then transferred into the metropole, as a way of keeping perceived threats «spatially

⁴² Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, op. cit., p. 188.

⁴³ Balfour, Lawrie, «Integration, Desegregation, and the Work of the Past», *Political Studies Review* 12 (2014), p. 350.

⁴⁴ Picker, Giovanni, *Racial cities*, Routledge, New York 2017.

isolated from the colonizer». The colonies were a republican «laboratory»⁴⁵, used for the formulation and test of many republican concepts, norms of identity and legal and administrative practices. Republican legal theory, with its particular emphasis on the notion of citizenship, has been deeply shaped by the relation between metropolitan France and the French colonies, and civic statuses and rights associated with citizenship have been established by differentiation with several minority statuses (colonial subjects, indigenous or native persons, slaves, free colored, Whites, etc.). Segregation is the deliberate effect of a series of political mechanisms aiming at keeping political exclusion in place through spatial exclusion: Picker lists four such spatial devices, displacement, omission, containment, and cohesion. These mechanisms intertwine with each other in various ways at a local, urban level, in order to create specific cultural, economic and political orders of domination.

In order to dismantle these orders, non-domination has to be the normative core of the account of integration as essential by-product of deracialization I suggest here. Like relational equality, non-domination does not claim that justice is done when material goods and liberties are equally distributed (it focuses on hierarchical relations of oppression); but unlike it, it aims, more radically and critically, at transforming relations of *power* (interpersonal and structural). From Rainer Forst, I adopt the idea that non-domination involves that «no political or social relations should exist that cannot be adequately justified toward those subjected to them». For him, non-domination is content neutral, and it is enrolled in a procedural theory of justice whose fundamental principle is a «principle of general and reciprocal justification». In sum, «[f]undamental justice guarantees all citizens an effective status as justificatory equals»⁴⁶. Hence, non-domination is, importantly, a justificatory ideal that allows us to guard against a flawed procedure of inquiry. Beyond this methodological gain, I also take non-domination as a grounding substantial norm in a non-ideal theorization of justice. In Cécile Laborde's critical republican perspective, citizens are dominated by institutionalized cultural and social

⁴⁵ Vidal, Cécile (ed.), *Français? La nation en débat entre colonies et métropole, XVIe-XIXe siècle*, Éditions de l'EHESS, Paris 2014, p. 9. She refers to Michel Foucault who noted that colonization, with its political and juridical technics and weapons, of course transferred European models to other continents, but also had many feed-back effects on power mechanisms in the West, on power apparatus, institutions and technics (Michel Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, Gallimard, Paris 1997, p. 89).

⁴⁶ Forst, Rainer, «Transnational Justice and Non domination, a discourse theoretical approach», in B. Buckinx - J. Treho-Mathys - T. Waligore (eds.), *Domination and Global Political Justice*, Routledge, New York and London 2015, pp. 90, 91, 92.

norms when they are «humiliated, stigmatized, marginalized, silenced, indoctrinated, defined by others, and their capacity for (...) democratic voice is either denied or dismissed»⁴⁷. In other words, X is dominated by Y (who can be an individual or a moral person, an institution as a system of rules, norms, procedures and objectives) if Y's choices asymmetrically shape X's capacity to express, define and pursue her ends and X cannot change the terms of the power relation between Y and her. Hence, in Cécile Laborde and Myriam Ronzoni's words, non-domination grounds «a plausible conception of *justice*, understood as requiring the minimization of domination as a matter of right. A just order is one that minimizes the extent to which persons or groups are subject to domination – first and foremost by binding power and making it controllable by those who are subject to it (by legal, political and socio-economic means)»⁴⁸. On this view, justice is primarily concerned with the nature and structure of power relationships; non-domination grounds the combat against social representations and norms that give meaning to individuals' and groups' positions. Promoting non-domination allows markers such as race to gain political signification as markers of how vulnerable a population is to arbitrary interference, and this vulnerability is inscribed in urban features. Integration as a by-product of deracialization will occur when, and if, France recognizes, and reduces, the dominated position of racialized groups, as groups negatively impacted by racialization processes that occur through some specific mechanisms of space urban management. From a methodological and non-ideal perspective, what we can learn from this journey of integration, from the US to France, is the deeply contextual nature of political concepts and the necessity for the political philosopher to never forget that they are part of situated political grammars in which our use of them may make sense.

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⁴⁷ Laborde, Cécile, *Critical Republicanism and the Hijab*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, p. 16.

⁴⁸ Laborde, Cécile and Ronzoni, Myriam, «What is a Free State? Republican Internationalism and Globalisation», *Political Studies* 64/2 (2015), p. 279-296.

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DOMINGO GARCÍA-MARZÁ*

SOCIEDAD CIVIL GLOBAL: HACIA UNA ÉTICA DE LAS INSTITUCIONES

Global Civil Society: Towards an Ethics of Institutions

Abstract

The objective of this brief article is to present and discuss a global civil society concept, along with an ethics of institutions, which enable us to think about a possible institutional structuring of civil society within a two-track democracy. The objective is framed within the task of thinking and defining new vocabulary capable of confronting this second modernity that globalization represents and, with it in U Beck's words, the disappearance of methodological statism. Thus our need for a *radical* civil society concept; i.e., civil society's critical perspective in globalization contexts. So we will take the following steps. Firstly, we will come across some basic characteristics of this new global order, of this new scenario, to explain the relationship between ethics and civil society, and to specify the role of moral resources. Secondly,

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the inadequacy of the whole civil society concept will be shown, which excludes the economy and its institutions, and proposes reformulating the Habermasian definition that moves towards a broader civil society concept. Third and finally, using the institutional design will be proposed to talk about civil society's possible institutional structure, and to make progress in the role that ethics plays in institutional design. All this will allow us to introduce a new civil society concept, one capable of receiving social transformation force from its own resources.

Keywords: Democracy; Globalization; Civil society; Ethics; Institutional design

Resumen

El objetivo de este breve artículo radica en presentar y argumentar un concepto de sociedad civil global junto con una ética de las instituciones que nos permitan pensar en una posible estructuración institucional de la sociedad civil dentro de una democracia de doble vía. Este objetivo se enmarca en la tarea de pensar y definir un nuevo vocabulario capaz de enfrentarse a esta segunda modernidad que supone la globalización y, con ella, a la desaparición del estatismo metodológico, por utilizar palabras de U. Beck. De ahí que necesitemos un concepto de sociedad civil *radical*. Esto es, una perspectiva crítica sobre la sociedad civil en contextos de globalización. Para ello daremos los siguientes pasos. En primer lugar, entraremos en algunas características básicas de este nuevo escenario, para explicar la relación entre ética y sociedad civil y explicar así el papel de los recursos morales. En segundo lugar, se mostrará la insuficiencia de todo concepto de sociedad civil que excluya a la economía y a sus instituciones, proponiendo reformular la definición habermasiana hacia un concepto más amplio de sociedad civil. En tercer, y último lugar, se propone utilizar el diseño institucional para hablar de una posible estructura institucional de la sociedad civil y avanzar en el papel de la ética en el diseño institucional. Este breve recorrido nos permitirá introducir un nuevo concepto de sociedad civil capaz de recoger la fuerza de transformación social de los recursos que le son propios.

Palabras Clave: democracia, globalización, sociedad civil, ética, diseño institucional

1. Un nuevo escenario

El interés actual por el diseño institucional y, en definitiva, por replantear el sentido y legitimidad de muchos de los acuerdos institucionales, responde a una situación de insatisfacción ante los problemas actuales de nuestros sistemas democráticos y las teorías que pretender dar razón de ellos. Una de las causas más importantes de esta insatisfacción es el vacío creado por la pérdida de protagonismo del estado como actor principal de la vida social y el corre-

spondiente aumento de la importancia y significación de la sociedad civil. La necesidad de legitimación aumenta con la extensión y transnacionalización de los problemas. La globalización también implica, en palabras de Offe, que “el orden vuelva a depositarse en manos de los individuos y de sus asociaciones. Estas deben, justo porque no habría ninguna otra instancia que fuese suficientemente soberana, prestarles lo mejor de su patrimonio (moral) común y de este modo, otorgar validez a su propio capital de juicio práctico de una manera que es igualmente sustitutiva de un poder estatal que se ha visto notoriamente desbordado”¹.

Dar lo mejor que tiene la sociedad civil, su patrimonio moral, lo que yo he denominado en otros escritos recursos morales². Dentro de esta idea de recuperar, de empoderar a los sujetos y a sus instituciones para que asuman su cuota de responsabilidad por lo público se va a mover este artículo. El objetivo no es otro que contribuir, modestamente, a la confección discursiva de un nuevo vocabulario político que recupere el valor de la participación, un sentido perdido en nuestros actuales contextos democráticos³. Desde esta perspectiva política e histórica, el actual escenario global debe verse como una oportunidad, antes de que otros la aprovechen. Esta es la idea, por ejemplo, de D. Held, cuando afirma: “La globalización no conduce simplemente al fin de la política, o a la capacidad de la actividad reguladora, sino que es más exacto relacionarla con la expansión del marco de la actividad política y del abanico de actores implicados en ella. La globalización supone la continuación de la política a través de medios novedosos que operan en muy diferentes niveles”⁴.

Nuevos actores y medios novedosos, nos dice Held. El problema es que muchos de estos medios no son democráticos, no responden a la libertad y a la igualdad en la toma de decisiones. Cada vez es más difícil ocultar el papel de actores institucionales que tienen poder, y por lo tanto responsabilidad, en el logro de un desarrollo humano sostenible y que, sin embargo, “carecen de dominio político sobre territorio alguno”, como es el caso de las empresas o de las iglesias, aunque sí que disponen de recursos, estructuras y personas con capacidad de movilización⁵. Estas estructuras de poder están fuera del juego democrático y constituyen una causa clara del síntoma de la “sensación de desencanto y decepción” ante las democracias actuales. Nuestros sistemas se

¹ Offe, C., *Las nuevas democracias*, Hacer, Barcelona 2004.

² García-Marzá, D., *Ética empresarial: del diálogo a la confianza*, Trotta, Madrid 2011.

³ Cortina, A., *Ética aplicada y democracia radical*, Tecnos, Madrid 1993.

⁴ Held, D., *Un pacto global*, Taurus, Madrid 2005, p. 34

⁵ Cfr. al respecto Crouch C., *Posdemocracia*, Taurus, Madrid 2003.

resienten ante la combinación entre, por una parte, unos ciudadanos pasivos que apenas influyen en las decisiones que les afectan y, por otra parte, una política real que se juega “entre bambalinas”, con unas élites que representan los intereses de las empresas. En resumen, aquellos a los que hemos elegido no tienen poder y los que tienen poder no los hemos elegido.

Nada que no supiéramos ya, podríamos pensar, pero la novedad es que ahora es el mismo modelo de gestión empresarial el que se ofrece como modelo a seguir por las democracias, olvidando la diferencia entre lo público y lo privado. La empresa, la institución con más poder en la actualidad, ha dejado de ser sospechosa: se ha convertido en el modelo institucional a seguir. Para las posiciones neoliberales, el mercado ya no es el criterio básico de la eficiencia, lo es también de la justicia. La entrada más clara para esta idea es, como no, la sociedad civil global⁶.

Cuando pensamos en la globalización acude a nuestra mente toda una serie de fenómenos de tipo exclusivamente económico, como la continua construcción de espacios económicos mundiales, la hegemonía de las empresas multinacionales o la universalización de la competitividad. Sin embargo, esta reducción es un grave error. La globalización no es sólo, ni básicamente, un fenómeno económico. Es un proceso mucho más amplio y profundo que afecta a todas las dimensiones del quehacer humano y transforma de hecho todo el escenario en el que se ha estructurado hasta ahora el mundo de las relaciones sociales y no sólo las económicas⁷. Estamos más bien, de acuerdo con Giddens, ante una compleja red de relaciones que atraviesan las fronteras nacionales y que interrelacionan y vuelven interdependientes a sujetos locales, nacionales, regionales y supraestatales. Sociedad global, en el sentido en que no hay ningún lugar ni grupo que pueda mantenerse al margen de los demás y que necesita, por lo tanto, valores y normas comunes⁸.

Como realidad, la globalización significa que nos encontramos, según afirma Beck, ante la desaparición de una de las premisas fundamentales en que se ha apoyado toda la reflexión económica y política de los últimos años, a saber: “la idea de vivir y actuar en los espacios cerrados y recíprocamente delimitados de los estados nacionales y de sus respectivas sociedades nacionales”⁹. Esta metodología “estatista” ya no es suficiente para entender nuestra realidad

⁶ Sen, A., *Desarrollo y libertad*, Planeta, Barcelona 2000; así como Conill, J., *Horizontes de economía ética*, Tecnos, Madrid 2004.

⁷ Gray, J., *Falso amanecer. Los engaños del capitalismo global*, Paidós, Barcelona 2000, p. 270; así como Beck, U., *¿Qué es la globalización?*, Paidós, Barcelona 1988, p. 16.

⁸ Giddens, A., *Consecuencias de la modernidad*, Madrid, Alianza, 1999, p. 67 y ss.

⁹ Beck, U., *¿Qué es la globalización?*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

actual, menos para cambiarla.

Esta apertura de los espacios de actuación es la clave para entender por qué determinados intangibles hasta ahora reducidos al terreno individual se han vuelto imprescindibles para toda relación económica y social (piénsese, por ejemplo, en la reputación). La imposibilidad de un conocimiento directo y apoyado en tradiciones compartidas aumenta el riesgo de que las relaciones sociales fracasen, por lo que se incrementa así la *vulnerabilidad del orden económico y social y de sus instituciones*. La importancia funcional de la ética responde a esta fragilidad de los contextos sociales y económicos.

Dos consecuencias importantes de este proceso de globalización se destacan para una comprensión actual del concepto de responsabilidad.

La primera consecuencia tiene que ver con el papel protagonista que había ejercido el Estado como actor principal de la vida social, como responsable exclusivo de lo público. Dentro de este esquema la responsabilidad de las instituciones de la sociedad civil se limitaba a cumplir sus fines sociales específicos, educación, seguridad, salud, beneficios, etc., dejando al estado la responsabilidad por todos los bienes que excedían su ámbito de actuación. Sin embargo, esta división de tareas ha cambiado. El papel actual de las instituciones que componen la sociedad civil debe analizarse hoy dentro de esta ruptura de la identificación entre responsabilidad pública y responsabilidad estatal y, por lo tanto, dentro de la demanda de la opinión pública para que las instituciones asuman parte de esta responsabilidad por lo público. Por ejemplo, en la responsabilidad ecológica o en la intervención positiva en el desarrollo de los pueblos¹⁰.

Desde este punto de vista, el protagonismo de la sociedad civil significa el aumento del poder y la responsabilidad de los actores mismos que componen este ámbito. Un nuevo escenario donde ya es evidente lo que siempre ha sido una realidad, por decirlo con C. Offe, que “la justicia ya no es algo que sólo pueda realizarse a través de la ley”¹¹. De hecho, los actores y sus capacidades para el acuerdo y el compromiso, lo que aquí denominaremos recursos morales, están adquiriendo así una creciente importancia funcional para la solución de problemas sociales.

La segunda consecuencia se refiere al universalismo que exige esta dimensión global de los problemas. Como mecanismo de coordinación de la

¹⁰ Cfr. al respecto los trabajos de una ética del desarrollo, por ejemplo Martínez Navarro, E., *Ética para el desarrollo de los pueblos*, Trotta, Madrid 2000.

¹¹ Offe, C., *La gestión política*, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Madrid 1992, pp. 321 y ss.

acción, el derecho constituye el instrumento básico del Estado para establecer las normas que posibilitan la acción social y, dentro de ella, la económica¹². La estabilidad para la consecución de las acciones, así como la confianza en el comportamiento futuro de los demás tiene mucho que ver con el derecho y con su capacidad de coacción, con la amenaza fáctica de sanciones. Aquello que el proceso de globalización nos confirma es una idea que ya venía argumentando con fuerza todo pensamiento crítico: que el derecho es necesario, pero no suficiente para dar razón del orden social.

No es sólo que el derecho ya no sirve ante la complejidad de muchos de los problemas, en el caso de los problemas ecológicos, de desarrollo o de la paz. La cuestión es mucho más profunda, pues afecta al marco global de los problemas, que excede y con mucho las fronteras estatales del derecho. Hoy es ya evidente para la opinión pública *la insuficiencia del derecho como instrumento exclusivo para la resolución de conflictos*. De ahí la fuerza actual de una Sociedad Civil cuyas fronteras flexibles se definen por la misma dimensión de los problemas y que posee mecanismos diferentes para la regulación de la acción y la resolución de conflictos. Mecanismos de cohesión social que tienen que ver más con el compromiso y la participación activa en sus organizaciones que con la imposición o coacción externa del derecho. Recursos morales en el sentido en que utilizan nuestro saber moral, aquello que esperamos unos de otros, como una capacidad para actuar, para tomar decisiones y actuar en consecuencia.

En resumen, ante este escenario global es indudable que necesitamos mostrar la existencia e importancia de otros mecanismos de coordinación de la acción que, si bien son posibles gracias a una base jurídica, dependen más de la acción libre y voluntaria de los sujetos y de sus organizaciones, de su convicción propia. Esto es, mecanismos informales de regulación de la acción a los que denominaremos *recursos morales*. La sociedad civil es el contexto donde se producen y reproducen estos recursos, este capital ético.

2. A vueltas con la sociedad civil

Autores como Habermas o Kaldor mantienen un concepto de sociedad civil alejado de la realidad, donde solo cuenta la solidaridad, el entendimiento

¹² Cfr. al respecto Poole, R., *Moralidad y modernidad. El porvenir de la ética*, Herder, Barcelona 1993.

y el acuerdo¹³. Pero, de esta forma, lo único que consiguen con la exclusión de la economía y de la política de la sociedad civil es dejar a estas instituciones “fuera de la crítica” y, con ello, renunciar a toda posibilidad de transformación y cambio que no provenga de las otras esferas, esto es, vía legal en el caso del estado, vía influencia en el caso de la opinión pública. Pero de esta forma, no dan razón de las posibilidades y necesidades de participación, de realizar nuestra autonomía en el seno mismo de sus instituciones.

Con su visión estrecha de la sociedad civil abandonan la necesidad de justificación, de legitimidad, en al que se apoyan las instituciones económicas y políticas. Abandonar esta necesidad de justificación implica dejar a las instituciones de la sociedad civil fuera de toda perspectiva crítica, fuera de toda posibilidad de transformación y cambio. La teoría de la democracia pierde así uno de sus pilares básicos, pues quedan fuera de análisis aquellos ámbitos de acción en los que de hecho se establecen la gran mayoría de las relaciones sociales y se produce y reproduce el poder económico y social.

Admitiendo que la sociedad civil global es un elemento básico de todo posible orden cosmopolita, en mi opinión llegaríamos más lejos con la siguiente definición de sociedad civil que ya propuse hacia varios años como suelo común para las éticas aplicadas: “ámbito de interacciones estructurado en torno a una red de asociaciones y organizaciones posibles gracias al libre acuerdo de todos los participantes, con el fin de alcanzar conjuntamente la satisfacción de determinados intereses y la resolución consensual de posibles conflictos de acción”¹⁴.

A diferencia de la posición de Habermas, no se trata de que la acción comunicativa tenga la exclusividad en este ámbito, que solo cuente la solidaridad como mecanismo básico de coordinación de la acción. Se trata más bien que el entendimiento y el acuerdo posibles sean primarios, no exclusivos. También en esta propuesta de comprensión de la sociedad civil, el ámbito moral se identifica con los intereses generalizables, pero no se encierra en sí mismo como el caso de Habermas. Estos representan siempre las condiciones mínimas para que pueda hablarse de un “libre acuerdo” en la definición y satisfacción de los demás tipos de intereses. El diálogo implica el aspecto moral básico del reconocimiento recíproco del otro, pero no nos conduce necesariamente al logro de consensos, esto es, al establecimiento de un in-

¹³ Habermas, J., *Facticidad y validez*, Trotta, Madrid 1988, p. 447; así como Kaldor, M., *Sociedad civil global. Una respuesta a la guerra*, Tusquets, Barcelona 2003.

¹⁴ García-Marzá, D., «Sociedad civil: una concepción radical», *Recerca. Revista de pensament i anàlisi*, 8 (2008) 27-46.

terés igualmente aceptable para todos. En muchas ocasiones nos limitamos a compromisos y negociaciones, a estrategias para un equilibrio entre intereses. También estos casos de acciones estratégicas están sometidos al criterio ético que impone “el libre acuerdo”. También son, como en el caso de las empresas, más o menos justas, más o menos correctas o morales. Analicemos brevemente las implicaciones de esta definición de Sociedad Civil.

- Se entiende como una esfera de interacciones sociales y no como un sujeto colectivo del que podamos esperar una actuación unificada. Es un ámbito de acción donde se llevan a cabo determinadas acciones y se constituyen organizaciones gracias a determinados recursos.

- No es posible concebirla separada del Estado y del derecho, ya que estos constituyen la garantía de los derechos básicos, tanto civiles y políticos, como sociales, culturales y económicos, sobre los que se construye esta esfera al garantizar tanto la libertad como los medios para ejercerla.

- La aceptación libre y voluntaria dentro de las limitaciones funcionales de cualquier ámbito de la praxis social constituye su esencia. Ello implicará, como veremos, condiciones de igualdad y simetría, al igual que de inclusión, para todos los interlocutores participantes en los diálogos y en la búsqueda de acuerdos que legitimen cada elemento de la Sociedad Civil.

- Desde este último punto de vista es evidente que estamos, como cualquier otro concepto que intente dar razón de lo realmente existente, ante un concepto normativo que no admite un sistema binario, bueno o malo, sino una progresiva aproximación o alejamiento de la idea que representa. De esta graduación dependerá el nivel de confianza “depositado en” y “generado por” la empresa.

El objetivo de la satisfacción de los intereses presenta otros dos aspectos que es

- a) En primer lugar, nos encontramos en la Sociedad Civil con intereses particulares (prestigio, dinero, etc.), pero también podemos encontrarnos con intereses comunes (profesionales, corporativos, etc.) y con intereses generales o universales (reconocimiento, dignidad, etc.). Estos últimos conforman la pretensión de validez moral al que remiten los demás.

- b) En segundo lugar, nada nos dice acerca de la forma determinada de alcanzar este acuerdo. El diálogo implica el aspecto moral básico del reconocimiento recíproco del otro, pero no nos conduce necesariamente al logro de consensos, esto es, al establecimiento de un interés igualmente aceptable para todos. En muchas ocasiones nos limitamos a compromisos

y negociaciones, a estrategias para un equilibrio entre intereses. También estos casos de acciones estratégicas están sometidos al criterio ético que impone “el libre acuerdo”.

Si bien la sociedad civil depende de un marco estatal, de la garantía de los que permitan una participación igual, la definición ofrecida va más allá puesto que las fronteras de la sociedad civil, sus límites, vienen determinados sólo y exclusivamente por la dimensión de los conflictos que se quieren solucionar de forma dialógica y razonada. En este sentido hablamos de un concepto de sociedad civil global. Como concepto normativo, la sociedad civil sí que insiste en que en esta búsqueda de acuerdos donde todos tengan las mismas posibilidades de participar. No es otro el horizonte moral de actuación y el criterio que legitima los logros realmente alcanzados. Pero, con el fin de delimitar esta participación y de aclarar la aportación de la sociedad civil al sistema democrático debemos ser capaces de estructurar este concepto de sociedad civil desde la perspectiva institucionalista. Definir estos espacios de participación, deliberación y búsqueda de acuerdos.

3. La estructuración institucional de la sociedad civil

Desde estas premisas, se puede entender la sociedad civil como el ámbito donde se generan y se logran, alcanzando después una determinada institucionalización, los acuerdos sociales. Entiendo por tales acuerdos toda posibilidad, estable y regular, de organizar, y, por lo tanto, potenciar, empoderar, las capacidades de acción de los individuos. Mientras que el estado puede entenderse como una determinada respuesta a la construcción de una opinión y una voluntad comunes, la sociedad civil está compuesta por un gran número de instituciones que tienen lógicas diferentes y estructuras distintas y que responden, en cierta medida, al bien social que caracteriza cada una de las esferas en que podemos dividir la sociedad civil. La globalización ha significado, en gran medida, la recuperación de los recursos morales de acción, bastante olvidados bajo la sombra de los recursos jurídicos.

Este mayor protagonismo de las instituciones que componen la sociedad civil ha ido apareciendo recientemente en distintos enfoques de los teóricos de la democracia. Uno de los casos más claros es el de R. Dahl quien siempre ha defendido una participación horizontal, por ejemplo en las empresas, pero que recientemente da un giro a esta exigencia de participación ante la globalidad y complejidad de las relaciones económicas y sociales. Hasta el extremo de pedir

que se reoriente el control democrático en organizaciones internacionales hacia mayores y más claras *exigencias de publicidad*. Su preocupación es, textualmente:

Tenemos que obligar a las organizaciones a rendir cuentas, aunque no necesariamente a través del tipo de técnicas democráticas que hemos llegado a comprender para hacer que las élites políticas en nuestros países, incluso dentro de ciertas limitaciones, rindan cuentas, ¿Cómo podemos proporcionar un marco que asegure un cierto grado de correspondencia entre sus acciones y los intereses informados de sus poblaciones, si tuvieran la oportunidad de estar mejor informadas?¹⁵

El gran poder actual de las instituciones y su demanda de legitimidad fuerzan a la propia teoría democrática, a una propuesta de democracia radical en el caso del que habla, a dar más de sí. Esta ampliación no sólo es necesaria para la comprensión del papel que juegan las instituciones y la dimensión moral dentro de ellas, sino para hacer fructífera la propia teoría democrática.

Habermas mismo reclama, ante la insuficiencia del derecho ante conflictos globales, en concreto, de los estados-nación y de sus directos competidores, las corporaciones multinacionales, que: “una vía alternativa al abandono de la política (nacional) consistiría en que ésta -con la constitución de actores capaces de actuar internacionalmente- renazca en los mercados”¹⁶. Muchos años antes, en uno de sus primeros trabajos, *Historia y crítica de la opinión pública*, ya reclamaba “un proceso de comunicación formal conducido a través de la publicidad interna de las organizaciones”.

Pero esta opción será posteriormente rechazada, como sabemos, pues en los ámbitos donde se mueven intereses particulares y grupales no hay forma de actuar sino es desde la racionalidad sistémica. Con lo que Habermas se encuentra en un claro “quiero y no puedo”, pues ha dejado a las instituciones de la sociedad civil “fuera” de la lógica comunicativa, sin darse cuenta de que también en ellas, en su seno, juega un papel clave la “fuerza de producción” de la comunicación, como denomina lo que yo prefiero denominar recursos morales y que tienen que ver con la capacidad de convencerse y actuar conjuntamente que tienen los sujetos. Es evidente que el derecho es necesario

¹⁵ Dahl, R., «El futuro de la democracia», *Claves de la razón práctica*, 97 (Nov. 1999) 4-9; así como del mismo autor *Después de la revolución*, Gedisa, Barcelona 1994. Cfr. para esta exigencia interpretada desde el punto de vista kantiano, García-Marzá, D., «Kant's Principle of Publicity», *Kant-Studien. Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft*, 103 (2012) 96-113.

¹⁶ Habermas, J., *La inclusión del otro*, Paidós, Barcelona 1999.

para que la sociedad civil funcione, pero lo que también es evidente, desde el carácter global que hoy la sociedad civil, que no es suficiente.

Mi propuesta es avanzar los rasgos básicos de una ética de las instituciones que sea capaz de reconstruir, de mostrar, los presupuestos normativos que subyacen a todo tipo de instituciones, que sea capaz de dar razón de las condiciones de posibilidad de su sentido y razón de ser, en suma, de su legitimidad y de los presupuestos de la confianza depositada en ellas. Desde el momento en que las asociaciones, grupos y movimientos, adquieren una estabilidad y formalidad, con el establecimiento del correspondiente sentido, normas de funcionamiento y las obligaciones correspondientes, necesitan rendir cuentas de lo que hacen y caen dentro del paraguas de lo que aquí pretendemos defender como una ética de las instituciones. Desde esta importancia de las instituciones se puede avanzar en la idea de una estructuración institucional de la sociedad civil que dé razón de una sociedad civil global. Para este fin, debemos complementar los planteamientos neokantianos de Habermas con otros enfoques teóricos, como es el caso de *Las esferas de la justicia* de M. Walzer. Nuestro interés no es discutir ahora una determinada teoría de la justicia, sólo se centra en la idea de que existen esferas o ámbitos de acción donde las instituciones como el ejército, escuelas, asilos, hospitales, empresas, etc. Adquieren su sentido por el significado social que, normalmente de forma intuitiva, determina cada bien social. A cada uno de estos bienes (pertenencia, poder, honor, gracia, amor, dinero, etc.) le corresponden diversos agentes, diferentes procedimientos y, lo que es más importante, diversos criterios de distribución. De esta forma, la idea de las esferas nos ayuda a entender los criterios por los que de hecho la sociedad civil adquiere la forma institucional que tiene. El parentesco, la educación, la política, la economía, la sanidad, la cultura, la estratificación, ...constituyen así esferas o ámbitos de sentido. Pero Walzer nos llama la atención sobre un tema básico: no existe un observador independiente que clasifica externamente estos bienes. Nuestra propia identidad está ya formada en estas esferas y en sus instituciones¹⁷. Para estos análisis no cabe la figura del espectador imparcial. Las instituciones no actúan en un vacío social, sino que tienen un significado intrínsecamente relacionado con el bien social que proporcionan y que cualquier justificación de la institución, cualquier argumentación a favor o en contra de su pretensión de validez, tendrá que tener en cuenta este bien o fin social.

Desde esta reconstrucción del sentido de cada una de las prácticas es

¹⁷ Cfr. al respecto Walzer, M., *Esferas de la justicia*, F.C.E., 1993, p. 18.

posible recuperar ahora los conceptos básicos del enfoque deliberativo y entender la validez de todas las instituciones desde esta idea de la justificación pública de las premisas y condiciones de las definen. Tenemos ahora dos criterios que es necesario integrar: el bien social proporcionado y el marco establecido para la deliberación pública libre¹⁸. Esta relación entre legitimidad y justificación es la que nos interesa destacar e interesa sobre todo porque no hay ninguna razón para excluir a toda una serie de instituciones de esta exigencia de justificación pública y de búsqueda de un acuerdo. En todos los casos la deliberación trata de llegar a un consenso y busca para ello razones que sean convincentes para todos los implicados y afectados. Sólo que en el resto de la sociedad civil, las decisiones vinculan a aquellos que forman parte o están implicados por la organización y las condiciones desiguales deben encontrar su justificación en el bien social proporcionado.

No debemos dejar la aplicación de las ideas morales a la influencia de la opinión pública, ni al derecho o la política. Necesitamos que las instituciones de la sociedad civil, tanto desde su sentido como acuerdos sociales, como desde su concreción como organizaciones, respondan también del poder que tienen. Con una ética de las instituciones no estamos ante una teoría nueva, ni ninguna metodología específica. Se trata sólo de enfatizar una dimensión necesaria de la reflexión política, que consiste en pensar acerca de las condiciones de posibilidad del sentido que tienen las instituciones. Si somos capaces de explicitar este saber y mostrar las razones morales que conlleva, estaremos en posesión de una perspectiva crítica desde la que afrontar la transformación y mejora de nuestras instituciones.

No se trata de reproducir las exigencias de participación política dentro de las diferentes instituciones, de repetir los sistemas de elección y decisión por la regla de mayorías, en el seno de las organizaciones que componen la sociedad civil. Esto no es posible ni deseable, como muestran, por ejemplo, las experiencias fallidas de la democracia industrial¹⁹. Las instituciones son el esqueleto de las diferentes prácticas o esferas sociales, y la exigencia democrática de la participación debe mediar siempre con el sentido y la función social, el bien social, que aportan las instituciones.

Tampoco estamos diciendo que la responsabilidad de las instituciones comience y acabe en su contribución al poder político. Una ética de las

¹⁸ Cohen, J., «Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy», en Bohman, J. – Rehg, W., *Deliberative Democracy*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999, pp. 67-93, p. 72.

¹⁹ Cfr. al respecto García-Marzá, D., *Ética de la empresa: del diálogo a la confianza*, op. cit., p. 268.

instituciones se dirige más bien a las propias organizaciones como *ciudadanos corporativos* y aquello que nos interesa es su contribución *qua* instituciones, en suma, ayudar a explicitar las condiciones del acuerdo que las legitima como tales. Sin esta perspectiva es difícil, por no decir imposible, dar razón de la capacidad de crítica y transformación social de estas instituciones.

La tarea de una ética de las instituciones consistiría, entonces, en explicitar las razones morales que subyacen a la pretensión de legitimidad que acompaña a todo acuerdo institucional y, con él, a la credibilidad y confianza que requieren para el cumplimiento de su papel social. Dar razón, en definitiva, de la validez moral con la que se presentan las instituciones, como sistemas de normas que son. Desde estas razones se pueden construir criterios normativos que orienten el diseño y rediseño de instituciones.

Una ética de las instituciones no representa más que una dimensión clara y definida de una *ética pública* cuya tarea principal es la crítica y orientación de la acción pública, entendiendo ésta en su sentido más general como aquella en la que las consecuencias de las acciones afectan también a los demás. En este sentido, intenta reflexionar sobre la moralidad en el espacio de libertad que poseen las instituciones y en el que cual no podemos dejar de movernos. El objetivo: proponer principios para que el diseño de las instituciones responda a la exigencia moral de que éstas permitan que “las expectativas de comportamiento y los conflictos se regulen en interés de todos por igual”. Como hemos dicho, en todos aquellos campos que tengan consecuencias para los demás y que, por lo tanto, deben ser públicamente legitimados.

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LUÍS GARCÍA SOTO*

OTRA VISIÓN DE LA CIUDAD CLÁSICA¹

Another view on the classic city

Abstract

Aristotle's political work, especially in *The Constitution of the Athenians* and the *Politics*, sheds light on what can be seen as an uncommon view of Athenian democracy and of the classic city. Two points are particularly interesting in this approach: financial justice and social justice. Both forms of justice are significantly developed both in Athenian democracy and in Aristotle's approach. Financial justice and social justice are under-treated issues in the current studies in Aristotelian politics and justice. However, given the novel view of the «polis» they provide us with, namely that of the Athenian democracy, and because of their relevance for present times, it deserves much more attention than it currently receives.

Keywords: City; Democracy; Financial justice; Social justice; Aristotle.

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¹ Con título «Another view on the classic city», una versión algo más reducida y un poco menos matizada de este texto fue presentada en el congreso internacional Philosophy of the City 2017, Porto, 11-12-13 October, 2017. Presento ahora este texto en castellano, porque mi interpretación está basada en conceptos y términos tomados de la doctrina científica jurídica relativa al derecho financiero español.

Resumen

La obra política de Aristóteles, en especial la *Constitución de Atenas* y la *Política*, puede proporcionar otra visión acerca de la democracia ateniense y de la ciudad clásica. Dos asuntos resultan particularmente interesantes en esta indagación: la justicia tributaria y la justicia social. Ambas justicias conocen un significativo desarrollo tanto en la democracia ateniense como en la reflexión de Aristóteles. La justicia tributaria y la justicia social son temas poco tratados en los estudios sobre Aristóteles, su pensamiento jurídico y político. Sin embargo, porque ofrecen una visión nueva de la «polis», la ciudad clásica y, en concreto, de la democracia ateniense, así como por su relevancia para el tiempo presente y el mundo actual, merecen más atención de la que corrientemente reciben.

Palabras clave: Ciudad; Democracia; Justicia tributaria; Justicia social; Aristóteles.

Introducción: la justicia y el derecho

En nuestra opinión, leer la obra política de Aristóteles (es decir, la *Retórica*, la *Constitución de Atenas*, la *Política* y la *Ética a Nicómaco*) tomando como eje la justicia y el derecho puede arrojar alguna luz nueva sobre diversas cuestiones relativas a la «polis» y su gobierno, llegando a ofrecer un nuevo aspecto de la ciudad clásica y la democracia antigua². En este texto, vamos a fijarnos en detalles y tratar dos justicias, la tributaria y la social, presentes en la democracia ateniense³ y recogidas por Aristóteles. En resumen, vamos a hablar de justicia, pero sin olvidar el derecho. Por eso, partiremos de la *Const.At.*, tomando este texto como suelo o base de nuestras reflexiones.

Una precisión: la *Cons.At.* que nos legó Aristóteles⁴ no es un texto legal, sino una descripción de la historia, primero, y del presente, después, constitucionales atenienses, destacando esencialmente la morfología y el funcionamiento de las instituciones de la ciudad. En nuestra opinión, en este escrito hallamos el contexto jurídico-político en el que piensa y sobre el que piensa

² Cfr. García Soto, Luís, *Teoría de la justicia e idea del Derecho en Aristóteles*, Marcial Pons, Madrid-Barcelona-Buenos Aires 2011.

³ Cfr. Rodríguez Adrados, Francisco, *La Democracia ateniense*, Alianza, Madrid 1998.

⁴ «The Authorship of the *AP*», Keaney, John J., *The Composition of Aristotle's Athenaiion Politeia*, Oxford University Press, New York 1992, pp. 12-14. Keaney rubrica la autoría exclusiva de Aristóteles. Rhodes piensa que la redacción material puede deberse a un discípulo: «on the evidence which we have, Aristotle could have written this work himself, but I do not believe he did». Rhodes, Peter John, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983, p. 63.

el filósofo⁵. Sin duda, manejó otras referencias, pero la *Const.At.* contiene un paradigma de democracia realmente existente⁶. A nuestros efectos, tomaremos en consideración, fundamentalmente, la democracia vigente en el tiempo de Aristóteles, la democracia restaurada en 403 a.C., después de un período oligárquico. También nos referiremos a la primera democracia, instaurada en torno a 594 a.C. y que persiste hasta 411 a.C., pasando por diversos avatares.

1. La justicia tributaria

En la *Const.At.*, el sistema tributario no es objeto de una exposición sistemática, pero sí de múltiples referencias y alusiones, con lo que es posible, reconstructivamente, hacerse una idea general. De todos sus elementos, nos fijaremos en dos componentes fundamentales: los contribuyentes y los impuestos.

1.1. Los contribuyentes

Los contribuyentes son, primordialmente, los ciudadanos atenienses. Ahora bien, ya desde la primera democracia, los ciudadanos están censados, distribuidos en clases, según sus rentas.

Como es sabido, Solón distribuye a los ciudadanos, estableciendo un censo, según sus rentas, «en cuatro clases» (7/3). Para establecer cada clase, toma como referencia los «medimnos» que son, originariamente, medidas de la cosecha, que está en relación con la propiedad capaz de producirla (7/4). Las clases son:

⁵ Para Nagle, sin embargo, «when Aristotle spoke of *the* city-state and *the* household, he was not basing his generalizations on a single city such as Athens, but on the actual universe of *poleis*, all 1500 of them, stretching, as Plato said, from Phasis in Georgia to the Pillars of Heracles at the western end of the Mediterranean» (Nagle, D. Brendan, *The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle's Polis*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2006, p. IX). En concreto, contrapone «Aphytis versus Athens». Nagle, D. Brendan, *The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle's Polis*, op. cit., pp. 53-58 y 74-75.

⁶ Según Strauss, el filósofo veía en la democracia ateniense una forma extrema o popular. Strauss, Barry S., «On Aristotle's Critique of Athenian Democracy», in C. Lord - D.K O'Connor. (eds.), *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1991, pp. 212-233. En el mismo sentido: Samaranch, Francisco, *Cuatro ensayos sobre Aristóteles. Política y ética; metafísica*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Madrid 1991, pp. 273-288. No compartimos esas visiones: a nuestro entender, el estagirita sería a fin de cuentas un crítico constructivo de la democracia: Soto, *Teoría de la justicia e idea del Derecho en Aristóteles*, op. cit., pp. 390-394.

- 1) «pentacosimedimnos» (500 medimnos o más);
- 2) «triacosimedimnos» o caballeros (desde 300 medimnos y hasta 500);
- 3) labradores (desde 200 medimnos y hasta 300);
- 4) y operarios o jornaleros (menos de 200 medimnos).

Esta clasificación refleja los impuestos, la cantidad, que cada clase de ciudadano pagaba a la ciudad (7/4); y, correlativamente, determina el acceso de cada clase a las magistraturas⁷. Los operarios o asalariados «no participaban de ninguna» (7/4), «excepto formar parte de la asamblea y de los tribunales» (7/3). Esta restricción desaparecerá posteriormente, al desarrollarse —y ampliarse— la democracia.

La misma clasificación cuatripartita se encuentra en la democracia restaurada, pues, en la constitución de los tiempos de Aristóteles, esa ley de Solón «está aún vigente» (47/1). En algún caso, sin embargo, parece más virtual que real, ya que: los tesoreros de Atenea son elegidos por sorteo entre los de la clase de los 500 medimnos y el designado desempeña el cargo «aunque sea muy pobre» (47/1). En nuestra opinión, este «muy pobre» hay que entenderlo, no en absoluto, sino relativamente: es «pobre» con relación a su clase (la «alta»). Lo que refleja esta situación es, por lo tanto, una desactualización del censo. Sobre la necesidad de revisarlo y actualizarlo incide el estagirita en la *Pol.*, en V/8, recordando la consiguiente necesidad de modificar, correlativamente, «las tributaciones (τὰ τὶ μέρητα)» (1308b3-4).

En esta época, sin ser ciudadanos, también pagan impuestos los extranjeros residentes en Atenas. Los hay de dos clases: «metecos e isóteles» (58/2).

Los metecos gozaban de algunos derechos, para lo que, además de satisfacer la «tasa de extranjeros (τὸ μετοίκιον)», debían pagar algunos impuestos y hacer el servicio militar, estando en su actuación jurídica y política representados por un patrón. Los isóteles, por su parte, estaban exentos de la tasa de extranjeros, pagaban impuestos iguales (a los ciudadanos)⁸ y no tenían las limitaciones de los metecos, en cuanto a la representación jurídica y política.

En algunas épocas de la historia de Atenas, también tenían que devengar «tributos» sus aliados, las ciudades que estaban bajo su hegemonía. Otras veces, les correspondió pagarlos a los atenienses, por ejemplo, a la Liga del Peloponeso, hegemonizada por Lacedemonia, en los primeros tiempos de la

⁷ Miller, Fred D. Jr., *Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, pp. 154-155.

⁸ De ahí, su nombre: isóteles, literalmente, iguales (en) impuestos.

restauración de la democracia. Así: los de Eleusis han de «contribuir con sus rentas al tesoro confederal como los demás atenienses» (39/2).

Ahora bien, además de impuestos directos, había impuestos indirectos. Así, por ejemplo, en la *Cons.At.* se menciona una «contribución», que grava el comercio de mercancías (en concreto, de granos). Expresamente, Aristóteles consigna una magistratura, los «diez inspectores del puerto de comercio», que se encargan de que, del grano que entre por mar, los mercaderes entreguen «los dos tercios a la ciudad» (51/4). Esta contribución recae, indistintamente, sobre ciudadanos y extranjeros. En otros textos, encontramos numerosos impuestos, tasas, que afectan al tráfico y consumo de bienes.

1.2. Los impuestos

Al hilo de los ya mencionados, podemos ahora aproximarnos a los diferentes impuestos.

En primer lugar, tenemos la distinción, ya señalada, entre «impuestos» y «tributos», según recaigan sobre la propia ciudad o sobre otras ciudades. Estos aparecen más tarde, cuando Atenas consigue la supremacía marítima: según Aristóteles, tres años después de la victoria de Salamina, se fijan los primeros «tributos» a las ciudades aliadas (23/5). En resumen, los «tributos (phóroi)» eran las aportaciones en dinero o en naves, que debían hacer los miembros (las ciudades) de la confederación. Podían, por tanto, consistir en una aportación dineraria o en una «contribución (sintaxis)» en especie. Por otra parte, los «impuestos (téle)» eran las diferentes imposiciones que había que satisfacer en el ámbito de la ciudad.

Ahora bien, dentro de los «impuestos» cabe distinguir diferentes clases: tributaciones, tasas, contribuciones y cargas.

Llamamos «tributaciones» a aquellas aportaciones dinerarias que los ciudadanos, según sus rentas, censitariamente establecidas, tenían que hacer a la ciudad. De este tipo, similar a estas tributaciones, es la tasa que, como extranjeros, deben satisfacer los metecos. Existía también, para circunstancias especiales, un impuesto directo extraordinario, la «eisphorá», que como las tributaciones tiene carácter proporcional (y solo rara vez es progresivo)⁹. Los operarios, que constituían la clase baja, estaban excluidos. Los metecos también estaban sujetos a la «eisphorá» con una cantidad específica.

⁹ Es la opinión de Vial, que proporciona una buena (sintética, mas con detalle) información sobre la «eisphorá». Vial, Claude, *Léxico de la antigüedad griega*, trad. cast. Mauro Armiño, Taurus, Madrid 1983, pp. 86-87. Es valiosa, asimismo, su información sobre el sistema tributario.

Luego, eran numerosas las «tasas», de naturaleza dineraria, impuestas y recaudadas en la ciudad. Principalmente, tenían que ver con el tráfico, la circulación y el consumo de bienes. Las hay sobre el comercio, fundamentalmente la importación y la exportación, sobre derechos de ventas, por ejemplo en el ágora, sobre ventas y alquileres de inmuebles, sobre variadas actividades económicas,... etc. Apenas aparecen en la *Cons.At.*, siendo en la *Pol.* apuntadas o aludidas, de paso, veces varias.

Después, las «contribuciones» serían pagos en especie, consistentes en entregar al fisco una parte del producto que se obtiene o con el que se trafica. En la *Cons.At.*, además del marco general en la democracia vigente (47/2), encontramos tres ejemplos concretos. El primero es el «diezmo» introducido por Pisístrato (tirano en la época de la primera democracia), que percibía una décima parte de los productos de las tierras (16/4). Otro ejemplo, ya mencionado y en la democracia vigente, es la entrega de 2/3 en las importaciones de granos (51/4). En este caso, como en el anterior y en general, la ciudad podía bien almacenar bien vender el producto, ingresando el dinero correspondiente. El tercer ejemplo, también en la misma época democrática, es el «aceite de los atletas» (60/2). Este aceite procede de los olivos sagrados. Los propietarios de las tierras, en las que están esos olivos, han de entregar una cantidad de aceite, primero variable, según el número de troncos, y posteriormente fija, según la heredad. El arconte recoge el aceite del año, lo entrega a los tesoreros y estos, en su momento, a los árbitros que, a su vez, se lo darán a los vencedores.

Finalmente, las «cargas (leitourgíai)» consisten en el desempeño de funciones y/o en la realización de servicios públicos. Las cargas recaían solo sobre los ricos: es decir, sobre la clase alta y, a veces, solo sobre algunos de sus miembros (los más ricos). Aunque indirectamente es posible señalar alguna más, en la *Cons.At.*, aparecen fundamentalmente dos cargas: la «coreguía (khoregía)» y la «trierarquía (trierarkhía)». En la *Pol.* figuran otras más. La «coreguía» consiste en costear los ensayos y el vestuario de los coros de música y baile, en las ceremonias culturales y en los concursos dramáticos (54/8). Las «coreguías» afectan a la clase alta¹⁰. Luego, la «trierarquía» es una carga consistente en correr con los gastos de equipamiento (y/o mantenimiento) de una trirreme, dotándola de armamento y tripulación (52/2). Debían cumplirla los ricos, dotando entre dos una trirreme. Había otras cargas relativas a reuniones y banquetes públicos, recepciones y embajadas,

¹⁰ Coreguía y buen uso de la propiedad: Frank, Jill, *A Democracy of Distinction. Aristotle and the Work of Politics*, The University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp. 58-64.

etc. Una carga singular era la «proeisphorá», consistente en el adelanto de la «eisphorá», que debían hacer los 300 más ricos (que, posteriormente, recibirían lo desembolsado, tras el pago hecho por los contribuyentes).

1.3. El sistema tributario

En fin, como se puede apreciar tras este repaso sumario de estos elementos nucleares del sistema tributario, los contribuyentes y los impuestos, el empleo sistemático de la proporcionalidad en la imposición, tiene como consecuencia la progresividad del sistema en su conjunto.

Por otra parte, este sistema tributario, en gran medida, es producto del ejercicio de la potestad de auto-imposición que detentan los ciudadanos.

En efecto, según vemos en la *Const.At.*, los impuestos eran establecidos por ley o por decreto, interviniendo, en uno y otro caso, el consejo y la asamblea¹¹. Por ejemplo, las tributaciones según el censo introducidas por Solón aparecen como establecidas por una ley. Por otra parte, en la democracia, y especialmente en la vigente, el procedimiento habitual, en el gobierno general y en la actividad legislativa, era el decreto. Según Aristóteles, en aquel entonces el pueblo se hizo dueño del poder: se convirtió en dueño de todas las cosas, gobernando por votaciones de decretos¹² y por su soberanía en los tribunales (41/2). En fin, cabe pensar, también, que para la suspensión y la eliminación de los impuestos el procedimiento sería similar.

Una buena muestra de este procedimiento, y en concreto del necesario paso por la asamblea, la encontramos en la *Ret.*, donde, en I/4, los «ingresos fiscales» aparecen entre los asuntos «sobre los que todos deliberan», junto con «la guerra y la paz, la custodia del país, las importaciones y exportaciones y,

¹¹ En ambos casos suelen intervenir el consejo y la asamblea: los decretos, propuestos por el consejo, son aprobados por la asamblea; las leyes, que además de por el consejo pueden ser propuestas por cualquier ciudadano, son presentadas a la asamblea, que elige, de entre los jueces, una comisión de «nomótetas», encargados de aprobarla o rechazarla. Posteriormente, deberá pasar el control de legalidad que realizan unos magistrados específicos, los «tesmótetas» (59/2). Los decretos también están sujetos al control de legalidad de los tesmótetas: si no lo pasan, son reenviados a la asamblea que los somete al escrutinio de los nomótetas que serán elegidos a tal efecto.

¹² «Ahora bien, la idea —latente en esta crítica— de una sustitución de las leyes por decretos y de una inmediatez sin solución de continuidad entre decreto de la Asamblea Popular —siempre sospechosa de veleidades irresponsables— y su efectividad ejecutiva, no parece históricamente sostenible». Samaranch, *Cuatro ensayos sobre Aristóteles*, op. cit., pp. 247-248. No suscribimos esta lectura: en ese mismo pasaje el estagirita refrenda el proceder democrático, explícitamente en lo que toca a los tribunales (41/2); por lo que vemos en la *Const.At.*, a pesar de las lagunas y/u omisiones, la democracia vigente no sustituye las leyes por decretos y estos ni son elaborados por la asamblea ni, una vez aprobados por esta, son aplicados inmediatamente sino sometidos a la supervisión de los tesmótetas (59/2).

por último, la legislación» (1359b21-23). Esta enumeración no pretende ser exhaustiva, pero los asuntos mencionados coinciden, grandemente, con los que Aristóteles en la *Pol.*, en III/11, señala como «aquellos más importantes» en los que «es justo que sea soberana la masa» (1282a38).

1.4. Justicia tributaria, justicia política y justicia distributiva

Pues bien, a este ordenamiento tributario, caracterizado por la proporcionalidad y la auto-imposición, se atiende Aristóteles. Las puntualizaciones que hace, eminentemente en la *Pol.*, unas críticas y otras constructivas, tienen como objetivo corregir o completar, en suma, perfeccionar este sistema. Su concepción general de la justicia tributaria está contenida, mayormente implícita, en sus formulaciones, en la *Pol.*, de la justicia política¹³ y, en la *Étc. Nic.*, de la justicia distributiva¹⁴. a la luz de estos textos, es posible además abordar el curso (o vida) de los impuestos (atribución y exenciones, percepción y gestión, incumplimiento y sanción), así como ahondar en la justicia tributaria (fundamento de la imposición, criterio de la imposición, límite de la imposición, legalidad y generalidad)¹⁵.

2. La justicia social

Según vemos en la *Const.At.*, el gasto público varía sustancialmente de la democracia a la oligarquía y tampoco es exactamente igual en el primero y en el segundo períodos democráticos. Originariamente, en el orden antiguo, el destino de los fondos públicos, es decir, aquellos dineros ingresados que no pasaban a engrosar los patrimonios particulares de los gobernantes, lo debían de constituir fines religiosos y militares.

¹³ En especial, lo referido a los «fines de la ciudad» y las «finalidades de los regímenes». Soto, *Teoría de la justicia e idea del Derecho en Aristóteles*, op. cit., pp. 239-246.

¹⁴ Es importante destacar que lo repartible, según se registra allí (en V/3), no son solo «bienes», sino también «males». Consiguientemente, el criterio señalado es aplicable al reparto «de lo bueno» (1131b20) y «de lo malo» (1131b21). Ahí, por tanto, entrarían los impuestos.

¹⁵ Soto, *Teoría de la justicia e idea del Derecho en Aristóteles*, op. cit., pp. 444-447 y 450-458.

2.1. El gasto público

En la primera democracia, en la época de la hegemonía ateniense, según informa Aristóteles, los impuestos y tributos mantienen las instituciones y funcionarios de la ciudad: en efecto, «de los tributos y de los impuestos y de los aliados, más de veinte mil hombres se mantenían» (24/3). Y, un poco más adelante, todavía precisa esos más de 20.000 mantenidos: jueces, magistrados, ejército, guardas,... huérfanos de militares (hasta su mayoría de edad) y el Pritaneo (que es una institución que reúne notables, gentes que prestaron algún servicio o contribución destacables a la ciudad). Pues bien, «de todos estos, la manutención era a expensas de las rentas —o fondos— de la comunidad» (24/3). En cuanto a los números, el estagirita habla de unos 1.200 magistrados y unos 6.000 jueces. Pericles fue quien introdujo la «retribución de los tribunales» (27/3). Antes, gobernando Cimón, habían sido parcialmente eliminadas las restricciones censitarias que limitaban el acceso a las magistraturas (26/2).

Durante la oligarquía, que abarca algo menos de unos 10 años, las magistraturas, según se desprende de la *Cons.At.*, dejaron de estar retribuidas. Se toma la medida por razones bélicas, estableciéndose que «el dinero recaudado no podría gastarse en otra cosa que en la guerra, las magistraturas se desempeñarán todas sin sueldo mientras dure la guerra, excepto los nueve arcontes y los pritaneos; estos cobrarían... » (29/5). Sin embargo, la medida parece mantenerse durante todo el período oligárquico, con los Cuatrocientos y con los Treinta. Concretamente, Aristóteles destaca que no tienen sueldo: los miembros del consejo (y probablemente los demás magistrados), hablando de los Cuatrocientos (30/2); y ninguna de las magistraturas, hablando de los Cinco Mil (33/1). En este período, la hegemonía pasó de Atenas a Esparta. De hecho, Atenas, que había cobrado tributos de sus aliados, comenzará la andadura de la segunda democracia, a finales del siglo V a.C., contribuyendo al tesoro confederal de la Liga del Peloponeso, bajo la hegemonía de Esparta.

Con la restauración de la democracia, las magistraturas vuelven a ser retribuidas, constituyendo, como en la primera democracia, un capítulo fundamental en el gasto público. Ahora, además, se señala un salario a la asamblea: primero «dos óbolos», después «tres óbolos» (41/3). Algo más tarde, según la constitución existente en vida de Aristóteles, esta retribución aumenta, pues, en las asambleas, el pueblo recibe sueldo: «una dracma en todas, nueve óbolos en la principal» (62/2). En esta época, existen pocas restricciones censitarias para el acceso a las magistraturas. La inmensa mayoría son elegidas por sorteo

(aunque, algunas veces, el procedimiento incluye una pre-selección hecha por votación), contándose las relativas a la guerra entre las pocas magistraturas provistas por votación (43/1). Existe una gran movilidad porque solo las magistraturas militares pueden desempeñarse varias veces, pero no ninguna de las demás, excepto ser miembro del consejo que, con duración anual, se puede ser dos veces (62/3). No olvidemos, además, que los tribunales, de participación multitudinaria, también son retribuidos: «tres óbolos» (62/2). Es elevado, por lo tanto, el número de ciudadanos que, en un momento u otro, se beneficia directamente de los dineros públicos. En nuestra opinión, cabe calificar este gasto como social.

2.2. El gasto social

Ahora bien, la segunda democracia fue más lejos que la primera en el gasto social. En primer lugar, amplió la cobertura, además de a los huérfanos, a los inútiles y finalmente a los pobres. Así, Aristóteles registra que: «hay una ley que dispone que los que poseen menos de tres minas y están impedidos físicamente para el trabajo, sean examinados por el consejo y que les sean concedidos, a cuenta del fisco, dos óbolos diarios a cada uno como alimento» (49/4). De hecho, según consta en la *Pol.*, esta asistencia abarcaba, no solo a los impedidos, sino, en general, a los pobres. E incluso, en segundo lugar, había un fondo público destinado a subvencionar la asistencia de los pobres a los espectáculos. Es «el dinero de las fiestas (τὸ θεωρικὸν)» (43/1). Es probable que esta subvención hubiese empezado con Cleofonte, en los últimos tiempos de la primera democracia (28/3). Ahora bien, en ese pasaje, no consta más que Cleofonte fue el primero en proporcionar «los dos óbolos». Por eso, es también muy posible que tal asignación, dos óbolos, tuviese una finalidad completamente diferente (probablemente, socorrer las penalidades de los más pobres).

Pues bien, Aristóteles, aunque sí hace objeciones y enmiendas puntuales, no cuestiona esta orientación social del gasto público. Es más, con sus críticas y propuestas, Aristóteles radicaliza la política social practicable por la ciudad, ampliando sus objetivos y, con eso, sus beneficiarios. De sus numerosas intervenciones puntuales, críticas y constructivas, encontramos dos, ambas en la *Pol.*, que, a nuestro entender, resultan, al respecto, enormemente significativas. Versan: una, en VI/5, sobre la pobreza; y, otra, en VIII/1, sobre

la educación.¹⁶ En ambos casos, se le señala a la ciudad un papel consonante con las finalidades constitucionales, que en la concepción aristotélica, ha de tener el mejor régimen: la paz, el ocio, la beneficencia (*Pol.*, VII/13-14-15).

2.3. Sobre la pobreza (contra), sobre la educación (pro)

Con respecto a la pobreza, en la *Pol.*, en VI/5, Aristóteles comienza censurando la solución que, ateniéndose al espíritu de lo previsto en la *Const.At.* (en 49/4), dan los demagogos al problema. A su entender, dicha solución, repartir dinero, es mala en dos sentidos: para la pobreza, pues palia la situación, pero no soluciona el problema; y para la democracia, pues la existencia de pobreza perjudica al régimen. En sus palabras, «no debe hacerse lo que actualmente hacen los demagogos», pues estos «distribuyen el excedente, y los pobres reciben y vuelven a necesitar» (1320a29-31). Esto es, según dice muy gráficamente, como pretender llenar una barrica agujereada. Además, que «la multitud —el pueblo, la masa—» sea pobre es «causa de que sea mala la democracia» (1320a33-35).

Alternativamente, Aristóteles estima que las «rentas públicas» deben destinarse a la creación de trabajo para los «pobres», implicando en eso también a los «ricos» (1320a36-38). Según él, «hay que discurrir los medios de dar —al pueblo— una posición acomodada permanente» (1320a35). En concreto, habla de ayudar, a los pobres, a «adquirir algún terreno» o, si no, a «emprender el comercio o la agricultura» (1320a38-1320b1). Es preciso, pues, variar la política financiera, reorientando el gasto público. Pero también es necesario, para contar con suficientes recursos y/o lograr esos objetivos, introducir las oportunas medidas de política fiscal, bien modificando las cargas sobre los ricos, bien recurriendo a incentivos extrafiscales. En suma, de lo que se trata es de «dar a los pobres los medios necesarios, orientándolos para algún trabajo» (1320b8-9).

Ahora bien, el programa aristotélico proyecta una acción social¹⁷ que,

¹⁶ Propuestas aún actuales sobre la (necesidad de la) educación pública, al decir de Curren, en Estados Unidos. Curren, Randall R., *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2000, pp. 7-8 y 183-221.

¹⁷ Una opinión diferente: «A further shortcoming of Aristotle's theory is that he has overlooked an important reason for regarding one social class, or certain of its members, as more worthy of consideration than others, i.e., need. [...] he has nothing to say on hardship, which constitutes a sound enough for according a person or a whole group of people the right of preferential consideration», Leyden, W. von, *Aristotle on Equality and Justice. His Political Argument*, Macmillan, London 1985, p. 57.

además del combate a la pobreza, incluye entre las incumbencias de la ciudad la labor de educación. En su opinión, competería a los poderes públicos, entonces, la organización, e incluso la gestión (mas esta no necesariamente en exclusiva), de un sistema educativo.

Significativamente, en la *Pol.*, en VIII/1, el estagirita, tras insistir en la importancia de la educación¹⁸ sea cual sea el régimen, dice¹⁹: «puesto que toda ciudad tiene un solo fin, está claro que también la educación tiene que ser una y la misma para todos los ciudadanos, y que el cuidado de ella debe ser cosa de la comunidad y no privada, como lo es en estos tiempos en que cada uno se cuida privadamente de sus propios hijos y les da la instrucción particular que le parece» (1337a21-26). Y aun, después de alabar en este aspecto —en su política educativa— a los lacedemonios²⁰, concluye sentando «que la educación debe ser regulada por la legislación y que concierne a la ciudad» (1337a33-34).

2.4. Justicia social, justicia política y justicia distributiva

Esta propuesta sobre la educación²¹, con la anterior sobre la pobreza, integra un programa de justicia social que, además de incardinado en el marco constitucional ateniense y en general en el contexto heleno, viene a concordar con la concepción aristotélica de las finalidades constitucionales: la paz, el ocio, la beneficencia²².

En resumidas cuentas, la orientación social del gasto público, el combate y la eliminación de la pobreza y la regulación y el establecimiento de una educación pública representan tres importantes vectores en el desarrollo de una justicia social. Correspondería a la justicia política y a la justicia distributiva, en los términos de Aristóteles, la confección e implementación de tal programa.

¹⁸ Vide «Conclusion. Éducation, morale et politique» en Bodéüs, Richard, *Le philosophe et la cité. Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d'Aristote*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1982, pp. 221-225.

¹⁹ Vide Curren, *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education*, op. cit., pp. 79-92.

²⁰ En la *Étic.Nic.* (en V/2), Aristóteles alaba la ciudad de Esparta (antes también a Creta, en I/13) por haber legislado sobre la educación, estableciendo un sistema público, una educación estatal. Como en la *Pol.*, lo que valora es el hecho de haber recurrido a las leyes para desarrollar —mejorar, perfeccionar— moralmente al individuo y políticamente a la colectividad. Sin embargo, como sabemos por la *Pol.*, rechaza la educación espartana (1333b8-10, 1333b37-38, 1334a4-5).

²¹ Lord, Carnes, «Politics and Education in Aristotle's *Politics*», in G. Patzig (ed.), *Aristoteles' «Politik»*, Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1990, pp. 202-215). Cfr. «Comments on C. Lord» (Rees, D.A., «Comments on C. Lord», in Patzig, G. (ed.), *Aristoteles' «Politik»*, op. cit., pp. 216-219).

²² Expresamente: *Pol.* 1333a30-39.

Algunas conclusiones

Terminamos así, y aquí, este breve recorrido por la justicia tributaria y la justicia social en Aristóteles, cuestiones poco o nada tratadas, pero que, en nuestra opinión, arrojan luces nuevas y abren otras perspectivas en la visión de la ciudad clásica, en concreto, de la democracia ateniense, y en la lectura y la interpretación de la filosofía política del estagirita. Cabe apuntar, al menos, algunas conclusiones.

En primer lugar, la democracia ateniense, una de las formas de la ciudad clásica, aparece, a la luz de la filosofía de Aristóteles, como una democracia social. Como una especie de democracia social, que, a pesar de sus limitaciones²³, resulta iluminadora en el panorama occidental contemporáneo, esencialmente democrático.

En segundo lugar, esa democracia social está informada, vertebrada, por una concepción compleja de la justicia, de la cual la justicia tributaria y la justicia social son dos componentes y dos derivaciones. Ambas traducen en hechos principios generales de justicia, expresos, en la formulación aristotélica, sobre todo en la justicia política y en la justicia distributiva.

En tercer lugar, el derecho, como ordenamiento en funcionamiento, es parte esencial en la existencia y realización de la justicia y de la democracia.

En cuarto, y último, lugar, cabe leer a Aristóteles como un pensador de la democracia. Como mínimo: la filosofía política del estagirita proporciona, como tema central suyo, un pensamiento de la democracia, de interés para la reflexión, no solo occidental, contemporánea.

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²³ Por ejemplo: patriarcado, esclavismo,... y no solo. Por nuestra parte, asumimos una perspectiva crítica: García Soto, *Teoría de la justicia e idea del Derecho en Aristóteles*, op. cit., pp. 382-385.

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JOSÉ LUÍS ALMEIDA GONÇALVES*

THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION INSIDE THE CITY

Abstract

The urbanization of the world has placed the whole world, in its diversity, more within the realm of the city. Having acknowledged the need to recognize this diversity, the recent debate over the importance, content, political, economic, social and cultural role of the notion of recognition has crystallized around a double challenge: either as a problem of the material redistribution of goods by all subjects (Fraser), or as the active respect for particular identities of sociocultural minorities (Taylor). However, the intensification of the phenomenon of human mobility has created a third invisible social subject in the public space: those excluded from stable and rewarding social relationships such as the homeless, the undocumented or the unemployed. These three types of collective subjects have different objectives and social bases, and the public space is today the scene of multiple «struggles for recognition» (Honneth), respectively, economic struggle, identity struggle and struggle for relationship (Renault). We intend to analyse these three social movements within the dynamics of coexistence in the city and the impacts that they exert

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on it, and critically reflect on whether and how they contribute to the construction of the common good, viewed from the perspective of «common purposes» (Taylor) and «societal goals» (Honneth).

Key-words: Recognition; Common purposes; Societal goals.

Luta por reconhecimento no interior da cidade

Resumo

A urbanização do mundo fez com que o mundo todo, na sua diversidade, esteja agora contido na cidade. Havendo necessidade de reconhecer essa diversidade, o debate nas últimas décadas sobre a importância, o conteúdo e a função política, económica, social e cultural da noção de «reconhecimento» cristalizou-se em torno de um duplo desafio: ora como problema de redistribuição material de bens por todos os sujeitos (N. Fraser) ora como respeito ativo pelas identidades socioculturais minoritárias (Ch. Taylor). No entanto, a intensificação do fenómeno da mobilidade humana fez emergir um terceiro sujeito social invisível no espaço público: os excluídos das relações sociais estáveis e gratificantes como os sem-abrigo, os indocumentados ou os desempregados. Constatando-se que estes três tipos de sujeitos coletivos têm objetivos e bases sociais diferenciados, o espaço público é, hoje, palco de múltiplas «lutas por reconhecimento» (A. Honneth), respetivamente, luta económica, luta identitária e luta por relação (A. Renault). Propomo-nos analisar estes três movimentos sociais no interior das dinâmicas de convivência na cidade e os impactos que sobre ela exercem e refletir criticamente se e como contribuem para a construção do bem comum, perspectivado este na ótica de «propósitos comuns» (Ch. Taylor) e «objetivos sociais» (A. Honneth).

Palavras-chave: Reconhecimento; Propósitos comuns; Objetivos sociais.

1. The urbanization of the world and recognition of difference

Historically, one of the principal means for the edification of cities consisted in the possibility that, in being protected by walls, it could delimitate us from them, order from barbarism, friend from enemy. The «urbanization of the world»¹ that occurred in the past one hundred years has inverted this millenary trend: the whole world in its diversity is now contained within the city. Migrants and outsiders converged to the city, and in its streets we find roaming strangers mingling with friends. The public space is elevated to a symbol of urban life into which the strangers and the anonymous now con-

¹ Augé, Marc, *Pour une anthropologie de la mobilité*, Manuels Payot, Paris 2009.

verge. The public space is, henceforth, ambivalent: simultaneously a place for risk and synonymous with the vulnerability of the urban condition, as well as a laboratory for learning to live within the difference.

Quoting Z. Bauman, «to live in the city means to live in company, in the company of strangers»². Living together in the city means that one has to organize the relations of proximity-distance that one wishes to cultivate, and that polarity is measured, above all, through a psychosocial and cultural construction³. The city is therefore bound to draw certain physical and symbolical boundaries between people. As Marc Augé warns, these sociocultural dynamics often become hostage to certain abscesses of territorial or ideological fixation expressed in the traditional spatial division: «with the emergence of a human world which is, in a conscious way, at the same extension of the whole planet, it's like if we felt the need to organize ourselves, going back to the old spatial divisions (boundaries, cultures, identities) that up until now were always an active source of confrontation and violence»⁴.

On the other side, the transformations that occurred in the past decades in all spheres of public, private and even intimate life have configured a true paradigm change in the sociability relations that weave the links that feed the reasons of life in common, especially in the city. We were faced with a crisis of the social bond that reached its climax with the «individualized individual», using the term by François de Singly⁵ and which has evolved in two distinct stages: in a first modernity, the socio-historical struggles have allowed for the generation of a emancipatory process of the individual - understood as distancing from its origins - , by affirming the equality of all members of a given society; the second modernity, resulting from a progressive complexification of the constitutive dimensions of the identity, has clearly invested in a personal differentiation of the subject in the public space, with the nature of the social links now emerging as if weaved by the plurality of the difference. The crisis of the social bond results, in great measure, from this complexification of the identities, raising the tension within the public space to a new contemporary challenge that can be formulated in the following way: how to articulate the guarantees of justice and social equality with the intersubjective

² Bauman, Zygmunt, *Confiança e Medo na Cidade*, Relógio d'Água Editores, Lisboa 2004, p. 71.

³ Cf. Hall, Edward T., *The Hidden Dimension*, Garden City, N.Y Doubleday 1966.

⁴ Augé, *Pour une anthropologie de la mobilité*, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵ Singly, François de, «L'Explosion du lien social», in *Laços Familiares e Sociais*, Psico&Soma, Viseu 2011, pp. 59-68.

recognition that will highlight the singularity of each individual?

The idea of singularity applied to this context is the one espoused by F. Guattari: «singularity is [above all] an existential concept; identity, on the other hand, is a referential concept, from a circumstance of reality to reference frameworks, frameworks which can be imaginary»⁶. Therefore, while identity here refers to an «awareness» [*Erkennen*] of the Other in the sense used by Axel Honneth⁷, the singularity aggregates the personalizing elements of the subject and configures an approximation to the conditions of a possibility for recognition [*Anerkennen*], also in the sense employed by A. Honneth.

2. Political responses in the face of diversity

To face the emergence of the Other diverse in the interior of the cities, the political debates and the social movements of the past decades brought about the concept of «recognition» in many of its dimensions: from the multicultural to feminism and the rights of minorities, the same normative idea is underlying - the individuals and social groups wish to see their difference recognized and respected. The experiences of disrespect for people and groups in the public space have been provoking a reflection on the anthropological meanings of the ongoing social changes inside western societies as well as the aspiration of seeing their difference legally recognized in the relations of reciprocal recognition. These phenomena of disrespect alert us to the urgent need of affirming that the moral quality of the social relations cannot be measured by the distributive material justice alone but must integrate, in a decisive way, the conceptions about how the subjects will constitute, relate, reconfigure and recognize themselves and the others, in their personal and group identity within the public space.

The socio-political framing of this phenomenon makes us realise that, if modern societies of the 20th century faced the challenge of articulating the exercise of the citizens public liberties with the reduction of inequalities, in the past few decades, and due to the ongoing sociocultural mutations, this aspiration has been identified with the need to regulate/promote diversity; diversity here understood as both an active respect for particular sociocultural identi-

⁶ Guattari, Felix - Rolnik, Suely, *Micropolítica: cartografias do desejo*, Vozes, Petrópolis 1986, p. 68.

⁷ Honneth, Axel, *Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2003.

ties, and also a problem of moral and material exclusion of certain subject(s) from the public space. And if the ideas of liberty and equality plunge their roots in the Age of Enlightenment, the awareness of diversity has been taking place at the cost of a latent conflict emerging from the claims of persons and groups in the public space, with considerable ethical repercussions and of anthropological outlines that lack an adequate problematization, but is already object of treatment in the context of Political Philosophy, through Rawls' *Theory of Justice* and Habermas' *Deliberative Democracy*, and of Social Philosophy, through the proposals of Honneth's *Critical Theory of the Struggle for Recognition*, or the *Recognition Policy* postulated by Taylor.

3. A Justice crisis and the recognition challenge

Yet, political philosophy in the past decades has known substantial changes since the times in which a social democratic conception of political life was still prevalent in Europe, and in the Anglo-Saxon world John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* was being developed. Though different, a common utopia bounded these political theories: that it was paramount to eliminate the social inequalities resulting from the economic differences between members of the same society to achieve social peace. The unifying idea was that of Justice. That perspective began to change in the late 1980's with the resurgence of the economic-financial sphere and its progressive deregulation, corresponding this dynamic to a phase of expansion of the individualist autonomy of the modern subject⁸.

This change can be translated into a new political ideal: replacing the elimination of inequalities, as an economic struggle, efforts are undertaken towards an identity struggle. The central categories of this new vision are no longer the equitable distribution or the equality of goods, rather dignity and respect. Nancy Fraser⁹ describes this transition with the movement from the idea of «redistribution» [connected to the idea of justice and the distribution of goods that will guarantee freedom] to that of «recognition» [defines the conditions of a just society through the goal of recognizing the dignity and integrity of the individual]. Seen in a positive light, this change could mean

⁸ Cfr. Honneth, Axel - Fraser, Nancy, *Umverteilung oder Anerkennung?*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2003.

⁹ Fraser, Nancy, «From redistribution to recognition? Dilemmas of justice in a 'post-socialist' age», *New Left Review*, 1/212, (July-August 1995).

an increase in the citizens' moral sensibility: aware of the political value of the experience of social or cultural contempt, the recognition of the dignity and singularity of persons or groups constitutes a key element of the new concept of justice.

4. The mobility that forces exclusion challenges the current recognition models

The intensification of the phenomenon of human mobility led to the emergence of a third invisible social subject in the public space: the excluded from stable and gratifying social and political relations as the homeless, the undocumented or the unemployed. Trying to understand this phenomenon, G. Simmel¹⁰ said, more than a century ago, that mobility constitutes a powerful element for the social, cultural and spatial (re)organization of the city and those who inhabit it, electing the figure of the stranger/foreigner as the positively destabilizing element of the instituted territorial-symbolical order. His presence has the ability to redefine proximity and distance relations by means of the social interactions that he triggers, either reconnecting people through gestures of hospitality, decentration and empathy, or promoting closure by way of the rejection or the animosity that he experiences. The stranger/foreigner redefines the 'in' and the 'out'...

The keyword to interpret the progressive «urbanization of the world» of which the city was an object can be that of exclusion in all its extension - a wide category to signify the social process of redefinition and reconstruction of dynamics of access, belonging or absence to given goods and social circles. Knowing that our societies are experiencing phenomena of «de-socialization»¹¹, in which cultural categories replace social categories, the phenomenon of social subjectivation is further highlighted. Faced with the logic of exclusion, there's a growing importance of the analysis of the mechanisms of integration, of social reconstruction, the imagining of new forms of solidarity.

So, the various social movements that came into being and which occupy the city's public space pursue different objectives in their claims for recogni-

¹⁰ Simmel, Georg, «Digressions sur l'étranger», In *L'école de Chicago*, Aubier, Paris 1990, pp. 53-59.

¹¹ Touraine, Alain, *Un Nouveau Paradigme*, Fayard, Paris 2005.

tion and, consequently, shape a distinct definition of Justice. Given that there are, at least, three types of collective subjects in the city that have differentiated goals and social bases, the public space is, nowadays, a stage for multiple «struggles for recognition»¹², namely, socioeconomic struggle, identity struggle and struggle for relation. While Nancy Fraser¹³ identifies the first two types of social struggle, Emmanuel Renault¹⁴ adds the third group. In a nutshell, the authors regard socioeconomic struggle as that which is carried out by social movements that have as support base certain social classes and whose main objective is to reach a fairer distribution of goods through work and salary. The identity struggle, in turn, is embodied by status groups, for instance, cultural minorities, that aim for a recognition of their identity difference or that struggle against a negative identity; finally, the third movement is not indexed to a fixed social base - represented here by groups as the homeless, the undocumented, refugee-immigrants or unemployed -has as its objective the inclusion of its members in stable and gratifying social and political relations. While the motivation of the two first movements - socioeconomic struggle and identity struggle - has in its inception incapacitating social relations that deprive them of the desired recognition, the third type of movement is literally excluded from relation and the social bond:

Les deux premiers types de mouvements sociaux se développent à partir de situations qui se caractérisent par des relations sociales dévalorisantes, et c'est en ce sens qu'elles ont le déni de reconnaissance pour origine et la reconnaissance pour objectif. Le troisième type de mouvement social se développe à partir de situations qui excluent les individus des relations sociales valorisantes ou dévalorisantes, et c'est donc en un sens différent qu'elles ont le déni de reconnaissance pour origine et la reconnaissance pour objectif. Mais, dans tous les cas la composante normative de leurs motivations est liée à la reconnaissance, et cette simple remarque suffit à légitimer une approche générale des composantes normatives de mouvements sociaux dans le cadre d'une théorie de la reconnaissances¹⁵.

¹² Honneth, Axel, *Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

¹³ Cf. Fraser, Nancy, «Penser la justice sociale, entre distribution et reconnaissance égalitaire», in *Politique et société*, 17 (1998) 3-36.

¹⁴ Renault, Emmanuel, *L'expérience de l'injustice. Reconnaissance et clinique de l'injustice*, Éd. La Découverte, Paris 2004.

¹⁵ Renault, *L'expérience de l'injustice.*, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

It is in this context that the normative dimension of their motivations must be articulated with recognition, and that simple observation is enough to legitimize an approach of a normative and moral nature to the social movements in the city in the context of the recognition theories.

5. Charles Taylor's *common purposes* and Axel Honneth's *societal goals*

Briefly, one can say that the appearance of this third social movement - the without relation - triggers a crisis in Charles Taylor's «common purposes» and Axel Honneth's «societal goals» conceptions.

To put it succinctly, for Taylor, the claims that the different groups wish to see their difference recognized as collective rights within democratic societies must be preceded by a critical revision of the relation between common good and the subject's self-realization. Based on the position that defends the human being as historically and culturally situated, inserted, therefore, in a relational and dialogical network inside a community of belonging, he advocates that recognition comes from a common action and from a collective agent, and not from the atomistic adding up of individual actions. Common action and simple intersubjective relation are not confused:

In other words, the very definition of a republican regime as classically understood requires an ontology different from atomism, falling outside atomism-infected common sense. It requires that we probe the relations of identity and community, and distinguish the different possibilities, in particular the possible place of we-identities as against merely convergent I-identities, and the consequent role of common as against convergent goods. If we abstract from all this, then we are in danger of losing the distinction between collective instrumentality and common action (...)¹⁶.

This proposal for common action is anchored in two of the author's conceptual pillars, namely, the ontological category of «shared meanings» and the meaning of «common good», which consists precisely in the identification of its citizens around «common purposes». The dignity of the citizen-subject

¹⁶ Taylor, Charles, *Philosophical Arguments*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1995 [trad. em port. *Argumentos Filosóficos*, Loyola, São Paulo 2000, p. 192].

stems from the fact that he exercises citizenship together with the others¹⁷.

One asks: in what measure can people and unorganized groups, without social or cultural bases, exercise their citizenship?

On the other hand, for Honneth «prestige' or 'standing' signifies the degree of social recognition the individual earns for his or her form of self-realisation by contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realisation of society's abstractly defined goals»¹⁸.

For Honneth, the subject is recognized in the third sphere and acquires social esteem when he contributes with his particularities for the common social objectives. However, Honneth has been alternating the terminology of its third sphere or recognition; if up until some years ago it oscillated between social esteem and solidarity, in more recent works it started using the term «differential performance» [*Leistung*]¹⁹, connected with market terminologies. This hasn't meant an abandonment of the concept of solidarity, on the author's part. As he states in reply to questions posed in the Potsdam seminars in 2007, published in 2008, «[...] I wouldn't necessarily eliminate the concept of solidarity today to, inversely, use solely the concept of differentiated performance»²⁰. And he explains that

The mechanism for the production of solidarity has always, as much as possible, and also for complex modern societies, the idea of division of labour - and with the division of labour comes also the experientiality of the contribution of others towards an objective shared by us [...]. For me, it's in this way, in any case, that the connection between the principle of differentiated performance and the concept of solidarity happens²¹.

Well, as Alain Caillé and Christian Lazzeri²² remark, we are then faced with the important question of *value* as mediator between the individual and

¹⁷ Cfr. Pélabay, Janie, *Charles Taylor, penseur de la pluralité*, Les Presses de l'Université de Laval, Quebec 2001.

¹⁸ Deranty, Jean-Philippe, *Beyond Communication. A Critical Study of Axel Honneth's Social Philosophy*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2009, p. 126.

¹⁹ Honneth - Fraser, *Umverteilung oder Anerkennung?*, op. cit.

²⁰ Honneth, Axel - Richter, Melvin, «Diskussion: wo bleibt die Solitarität – zum Status eines Leitbegriffskritischer Gesellschaftstheorie und dessen Ort in der Anerkennungstheorie von Axel Honneth», in *Axel Honneth, Gerechtigkeit und Gesellschaft. Potsdamer Seminar*, 2008, p. 56-57.

²¹ Honneth - Richter, «Diskussion: wo bleibt die Solitarität», op. cit, p. 61.

²² Caillé, Alain - Lazzeri, Christian (dir.), *La reconnaissance aujourd'hui*, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2009.

recognition. The «self-respect» and the «self-esteem» constitute, for these authors, the valorisation of different properties and qualities enjoyed by people in the political community.

On the one hand, «recognition-respect» is gained, either by the moral faculties of rationality and reason (Rawls), or by the capacity for argumentative inter-comprehension (Habermas), by the deliberative capacity (Pettit, Thomson, Gutman), by an attitude for autonomy (Honneth), or yet by the conditions for egalitarian participation granted to the citizens (Fraser) - all this in order to generate the 'socially visible', the ones who are entitled to have rights and be treated with the dignity associated with a person.

On the other hand, the «recognition-esteem» is, contrarily to the first, socially variable because it rests on performances, on the capacities and the performance of the individuals in competitive contexts. The multiplicity of those capacities, the adaptation to the environment and the adoption of specific procedures in distinctive contexts constitutes still an open discussion by the different authors (Bourdieu, Walzer, Honneth, Fraser).

Final notes

Of the three social movements present and active within the city, the two that fight for interests of a social-economic or cultural-identity nature, depart from a stable social base that authorizes, in the abstract plane of political theory, Charles Taylor to identify them «common purposes» and Honneth to call them «societal goal». However, the movement represented by disaggregated individuals without a fixed social base such as the homeless, undocumented, immigrant-refugee or unemployed, excluded from the relationship and the social bond, lack the fundamental legal-moral value: the dignity of the subject-citizen.

On the political level, only the citizen that constitutes a legal entity, by positive law, has the right to claim politically universal rights for themselves and for others, since this claim is based on the necessary and binding correlation between State - Nation- Citizen. With their citizenship suspended due to their lack of participation in a political community of their own - a condition for the possibility of claiming rights - they return to the prehistory of minimum human conditions. What the condition of the people of this third movement comes to denounce is that, to the juridical recognition of the person in the State sphere - and of their fundamental rights -, one should add the

ethical and solidary components coming from the other spheres of personal and social life, as Honneth defends. However, this recognition cannot be held hostage to performances [*Leistung*], capabilities and performance of individuals in competitive contexts. The principle of the ethical right of each person's status must precede the principle of political rights, allowing the universalism of the rights of the person to protect his dignity against all forms of disrespect or threats to his integrity and to promote their social inclusion.

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LA FORMAZIONE POST-DISCIPLINARE PER ABITARE LA CITTÀ

Post-disciplinary training for living the city

Abstract

This work starts from the conviction that the school curriculum structure is based on disciplinary diversification, which often translates into methodological separateness if not in open conflict between knowledge. This methodological separateness seems to induce, in those who learn, disorientation and crisis, compared to that global approach that seems to be a natural characteristic of our cognitive relationship to the world and above all to the urban spaces of the contemporary world. Urban space in the contemporary is above all a conceptual space that requires a global cognitive approach. Speaking of post-disciplinarity, therefore, does not want to be a provocation, but the expression of a possible strategy that places first the problem on which to do research. The investigation of the problem seems to us to be guaran-

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teed by the methodological solidity of the project. The epistemological background is hermeneutical, therefore, provides a qualitative methodological approach.

Key Words: Post-disciplinary; Training; Community; Didactic; Philosophy of the city.

Abstract

Questo lavoro parte dalla convinzione che la struttura curricolare scolastica fondata sulla diversificazione disciplinare, che spesso si traduce in separatezza metodologica se non in aperta conflittualità tra saperi, induca in chi apprende disorientamento e crisi, rispetto a quella modalità *globale* di approccio che sembra caratteristica naturale del nostro relazionarci conoscitivo al mondo e soprattutto agli spazi urbani della contemporaneità. Lo spazio urbano nel contemporaneo è prima di tutto uno spazio concettuale che richiede un approccio cognitivo globale. Parlare di *post-disciplinarietà*, quindi, non vuole essere una provocazione, ma l'espressione di una possibile strategia che pone al primo posto il *problema* sul quale fare ricerca. L'indagine sul problema ci sembra possa essere garantita dalla solidità metodologica del *progetto*. Lo sfondo epistemologico è di tipo ermeneutico, pertanto, prevede un approccio metodologico qualitativo.

Parole Chiave: Post-disciplinarietà; Formazione; Comunità; Didattica; Filosofia della città.

Introduzione: L'epoca del post-disciplinare nella città che cambia

La città nella società complessa richiede nuove chiavi di lettura, per essere «abitata» in modo attivo, consapevole e soprattutto creativo. Le nuove chiavi di lettura richiedono una formazione innovativa, una prospettiva che abbiamo chiamato post-disciplinare.

Non auspichiamo, e forse non sarebbe nemmeno il caso di chiarirlo, l'improponibile «morte» dei saperi specialistici, ma una loro riconsiderazione nella logica del confronto interdisciplinare, e di un dialogo che sappia superare quelle forme di compiaciuto, e solitario, senso di superiorità di cui la storia della cultura e della sua trasmissione è piena. Riteniamo opportuno, invece, il passaggio a un'effettiva *democrazia conoscitiva*, che sappia superare i miti inutili di verità definitive. A tale proposito abbiamo considerato con attenzione e interesse la svolta epistemologica prodotta da Futowicz e Ravetz¹, nella loro

¹ Funtowicz, Silvio – Ravetz, Jerome Raymond, *Environmental problems post-normal science, and extended peer communities*, Etud. Rech. Syst. Agraires Dév. 1997. Si veda anche: Funtowicz,

riconsiderazione di un classico come Thomas Kuhn², in relazione a quelle situazioni di complessità dove il richiamo ai paradigmi soliti, o «normali», dei saperi scientifici non sembrano in grado di offrire soluzioni. Si insiste molto da parte degli autori, il cui punto di riferimento è l'economia, sull'*incertezza* dei contesti in cui si manifestano i fenomeni oggetto di ricerca e sulla rilevanza degli *interessi* collettivi che entrano in gioco. Il nostro campo d'azione è la formazione, non l'economia «ecologica» e nemmeno quella di mercato, non siamo esperti di «decrecita» e, tuttavia, riteniamo che anche nella nostra sfera d'intervento vi sia una incertezza crescente e notevoli interessi in ballo.

Per questo riteniamo che le scienze della formazione, a fronte delle emergenze e delle urgenti sfide, debbano avere il coraggio di una prospettiva epistemologica innovativa e non trovarsi a dipendere dalle epistemologie classiche delle scienze naturali dominanti. Nel nostro caso è particolarmente evidente l'importanza di allargare il campo dei soggetti in grado di raccogliere informazioni e di dibattere, anche ai fini di revisione, le teorie scientifiche di riferimento. Ciò che si sperava di ottenere dal confronto epistemologico tra saperi diversi e dal fruttuoso scambio metodologico è stata poca cosa, perché gli unilaterali protocolli rassicuranti convincono più degli ardui percorsi alternativi. Poi non vi è l'umiltà dei mettersi in relazione con il quotidiano, dato che solo il «laboratorio» parla la lingua della scienza, e neppure con la tradizione popolare che, spesso, nei saperi ancestrali racchiude veri e propri tesori di conoscenza. Lo abbiamo scoperto in tanti anni di ricerche in America Latina e ne abbiamo colta l'efficacia nei comportamenti etici delle comunità, nell'equilibrio e nell'armonia con la quale si vive l'esperienza collettiva in termini solidali. Ancora più rilevante l'ipotesi di rivedere il ruolo degli «esperti» e di lasciare più spazio agli «interessati», che di solito si vedono calare dall'alto le riforme della scuola, ad esempio, e, più in generale, nell'intero mondo della formazione. Ci convince, per altro, pure la riflessione su di una post-normalità che non si pone più l'obiettivo di ricercare la «verità» quanto piuttosto, secondo un *principio di precauzione*³, di raccogliere quante più informazioni

S. - J.R., Ravetz, *The Worth of a Songbird: Ecological Economics as a Post-normal Science*, Ecological Economics, 1994.

² Kuhn, Thomas Samuel, *La struttura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche. Come mutano le idee della scienza*, Einaudi, Torino 1969. In realtà in Kuhn appare la nozione di *scienza straordinaria*: «(...) durante le rivoluzioni, gli scienziati vedono cose nuove e diverse anche quando guardano con gli strumenti tradizionali nelle direzioni in cui avevano già guardato prima» (p. 139).

³ L'argomento riguarda in particolare la biodiversità, e la sua salvaguardia, nonché, più in generale la difesa ecologica dell'ambiente. Le normative di carattere internazionale ed europeo si ispirano a tale principio in assenza o incertezza di risposte scientifiche. Traslarlo al mondo della formazione in nome di una sua ecologia ci sembra significativo.

e opinioni possibili e di tener conto d aspirazioni legittime che da più parti convergono sul versante formativo.

Si parla anche di intelligenza post-normale e, in tal caso, ci si avvicina ancora di più alla nostra proposta di una post-disciplinarietà. Alle Giornate Internazionali di Confronto sui temi della Sicurezza, svoltesi a Bogotá il 13 e 14 settembre 2017, cui abbiamo partecipato con una relazione, lo studioso catalano Jordi Serra del Pino⁴, analista di Intelligenza, ne ha parlato in riferimento al titolo suggestivo che fungeva da traccia all'incontro «El arte del acecho». Non è facile tradurre in italiano il senso autentico dell'assunto. Il vocabolario parla di «agguato» o «appostamento»; ma vi è una felice immagine che ci è stata suggerita da un vecchio cacciatore indio colombiano: la postura statica del felino nell'imminenza di lanciarsi sulla preda. Ecco l'intelligenza post-normale pare potersi tradurre in una strategia che è ben delineata da questa metafora: la disponibilità, quindi, ad acquisire conoscenza tramite un balzo in avanti che dà risposta a un desiderio profondo, che è stato preparato con una silente e lucida fase di attesa e di valutazione del compito e del risultato sperato. L'intelligenza post-normale prefigura la città del futuro, sente il bisogno di proiettarsi in avanti per costruire, dare forma, intraprendere. È la formazione che deve farsi carico di stimolare tale nuovo modo di intendere l'intelligenza, a costo di divergere dall'immagine normale di intelligenza che tende a restare prevalente, e rassicurante, nei campi disciplinari.

Il vero problema del presente, però, nella città che cambia e che richiede nuove forme di cittadinanza, è che lo studio non trova più motivazioni serie, non vi è nulla che riesca a sostituire ciò che per secoli è stato il senso del dovere, il bisogno di riscatto sociale, la volontà di realizzazione come segno di appartenenza. Ciò viene per lo più ignorato, sia a livello politico, sia a livello culturale. Il rimedio istituzionale, anche per venire incontro alle esigenze poco scusabili di famiglie distratte, e non di rado prepotenti, è quello di abbassare progressivamente la qualità degli studi. I ragazzi non sono più in grado svolgere un tema? Bene, si sosterrà che la capacità di argomentare non è più necessaria, meglio saper riassumere. E poi ciò che è indispensabile, la protesi digitale, è sempre a portata di mano e, come una bacchetta magica, trova una risposta a tutto. Non riusciamo a far passare l'idea che il mezzo digitale è, appunto, solo uno strumento e non un fine. Il suo utilizzo intelligente, strategico non consiste nella quantità di dati che può mettere a disposizione, ma nella capa-

⁴ Serra del Pino, Jordi, «Posthumanos Postnormales.», in *¿Humanos O Posthumanos?*, Fragmenta Editorial, Barcelona 2015.

cità di scegliere le informazioni che occorrono per affrontare una situazione problematica, come tenderemo di spiegare in seguito.

Le singole discipline, scientifiche o umanistiche che siano, rinchiusi nei loro steccati poco si interessano a tali emergenze epocali, e continuano per la loro strada «dottrinarie» elargendo nozioni storiche, geografiche, letterarie, matematiche, fisiche, filosofiche. La convinzione è che, prima o poi, lo studente troverà la propria strada, sceglierà un indirizzo, dapprima nella scuola superiore e poi, caso mai, all'università. Certo, ogni sapere è portatore di metodi e si fonda su paradigmi che è bene identificare, ma la diversificazione può disorientare anche lo studente più interessato, ecco perché negli anni Settanta del secolo scorso il tema dell'interdisciplinarietà è diventato oggetto di dibattito e simbolo di un'esigenza di rinnovamento volto a mettere in discussione il prevalente specialismo.

Vi è un illustre precedente che non può passare sotto silenzio: già nel 1944 Cassirer aveva considerato il rischio implicito del sapere specialistico, nel senso di una disumanizzazione che doveva trovare argine nel rilancio di un nuovo umanesimo capace di prendere le distanze dal gretto disciplinarismo⁵. Da parte sua Piaget⁶, nel Convegno OCSE del 1970 a Nizza, poneva la questione di un vero e proprio sistema istituzionale dell'interdisciplinarietà, con l'intento di superare una relazione solo occasionale tra saperi, o multidisciplinarietà, che si accontentava di porre gli oggetti di ricerca in una prospettiva più vasta. Ma non si può dimenticare, nell'ottica di un'autonoma epistemologia della formazione, il peso determinante della posizione husserliana relativa all'intreccio tra scienza e potere. Per il filosofo tedesco già da tempo la scienza ha smarrito lo scopo di avere nell'uomo il fulcro della propria azione conoscitiva, in particolare nella direzione di migliorarne la qualità di vita, per orientarsi al mero controllo/sfruttamento sulla natura. Ecco, di conseguenza, l'immagine degli specialisti tecnici che se ne ricava: «Peer loro la conoscenza è fin dall'inizio equivalente a una serie di industriose prestazioni nella prassi di dominio della natura e degli uomini»⁷. Da parte dei rappresentanti del mondo imprenditoriale si dirà che ciò è «normale», in quanto storicamente determinato. Ma per noi, sostenitori della post-normalità, non è questa modalità di sapere scientifico che vogliamo vedere nella scuola, perché asservito, acritico, unilaterale e, inoltre, fermo su prospettive socio-economiche ormai insostenibili.

⁵ Cfr. Cassirer, Ernst, *Saggio sull'uomo*, Armando, Roma 1968.

⁶ Cfr. Piaget, Jean, *Le scienze dell'uomo*, Laterza, Bari 1968.

⁷ Husserl, Edmund, *Idee per una fenomenologia pura*, Einaudi, Torino 1965, p. 871.

1. Il *problema* come emergenza conoscitiva

La città contemporanea, post-globale e, come molti dicono, post-normale può divenire un ambiente formativo particolarmente efficace per l'antropologia dei nostri giovani, a patto che se ne posseggano gli strumenti di orientamento. Ed è qui che si inserisce la nostra riflessione educativa.

Nel mantenere come punto di riferimento la metafora dell'*acecho*, potremmo dire che il problema rappresenta la preda dell'intelligenza, che su di esso si scaglia con impeto per risolverlo, dopo essersi avvicinata con cautela scartando ipotesi di soluzione e mantenendone in essere altre che devono essere valiate sui fatti. Se le teorie sono «modi di vedere il mondo», come sosteneva Kuhn nella sua celebre opera già citata, o «grammatiche osservative» non riconducibili ad un'unica fonte, si può dedurre «che non c'è una singola norma, per quanto plausibile e per quanto saldamente radicata nell'epistemologia, che non sia stata violata in qualche circostanza»⁸. Il problema reale, pertanto non è mai questione affrontabile con una semplice operazione circoscrivibile a un unico orizzonte semantico, serve una pluralità di approcci, un'attenzione alle circostanze, una disponibilità alla contaminazione ma, prima di tutto, la convinzione di dover cambiare il modo di fare formazione: partire dall'emergenza del problema e poi servirsi dei contributi disciplinari.

Di norma i saperi scientifici presentano problemi emblematici, che servono come *exempla* sui quali applicare procedure standard, per questo non suscitano né entusiasmi, né curiosità, né passioni, in quanto se ne coglie la distanza rispetto al vissuto. Nella vita vera, infatti, le situazioni emergenti sono intersecate a credenze, rappresentazioni, ideologie che non possono restare estranee ad una pratica formativa multiforme, la quale di fronte al problema individuato può far conto su procedimenti d'indagine scientifica, ma anche su altri punti di vista, compreso in certi casi il buon senso o la tradizione, compresi i pregiudizi che l'accompagnano e gli errori di valutazione che possono essere rivisti criticamente.

Può risultare utile, a questo punto, portare un esempio di problematicità che presenta tratti di significativa attualità. È sensato pensare che un educatore di strada per svolgere il proprio lavoro abbia bisogno di acquisire una certa documentazione, relativa ai soggetti di cui dovrebbe occuparsi con competenza. Spesso le storie di vita, le biografie di soggetti disagiati e marginali sono frutto di racconti orali, che vengono indagati con metodi etnografici e

⁸ Feyerabend, Paul Karl, *Contro il metodo*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1979, p. 21.

di antropologia culturale, traslati alla dimensione metropolitana ma in origine utilizzati per la ricerca sulle popolazioni indigene, per nulla urbanizzate. È evidente la distanza di contesto, ma per esperienza personale va detto che l'indigeno è più coerente e chiaro nel definire la propria «storia», perché s'identifica nei valori di una comunità; mentre il marginale e/o deviante può mettere in atto svariati elementi di disturbo, consapevoli o meno, dato che si sente sradicato rispetto al mondo in cui vive. Oggi la cosa è resa più complessa dall'enormità del flusso migratorio, che pone problemi di dialogo tra culture non come moda passeggera, ma come necessità esistenziale costante. Gran parte di queste indagini sono di carattere qualitativo, ma non vanno trascurati i dati statistici quantitativi sui livelli di povertà, sul tasso di scolarizzazione, sui tipi di reato prevalenti in situazioni di estrema difficoltà socio-economica. L'esempio ci suggerisce che un problema emergente come questo non può essere affrontato da nessuna singola disciplina, perché è necessario inquadralo nella sua portata globale. Noi crediamo che sia necessario operare secondo una progettazione per moduli problematici, dove varie discipline entrano in gioco ma nella relazione e nel confronto proficuo con altre.

Si comprende bene l'opportunità di questa svolta, strategica e operativa ad un tempo, se pensiamo a come è mutata negli ultimi anni la relazione naturale-artificiale, anche in termini di osservazione. L'artificiale non può più essere considerato come una forma progressiva, e forse evolutiva, del naturale e nemmeno come suo semplice allargamento prospettico. Esso, piuttosto, si manifesta ormai come mondo alternativo e non di rado conflittuale. Porsi su tale itinerario di ricerca implica il riuscire ad intrecciare saperi scientifici, tecnologici e filosofici. Proprio la filosofia, del resto, non è più qualificabile come austero modello teorico, dato che è chiamata ad entrare nel flusso vitale, ad inoltrarsi nel processo di cambiamento incessante dell'esistenza, ad esempio facendo i conti con la nozione di *ecologia profonda*: «(...) il movimento dell'ecologia profonda riconosce che l'equilibrio ecologico esige mutamenti profondi nella nostra percezione del ruolo degli esseri umani nell'ecosistema planetario. In breve, esso richiede una nuova base filosofica e religiosa»⁹.

Se non si entra nella dimensione della problematicità, e si resta ancorati alla programmazione per discipline, un argomento come questo non può essere nemmeno sfiorato e si perde, così, il senso più autentico dell'innovazione culturale, che non passa affatto soltanto attraverso sempre nuove generazioni di computer o di telefonia mobile. Solo nel confronto tra discipline su di un

⁹ Capra, Fritjof, *Il punto di svolta*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1984, p. 340.

problema, posto come emergente oggi, può scaturire quell'esigenza critica che si è fatta radicale nel riconoscere come il dato fenomenico (ciò che appare) non renda per niente il sapere «oggettivo» ma relativistico, possibile e non assoluto, incerto e non definitivo. Si pensi a come la «psicologia esistenziale»¹⁰ abbia mostrato il coraggio etico, oltre che culturale, di non ritenere interpretabile nemmeno il mondo dei vissuti soggettivi, circoscrivendo il proprio campo d'intervento ad un metodo empatico che si pone sulla traccia di simboli, emozioni, esperienze. Dalla delicatezza dell'empatia dovrebbe sempre partire anche l'azione formativa, in particolare per riconoscere il peso dell'intelligenza emozionale nell'apprendimento. Daniel Goleman¹¹ ha chiarito in maniera convincente che la componente emozionale del nostro cervello non è in antitesi a quella razionale e, benché deprecata in tanta scuola del passato, rappresenta un punto di forza nel motivarci o nel frenarci rispetto all'azione. Le emozioni sono impulsi che ci rendono attivi soprattutto in casi di emergenza, aiutandoci a cercare soluzioni rapide nell'urgenza del momento.

Gardner, da parte sua, che ha considerato l'intelligenza come «capacità di risolvere problemi» e, pertanto, rappresenta un punto di riferimento della nostra proposta, è famoso per la sua teoria delle intelligenze multiple. Egli, tra l'altro, ritiene preoccupante e pericolosa la tendenza, che spesso si ripresenta, a prospettare un unico sistema educativo. I soggetti umani apprendono in forme diverse tra loro e costruiscono una visione del mondo propria, connessa al diverso dosaggio delle forme intellettive. Quelle che egli definisce intelligenza *intrapersonale* (comprensione di sé), *interpersonale* (comprensione degli altri) ed *esistenziale* (rivolta all'indagine del senso stesso dell'esistenza, al significato della morte e della trascendenza) hanno certamente a che fare con il fattore emotivo. Appare evidente che la modalità scolastica condizionata dall'uniformità – gli stessi contenuti a tutti, nello stesso modo e con gli stessi strumenti di valutazione – ha prodotto una prassi formativa assai discutibile alla prova dei fatti: «Questa procedura apparentemente democratica dava l'illusione della correttezza e dell'equità, ma, secondo me, era corretta ed equa solo per una fascia di studenti: quella dei ragazzi che hanno la fortuna di possedere buone attitudini linguistiche e logiche»¹². È indispensabile che le pratiche formative allarghino questa potenziale *fortuna*, indagando sul valore strategico di altri registri conoscitivi, oltre a quelli indicati, che vanno dall'intelligenza musicale a quella naturalistica, a quella corporeo-cinestesica.

¹⁰ Cfr. Fontana, David, *Personalità e educazione*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1984.

¹¹ Cfr. Goleman, Daniel, *Intelligenza emotiva*, trad. it. di I. Blum e B. Lotti, Rizzoli, Milano 1999.

¹² Gardner, Howard, *Sapere per comprendere*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1999, p. 74.

Con le ultime questioni prese in considerazione, risulta chiaro che la problematicità non può riguardare solo il campo di argomenti e contenuti stimolanti, capaci di suscitare interesse, passione e di far emergere quei «talenti» evangelici che ognuno di noi pare possedere per nascita. Il problema è anche all'interno dell'intelligenza stessa, nel modo di adoperarla, nel saperne fare un mezzo per la realizzazione di sé e pure di supporto a quella degli altri, imparando a scegliere tra la dimensione egoistica e quella solidale. Chi opera nel mondo della formazione, pertanto, non può pensare di avere solo responsabilità relative agli apprendimenti, perché l'acquisizione di questi ha molto a che fare sia con i comportamenti che con i valori. Ha sostenuto Morin, all'inizio del nuovo millennio, che non serve affatto alla scuola un'ulteriore riforma *programmatica* bensì *paradigmatica*, quindi non tanto relativa alla scuola ma al pensiero, con l'intento di *ecologizzarlo*, mettendolo nella condizione di porre «ogni evento, informazione o conoscenza in una relazione di inseparabilità con il suo ambito culturale, sociale, economico, politico e, beninteso, etico»¹³. Di qui il possibile senso di un'innovazione dove, finalmente, la conoscenza sia vita e questa il campo di espressione della stessa, secondo quella circolarità che Maturana e Varela definiscono «conoscere il modo in cui si conosce»¹⁴.

La questione è molto più complessa di quanto possa sembrare, in quanto occorrerebbe prevedere, in ottica problematica, mezzi d'indagine capaci di rendere conto dei fattori *involontari, diffusi e non intenzionali* che s'intravedono nella formazione. Considerava Riccardo Massa che bisognerebbe orientare ad un sapere capace di verificare i dispositivi dell'agire educativo e di metterne in luce la struttura latente. La *clinica della formazione* dovrebbe avere come fine «un'acquisizione di maggior consapevolezza e criticità rispetto ai processi della formazione»¹⁵. Nel riprendere il significativo, profondo lavoro filosofico-educativo dello studioso piemontese, in particolare rispetto alla ripresa del concetto foucaultiano¹⁶ di *dispositivo*, vorremmo mettere in evidenza che chi opera nel mondo della formazione può accettarne l'ineluttabile portata *normativa*, ma deve essere disposto a lottare con tutte le proprie forze contro la perdurante pressione *normalizzante*.

¹³ Morin, Edgar, *La testa ben fatta*, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2000, p. 19.

¹⁴ Maturana, Humberto Romesín - Varela Francisco Javier, *L'albero della conoscenza*, Garzanti, Milano 1992, p. 44.

¹⁵ Massa, Riccardo, *Istituzioni di pedagogia e scienza dell'educazione*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1990, p. 586.

¹⁶ Cfr. Foucault, Michel, *Sorvegliare e punire*, Einaudi, Torino 1975. Dello stesso autore si veda anche: *Microfisica del potere*, Einaudi, Torino 1977.

2. L'essenza democratica del *progetto* per la città del presente

La nostra metafora di partenza, che continua ad ispirarci, suggerisce un'ulteriore suggestione. Il felino che si appropinqua alla preda, si fa parte integrante dell'ambiente, si fonde con esso e in esso si con-fonde: è l'arte mimetica della caccia, in sostanza un imparare ad imitare il contesto per sfruttarne le caratteristiche. L'intelligenza non può stare al di fuori, o al di sopra, delle cose. Per conoscerle deve farsi parte integrante di esse, osservarle per scoprirne l'identità e dar loro un ordine per comprenderle e renderle ecologicamente utilizzabili. È questo che noi, con gli approfondimenti del caso sul versante formativo, consideriamo *progetto*; perché è di fronte ad una situazione complessa, o problematica, che si sente il bisogno di «proiettare» lo sguardo in avanti ma, appunto, dopo essersi immersi nelle cose, aver sentito il peso della difficoltà nel trovare risposte convincenti ai quesiti che gli eventi pongono in circostanze determinate.

L'Accademia del Cimento sintetizzava con il proprio motto, «provando e riprovando», il senso dell'impegno instancabile nella ricerca. Esso delinea la qualità stessa dell'ingegno umano quando si «cimenta», ovvero si mette alla prova con intento risolutivo. Galilei, ispiratore dell'Accademia stessa, diede alla progettualità un'impronta precisa, quella laboratoriale. Non è questa la sede in cui ripercorrere l'ostico compito di sottoporre a contro-prova le ipotesi di spiegazione dei fenomeni, celesti e terrestri, data la scarsità dei supporti tecnici allora disponibili, tanto da dover ricorrere ai cosiddetti «esperimenti mentali». Sta di fatto che il laboratorio era destinato a diventare il banco di prova sperimentale delle adeguate scelte progettuali. La mitizzazione, che ha accompagnato a lungo tale prassi di ricerca nella modernità, verte sull'immagine del ricercatore solitario che trova soluzioni infallibili, e non soltanto possibili, e sembra restare estraneo al mondo nel suo fluire e alla vita quotidiana nel suo scorrere.

Abbiamo voluto sintetizzare un modello, che ancora riveste il suo peso nell'immaginario collettivo, per mettere in guardia sui disagi che si possono incontrare nel rendere operativa una fase progettuale, nella vita scolastica, e sulle illusioni e contraffazioni che si possono insinuare nel pensiero di bambini e ragazzi. La più banale e diffusa si può individuare nella convinzione che avremo sempre un buon progetto per dare soluzione alle nostre esigenze, perché il progresso è inarrestabile e non conosce battute d'arresto.

Per dare ordine ai processi che pongono in essere un approccio progettuale, occorre dire che esso stravolge l'immagine classica del rapporto inse-

gnamento-apprendimento: nella dimensione progettuale non vi è un docente che trasmette conoscenza e un allievo che la recepisce per assorbimento. Al contrario, siamo di fronte ad una logica «democratica», perché si costruisce in comune il sapere con una radicale scelta iniziale di condivisione, che deve motivare e coinvolgere in un lavoro solidale. Il *metodo dei progetti* di Kilpatrick¹⁷ risale al 1916 ed è conseguenza di un lavoro sperimentale, svolto presso l'Università di Chicago, dove era stata istituita una scuola elementare, al fine di farne oggetto di studio e ricerca nell'ottica dell'attivismo pedagogico, del quale Dewey era il massimo rappresentante negli Stati Uniti e Kilpatrick suo fidato collaboratore. Quest'ultimo, per rendere il bambino protagonista dei propri processi di apprendimento, inaugura una procedura che avrà notevole successo, non solo nel mondo della scuola ma anche in quello del lavoro avanzato per i richiami che vi si possono individuare, in generale, nell'apprendimento organizzativo e, in particolare, nell'apprendimento collaborativo. Nella visione dell'autore i bambini assieme al maestro predispongono un ordine progettuale scandito in fasi. La prima è l'*ideazione*: selezionare uno scopo e, quindi, operare una scelta condivisa sul *cosa* rendere oggetto di ricerca, e ovviamente sul *perché*, tenendo conto che non si può tornare indietro, pena la frustrazione di non aver saputo realizzare quanto deciso. La seconda fase è il *piano di fattività*: quali strategie e quali strumenti individuare per realizzare il compito prefissato, con l'inevitabile discussione sulle procedure e i metodi che, una volta adottati, diventano «direttivi». La terza fase è l'*esecuzione*: bisogna realizzare in concreto quanto stabilito, metterlo alla prova con l'attenzione costantemente rivolta agli scopi, al fine di non deviare rispetto al significato del progetto. Infine, vi è il *giudizio*, o valutazione, che consiste nell'analisi rigorosa dei risultati conseguiti attraverso l'esecuzione e della sua congruenza rispetto ai fini di apprendimento che si volevano conseguire.

L'accento viene posto, anche negli studi successivi, sulla dimensione partecipativa del progetto, sul coinvolgimento degli attori, rispetto allo scopo che è stato individuato in ordine alla sua peculiare emergenza. Nella ricerca-azione, dove individuiamo forti elementi di continuità, emerge la convinzione che per realizzare il progetto non sia sufficiente il sapere: «La ricerca non finisce con l'azione ma azione e ricerca sono contemporanei: la ricerca fornisce il supporto conoscitivo per l'azione che a sua volta modifica la situazione (...)»¹⁸. Nella condizione dinamica che si viene a creare trova la propria confi-

¹⁷ Cfr. Kilpatrick, William Heard, *Il fondamento del metodo. Conversazioni sui problemi dell'insegnamento*, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1962.

¹⁸ Trincherò, Roberto, *I metodi della ricerca educativa*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2004, p. 140.

gurazione la *comunità educativa* la quale, dopo aver individuato la situazione-problema, con il coinvolgimento di tutti i suoi membri, l'affronta con una precisa volontà di cambiamento, che induce alla possibile soluzione tramite la negoziazione. È palpabile in tale prassi la permanenza di quell'*imparare facendo* che era stato il fulcro dell'attivistica *Action learning*.

Le pratiche progettuali, come ho potuto constatare nelle molteplici collaborazioni in particolare con la scuola superiore, hanno la forza di produrre negli studenti una trasformazione, perché danno credito alla risorsa umana e ne sfruttano l'innata propensione alla ricerca risolutiva. Progetti ben organizzati e portati a termine con impegno continuativo rendono effettiva la competenza, in quanto i soggetti coinvolti prendono atto che il progresso, possibile e mai certo nei fatti umani, è connesso alla loro capacità di modificare i propri approcci ai compiti, secondo una prospettiva che è sempre sia pratica che teorica e riconoscendovi un'occasione di crescita. Le competenze, sempre plurali, e nella duplice connotazione indicata, incarnano un patrimonio condiviso nelle «comunità di pratiche», organizzazioni dove gli appartenenti si preparano per accedere a compiti di crescente difficoltà, ma senza perdere di vista l'orizzontalità che rafforza le relazioni e fornisce identità espansiva¹⁹.

Il nostro sforzo è stato quello di voler cogliere nel progetto la naturale predisposizione verso il futuro, in questo la sua irrinunciabile valenza nell'ottica della post-disciplinarietà. Lo stesso non si può dire per la programmazione scolastica che, nella sua consolidata staticità burocratica, ha finito per tradursi in ritualismo fine a se stesso. La pretesa che potesse rivestire una peculiare flessibilità e adattabilità a diversi contesti, è stata una delle tante illusioni dell'autonomia scolastica. Di fatto, dal momento in cui si è iniziato, benché in forma poco chiara e coerente, ad immaginare la scuola come organizzazione capace di qualificarsi attraverso progetti caratterizzati e attualizzanti, il destino della programmazione è da considerarsi segnato, anche perché essa è stata avvertita da molti docenti come un obbligo e non un'opportunità per migliorare l'efficacia del proprio lavoro. Del resto questa è la sorte scontata di un'esterofilia provinciale, che da sempre pesa sulle nostre istituzioni scolastiche, portatrici di un immotivato complesso d'inferiorità nei confronti dei modelli statunitensi ed anglosassoni.

Quali ostacoli si frappongono, almeno nella nostra visione del presente, ad una formazione di matrice progettuale? Con molta franchezza dobbiamo

¹⁹ Meghnagi, Saul, *Il sapere professionale. Competenze, diritti, democrazia*, Feltrinelli, Milano 2005, pp. 49-50.

affermare che è il soggetto in formazione a preoccuparci, data la generalizzata scarsa predisposizione a vivere nell'orizzonte della complessità e dell'incertezza che la caratterizza. Si vive in un diffuso stato di «orfanezza», ma con scarsa consapevolezza di chi siano la madre e il padre da onorare nel lutto; di qui quelle «passioni tristi», di spinoziana memoria, che hanno trovato un certo successo una quindicina di anni fa nel libro di Benasayag e Schmit²⁰. La crisi esistenziale si manifesta in un'aperta mancanza di progettualità, in un vuoto d'iniziativa che è tipico di chi si sente minacciato e teme di non avere strumenti per affrontare il nuovo che avanza. Gli autori non mancano di individuare una delle cause nel venir meno dell'autorità: genitori e insegnanti non sono credibili, soprattutto se guadagnano poco, non si capisce perché si debba loro obbedienza visto lo scarso impegno nel sentirsi reciprocamente responsabili. Un'altra causa insidiosa, che cerca di dare risposta banale alla propria fragilità, s'intravede nell'abuso del virtuale come gioco: «Se tutto sembra possibile, allora più niente è reale»²¹. Il virtuale diventa onnipotente e il pensiero decade a pretesa infantile di rendere «pensabili tutti i possibili»²²: in ciò non vi è più nulla di progettuale, la ragione si esercita nel mero calcolo del tornaconto per sé.

Dobbiamo aggiungere un'ulteriore inquietante constatazione: di fronte all'invadenza dell'apprendimento informale, e per certi aspetti di un vero e proprio indottrinamento anti-formale, l'epistemologia pedagogica appare incerta, mentre l'educazione intenzionale lascia trapelare debolezze marcate rispetto a modelli comportamentali e valoriali che rappresentano il vero e proprio cavallo di battaglia dell'avversario²³. È sotto gli occhi di tutti: i social network assurgono a simbolo di comunicazione, di approcci relazionali ampi e vari, non importa se superficiali. Da loro si possono derivare apprendimenti poco faticosi e che non richiedono intenzionalità educativa specifica. Sarebbe il caso di riflettere sulla netta sproporzione tra la pervasività di un'educazione informale, a forte connotazione tecnologica (telefonia mobile, reti informatiche e conseguenti reti sociali) e una debole, disorientata educazione che trova la propria forma perdurante in professori, curricula disciplinari, aule e lezioni in presenza. Serpeggia ampia la convinzione che la scuola sia poca cosa se paragonata alle scintillanti tecnologie cui appartiene il futuro in tutti i settori: studio, lavoro, tempo libero.

²⁰ Benasayag, Miguel – Schmit, Gérard, *L'epoca delle passioni tristi* (2003), Feltrinelli, Milano 2005.

²¹ Benasayag – Schmit, *L'epoca delle passioni tristi*, op. cit., p. 23.

²² Benasayag – Schmit, *L'epoca delle passioni tristi*, op. cit., p. 94.

²³ Si veda: Tramma, Sergio, *Che cos'è l'educazione informale*, Carocci, Roma 2009.

Spaventa il ricorso alla tecnologia senza alcun sentimento che ne indirizzi lo sguardo. Se i «maestri» di oggi sono i media digitali, con la loro portata di omologazione inconsapevole, i compiti dell'educazione formale tendono a farsi irrisolvibili e bisognerebbe interrogarsi sul perché, negli ultimi cinquant'anni, l'educazione abbia perso in consenso e prestigio sociale. Il pensiero pedagogico non è parso all'altezza, se non per una difesa d'ufficio, di sostenere lo sviluppo del sistema educativo democratico. Di qui l'emergenza preoccupante di un vuoto etico nell'utilizzo di conoscenze informali fuori controllo, come si evince dall'idea, ottusa e diffusa, di una libertà come *dominio* (sulla natura e sugli altri, sugli affetti e sul corpo, sullo spazio e sul tempo, ecc.). D'altra parte, il perdurare di modalità di ricerca lontane dall'investire le trasformazioni che stanno coinvolgendo, su molteplici versanti, il sistema formativo, ha creato una sorta di limbo, dove ognuno vaga alla ricerca di un'impossibile identità culturale. Ciononostante è maturo il tempo per il ripristino delle «passioni gioiose», e il non aver posto al centro dello sviluppo la capacità progettuale, come elemento strategico adeguato al presente, pur trattandosi del limite più grave, può trovare rimedio. Le «passioni gioiose», infatti, trovano la loro ragion d'essere nello slancio curioso e ottimista verso il nuovo, la creatività, il senso dell'avventura e della scoperta, lo sguardo solidale rivolto agli altri nella loro arricchente differenza. Su queste basi, che continuano a vedere nell'umano un significato irrinunciabile, riteniamo sia da accettare la scommessa sul futuro.

Conclusioni: Uno sforzo di prefigurazione nella permanenza dell'uomo

Infine il vero cacciatore, sia esso animale o umano, si preoccupa di mantenere l'ambiente vitale nella migliore condizione, ed è estraneo ad ogni modalità distruttiva. Per questo in molte popolazioni indigene dell'America Latina si chiede all'animale il permesso di ucciderlo al fine di dare continuità all'esistenza propria e della comunità d'appartenenza. Allo stesso modo l'intelligenza è volta a costruire la vita in tutte le sue forme e non a sopprimerla; essa produce modelli ermeneutici, interpreta la realtà e la trasforma, con armonia ed equilibrio la «umanizza». Ma, quando la riduce a mera forza produttiva da sfruttare, si rende *strumentale* e perde il proprio potere propulsivo e progressivo. Con questa inquietudine che ha trovato tante conferme storiche, anche sul piano dell'educazione, ci accingiamo a delineare, per fasce d'età scolare,

una traccia modulare in base alla prospettiva epistemologica che abbiamo tentato di configurare.

Prima di addentrarci in questo discorso che sfiorerà pure qualche questione didattica, sia pure in forma specialistica, tuttavia, riteniamo necessario un ultimo chiarimento. Abbiamo appena fatto riferimento, con convinzione, al fatto che un buon uso dell'intelligenza *umanizza* la realtà, per questo la nostra proposta, pur parlando di post-disciplinarità, non ha nulla a che fare con le visioni post-umane o trans-umane.

In entrambi i casi, per noi, si respira una fastidiosa aria di fantascienza o, peggio, di pseudo-scienza. Il trans-umanesimo si muove nell'ottica dell'epurazione di ciò che nell'uomo vi è di sconveniente, di fastidioso. In sostanza si deve giungere a poter prendere solo il «buono» dell'innovazione e lasciare il «cattivo» agli altri, ad esempio la morte la si può lasciare ai più poveri, cosicché oltre a tutte le altre diseguaglianze si trovino a dover sopportare anche questa. Non è facile ironia, emerge sul serio la convinzione che grazie alle scoperte scientifiche e tecnologiche si possano sconfiggere le malattie e l'invecchiamento con crescente facilità ed affidabilità di «mercato», in tal senso il sapere scientifico è un «usa e getta» per gente facoltosa. Il post-umanesimo si muove su di un piano che non fa leva sulla vendita di illusioni, ma insiste sul fatto che scienza e tecnologia ci stanno trasformando, o ci hanno già trasformati, in soggetti (o oggetti?) che nulla hanno a che vedere con le pretese umanistiche, le quali sono da ritenersi superate e ostacolanti un'adeguata visione del mondo attuale. Da parte nostra continuiamo a pensare che l'umanesimo sia stato, e possa continuare ad essere, un fattore essenziale della cultura, tanto del passato quanto del presente. Come abbiamo cercato di evidenziare anche in questo scritto, l'uomo ha ancora molto da fare e da dimostrare. Vi è in noi la convinzione profonda che a lui spetti di governare la ricerca scientifica, tecnologica, e di qualsiasi altro genere, e non di esserne oggetto. Anche nella malattia più grave l'uomo rimane soggetto e possiede una dignità che gli deve essere riconosciuta dall'*altro*, cioè da chi se ne prende cura. A maggior ragione, nessun essere umano può essere pensato come oggetto di educazione, o di formazione. Egli deve essere sempre il fulcro del proprio destino, come nell'immagine rinascimentale di Pico della Mirandola: «Nell'uomo nascente il Padre ripose semi d'ogni specie e i germi di ogni vita. E secondo ciascuno li avrà coltivati, quelli cresceranno e daranno in lui i loro frutti»²⁴.

²⁴ Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, *Discorso sulla dignità dell'uomo*, a cura di G. Tognon, trad. it. di E. Garin, La Scuola, Brescia 1987, p. 7.

Nella nostra riflessione conclusiva ci assumiamo il rischio di una esemplificazione, quindi della traduzione in pratica di una serie di nuclei problematici che possono essere oggetto di una trattazione progettuale. Non vi è nessuna pretesa vincolante, solo il desiderio di dare maggiore specificità a quanto siamo venuti argomentando. Abbiamo un buon punto di riferimento dal quale partire: il «corso di studi sull'uomo»²⁵, elaborato da Bruner e dai suoi collaboratori, verso la metà degli anni Sessanta del secolo scorso, per bambini di una classe quinta elementare, che avrebbero così potuto imparare a dare risposta ad alcune domande fondamentali: 1) su ciò che vi è di specificatamente umano in tale soggetto; 2) su quali fattori abbiamo contribuito alla sua umanizzazione; 3) sulla possibilità di un suo progressivo perfezionamento nel tempo. Le risposte vanno cercate nelle cosiddette «grandi forze» umanizzanti, che vengono sintetizzate in cinque unità: linguaggio, infanzia prolungata e utilizzabile a fini educativi, curiosità e desiderio di dare spiegazione al reale, organizzazione sociale, capacità costruttiva e strumentale. In ognuna delle unità occorre individuare i contenuti essenziali, mettere in luce le insidie del percorso, approntare pratiche d'indagine, predisporre materiali didattici ed esercizi mirati.

Il compito può apparire facilitato da due spunti epistemologici di rilievo: il primo è quello inerente la necessità di stimolare il soggetto a non accontentarsi delle informazioni in suo possesso, poiché in lui vi è «l'abilità di andare al di là dell'informazione data verso la probabile ricostruzione di altri eventi»²⁶. E ciò fa suonare un campanello d'allarme, nel presente, sul modo da noi evidenziato in cui si entra in contatto con la giungla informativa. Compare, tuttavia, un elemento più importante: l'andare oltre, l'approfondire con spirito critico e curiosità, permette di cogliere in altri «eventi» elementi di conoscenza trasferibili a quello in oggetto. Il verbo «ricostruire», inoltre, ci permette di aprire la seconda questione epistemologica: apprendere per scoperta. Bisogna favorire in chi si sta formando la capacità di «scoprire rapporti e regolarità»²⁷, cioè un atteggiamento investigativo, che si traduce in uno sguardo *costruzionista*, quello di chi «sa organizzare ciò che incontra non soltanto in modo da scoprirvi rapporti e regolarità, ma anche di evitare la deriva in cerca di in-

²⁵ Cfr. Bruner, Jerome Seymour, *Verso una teoria dell'istruzione* (1966), trad. it. di G. B. Flores d'Arcais, P. Massimi, Armando, Roma 1991.

²⁶ Bruner, Jerome Seymour, «Al di là dell'informazione data», in *Psicologia della conoscenza*, trad. it. di S. Dinelli, Armando, Roma 1976, vol. I, p. 332.

²⁷ Bruner, Jerome Seymour, «Le strutture concettuali della pedagogia moderna», in AA. VV., *La sfida pedagogica americana*, Armando, Roma 1969, p. 57.

formazioni slegate»²⁸. Alla luce di tali impostazioni epistemologiche, l'autore prende le distanze da Dewey su di un punto fondamentale: non è la cosa migliore partire da ciò che è più prossimo all'esperienza infantile, perché sono le situazioni inusuali, i fatti imprevedibili e inattesi, che consentono di cogliere la realtà in forma più articolata e completa.

Su queste basi di partenza abbiamo immaginato un primo nucleo problematico per la

Scuola dell'Infanzia: *io, tu, noi*. Se volessimo tradurlo in domande, per riprendere l'impostazione bruneriana, la questione potrebbe essere posta in questi termini: chi è il soggetto che mi somiglia, ma son sono io? Perché sta in uno spazio che è *mio*? Perché devo stare assieme a lui e ad altri? Sappiamo che i bimbi di questa età devono affrontare l'egocentrismo e imparare a condividere esperienze con i pari età. Ciò è fondamentale non solo per la crescita individuale ma soprattutto per acquisire le prime forme di partecipazione sociale, che non possono essere esenti da regole e norme da rispettare.

Per la Scuola Elementare abbiamo pensato al nucleo *famiglia e comunità*. Qui si può già pensare all'intervento di più discipline: ricostruire su basi storiche la nascita della famiglia, evidenziare su basi geografiche le differenze e le somiglianze nell'organizzazione della vita familiare. Si può parlare dei calcoli relativamente ai costi che ogni famiglia deve affrontare per unità di tempo (settimana, mese, anno). Vi è poi la possibilità di leggere racconti sul tema e di raccontare in prima persona storie familiari. Il passaggio alla nozione di comunità introduce l'argomento dei diritti e dei doveri, ma anche del senso di appartenenza e della solidarietà. Di qui la possibile apertura di una riflessione sullo straniero, che ha abbandonato la propria comunità e, a maggior ragione sente il bisogno della solidarietà. Uno strumento utile per favorirla può essere il confronto e l'incrocio di storie di vita, dalle quali si evince che, pur nella differenza, vi sono molti elementi di somiglianza nell'esperienza esistenziale.

Relativamente alla Scuola Media abbiamo individuato: *ragazze e ragazzi di fronte al futuro*. Già nel titolo si vuole evidenziare la relazione tra differenze di genere. Tutto il lavoro progettuale, per noi, dovrebbe essere giocato sulle differenti aspettative ma nella disponibilità a confrontarsi e nel rispetto per l'altro, che non può mai essermi estraneo ma sempre complementare. Da questo momento non abbiamo più voluto dare indicazioni disciplinari, per non cadere nel più banai didascalismo e per lasciare ad ogni lettore ampio spazio di individuazione dei contributi ritenuti congrui.

²⁸ Bruner, «Le strutture concettuali della pedagogia moderna», op. cit., p. 58.

Per il biennio della Scuola abbiamo pensato a: *cittadinanza, partecipazione, talenti*. In questo caso si vuole mettere in luce la rilevanza di sentirsi cittadini, con diritti e doveri ma, in particolare, con la necessità di partecipare alla vita sociale cercando di dare il meglio di sé. Di qui l'attenzione ai talenti, per altro già suggerita per la valenza etica oltreché pedagogica, perché individuandoli e mettendoli a disposizione degli altri ognuno di noi dà il meglio di sé.

Nel caso del triennio della Scuola Superiore abbiamo voluto indicare: *lavoro, ricerca e innovazione*. È il momento in cui è necessario cominciare ad orientarsi, ma anche interrogarsi, in relazione agli indirizzi di studio, sul significato della ricerca nei vari campi del sapere e su che cosa si debba intendere per innovazione. Parola abusata, densa di significati contraddittori e spesso inadeguata a comprendere qual è il nuovo che avanza. In particolare, è pericolosa la pretesa di universalizzazione di un fattore rispetto ad altri. Sarebbe il caso, forse, che a ognuno di noi fosse lasciata una speranza sull'innovazione che vogliamo. In questo senso ci sentiamo piccoli interpreti di una bella riflessione di Bruner: «Una cultura è costantemente presa nel processo di ricreazione nel momento in cui è *interpretata e rinegoziata* da coloro che ne fanno parte»²⁹.

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²⁹ Bruner, Jerome Seymour, *Actual minds, possible worlds*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. London 1986, p. 23. Corsivi nostri nella citazione.

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JUDITH M. GREEN

URBAN ONTOLOGY: WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF THE CITY?

Abstract

Margaret Kohn raises but does not resolve an important ontological and ethical issue in her recent book, *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth* (2016), when she attempts to justify her claim that all of the people who live in a city are entitled to claim property rights in it, including a right to continue living in their current neighborhood instead of being dispossessed when forces of “gentrification” increase the market price of its housing. A philosophy of the city that can guide interdisciplinary urban theory, democratic political processes, and justice-focused advocacy on this and related problems requires a reasonable and persuasive answer to the question, “Who is the subject of the city?” Many influential classical and contemporary liberal political theorists have answered this question in the first person singular, “I am,” understanding cities as nothing more than loose and protean collections of individuals linked only by a voluntary, unequal, power-differentiated social contract from which they can withdraw at any time. However, my thesis in this essay is that the question, “Who is the subject of the city?” is best answered in the first person plural, “We are,” because a city’s enactors are inextricably interlinked.

Key Words: City; Urban ontology; Commonwealth; Justice; Operability; Planning.

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Ontologia urbana: quem é o sujeito da cidade?

Resumo

Margaret Kohn levanta uma importante questão ontológica e ética, mas que não consegue resolver, na sua recente obra, *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth* (2016), onde procura justificar a sua afirmação de que todas as pessoas que residem na cidade têm direito a reivindicar direitos de propriedade, incluindo o direito de continuar a viver no seu bairro atual, em vez de serem desapossados quando as forças de «gentrificação» aumentam o valor de mercado dos imóveis. Uma filosofia da cidade que seja capaz de orientar uma teoria urbana interdisciplinar e os processos políticos democráticos, bem como uma defesa de esse e outros problemas relacionados, focada na justiça, requer uma resposta credível e persuasiva à pergunta «Quem é o sujeito da cidade?». Os teóricos políticos liberais contemporâneos respondem a essa pergunta na primeira pessoa do singular, «eu sou», entendendo as cidades como meras coletividades soltas e mutáveis de indivíduos ligados apenas por um contrato social voluntário, desigual, diferenciado pelo poder, do qual se podem desvincular a qualquer momento. No entanto, a minha tese neste artigo procura sustentar que a melhor resposta à pergunta «Quem é o sujeito da cidade?» se conjuga na primeira pessoa do plural, «Nós somos», porque os agentes da cidade estão inextricavelmente interligados.

Palavras-chave: Cidade; Ontologia urbana; Comunidade; Justiça; Operabilidade; Planeamento.

Introduction

Margaret Kohn raises an important ontological and ethical problem in *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth* (2016) in attempting to justify her claim that all of the people who live in a city are entitled to claim property rights in it, including a right to continue living in their current neighborhood instead of being dispossessed when forces of «gentrification» increase the market price of its housing¹. A philosophy of the city that can

¹ Calling for more careful use of the concept and better data, Ronald R. Sundstrom has challenged the characterization as «gentrification» of urban neighborhoods processes of market revaluation that lead to changes in the predominant class, race, ethnicity, and other social characteristics of their residents, especially if gentrification is understood as unjust displacement. He argues that in some cases, such changes may exemplify ethically neutral processes of «succession», in which previous residents choose to live elsewhere for their own good reasons, e.g., better amenities, easier access to work, the possibility of building family wealth through home ownership, or imaginative inspirations from other places. See «The Concept and Harms of Gentrification», Sundstrom's Keynote Address to the Fifth Annual Conference of the Philosophy of the City Research Group at

guide interdisciplinary urban theory, democratic political processes, and justice-focused advocacy to effectively address this and related issues requires a reasonable and persuasive answer to the question, «Who is the subject of the city?». Many influential classical liberals and contemporary neo-liberal political theorists have answered this question in the first person singular, «I am», understanding nations, like cities, as nothing more than loose and protean collections of individuals linked only by a voluntary, unequal, power-differentiated social contract from which they can withdraw at any time. However, many considerations suggest that this question is best answered in the first person plural, «We are», based on understanding cities, their diverse citizens, and their regions as inextricably interlinked through ecological, social-cultural, and communicative transactions, as well as shared ethical-legal norms, imaginative identifications, and daily living in distinctive local «places» to which we contribute and from which we derive support.

My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I present a list of realistic philosophical considerations that support a shift in our thinking about these issues away from the dominant, singularity-centered ontological grammar of liberal individualism to a pragmatist reconstruction of the deeply familiar, but currently undervalued, plurality-centered ontological grammar of community life. Then, I offer some examples from various fields of current research—philosophical ethics, applied epistemology, social psychology, public health, political history, democratic political economy, and urban planning—that support such a shift in our thinking from the primacy of the «I» to the primacy of the «We». My conclusion is that such a shift in the ontological grammar that underlies our research, law, public policy processes, and «common sense» expresses a realistic understanding that our urban regions and their diverse citizens are ultimately interconnected in our ecological, social-cultural, and communicative transactions, in our shared ethical-legal norms, in our identities and loyalties, in our imaginative visions, and in our decentralized processes of daily living in our neighborhoods and our other special «places» as residents, workers, and caring, purposive visitors. Through our inter-actions as co-laboring members of practical communities, «we» together constitute, energize, and build up our cities and their regions as long-living natural-architectural-social entities and «common wealths» of ideas, goods, tools, and artifacts that need and deserve our continuing efforts to sustain them while also sustaining our larger Biotic Community. At the same time, our diverse urban «we's» and the «I's» who emerge within

the University of Porto (Porto, Portugal), October 12, 2017.

them need and deserve the support of their city and its region as well as their fellow members in a community solidarity that is both moral and practical.

Part I: Some Realistic Philosophical Considerations

The following list of realistic philosophical considerations should ground our common sense about urban ontology, both because they reflect our human experience as had and because they are well-supported by contemporary research in the social sciences, medicine, and ecology.

1. The human «I» emerges out of prior, empowering familial and local «We's» as well as grand «We's» that potentially outlast that individual person².

2. Every «I» has an intrinsic dignity that does not derive from social recognition or market valuation, but rather out of that individual's participation in a grand «We»—humanity—nested within an even grander «We» of the Biotic Community, the eco-social sources and supports for any individual human life and of all the other valuations we humans make³.

² Many «non-Western» philosophical traditions concur with this ontological first premise. See, for example Fred Lee Hord (Mzee Lasana Ospara) and Jonathan Scott Lee's helpful introduction to *I Am Because We Are: Readings in Black Philosophy*, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 1995, and Michael Battle's *Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu, Revised Edition*, Pilgrim Press, Cleveland 2009, which analyzes how *ubuntu*—an African concept recognizing that persons and groups form their identities in relation to one another—guided the necessarily public-inclusive work of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which made it possible to move past the violent horrors and losses of the apartheid period within a shared project of actualizing the possibility of multicultural democracy in their diverse country. See also Christopher W. Gowans' explanation of the concept of «dependent rising» in *Buddhist Moral Philosophy: An Introduction*, Routledge, New York 2015, as well as Walpola Rahula's classic work on Buddhist thought, *What The Buddha Taught*, Revised and Expanded Edition Grove Press, New York 1974 and the Dalai Lama's, *Ethics for the New Millennium*, Penguin Books, New York 1999. See also Roger Ames' many works on Daoist and Confucian thought, including *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 2011. Many non-Western feminist theorists (and some Western feminists, too) also concur; see, for example, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's *We Should All Be Feminists*, Random House, New York 2012, which originally was presented as a TED talk, and Rita Manning's widely anthologized essay, «Just Caring», from *Speaking from the Heart*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1992.

³ This generalization draws on Aldo Leopold's concluding essay, «The Land Ethic» in *Sand County Almanac*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1949, one of the founding documents of ecology as a natural-social scientific interdisciplinary field. For Native American thinkers about the ontological nesting of humanity within Earth's larger community of life, see Black Elk's «The Great Vision» in John G. Neihardt's *Black Elk Speaks*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1932, George Linden's «Dakota Philosophy» in *The Black Elk Reader*, ed. Clyde Holler, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse 2000, Joseph Epes Brown's «I Become Part of It» in *I Become Part of It: Sacred Dimensions of Native American Life*, ed. D. M. Dooling and Paul Jordan-Smith, Harper San Francisco, San Francisco 1992, Joseph Epes Brown and Emily Cousin's *Teaching Spirits: Understanding Native American Religious Traditions*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, Roger Dunsmore's

3. Individuation processes that lead to increasingly distinctive «I's» require participation and support from other individuals who value and encourage such «careers» as «what We do»—in the absence of such active co-participation and effective support from others, human individuation processes are suppressed or distorted⁴.

4. At every point in their «careers», individuating «I's» need, desire, and seek respect, recognition, and critical or appreciative responses from members of «We's that matter for them, gaining their sense of what is worthy, significant, and contributive (or the converse) from these «We»-members, even as the individuating «I's» become increasingly influential (or disrespected, ignored, and alienated) in the transactional processes of community life⁵. As the movie *Avatar* expresses this general idea, every «I» needs recognition from well-embedded We-members who say, «I see you»⁶.

5. The grandest «We»—the Biotic Community and the dynamic ecological forces to which it continually adapts—conditions, inspires, supports, and limits the *decentralized experiments* of the grand human «We» in search of ways to sustain widely scattered, intergenerational populations in living long, healthy, meaningful, and productive lives that contribute to the social-cultural richness, complexity, and diversity of the grand human «We» and its smaller «We's» by fostering both effectively adaptive collaboration and creative individuation⁷.

6. Cities and their regions are the oldest and most enduring form and

Earth's Mind: Essays in Native Literature University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque 1997, and Jonathan Lear's *Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2006.

⁴ This generalization draws on the work of two classical pragmatist philosophical texts, John Dewey's 1932 *Ethics, Revised Edition*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1985 and George Herbert Mead's *Mind, Self, and Society*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1966.

⁵ This language of individual «careers» derives from John Dewey's 1939 essay, «Time and Individuality» in *John Dewey: The Later Works*, Vol. 14, University of Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale 1988, which interconnects then-contemporary physics with human processes of social-relational individuation over time through transactions that call forth some potentials rather than others into actuality. Dewey's philosophy of education reflects this same idea; see, for example, *Democracy and Education*, originally published in 1916, in *John Dewey: The Middle Works*, Vol. 9, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1980, *Experience and Education*, originally published in 1939, in *John Dewey: The Later Works*, Vol. 13, University of Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale 1988, and various essays collected in *The Essential Dewey: Vol 1*, ed. Larry A. Hickman - Thomas M. Alexander, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1998.

⁶ See *Avatar*, directed, written, produced and co-edited by James Cameron, Lightstorm Entertainment and Twentieth Century Fox, 2009.

⁷ This list of neutral, cross-cultural criteria for desirable human lives combines those that Amartya Sen deploys in many of his major works, including Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, Random House, New York 1999, with those that William James, John Dewey, G. H. Mead, and other classical pragmatists deploy in various works.

process of human living; nation-states, empires, and international entities come and go, organized around and sustained by cities and their regions, *unless and until* these larger social-political structures become impediments to the eco-social sustainability and growth in richness, complexity, diversity, and ability to foster the highly adaptable solidarity of their constituent «We's,» as well as their processes of individuation, recognition, and contribution of distinctive, differing, creative «I's».

7. Human architecture—including buildings, communicative grids, landscaping, cultivated land, purposively shaped earth forms, roads, sidewalks, parks, monuments, canals, levees, berms, dunes, and sea walls—is a hybrid natural-social project involving intentional, intergenerational collaborations and decentralized, institution-mediated coordinated actions of countless «We» - members of cities and their wider regions, as well as the creative contributions of highly individuated «I's».

8. Human architecture influences the future of the local «We» that makes and uses it, as well as that of other local «We's» that come into contact with it or with the ideas, «goods» of various kinds (and harms of various kinds) that it causes or makes possible; through these contacts, its influence spreads contagiously for good or for ill throughout thousands of other urban and regional «We's», affecting the neighborhood and familial «We's» that constitute and are constituted by their urban and regional «We's»—as well as the millions of «I's» that emerge within these neighborhood and familial «We's», filled with inchoate longings to belong, to individuate, and to leave their mark within or beyond the particular natural-architectural-social environment that is their natal and formative niche. Ultimately, locality-specific human architecture affects the future of the grand human «We» and the even grander «We» of the Biotic Community.

9. However, all of our purduring natural-architectural-social structures, as well as the «We's» and «I's» who make and transform them, are *experimental*—and sometimes these experiments go *radically wrong* through ignorance, forgetting, hubris, or toxic desires for dominance, for revenge, or for timeless acknowledgment of the worth of a particular «I» or a limited «We» at the expense of others' quality of life. Sometimes initially promising experiments go radically wrong because too many people become addicted to various pleasures as substitutes for the more challenging, fully human processes of learning, caring, building, and celebrating others' achievements and the beauty of our shared «We's».

10. Regrettably, both authors of historically influential philosophical

texts and history-impacting political leaders have perversely treated such *experiments run amok due to toxic misleadings* as humanly normal, historically progressive, and universal ideal guides for desirable ways of future human living, including the natural-architectural-social structures these will require:

- Thomas Hobbes, author of *Leviathan*, the English Civil War-tinged vision of life without an authoritarian national government as a never-ending war among all human individuals⁸
 - Those who rationalized and benefitted from chattel slavery in the Americas
 - Those who celebrated the global empires of nations and corporations achieved and maintained through violent domination, dispossession, and cultural conversion
 - Hitler and Stalin
 - Le Corbusier and contemporary egotistical “star-architects” who ultimately serve only their own aesthetic vision, and who resist democratic public inputs in their designs⁹
 - Democratic urban theorist and activist Jane Jacobs’ powerful opponent, Robert Moses, who was New York City’s unelected land use, parks, and transportation «czar» from the 1930’s to the 1970’s, destroying neighborhoods and redesigning the natural-architectural-social structures and systems of the city and its wide suburban-rural region based on his own vision of progress, in consultation only with like-minded, equally powerful men¹⁰
 - Neo-liberal theorists who generate abstract “I”-centered models of value, rights, and obligations at individual and national level levels of analysis and policy prescription
 - Al Qaeda and ISIS, terrorist «We’s» bent on destroying all other

⁸ See Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* (1651), reprinted with a valuable introduction by C. B. Macpherson, Penguin Books, New York 1982.

⁹ On the destructiveness of Le Corbusier’s kind of top-down, «I am the artist» vision of architecture, see Scott, James C., *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1999.

¹⁰ Jane Jacobs says very little about Robert Moses in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Random Books, New York 1961 and a series of subsequent books that have become urban studies classics and now are finding a new audience. However, a recent film that focuses on her urban activist legacy even more than on her writing, *Citizen Jane: Battle for the City*, produced and directed by Matt Tyrnauer, Altimeter Films 2016, gives Moses a central role and analyzes his rival vision of urban planning processes in great detail.

«We's» in pursuit of an ideal vision of an international «we» structured as a caliphate of believers, with the social power to form and control only one kind of male «I» and only one kind of female «I» as approved by a single top leader-interpreter of holy texts that are said to express God's timeless will for all aspects of human life and nature

- Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, other authoritarian, ethno-centric «populists» who stimulate and manipulate the formation of fearful, angry, ignorant «We's» that follow the various cultural, political, economic, and ecological directives of these powerful «I's» uncritically, no matter how empirically ill-founded, eco-socially toxic, damaging to the emergence process of creative individuals within valuable alternative «We's», and destructive of their cities and their nations' hard-won relations with others

- Wall-builders between nations and between conflicting cultural and religious «We's»

- Normalizers of urban gentrification and dispossession in public policy, law, and business who analyze unequal wealth-based individual property rights as moral and legal “trumps” over all other kinds of rights and values, including basic human rights to food, clothing, shelter, education, health care, work, and social membership listed in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, as well as shared access to high-quality shared ecological resources like air, water, soil, viewsapes, and experiences with other species that large numbers of citizens of diverse regions and cultures highlight in the «national happiness studies» that Jeffrey Sachs and his international team of researchers produce annually for the U.N.¹¹

11. However, other philosophical voices from the past and the present have critically challenged such visions of a contract-based, gang-like, Leviathan «we» that allows some «I's» to dominate all other «I's», all other «We's» and the great «We» of Earth's biotic community – and they have proposed feasible and desirable processes for achieving more deeply democratic and more caring national and urban «We's» that can sustainably meet the needs of current and future generations while supporting the emergence of ethically committed, creative «I's» who can bridge the gaps that now divide us. These

¹¹ See the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) at www.un.org. See also the annual *World Happiness Report*, www.worldhappiness.report, researched by Jeffrey Sachs et al., which includes ranked assessments of the “gross national happiness” of 155 nations.

voices include:

- The former slave become great orator, Frederick Douglass, and the white, middle class mother and visionary writer, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who joined forces at the highly controversial 1848 meeting in Seneca Falls, New York, that produced the «Declaration of Sentiments» both spoke for and signed, and in the conflict-riven years that followed, to demand both the abolition of chattel slavery and the liberation of women from their subservient, highly controlled, and individualization-limiting social, religious, political, and economic status¹²
- Anna Julia Cooper, who rose out of American chattel slavery to achieve a doctorate from the Sorbonne, and who called in *A Voice from the South* for gender-inclusive epistemologies in our academies and in public policy-making that can collaboratively construct wider and wiser truths¹³
- Charles Mills, whose work on «the racial contract» argues that the revolutionary founders of powerful modern democracies never imagined their «social contract» as including the people of color whose violently extorted labor built up the national wealth and systems of race-linked privileges their «white» beneficiaries now regard as «normal» and just¹⁴
- Jane Addams, who founded and lived with her collaborators in Chicago's Hull House, America's first settlement house, as a neighborhood place of mutual hospitality to welcome and empower culture-rich immigrants fleeing wars, religious pogroms, and bleak poverty, to foster intercultural exchange, and to organize collaborative efforts to help this young city to develop effective institutions, systems, and social habits while helping their new nation to fulfill its

¹² See *Frederick Douglass: Selections from His Writings*, ed. with a valuable introduction by Phillip S. Foner, International Publishers, New York 1945, which includes information about his active support of Stanton's "Declaration of Sentiments" at the 1848 Convention on Women's Rights in Seneca Falls, New York, as well as some of Douglass's later editorials in support of women's rights. See Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., *The History of Woman Suffrage*, Ayer, North Stratford 1911.

¹³ See Cooper, Anna Julia, *A Voice from the South*, first published 1892, Oxford University Press, New York 1999. See also May, Vivian M., *Anna Julia Cooper, Visionary Black Feminist*, Taylor & Francis, New York 2007.

¹⁴ See Mills, Charles, *The Racial Contract*, Cornell University Press, Cornell 1999.

ethical potential as a social democracy¹⁵

- Addams' fellow American pragmatist philosophers, founding social scientists, and progressive change-makers, including William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, W.E.B. Du Bois, Mary Parker Follett, and Martin Luther King, Jr., all of whom made contributions of lasting value to the theory and praxis of creating deeper democracies in «imperfect» conditions of social conflict, actual injustice, unmet basic needs, and underdeveloped human capabilities through processes of education, cross-difference collaborative inquiry, institution-building, and activist struggle¹⁶

- Alain L. Locke and later analysts of colonial exploitation, cultural conversion, and the long-lasting post-colonial impacts of these toxic processes on both the colonized and the colonizers, who have proposed «culturally relative» processes of education, social inquiry, and cross-difference communication through the arts to create the social basis for shared, «rooted cosmopolitan» visions of democracy within and among peoples, as well as transformative paths to actualize these¹⁷

¹⁵ See Addams, Jane, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, first published 1902, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2013, and *Twenty Years at Hull House*, first published 1910, University of Illinois Press, Champaign-Urbana 1990. See also Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, *Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric*, University of Chicago, Chicago 1996, Marilyn Fischer (ed.), *Jane Addams and the Practice of Democracy* (University of Illinois Press, Champaign-Urbana 2008), and Maurice Hamington (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Jane Addams*, Penn State University Press, State College 2010.

¹⁶ See James, William, *The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition*, ed. John J. McDermott (Random House, New York 1967), John Dewey, *The Essential Dewey, Volumes I and II*, ed. Larry A. Hickman - Thomas M. Alexander (Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1998), George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: The Definitive Edition*, ed. Charles M. Morris, annotated edition by Daniel R. Huebner and Hans Joas (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1934, 2015), W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk*, first published 1903 (Bantam Books, New York 1989), Mary Parker Follett, *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government*, first published 1918 (Penn State University Press, University Park 1998), and Martin Luther King, Jr., *Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. James M. Washington (HarperCollins), San Francisco 1986.

¹⁷ See Alain LeRoy Locke's 1915-1916 lecture series, *Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race*, ed. Jeffrey Stewart (Howard University Press, Washington 1992), his introductory essay in the path-breaking collection he edited, *The New Negro*, first published 1925 (Simon & Schuster, New York 1992), the collection of essays he co-edited with Bernhard J. Stern, *When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts* (Progressive Education Association, New York 1942), many of his other essays Leonard Harris has collected and introduced in *The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond* (Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1989), as well as *The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race, and Education*, ed. Leonard Harris (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1999), and chapter 4, "Cosmopolitan Unity Amidst Valued Diversity: Alain Locke's Vi-

- Contemporary feminist theorists, including Carole Pateman, Patricia Hill Collins, Iris Marion Young, Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, bell hooks, and Martha C. Nussbaum, who have criticized the continuing exclusion, suppression, and exploitation of women in diverse nations and cultures, and who draw on the differing experiences and imaginative visions of diverse women to propose for more inclusive, caring, and just ways of living¹⁸
- Native American thinkers such as Black Elk, Chief Seattle, Chief Joseph, the founders of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy and its contemporary orators and healers, including Oren Lyons and Jake Swamp, as well as the visionary Cherokee leader Wilma Mankiller and the other indigenous women leaders with whom she worked effectively in cross-difference efforts to improve the quality of life of the members of their tribal «We's» by reflecting together and collaboratively planning *with* rather *against* nature¹⁹

sion of Deeply Democratic Transformation,” in my own *Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity, and Transformation* (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1999). Later great post-colonial and cosmopolitan thinkers who contribute to this stream of thought and action include Frantz Fanon, *Black Skins, White Masks* (Paris, Editions du Seuil 1952), Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Random House, New York 1978), Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (W. W. Norton & Company, New York 2006), and Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, with commentaries by Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford University Press, New York 2006).

¹⁸ See Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970) and *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1988); Patricia Hill Collins “Searching for Sojourner Truth” in *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1998) and *Intersectionality*, with Sirma Bilge (Polity Press, Malden 2016); Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990) and *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2000); Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1982); Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (University of California Press, Berkeley 1984); Bell Hooks, *Feminism Is for Every Body: Passionate Politics* (South End Press, Boston 2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Sex and Social Justice* (Oxford University Press, New York 1999) and *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (Harvard University/Belknap Press, Cambridge 2011); and Chimamand Ngozi Adichie, *We Should All Be Feminists* (Random House/ Anchor Books, New York 2012).

¹⁹ See Black Elk, op. cit. On Chief Joseph and Chief Seattle, see «Earth's Mind» in Roger Dunsmore, op. cit. On the founding of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, see Bruce E. Johansen, «Dating the Iroquois Confederacy», Akwesasnee Notes at radical.org/AkwesasneNs.html. For contemporary Onandaga oratory in the Haudenosaunee tradition, see Oren Lyons, «Our Mother Earth», in D. M. Dooling - Paul Jordan-Smith, op. cit. For the Mohawk healing tradition, see Sub-Chief Jake Swamp in *The Native Americans*, Episode 2: “The Northeast: Give and Take” (TBS Productions, 1994). See Wilma Mankiller, *Mankiller: A Chief and Her People* (St. Martin's Press, New York 2000). See also her edited collection of her conversations with women leaders of diverse Native American tribes, *Every Day Is A Good Day: Reflections by Contemporary Indigenous Women* (Fulcrum Publishing, Golden 2004).

- Founding ecologist Aldo Leopold, as well as contemporary ecologists and eco-philosophers, who have not only demonstrated the humanity-destroying consequences of narrowly anthropocentric conceptions of our shared natural environment, but have offered an empirically well-grounded, ethically rich, and imagination-inspiring alternative vision of our human place in nature as «citizens of the Biotic Community»²⁰

- The thinkers on whose work Margaret Kohn draws in proposing new forms of shared property grounded in recognition of shared contributions to the city, including the early twentieth century French Solidarists—Alfred Fouillee, Leon Bourgeois, Charles Gide, and Leon Duguit—the mid-twentieth century French political theorist Henri Lefebvre, and the mid-twentieth century American architectural critic, urban visionary, and change agent, Jane Jacobs

12. These thinkers and their allies in various disciplines offer good guidance for experimentally fostering more complexly sustainable «We's» who foster more humble, creative, and caring «I's»—individuals who can feasibly and desirably reimagine our cities, regions, nations, and transnational networks and systems, and can who can actualize these through democracy-deepening processes of collaboratively building up, sustaining, and sharing these natural-architectural-social achievements together. Consider the following as guiding ideas:

- The comprehensive architecture of livable cities and their regions—their buildings, communicative grids, landscaping, cultivated land, purposively shaped earth forms, roads, sidewalks, parks, monuments, canals, levees, berms, dunes, and sea walls—has always been a hybrid natural-social project involving intentional, intergenerational collaborations as well as the decentralized, institution-mediated coordinated actions of countless «We» - members of cities and their regions, aided by the creative contributions of highly individuated but humble, caring, mutuality-minded «I's»—not just the famous names our histories remember.

- Human architecture influences the future of the local «We» that makes and uses it, as well as that of other local «We's» that come into contact with it or with the ideas, as well as the «goods» of vari-

²⁰ See Aldo Leopold, «The Land Ethic», op. cit.

ous kinds (and the «harms» of various kinds) that it causes or makes possible.

- Through these experiences of contact, a city's architecture, the activities it empowers, and the values it expresses contagiously influences thousands of other cities and their regional «We's», as well as the neighborhood and familial «We's» that constitute and are constituted by their cities and regions, and the millions of «I's» that emerge within them, filled with inchoate longings to belong, to individuate, and to leave their mark within or beyond the particular natural-architectural-social environment that is their natal and formative niche.

- Ultimately, locality-specific human architecture affects the future of the grand human «We» and the even grander «We» of the Biotic Community.

- A city's «We» includes a large but indefinite number of diverse, eco-socially interlinked groups and their individual members, transacting in a kind of place-specific practical solidarity, not only through participatory political institutions and locality-focused communications media, but in a more basic way by playing distinctive, interlinked roles in their region's economic, cultural, religious, legal, political, educational, nutritional, recreational, and tourism aspects and in processes of daily social living that include sharing sidewalks, streets, mass transit, parks, stores, banks, libraries, arts spaces, sports, coffee shops and other «locals».

- A city's constantly changing «We» perdures through countless historical events.

- A city's «We» is composed and continuously renewed by individuals who enter and depart from the whole, contributing to and being deeply shaped by its distinctive character.

- A city's «we» expresses critical tensions as well as mutual reliances among its diverse local neighborhoods and their distinctive living-working-cultural-religious- artistic-aesthetic communities.

- A city's «we» relies heavily on what Aristotle calls practical wisdom (*phronesis*), John Dewey calls social intelligence, and James C. Scott calls expert practical know-how (*metis*), within the collaborative transactions of making and exchanging goods and services, devising and communicating ideas, and decision making in daily life, in business, and in government, including in those sectors of govern-

ment in which professional public administration is necessary²¹.

- A city's «we» has no single center, but rather multiple nodes and nexus points of communicative, practical, and interpretive power where its intersecting social, political, financial, scholarly, cultural, religious, and artistic networks converge.

- All of a city's individual citizens are architecturally, socially, and ecologically

dependent on and contributive to its life-sustaining, educative, wealth-creating, culture-transforming, and meaning-making resources.

- For reasons of operational effectiveness as well of justice, all of a city's individual citizens and significant groups, including neighborhoods, are responsible for and entitled to social and civic voice in expressing the city's «We» and all are entitled to share in the city's «common wealth».

- A shift to thinking of «We» as the subject of the city in the ontological grammar of democratic theory, property law, public policy, and everyday life can make the lives of cities and their citizens more vital, more meaningful, and more sustainable.

Part II: Supportive Interdisciplinary Examples from Contemporary Research

Although it may initially seem like a daunting prospect to try to achieve such an ontological shift in our laws, public policies, and shared social habits from thinking about all of these matters in terms of a primordial atomic «I» who deliberates, chooses, and acts for narrowly self-interested reasons, to thinking of them in terms of antecedent and still-emerging intergenerational «We's» who make the emergence of distinctively individuated «I's» possible through the intended and unintended outcomes of their direct, mediated, and long-distance transactions, such a shift is well-supported by current work in many fields.

²¹ On *phronesis* or practical wisdom, see Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. On social intelligence, see John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, originally published 1927, in *John Dewey, The Later Works, Volume 2* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1984) and *Liberalism and Social Action*, originally published 1935, in *John Dewey, The Later Works, Volume 11* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1987). On *metis* or expert practical know-how, see James C. Scott, *op. cit.*

1. Philosophical ethics, which at its heart is a guide to «we» feeling, thinking, and acting:

- The concept of caring
- The concept of obligation
- The concept of justice
- The concept of property rights as moral claims on others

2. Social psychology:

- The well-documented need of human babies for face-time, touching, familiar voices
- The well-established fact that crowding (a toxic «We») leads to psychopathology, as does neglect (an absent «We»)
- Inspiring «We» experiences, such as those New Yorkers shared after 9/11 when they felt the support of other urban «We's» around the world, giving rise to shared social hope and renewed individual capabilities to get on with life and meet others' needs

3. Public health:

- The recognition that epidemics are a «We» problem that require a «We» response
- The recognition that urban childhood asthma requires a «We» response, including reducing car, truck, and bus emissions
- The recognition that urban and regional health requires «green» buildings

4. Applied epistemology:

- The recognition that scientific advances require team collaboration as the ground for individual creativity
- The «epistemic bubble» phenomenon that Dan Kahan and Cass Sunstein research²²
- *Paideia*—the long-recognized fact that people develop citizenship attitudes and skills by participating in community problem-solving, including Dewey's famous example of Abraham Lincoln, who became the Lincoln we remember by responding to the com-

²² See Dan Kahan, «Cultural Cognition and Public Policy», *Yale Law and Public Policy Review* (Vol. 24, 2006) and See Cass R. Sunstein, *#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media* (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2017).

mon needs of his times²³

5. Recent political history:

- The struggle of the Greek people—an ancient «We» —for recognition, as well as for sustainable debt relief and political autonomy within the institutional structures of the European Community’s younger, diverse, highly contentious grand «We»
- The struggle of Barcelona and the Catalan people with Madrid and the Andalusian people over the status of their various «We’s» and the possibility of a more just grand «We» within Spain’s young multicultural democracy
- The struggle of «We, the people of the United States» in the Trump era over whether «We» will fulfill our obligations to Earth’s Biotic Community and to all the other local and national «We’s» now at risk from climate change, as agreed in the Paris Accords

6. Democratic political economy:

- The recognition by Amartya Sen, Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Muhammad Yunus, and many other influential economists that sustainable economic systems that promote both common and individual flourishing without generating human inequalities that damage families, cities, nations, and the Biotic Community must be neither top-down, command and control systems nor unregulated market systems—both of these models focused on and enacted by “I’s”—but rather democratically organized, intelligently regulated, decentralized webs that interconnect the members of local and widely dispersed «We’s» within looping processes of contributing and receiving²⁴
- The emerging recognition that such a democratic, «We» - focused paradigm is preferable not only for reasons of justice, but also

²³ See John Dewey, «Time and Individuality», originally published 1939, in *John Dewey, The Later Works, Volume 14* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1988).

²⁴ See Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) and *The Idea of Justice* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2007). See Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Harvard University/Belknap Press, Cambridge 2014). See Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The Euro: How A Common Currency Threatens The Future of Europe* (W. W. Norton and Company, New York 2017). See Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The Age of Sustainable Development* (Columbia University Press, New York 2015). See Muhammad Yunus, *A World of Three Zeros: The New Economics of Zero Poverty, Zero Unemployment, and Zero Net Carbon Emissions* (PublicAffairs, New York 2017).

for operability, because excluding community members from participation and benefit creates unsustainable carrying weights on an economy, and alienated people can stop all aspects of complex social systems, including law, politics, transportation, and the daily processes of urban life

7. Urban and regional planning:

- The recently renewed appreciation of Jane Jacobs' insight about livable cities as sustained and energized by the on-going contributions of countless numbers of individuals to the «We» of their neighborhoods as places of safety, beauty, work opportunities, rich resources for meeting basic needs, and for experiencing many of the small pleasures of living, and that without neighborhoods and their countless intergenerational makers, cities and their regions cannot survive and thrive²⁵

- The widely emulated «Seattle model» of community-led, consultant-assisted, mutually educative visioning as the beginning phase of neighborhood residents' planning for their shared future, out of which feasible and desirable city-wide plans can grow²⁶.

Conclusion

When we realistically understand cities as our primary places of human habitation and as the «centers of gravity» for their regions, nations, and global networks of human transactions of all kinds, it becomes clear why we need a new philosophy of the city grounded in a realistic, «We» - focused ontology that is reflected in a deeply democratic, pragmatist ethics. A philosophy of the city

²⁵ See two recent biographies of Jane Jacobs: Peter L. Laurence's *Becoming Jane Jacobs* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2016) and Robert Kanigel's *Eyes on the Street: The Life of Jane Jacobs* (Knopf Doubleday, New York 2017).

²⁶ See Carmen Siriani, *Investing in Democracy: Engaging Citizens in Collaborative Governance* (Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2009). See my *Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity, and Transformation* (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham 1999) for the original account of the consulting work of GreenWoods Associates, which David Woods and I continue to lead, to assist stakeholders in the Crown Hill-Ballard Neighborhood in Seattle in the future visioning process, Stage I in developing a neighborhood plan within the city's planning framework. This neighborhood was the only one in the city of Seattle that successfully completed this Stage I visioning process—all the others broke down in irreconcilable conflicts. See also Chapter 6, «The Continuously Planning City: Imperatives and Examples for Deepening Democracy», in my *Pragmatism and Social Hope: Deepening Democracy in Global Contexts* (Columbia University Press, New York, 2008).

that reflects such an urban ontology and such a pragmatist ethics can guide our efforts to transform humanity's non-ideal ways of living together toward more just, mutually committed, and sustainable ones, including our inextricably interlinked processes of collaboratively building up more adaptable architectures, institutions, and processes. When we recognize that such «We's» are the proper subject of our cities and acknowledge the immensity of their achievements, we will begin again to value them for their own sake, as well as for the sake of the individuals who will emerge within them, and we will recognize that *We are the city*, even more than the built forms, the artistic achievements, and the goods and services for which cities are known to others.

On this ontological and ethical basis, we will recognize that the urban «common wealth» that a city's «We» builds up belongs to them together, and that its constituent groups and their individual members have various kinds of moral claims on it to meet their basic human needs, to support their creative individuation processes, and to support their on-going efforts to sustain, to improve, to enjoy, and to reflect on the meaning of the complex transactions of their lives. Finally, we will recognize the importance of our human «We's» for the even greater «We» of Earth's Biotic Community, which relies on all of us to practice wise stewardship together in our daily living, including our committed efforts to plan for urban and regional futures in which our children's children will continue to experience the awe and wonder at its natural beauty that Aristotle regarded as the starting place of philosophy, as well as its bountiful provision for the needs of all of us humans and all of our other-than-human companions on life's journey.

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O OUTRO LADO DA CIDADE: DINÂMICAS DE APROPRIAÇÃO DE ESPAÇOS RESIDENCIAIS PERIFÉRICOS

The other side of the city: dynamics of appropriation of peripheral residential spaces

Abstract

This article is based on the communication that took place at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of University of Porto from October 11 to 13, at the International Conference *Philosophy of the City 2017*, and was included in the panel entitled «The

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other side of the city: dynamics of appropriation of peripheral residential spaces». Based on a sociological understanding, the urban social tissue is based on the social constructions that underlie it. Social neighbourhoods located in peripheral areas of the cities are physical and social spaces characterized by manifestations of poverty and social exclusion. In these spaces are developed ways of life with specific and differentiated configurations compared to dominant society. It is based on the fact that social exclusion is a dynamic and multidimensional process relationally constituted as the source of identity tensions in space. The contribution to this article is based on the approach of the appropriation processes in peripheral social neighbourhoods located in Darque, Viana do Castelo, focusing on research on influences underlying the dynamics of social and ethnic identities that are agglomerated in these relational social spaces.

Keywords: City; Peripheral residential spaces; Social neighbourhoods; Social exclusion, Identities.

Resumo

Este artigo tem por base uma mesa redonda realizada no âmbito do Congresso Internacional *Philosophy of the city 2017*, que teve lugar na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto de dia 11 a 13 de outubro, e integrou-se no painel intitulado «The other side of the city: dynamics of appropriation of peripheral residential spaces». Com base numa leitura sociológica, o tecido social urbano baseia-se nas construções sociais que o sustentam. Por excelência, os bairros sociais localizados nas zonas periféricas das cidades são espaços físicos e sociais, marcados por manifestações de pobreza e exclusão social. Nestes espaços, desenvolvem-se modos de vida com configurações específicas e diferenciadas relativamente à sociedade vigente e dominante. Tem-se por base que a exclusão social consiste num processo dinâmico e multidimensional constituído de forma relacional como origem de tensões identitárias no espaço. O contributo deste artigo assenta na abordagem dos processos de apropriação em bairros sociais periféricos situados em Darque, Viana do Castelo, focalizando a pesquisa nas influências subjacentes às dinâmicas das identidades sociais e étnicas que se aglomeram nestes espaços sociais relacionais.

Palavras-chave: Cidade; Espaços residenciais periféricos; Bairros sociais; Exclusão social; Identities.

1. O (não) direito à cidade: fenómenos de exclusão social

O tecido social urbano é configurado segundo as construções sociais que lhe são subjacentes, daí que a organização do espaço urbano e a vivência em zonas periféricas, alvo de segregação tanto a nível espacial, como social e cul-

tural, condicionem – e sejam condicionadas – (pel)os modos de vida e as representações dos seus habitantes com efeitos ao nível dos seus recursos materiais, sociais e simbólicos. Assim, o território é sinónimo de apropriação, pois condensa o conjunto dos projetos e das representações nos tempos e nos espaços sociais, culturais, estéticos, cognitivos. A vivência em pleno da cidade pressupõe a existência de um padrão social de referência em termos de direitos e de deveres e, por isso, ao direito à cidade estão associados outros direitos, como o direito ao alojamento, o direito ao emprego, o direito aos serviços, o direito à cultura e à qualidade de vida urbana e o direito de cidadania¹. Nesta ótica, os bairros desqualificados são os lugares onde existem cumulativamente os maiores estrangulamentos face a estes direitos². Com efeito, geralmente nestes espaços evidenciam-se processos dependentes de participação na medida em que os habitantes são simplesmente informados das decisões e não encetam estratégias de concertação com os poderes políticos, que por sua vez, não têm qualquer interesse no exercício mais ativo e coparticipado por parte das populações³.

Os fenómenos de desqualificação social e urbana apresentam conectividades com o fenómeno da exclusão, traduzem processos de afrouxamento ao nível das ligações sociais e com incidências em termos de *deficit* de integração identitária. Não será de estranhar, portanto, que os indivíduos socialmente desqualificados se encontrem tendencialmente concentrados nos mesmos bairros, com problemas de conceção e de organização evidentes e ainda de degradação do edificado e dos espaços públicos coletivos. A «redundância dos símbolos visíveis de degradação»⁴ gera intensas tensões entre os habitantes e a sociedade no seu todo, situação que é agravada pela constituição de uma imagem social estigmatizante e que interpreta esses espaços como negativos e violentos. Ora, a segregação reveste-se de um carácter de «fratura» social, sendo causa e consequência do surgimento de inúmeros problemas sociais de atualidade mediática e de debate técnico.

¹ Guerra, Paula, «A cidade na encruzilhada do urbano», *Dissertação (Mestrado)*, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, Porto 2002a. Guerra, Paula, «A cidade inclusiva», in Figueiredo, António Manuel; Penabad, Jose Manuel Peña; Álvarez, Enrique José Varela (coords.), *Retos de la Acción de Gobierno para las Ciudades del siglo XXI/Desafíos da governação das cidades do século XXI*, Eixo Atlântico do Noroeste Peninsular, Porto/Vigo 2012a, p. 351.

² Fayman, Sonia, «La politique de la ville ... et les habitants?», *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine*, n.º 68-69 (1995), pp. 114-122.

³ Blanc, Maurice, «Politique de la ville et démocratie local. La participation: une transaction le plus souvent diférée», *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine*, n.º 68/69 (1995), pp. 98-106.

⁴ Simon, Patrick, «La politique de la ville contre la ségrégation ou l'idéal d'une ville sans divisions», *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine*, n.º 68/69 (1995), pp. 26-33.

Como já foi por nós referido em outro momento⁵, o processo de estigmatização social tal como é explicado por Erving Goffman deriva de uma «etiquetagem» social, demonstrando o carácter lateral que a questão do desvio assume em relação às normas na problemática goffmanniana. Com efeito, este autor diferencia dois tipos de identidades sociais: a identidade social virtual que é construída a partir do somatório de informações do «eu» recolhidas na interação – aspetos físicos, reputação, modos de falar, modos de vestir, etc., e a identidade social real composta pelos atributos próprios, ou seja, reais, dos indivíduos⁶. Alguns destes atributos implicam o «descrédito» imediato dos indivíduos que os possuem. Se os atributos que conferem descrédito não se apresentarem, de imediato, no decurso da interação social, o indivíduo tende a ocultá-los, por intermédio de táticas, fazendo corresponder a sua identidade social virtual à sua identidade social real. Durante os processos de interação social podem assomar discrepâncias reais entre o que a sociedade vê e o que o indivíduo é, nascendo deste modo, também, o estigma. Este é constituído pela valorização dos atributos mais negativos dos sujeitos, ocasionando anátemas que na interação, vão constituir marcas de desqualificação e exclusão, constituindo estereótipos identificativos, a todo o momento.

2. Bairros sociais periféricos em Darque

Como podemos perceber a partir da visualização da figura 1, respeitante à delimitação das áreas geográficas onde se localizam as comunidades desfavorecidas de Viana do Castelo pelo *Plano de Ação de Integrado para as Comunidades Desfavorecidas* de Viana do Castelo, demonstramos a localização periférica da área geográfica de Darque e correspondente a *comunidade desfavorecida*.

⁵ Guerra, Paula, «Tecido urbano actual: continuidade ou descontinuidade», *Sociologia: Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto*, Vol. I, nº2 (1992) 145-175. Guerra, Paula, «Cenários portuenses de insegurança. Contributos do interacionismo simbólico para uma análise sociológica da construção mediática do desvio», *História – Revista da Faculdade de Letras*, Vol. 3 (2002b) 125-159. Guerra, Paula, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto: cenário de pertenças, de afectividade e de simbologias», *Sociologia: Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto*, Vol. 12 (2002c), pp. 65-144.

⁶ Goffman, Erving, *Estigma - notas sobre a manipulação da identidade social deteriorada*, Zahar Ed, Rio de Janeiro 1982, p. 11.

Figura 1 - Delimitação das comunidades desfavorecidas de Viana do Castelo pelo PAICD de Viana do Castelo



Fonte: CM Viana do Castelo; CEGOT.UP

Localizada na margem sul do rio Lima, numa área periférica em relação ao centro da cidade de Viana do Castelo, Darque é o local em que muitos dos bairros sociais desta cidade se concentram, mais resguardados da vista da cidade. Como sabemos, os bairros sociais, particularmente aqueles que estão localizados nos arredores das cidades – são espaços físicos e sociais principalmente marcados pela pobreza e por fenómenos de exclusão social, espaços onde se desenvolvem configurações específicas dos modos de vida⁷. A par da localização periférica de Darque, esta área pertencente a Viana do Castelo agrega

⁷ Rodrigues, Marta, «Vidas entrelaçadas em Darque: uma abordagem aos processos de (re) construção identitária de habitantes de bairros sociais» *Dissertação (Mestrado)*, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, Porto 2017. Guerra, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto...», art. cit.

um conjunto de problemáticas devido à confluência de indivíduos com uma série de problemáticas sociais que habitam bairros sociais desqualificados socialmente. Tendo por base os dados estatísticos do INE referentes a 2011, o perfil sociográfico da comunidade desfavorecida de Darque revela indicadores de vulnerabilidades económicas, culturais e sociais, como é o caso da elevada taxa de desemprego, 15,7%, nomeadamente de longa duração. No que diz respeito ao cenário mais negativo, no âmbito da procura de novo emprego no concelho de Viana do Castelo – havendo 85,8% de indivíduos em situação de procura do primeiro emprego; as situações de pobreza também têm relevância nesta comunidade, sendo que 16,8% das famílias têm pelo menos um membro desempregado no seu agregado; os níveis de abandono e insucesso escolares são consideráveis nesta comunidade desfavorecida, existindo um número de crianças com um grau de absentismo escolar superior ao dos demais agrupamentos de escolas de Viana do Castelo; os baixos níveis de qualificação escolar, representados por uma taxa de analfabetismo de cerca de 5,7%, sendo que apenas 39,7% dos indivíduos que integram a comunidade desfavorecida de Darque têm qualificações iguais ou superiores ao 3º ciclo do ensino básico. A somar a estes fatores, destaca-se a forte presença de comunidades ciganas que habitam bairros sociais alvo de processos de desqualificação social e física do espaço público⁸.

Desta feita, o objeto de estudo desta pesquisa tem por base mulheres ciganas que se encontram desempregadas, ou em situação de pobreza, e que registam abandono e/ou insucesso escolar, baixos níveis de qualificação escolar e que vivem em bairros sociais com condições precárias. A opção pela delimitação do objeto de estudo feminino tem em consideração que:

ainda vivemos [...] [num] sistema patriarcal (...) construído sob bases arbitrárias em que a figura da mulher foi enfraquecida a partir das divisões e atribuições dadas a cada sexo/sujeito. Além disso, surgiram, ao longo dos tempos, muitas questões sobre essas divisões, sobretudo em consequência da acentuada diferença que se sobrepôs à figura da mulher⁹.

A par das influências internas e externas da exclusão social, existem con-

⁸ Com base numa componente da candidatura do Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento Urbano (PEDU) de Viana do Castelo – *Plano de Ação Integrado para as Comunidades Desfavorecidas*. Viana do Castelo, Setembro de 2015.

⁹ Souza, Sibely da Silva, «Periferias narrativas: vozes em trânsito», *Dissertação (Mestrado)*, Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Letras da Universidade Federal do Amazonas, Manaus 2017.

flitos interétnicos devido à coabitação nos mesmos espaços entre ciganos e não ciganos ou com outras diferenças socioculturais. Devido à progressiva sedentarização dos grupos de etnia cigana, a sua «fixação tem vindo a passar das casas abarracadas, barracas e unidades móveis, para o realojamento em bairros sociais, onde se registam elevados níveis de concentração de efetivos e uma coabitação multiétnica, assim como alguns sinais de conflitualidade interétnica»¹⁰.

Através de uma abordagem metodológica qualitativa, com o uso de observação direta e entrevistas para essas mulheres e para os agentes socioinstitucionais, esta investigação pretende analisar processos diacrónicos e sincrónicos de reconstrução relacionados com as identidades sociais e étnicas.

2. Os espaços residenciais periféricos

Correntemente, emergem fenómenos designados por gentrificação, um processo que Walter Rodrigues analisou na cidade de Lisboa¹¹, e sobre o qual adianta três pressupostos básicos. Primeiramente, saber as formas de que se reveste o processo em cada contexto urbano particular. Seguidamente, a importância do processo para a recomposição do tecido social das áreas urbanas, independente muitas vezes de qualquer reapropriação das zonas ditas históricas por parte das camadas mais desfavorecidas e populares do tecido social. Finalmente, a gentrificação deverá ser abordada não só numa componente de apropriação residencial, mas dentro de um processo de reestruturação das cidades que faz com que coexistam no mesmo espaço, os «profissionais e a *beautiful people*, da gentrificação residencial e económica» e «o «Outro» das heterotopias do tecido social das metrópoles»¹².

Decorrente do processo de gentrificação, surgem fenómenos de polarização que se traduzem na dualização da estrutura social das cidades acentuando-se as clivagens entre classes possidentes e classes desapossadas. A polarização social crescente nas cidades, categoria conceptual inacabada

¹⁰ Mendes, Maria Manuela, «Um olhar sobre a identidade e a alteridade: Nós, os Ciganos e os Outros, os Não Ciganos», *Actas do IV Congresso Português de Sociologia – Sociedade Portuguesa: passados Recentes, Futuros Próximos*, (2005b), p.31.

¹¹ Rodrigues, Walter, «Globalização e gentrificação. Teoria e empiria», *Sociologia - Problemas e Práticas*, n.º 29 (1999), pp. 95-125. O mesmo autor tem vindo a desenvolver as suas análises em outros trabalhos, dos quais salientamos, Rodrigues, Walter, «Urbanidade e novos estilos de vida», *Sociologia - Problemas e Práticas*, n.º 12 (1992), pp. 91-107.

¹² Rodrigues, «Globalização e gentrificação», art. cit., p. 111.

e polissémica, pode ser definida como um conjunto de processos que desembocam na criação de uma fratura social profunda entre os que têm capacidade de apropriação económica do espaço ou não; esta desigualdade pode radicar nos rendimentos e na estrutura de rendimentos possuída pelos estratos sociais presentes, entrecruzada com as diferentes oportunidades em termos de mobilidade social ou profissional através da criação de obstáculos à mudança de estatuto ou de segmento do mercado de trabalho, traduzindo-se assim, em segregação residencial, cultural e simbólica¹³.

A análise da polarização interessa-nos na medida em que está estreitamente relacionada com toda a amálgama de processos que conduzem à concentração de pessoas de débeis recursos em aglomerados habitacionais e urbanísticos de qualidade medíocre e de impacto negativo sobre a estrutura urbana. A consequência de todo este processo de estruturação do espaço situa-se no facto de que determinados atores sociais urbanos, devido à sua insuficiente estrutura de recursos, desprovidos de capacidade negocial, sujeitam-se a processos de seleção e de segregação no quadro da sua localização do espaço urbano¹⁴, sendo de assinalar ruturas evidentes a que são vulneráveis determinadas categorias sociais em particular, sendo de destacar, a título exemplificativo, o caso dos jovens que se encontram desintegrados da escola, do trabalho, do emprego e da cultura dominante, assim,

os jovens podem passar muito facilmente de uma situação de desqualificação ou de insucesso repetidos a uma situação de rutura, sem passar praticamente pela fase de dependência, porque esta fase de fragilidade, de desqualificação, pode levá-los a procura (de) compensações nos meios marginais, em particular nas redes de droga, e a perder os laços que os ligavam a uma rede profissional e à família¹⁵.

Importa agora passar a uma caracterização dos bairros sociais de Darque que estão na base deste trabalho, assim como a uma caracterização socio-demográfica dos entrevistados. Nas fotografias da figura 2 podemos ver um

¹³ Sobre esta questão Christ Hamnett tece importantes considerações: Hamnett, Christ, «La polarisation sociale: déconstruction d'un concept chaotique?», in A. Martens – M. Vervaeke (coords.), *La Polarisation Sociale des Villes Européennes*, Anthropos Paris 1997, pp. 111-123.

¹⁴ Guerra, «Cenários portuenses de insegurança...», art. cit.. Guerra, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto...», art. cit.. Willmott, Peter - Murie, Alan, *La Pauperisation du Logement Social. Le cas de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France*, Éditions L'Harmattan, Paris 1990, pp. 75-99.

¹⁵ Paugam, Serge: «A desqualificação social», in SOULET, Mark-Henry, *Da Não-Integração. Tentativas de Definição Teórica de um Problema Social Contemporâneo*, Quarteto Editora, Coimbra 2000, p. 117.

dos bairros sociais onde vivem nossos entrevistados: Bairro do Fomento. A primeira impressão desse bairro social é que revela vários sinais de degradação física que não possibilitam representações sociais positivas. Além do aspeto físico do bairro, este acolhe um grupo de indivíduos com vulnerabilidades sociais que tendem a danificar as imagens reproduzidas relativamente ao bairro, segundo um processo cíclico¹⁶.

Figura 2 - Perspetivas do edificado do Bairro do Fomento



Fonte: Fotografada por Marta Rodrigues, 2017

Na figura 3, podemos visualizar outro dos bairros sociais onde vivem nossos entrevistados: Bairro 3 de julho. O Bairro 3 de julho possui uma imagem física mais agradável devido ao facto de ter sido pintado recentemente e possuir mais condições. No entanto, persistem as representações sociais menos positivas sobre o bairro devido ao conjunto de pessoas com diferentes problemas sociais que habitam esse espaço social.

¹⁶ Guerra, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto...», art. cit.

Figura 3 - Perspetivas do edificado do Bairro 3 de julho



Fonte: Fotografias por Marta Rodrigues, 2017.

De acordo com a informação sobre o objeto de estudo supramencionado, segue-se a estrutura que define os perfis sociodemográficos dos entrevistados:

Tabela 1 - Dados sociográficos das entrevistadas

Etnia	Idade	Profissão	Nível de escolaridade	Local de residência
Cigana	22	Executante das tarefas do lar	9.º ano	Bairro do Fomento
Cigana	16	Estudante	6.º ano	Bairro do Fomento
Cigana	20	Feirante	9.º ano	Bairro do Fomento
Cigana	21	Executante das tarefas do lar	6.º ano	Bairro do Fomento

Cigana	25	Desempregada	5.º ano	Bairro do Fomento
Cigana	22	Executante das tarefas do lar	9.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	16	Estudante	9.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	41	Feirante	6.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	17	Feirante	8.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	42	Desempregada	Analfabeta (sabe escrever o nome próprio)	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	19	Desempregada	10.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	13	Estudante	4.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho
Cigana	12	Estudante	4.º ano	Bairro 3 de julho

Através da *Tabela 1*, imediatamente constatamos que estas mulheres ciganas são empregadas domésticas, estudantes ou desempregadas e, quando têm emprego, são comerciantes. Em relação à escolaridade, os níveis apresentados são o resultado do abandono e do insucesso escolar que ainda são comuns na etnia cigana, apesar das mudanças sociais que se têm verificado neste sentido. Isto significa que as mulheres ciganas não são bem qualificadas, o que implica ciclos de exclusão social que impedem de se candidatar a outros trabalhos, a menos que tenham que gerir o próprio negócio no contexto das feiras.

Ao focalizarmos o nosso olhar em bairros, quisemos manter uma certa distância epistemológica relativamente ao que Henri Lefebvre apelida de «ideologia do Bairro»¹⁷. Sabemos que a entidade que apelidamos de Bairro não é o quadro natural da vida social da cidade, mas corporiza um tipo ideal de vida em sociedade à escala humana. Aliás, a questão do alojamento tem sido colocada no âmbito das políticas urbanas na medida em que se entende que o primeiro plano de realização humana passa pela sua satisfação no espaço de vida doméstico¹⁸. O bairro não deve ser assumido como essência da vida humana, sobretudo numa época em que a escala do ator social já não pode determinar o todo, pois a urbanização facilitou uma organização

¹⁷ Lefebvre, Henri, *Du Rural à l'Urbain*, Éd. Anthropos, Paris 1970, p. 207.

¹⁸ Cfr. Joseph, Isaac, «Le droit à la ville. La ville à l'oeuvre. Deux paradigmes de la recherche», *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine*, n.º 64 (1994) 4-10.

mais ampla da vida económica e social. A multiplicação dos meios de comunicação nas deslocações passou a ser um ingrediente essencial da vida quotidiana¹⁹ como já referimos anteriormente. No que diz respeito ao ideal comunitário tantas vezes atribuído ao Bairro, ou à vida no Bairro, em virtude da intensa participação dos seus habitantes, Beringuier evidencia os objetivos de assegurar a reprodução dos mecanismos de exploração e de acumulação de capital que são ocultados sob a forma de defesa da vida associativa. De igual modo, Beringuier também problematiza o facto de sempre se associar a identidade face ao espaço como local de habitação²⁰.

3. Fragmentos (e resistências) identitários

As entrevistas realizadas no âmbito desta pesquisa sociológica foram na forma de histórias de vida de mulheres giganas para conhecer as suas representações sobre viver num bairro localizado nos arredores da cidade de Viana do Castelo. Aqui se apresentarão alguns excertos de entrevistas para demonstrar as perspetivas dessas pessoas sobre a sua pertença e vivência em bairros sociais periféricos por forma a entender os efeitos identitários. As entrevistadas consideram que viver no bairro não é o único fator que influencia as situações de pobreza e exclusão, mas também o facto de serem de etnia cigana. Uma das características das políticas de construção destes espaços assenta na diferenciação pela negativa, que se transporta também para os seus habitantes²¹. Assim, também são espaços de desenraizamento e de pulverização dos contactos e das relações sociais, não podendo deixar de se constituir como espaços de especial atenção porque materializam o quotidiano de um número cada vez maior de pessoas.

Para além disso, verifica-se que o posicionamento de aparente repulsa da coabitação com etnia cigana por parte de membros da mesma etnia não exprime um afastamento identitário face ao grupo, mas sim «um reconhecimento da sua singularidade e especificidade» relativamente aos não-giganos e

¹⁹ Cfr. Rémy, Jean - Voyé, Lilianne, *Ville, Ordre et Violence*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1981.

²⁰ Beringuier, Christine, «Se reconnaître dans la ville: à chacun son quartier!», *Espaces et Sociétés*, n.ºs 34-35 (1980).

²¹ Cfr. AA. VV., *Demain la Ville – Rapport présenté au Ministre de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité par Jean-Pierre Sueur – Maire d'Orléans*, Tome I, La Documentation Française, Paris 1998. Guerra, «Cenários portuenses de insegurança...», art. cit.. Guerra, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto...», art. cit.

a presença de conflitos que envolvem ciganos²².

É um bairro social, basta dizer que vives num bairro social com ciganos que já te fecham todas as portas, mesmo que sejam ciganos intelectuais e como deve de ser, com uma vida social muito equilibrada, dizem-te logo «mora num bairro social? é logo, há logo aquela coisa com os ciganos e isso muda, acho muito que sim.

(Etnia cigana, 41 anos, feirante, 6.º ano, residente no Bairro 3 de julho)

Se morasse numa casa sem ser perto dos ciganos acredito que fosse melhor, que tivesse mais oportunidades.

(Etnia cigana, 25 anos, desempregada, 5.º ano, residente no Bairro do Fomento)

Para além do referido, as condições físicas dos bairros e a falta de limpeza dos espaços também influenciam as experiências de auto e hetero representações sociais acerca desses espaços sociais. Os habitantes desses bairros acabam por contribuir para a imagem degradante dos bairros onde residem, uma vez que acabam por revelar algum desinteresse pela sua preservação²³.

Melhorar mais o aspeto do bairro que tem um aspeto assim... [mau].

(Etnia cigana, 17 anos, feirante, 8.º ano, residente no Bairro 3 de julho)

Já viu como está este bairro? Está muito velho este bairro, tem muito mau aspeto. [...] Não há muita limpeza. As pessoas não têm cuidado, mandam muita coisa para o chão.

(Etnia cigana, 20 anos, feirante, 9.º ano, residente no Bairro do Fomento)

A concentração de pessoas com diversos problemas sociais em espaços de habitação segregados e localizados na periferia intensifica os processos de exclusão social. Como refere Michel Pinçon a segregação «é sinónimo de exclusão e de relegação»²⁴. A segregação sócio espacial prende-se com as

²² Mendes, Maria Manuela, *Nós, os Ciganos e os Outros: Etnicidade e Exclusão Social*, Livros Horizonte, Lisboa 2005a, p.87.

²³ Guerra, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto...», art. cit..

²⁴ Pinçon, Michel, «Des communautés peu ordinaires: élites sociales et comités de défense

diferentes localizações de grupos sociais definidos em função da sua posição social, da sua origem geográfica, da sua religião, etc.. Este eixo conceptual remete-nos para a instauração de distâncias sociais e físicas e para a saliência simbólica da diferença face ao «outro». Num segundo enfoque conceptual, este processo prende-se não tanto com as distâncias sócio espaciais estabelecidas entre os diferentes grupos no quadro de interação espacial, mas sobretudo, com as desigualdades de acesso aos recursos materiais, lúdicos e simbólicos da cidade²⁵, por outras palavras, à centralidade da cidade corporizadora de equipamentos e de serviços destinada à propiciação do bem-estar social e humano²⁶. A pertinência analítica destes dois eixos parece-nos importante, pois a cidade incorpora dinamicamente ambas as modalidades de segregação. No caso particular dos bairros sociais ou de iniciativa camarária, as duas componentes encontram, a nosso ver, uma exemplificação paradigmática.

Dentro da mesma linha de abordagem, é necessário focar aqui dois fatores que podem amplificar os processos de segregação sócio espacial. Por um lado, a focalização, e a sobreposição, de programas de intervenção (transnacionais, nacionais e locais) nestes espaços, podem, ainda, adensar mais os sentimentos de estigmatização que afetam as populações que residem em determinados espaços urbanos, pela atribuição negativa e depreciativa de que são objeto por parte da restante população. Esses lugares tendem a ser catalogados e etiquetados de «bairros difíceis», ou por outras palavras, bairros ou zonas «deserdado(a)s». Por outro lado, a mediatização de que são alvo esses espaços, assume, com frequência, um pendor sensacionalista e empolgado, quase fantasmagórico, o que contribui para reforçar e amplificar a imagem exterior negativa desses locais e das populações que aí residem. A imagem pública socialmente difundida retrata esses espaços como espaços de violência, de conflito, inseguros, em síntese, espaços perigosos, aí não é possível viver²⁷. O que podemos verificar é que quando as famílias ciganas pretendem alugar

dans les beaux quartiers», in N. Haumont (ed.), *La Ville: Agrégation et Ségrégation Sociales*, Éditions L'Harmattan, Paris 1996, p. 55. Guerra, «A cidade na encruzilhada do urbano», op. cit.

²⁵ Cfr. Preteceille, Edmond, *La Ségrégation Sociale dans les Grands Villes*, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1992; Pinçon, Michel et al, *Ségrégation Urbaine. Classes et Équipements Collectifs en Région Parisienne*, Éd. Anthropos, Paris 1986.

²⁶ Guerra, «A cidade na encruzilhada do urbano», op. cit. Grafmeyer, Yves, «Regards sociologiques sur la segregation», in J. Brun, - C. Rhein (eds.), *La Ségrégation dans la Ville*, Édition L'Harmattan, Paris 1994, pp. 85-117.

²⁷ Guerra, «Cenários portuenses de insegurança...», art. cit.. Guerra, «O Bairro do Cerco do Porto...», art. cit.. Um maior desenvolvimento destas questões pode ser encontrado no artigo de Oberti, Marco, «La relégation urbaine, regards européens», in S. Paugam, (dir.), *L'Exclusion, l'État des Savoirs*, Éditions La Découverte, Paris 1996, p. 237-247.

ou comprar uma casa e os proprietários percebem que estão a negociar com famílias ciganas, seguem-se um conjunto de desculpas para que o negócio fique por ali. O argumento é que pessoas de etnia cigana provocarão uma série de problemas, consequência das representações sociais associadas aos seus comportamentos.

Quando quero alugar uma casa pedem logo folhas de vencimento, folhas de IRS, claro que se não trabalho não tenho, só que se veem que sou cigana...

(Etnia cigana, 22 anos, executante das tarefas do lar, 9.º ano, residente no Bairro 3 de julho)

Sei que não alugam casas a ciganos. Aqui em Darque e em Viana sabem que é cigano e não querem [...] vou para onde? Quem me dera a mim que me dessem uma casinha.

(Etnia cigana, 25 anos, desempregada, 5.º ano, residente no Bairro do Fomento)

Se pudessem dar outra casa queria sair daqui.

(Etnia cigana, 42 anos, desempregada, apenas sabe escrever o nome próprio, residente no Bairro 3 de julho)

Para além da discriminação e do racismo que se denota no acesso ao mercado de trabalho, as mulheres ciganas também relatam o facto de que as distribuições das pessoas pelos blocos do bairro revelam discriminação contra os ciganos.

Há pessoas racistas [...] quando não dão trabalho às pessoas, ainda há racismo.

(Etnia cigana, 16 anos, estudante, 6.º ano de escolaridade, residente no Bairro do Fomento)

Em vez de fazerem os prédios para a banda de cá fizeram para a de lá porque são racistas.

(Etnia cigana, 42 anos, desempregada, apenas sabe escrever o nome próprio, residente no Bairro 3 de julho)

Concluindo, as mulheres entrevistadas pretendem mudar de residência se lhes for concedida essa oportunidade, uma vez que os espaços sociais onde vivem são o *locus* de concentração de problemáticas sociais. No entanto,

as mulheres entrevistadas não têm como prioridade abandonar Darque. A habitação funciona como lugar privilegiado de instalação no tecido urbano. Nesta perspetiva, a cidade e a casa desenvolvem relações de complementaridade, uma vez que o urbano é o cenário da deslocação do movimento e da circulação, funcionando a habitação como o local da interiorização, da adaptação²⁸. A crise do urbano também será, então, a expressão da crescente desarticulação entre a cidade e a casa, tornando-se, esta última, cada vez mais um espaço de fragmentação, de desenraizamento e de precariedade de existência²⁹.

Sabemos que a construção de uma casa é um fenómeno cultural que se inscreve no espírito de uma época. A habitação torna-se um elemento de base na avaliação da qualidade de vida social, que é apreciada, não só a partir do seu «valor de abrigo», mas também a partir, e de forma cada vez mais intensa, do seu valor de implantação e de localização, aliada às possibilidades de aceder facilmente aos diferentes locais de trabalho e de serviços³⁰. Ou, de outra forma, pela sua renda de posição e pela sua renda de qualidade. A casa pode ser perspetivada como «janela de cultura» na medida

em que a própria conceção arquitetónica e os usos dos espaços domésticos estão bastante ligados a valores e práticas culturais (...). A casa aparece (...) como um todo a explorar numa ótica de produção e apropriação sociocultural, utilizando, para tal, modelos ambientais suscetíveis de diferenciar socioculturalmente diversos modelos de habitar...³¹.

Estas formas de habitar são influenciadas pelos modelos culturais, pela posição do indivíduo na estrutura social, mas, também, pela própria estrutura espacial ou contexto espacial em que os agentes sociais se movem.

4. Seguindo os sinais

A forma como estes indivíduos se auto e hetero definem baseia-se nas suas trajetórias e experiências de exclusão por comparação ao *outro*, isto é, tendo

²⁸ Guerra, «A cidade na encruzilhada do urbano», op. cit..

²⁹ Cfr. Jarreau, Philippe, *Du Bricolage: Archéologie de la Maison*, CCI-Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris 1985.

³⁰ Rémy - Voyé, *Ville, Ordre et Violence*, op. cit., p. 89.

³¹ Freitas, Maria João, «Pensar os espaços domésticos em contextos de realojamento», *Sociedade e Território*, n.º 25/26 (1998) p. 153-154.

o *outro* como referencial. A ausência de perspectivas futuras de mobilidade social por parte das entrevistadas adultas é uma regularidade verificada. Porém, as aspirações para os seus descendentes são mais elevadas. Verifica-se que as exclusões sociais de que estas mulheres ciganas são alvo tendem a manter-se geracionalmente, o que constitui limitações no acesso a melhores condições de vida e a ocorrência de processos de mobilidade social ascendente³². Existem sinais de que nos espaços sociais como os bairros sociais que temos vindo a falar ao longo deste artigo ocorrem processos sociais de exclusão dos modos de vida destas mulheres ciganas que habitam estes locais.

As identidades sociais e individuais sofrem constantes processos de reconstrução, fundamentalmente aqueles que são alvo de exclusão social e lidam com tensões identitárias que envolvem violência simbólica por oposição aos valores e modos de vida contrastantes com os dos restantes indivíduos que integram a sociedade. Estas pessoas servem-se de estratégias identitárias para se autodefinirem e às suas condições de vida. As trajetórias biográficas destas mulheres ciganas continuam a revelar-se tendencialmente limitadas por constrangimentos associados às vulnerabilidades sociais que albergam e o facto de se inserirem num grupo étnico altamente discriminado na sociedade (ver figura 4).

Figura 4 - Word cloud: perfis sociodemográficos das entrevistadas



Fonte: Marta Rodrigues, 2017.

³² Rodrigues, «Vidas entrelaçadas em Darque...» op. cit.

A inclusão ilustra uma nova etapa assente na aceitação e valorização da diversidade, na cooperação entre diferentes e na aprendizagem da multiplicidade; um processo através do qual a sociedade, nas suas mais diversas dimensões, se adapta de forma a poder incluir todos os indivíduos que, por sua vez, se preparam para desempenhar um papel nessa sociedade.

Como Paula Guerra³³ refere, de acordo com a noção de que estar excluído é estar privado dos direitos de cidadania plena, a exclusão social constitui um problema não só social como democrático e de resolução crucial a integrar nas políticas de inclusão social. Na perspetiva de Marco Oberti³⁴, a cidade é um espaço dual, proporcionando quer a integração, quer a exclusão. A diferenciação social inscreve-se no espaço físico, de facto, as cidades foram e são ainda na atualidade caracterizadas pela divisão social do seu território. A ocupação do espaço sempre originou lutas sociais, sobretudo em meio urbano; podemos mesmo considerar que o tecido social urbano é descontínuo e fragmentado. Assim, estamos perante uma cidade de dispersão social e física e de enclaves físicos e simbólicos, visíveis e invisíveis.

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³³ Guerra, Paula, «Da exclusão social à inclusão social: eixos de uma mudança paradigmática», *Revista Angolana de Sociologia*, n. 10 (2012b) 91-110.

³⁴ Oberti, «La relégation urbaine, regards européens», op. cit., p. 237-247.

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**MÁS ALLÁ DEL NOMOS DE LA TIERRA. UN ANÁLISIS DE LA
CRISIS DEL ESPACIO COMO MEDIDA EN LA ERA DE LA POST-
METRÓPOLI**

Beyond the Nomos of the Earth. An Analysis of the Crisis of Space as a Measure in the Age of the Post-Metropolis

Abstract

The distinction between the twentieth-century metropolis and the Roman model of a city must be sought in the eminently biopolitical character of the modern-day (post-)metropolis. As a result, the primacy of time over space has been established as the only way of measuring the proximity of (re)productive relationships: everything that can be converted into information is instantaneous and the value of goods depends not on the requirements of its production process but on the cost of its transportation. As a kind of Phenomenology of the Urban Spirit, this paper devel-

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ops the main milestones in the historical unfolding of this Logic of the Absolute Urban Spirit.

Key words: Urban Politics; Smart Cities; *Nomos*; *Arcana Imperii*; Over-exposure.

Resumen

La distinción de las metrópolis del siglo XX con el modelo romano de ciudad reside en el carácter eminentemente biopolítico de las actuales (post)metrópolis. Como consecuencia de ello, se ha establecido una primacía del tiempo sobre el espacio como única forma de medir la proximidad de las relaciones (re)productivas: Todo lo susceptible de ser convertido en información es instantáneo y el valor de las mercancías depende no tanto de los requerimientos de su proceso de producción como del coste de su transporte. Como una Fenomenología del Espíritu Urbano, la presente comunicación desarrolla los principales hitos en el despliegue histórico de esta Lógica del Espíritu Urbano Absoluto.

Palabras clave: Política urbana; *Smart Cities*; *Nomos*; *Arcana Imperii*; Sobreexposición.

1. Arcana Urbem Imperii

Relatado como un cuento infantil dedicado a su hija Ánima y auténtico prelude de su más conocido *Nomos de la Tierra*, en 1942 Karl Schmitt publicó *Tierra y Mar*, que fue concebido como «una reflexión sobre la historia universal» centrada en torno a los distintos tipos de relaciones jurídico-políticas que posibilitaban la primacía del dominio técnico sobre cada uno de los cuatro elementos identificados en la Antigüedad. Schmitt intentaba destacar el drástico cambio producido en las relaciones jurídicas modernas o *Ius Publicum Europaeum* con el paso del *Nomos* de la Tierra propio de las ciudades-Estado al dominio mercantil del Agua característico de la Era Moderna. Únicamente en el último capítulo anuncia un nuevo paso al paradigma del Aire propio de «los medios de comunicación e información»¹.

Schmitt señaló que la tecnología de los medios de transporte desarrollada tras la Segunda Revolución Industrial puso en crisis la necesaria escala o medida territorial de los Estados europeos para que la planificación urbanística –convertida en ordenación territorial del Estado– pudiera seguir englobando la nueva dimensión adquirida por los medios de producción. Como única

¹ Schmitt, Karl, *Tierra y mar: una reflexión sobre la historia universal*, Trotta, Madrid 2007, p. 81.

alternativa al Imperio aéreo que se acercaba, Schmitt propuso su teoría de los grandes espacios (*Grobraum*). Su objetivo era salvaguardar la soberanía de lo público, lo que, según él, solo es posible dentro de un modelo telúrico. El jurista alemán tenía claro que «la técnica ha transformado el concepto de espacio»², y que para desvelar el secreto del arte de tratar con el Leviatán marítimo «era necesario descubrir las técnicas del poder indirecto [y] penetrar en los *arcana imperii*»³.

Ahora bien, Schmitt, debido a su formación exclusivamente jurídico-política, no fue capaz de desarrollar el análisis concreto de cómo los cambios producidos en el dominio técnico de los elementos afectaban al funcionamiento – y por tanto a la administración y la gestión– de las ciudades y el espacio público. Setenta y cinco años después de la publicación de *Tierra y Mar*, el desarrollo de las tecnologías de la información ha mostrado claramente la incapacidad de unas Administraciones Públicas aún definidas territorialmente para poder controlar y/u organizar los procesos (re)productivos que tienen lugar en los territorios en los que creen ser soberanas. Con el paso del paradigma telúrico al eólico (la nube digital) y la necesidad de cambiar el proceso de expansión de la ciudad por la regeneración inteligente de sus infraestructuras y edificaciones, el proceso de extracción de plusvalías ya no depende de la revalorización que experimentan los solares al pasar de suelo «no urbanizable» a «urbanizable», por lo que las Administraciones Públicas quedan completamente denostadas: son propias de un paradigma telúrico ya superado.

Con el objetivo de identificar tanto las técnicas urbanísticas obsoletas como las nuevas y urgentes necesidades de regulación que los actuales desarrollos urbanos conllevan, este artículo presenta una pequeña fenomenología del Espíritu Urbano estructurada en torno a los *arcana* elementales descritos por Schmitt: la polis terrestre, la metrópoli marítima y la post-metrópoli eólica.

2. El Behemoth de la ciudad-Estado y la crisis del Nomos de la Tierra

En la disciplina filosófica habitualmente el primer significado de las ciudades se relaciona de modo completamente ingenuo e históricamente irresponsable con una construcción ideal de la *polis* griega como delimitación

² Volpi, F., «Epílogo», in K. Schmitt, *Tierra y mar: una reflexión sobre la historia universal*, Trotta, Madrid 2007, p. 103.

³ Volpi, «Epílogo», art. cit., p. 101.

de una zona del territorio en la que todo ciudadano tendría, por utilizar la conocida expresión de Hannah Arendt, «el derecho a tener derechos». Es decir, todo ciudadano posee la garantía de un derecho de aparición en un espacio en el que poder exponer y discutir, en pie de igualdad, las opiniones sobre el modo de gestión de la vida pública de la *polis*. Esta es una visión puramente política de la ciudad que muy probablemente jamás haya tenido una realidad efectiva.

Por su parte, aquellos que critican esta lectura de la ciudad-Estado ateniense como época dorada del igualitarismo democrático suelen recurrir o al análisis marxista de su modo de producción basado en la esclavitud⁴ o al genético-belicista⁵. Lo que las tres lecturas suelen pasar por alto en su descripción de la política ateniense es la estrecha relación que esta guarda con las técnicas de medición del espacio. A este respecto es necesario recalcar que en la polis griega, el *nomos* (νόμος) de la tierra que marcaba la diferencia entre la ciudad habitada por el hombre griego y el resto del mundo era simultáneamente ley (derecho), razón (forma lógica) y proporción (forma geométrica o aritmética $a/b = c/d$), de modo que aquel que salía del límite o *lira* de la ciudad era precisamente aquel que de-liraba ante la terrorífica des-mesura del territorio (*terreo*) entendido como aquello que estaba falto de toda medida o proporción (irracional).

Por el contrario, la condición de posibilidad de lo racional y, por tanto, de lo público consistía en la posibilidad de establecer una medida y dominio del espacio físico a través del desarrollo de la Geo-metría y la agri-mensura. O lo que es lo mismo, la ciudad Estado ateniense (πόλις) era entendida como la técnica por excelencia de medición socio-espacial del territorio. Era, de este modo, una auténtica administración del espacio interior a un determinado *génos* y una política de defensa (πολιμος) contra el irracional y des-medido enemigo exterior⁶.

Por ello el cambio en la ciudad vendrá de la mano de la transformación de la técnica de medición. Será la invención de la técnica perspectiva en el Renacimiento la que permitirá un desarrollo exponencial de la sistematización métrica del espacio, lo que conducirá al paradigma metropolitano, pues en

⁴ Cfr. Kautsky, Karl, *Parlamentarismo y democracia*, Editorial Nacional, Madrid 1982, pp. 103-107.

⁵ Cfr. Cacciari, Manfredo, «La ciudad territorio (o la post-metrópolis)», in L. Arenas - U. Fogué (eds.), *Planos de (Inter) sección: materiales para un diálogo entre filosofía y arquitectura*, Ricardo S. Lampreave Editor, Madrid 2011, p. 7.

⁶ Cfr. Cacciari, «La ciudad territorio (o la post-metrópolis)», art. cit., p. 42; Cacciari, Massimo, *La città*, Pazzini Editore, Venezia 2009, p. 16.

último término, esta técnica implica para el espacio las mismas consecuencias que la yuxtaposición numérica del lenguaje fonético supone para el sentido. Ambas relaciones pueden ser fácilmente mostradas mediante el término «heterotopía» desarrollado por Foucault. En *Las palabras y las cosas*, el filósofo francés, tomándolo de una obra de Borges, puso el ejemplo hasta hoy paradigmático de heterotopía lingüística conocido como la lista del emperador⁷.

Tres años después de que Foucault publicará su famoso libro, Manfredo Tafuri realizó una lectura completamente heterotópica del diseño morfo-tipológico de la Basílica del *Santo Spirito* de Florencia diseñada por Brunelleschi a partir de 1444. Al igual que en el caso de la lista del emperador, según Tafuri, la metodología del diseño brunelleschiano es una yuxtaposición de formas puras completamente independientes y autónomas las unas de las otras cuya conexión y continuidad espacial sería posibilitada por el empleo de un único módulo métrico para todo el edificio. De este modo, la primera tipología formal sería la empleada en la nave central y el núcleo central del crucero «casi seguro resueltas, en el proyecto original, con cubiertas abovedadas»⁸. La segunda estaría compuesta de bóvedas vaídas con las que se solucionarían los «espacios menores». Por último, la tercera tipología formal la constituirían los ábsides perimetrales cupulados.

De igual modo, la mayor parte de las villas renacentistas empezarán a construirse según series armónicas 12-18-36 que representan las razones 1:2, 2:3, y 1:3. Es decir, «el Renacimiento y los períodos clásicos prefirieron la faceta numérica, es decir, aritmética de esa tradición [la neoplatónica]»⁹. La relación existente entre la perspectiva y los procedimientos aritméticos de proyección arquitectónica reside en que únicamente «cuando existe una progresión o serie de razones iguales podremos esperar el descubrimiento de una ley que regule las razones de esos objetos que aparecen escorzados en la intersección»¹⁰. Únicamente las relaciones de la planta y el alzado según estructuraciones aritméticas realizadas según números enteros o fracciones simples, permiten al ojo humano percibir relaciones constantes y racionales en la aprehensión del espacio proyectado a través de las leyes de la perspectiva¹¹.

Si bien la intención de los primeros arquitectos renacentistas era lograr

⁷ Cfr. Foucault, Michel, *Las Palabras y las Cosas. Una Arqueología de las Ciencias Humanas*, Editorial Siglo XXI, Madrid 2005, p. 1.

⁸ Tafuri, Manfredo, *La arquitectura del humanismo*, Xarait Ediciones, Barcelona 1978, p. 14.

⁹ Wittkower, Rudolf, *Sobre la arquitectura en la edad del humanismo*, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona 1979, p. 530.

¹⁰ Wittkower, *Sobre la arquitectura en la edad del humanismo*, op. cit., p. 548.

¹¹ Cfr. Argan, Giulio Carlo, *Renacimiento y Barroco Vol. I*, Ediciones Akal, Madrid 1987, p. 103.

un control y con-mensurabilidad total y sistemático del espacio urbano, las consecuencias fueron totalmente antagónicas, pues dieron lugar a una estructuración racional del espacio completamente homogénea en la que, suprimidas ya todas las connotaciones naturalistas y sustancialistas del espacio mítico¹², este funcionaba como una estructura espacial *a priori* en la que todo puede tener lugar¹³. El resultado final de dicha homogenización es la indiferencia de todos los objetos.

La sistematización matemática virtual del espacio podrá unirse rápidamente a la sistematización monetaria realizada, gracias a la invención de la contabilidad por partida doble, por el neoplatónico Luca Pacioli en su obra *Summa de arithmetica, geometria, proportioni et proportionalita*, publicada en 1494. Al igual que ocurría en el caso de la perspectiva y el lenguaje fonético, si bien las intenciones originarias neoplatónicas de la contabilidad por partida doble estaban basadas en la idea de que es posible dar razón de un orden armónico y equilibrado preestablecido en el ámbito de la valorización económica –tal y como Hermann Broch describió al final del tercer volumen de su trilogía de los sonámbulos–, las consecuencias de esta posibilidad de perfecta sistematización de los valores culminó en lo que Lewis Mumford denominó «sistema mecánico» entendido «como aquel en que una muestra al azar del conjunto puede servir en lugar del conjunto [de modo que] se supone que lo que rodea al objeto no afecta a su comportamiento»¹⁴. Así pues, el *nomos* (νομος) originariamente enraizado en una determinada tierra empieza a devenir un sistema de medida autónomo e independiente, instaurándose una relación con el espacio similar a la que la «moneda» (νομισμα) instaura con el valor de las cosas.

A partir de este momento, el *νομος* propio de la polis se transformará en el *oikos-nomos* metropolitano, en el que todo desarrollo espacial y/o medida de la tierra dependerá única y directamente de «la economía de un trazado urbano: él condiciona la forma, implicando, como es evidente, la proporción fundamental entre áreas construidas y áreas libres, entre la altura media de los edificios y la extensión del perímetro urbano. El predicado económico viene así, espontáneamente, a colocarse al lado del moderno concepto de espacio»¹⁵.

¹² Panofsky fue el primero en mantener que la perspectiva es la que transforma «‘la οσα εν αινυμενον’», Panofsky, Erwin, *La perspectiva como forma simbólica*, Tusquets Editores, Barcelona 1999, p. 54.

¹³ Cfr. Tafuri, *La arquitectura del humanismo*, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁴ Mumford, Lewis, *Técnica y Civilización*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1977, p. 61.

¹⁵ Argan, Giulio Carlo, *Proyecto y destino*, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas 1969, p. 76.

3. El Leviathán metropolitano y la crisis del imperialismo mercantilista colonial marítimo

La producción y gestión de la ciudad moderna tiene una relación estrecha con la concepción romana de ciudad, concretamente, con la concepción de ciudad de la Roma imperial: «*civitas mobilis augescens*»¹⁶. Frente a la concepción griega de la ciudad entendida como formación natural u orgánica de un determinado *génos*, en sus mejores momentos la *urbs* romana se definió a sí misma como una técnica jurídica capaz de conferir el título de ciudadano de la misma a cualquier *génos* que en ella habitara. Era, por tanto, un proyecto de expansión ilimitada a través de una universalización jurídica imperial, que en la metrópoli moderna quedará predeterminada de un modo prioritariamente eco-nómico.

La metrópoli moderna apostará por el establecimiento de un proceso de crecimiento ilimitado y por una constante expansión de sus fronteras mediante la transformación de una economía contable en otra capitalista. Perdida ya toda noción de *νομος* de la tierra, serán los flujos marítimos del capital los que predeterminarán el in-forme *sprawl* de los desarrollos urbanos metropolitanos¹⁷. Es decir, la hidrología del *geist* metropolitano radica en que cuando el capital de ultramar no llega a tiempo, todo el equilibrio dinámico del sistema mecánico que relaciona tierra (suelo, espacio) y dinero (valor) se viene abajo¹⁸.

Ahora bien, el carácter hídrico de este *geist* marítimo-metropolitano que inunda el mundo con su nueva forma de habitar un espacio liberal y liberado de las antiguas coacciones ejercidas por el *nomos* de la Tierra supone también la instauración de una disciplina urbana biopolítica normalmente ocultada a los habitantes de la metrópoli, pero sin la cual esta última sería incapaz de sobrevivir: la colonia. El carácter económico de la metrópoli deberá establecer una siempre precaria segmentarización entre metrópoli y colonia que permita un trasvase lo más «fluido» posible de las mercancías y los capitales manteniendo, a su vez, una estricta separación entre interior y exterior a la metrópoli tanto a nivel espacial, mediante la interposición de los océanos, como a nivel social, mediante la categoría jurídica de ciudadano de la metrópoli, esto es,

¹⁶ Cacciari, «La ciudad territorio (o la post-metrópolis)», art. cit., p. 34.

¹⁷ Cfr. Marx, Karl, *El capital. Tomo II. Crítica de la Economía Política*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D.F. 1999, pp. 207-208.

¹⁸ Cfr. Marx, Karl, *El Capital. Tomo III*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D.F. 2001, p. 321.

mediante el antagonismo colonizador-colonizado¹⁹. Así pues, la universalización de la red de conexiones marítimas no conduce directamente a una universalización homogénea e isomorfa, sino a una estricta bipolarización antagonica de metrópoli y colonia²⁰.

A nivel morfológico, la metrópoli funciona por yuxtaposición espacial de objetos procedentes de los lugares más diversos del mundo sin relación alguna entre ellos –paradigma de la ciudad museo liberal descrita por Colin Rowe en su *Collage City*– y por la indiferencia psíquica ante una sobrecarga de estímulos tal y como fue concebida por el *nervenleben* simmeliano. En cambio, la colonia se configurará como un concreto dispositivo de producción biopolítico propio del poder disciplinar descrito por Foucault²¹. Se definen de esta forma dos paradigmas de ciudad claramente antagonicos: la ciudad-consumo y la ciudad-producción. La diferencia primordial entre ambos modelos de ciudad radica en que no es posible que exista metrópoli sin que «toda *forma urbis* tradicional se haya disuelto»²².

Por su parte, a la colonia le será aplicada lo que Foucault denominó una «arquitecturación» del espacio urbano capaz de asegurar, mediante técnicas espaciales, el control de los habitantes y la gestión de las poblaciones, y cuyo paradigma de eficiencia sería, tal y como ya puso de relevancia Giorgio Agamben, el campo de concentración. A nivel metropolitano, en cambio, lo que prima es la obsolescencia de las técnicas de medición de la tierra como forma de control de la población, lo que significa que «el desarrollo territorial de la ciudad metropolitana no es, por tanto, programable [...] Nadie es ya soberano sobre los nexos que unen las partes o sobre la lógica de las relaciones»²³

A partir de ese momento las estrategias urbanísticas no tratarán de asignar a cada individuo una posición socioespacial fija en busca de un armónico equilibrio imposibilitado por la constante revalorización de los flujos de capital sino que, gracias a las ciencias estadísticas, tratarán de hacerlo directamente sobre la población. Dando un paso más en la sistematización cuantitativa de

¹⁹ Cfr. Sloterdijk, Peter, *Esféras II. Globos*, Siruela, Madrid 2003.

²⁰ Cfr. Memmi, Albert, *Portrait du colonisé*, Gallimard, Paris 1985, p. 51. A este respecto, Memmi describió pormenorizadamente cómo pese a residir en colonias, el colonizador siempre será un habitante de la metrópoli. Cfr. Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé*, op. cit., p. 35.

²¹ Cfr. Foucault, Michel, *Seguridad, territorio, población: curso en el Collège de France (1977-1978)*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos Aires 2006; Foucault, Michel, *Nacimiento de la biopolítica: curso en el Collège de France (1978-1979)*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Buenos Aires 2007.

²² Cacciari, «La ciudad territorio (o la post-metrópolis)», art. cit., p. 35.

²³ Cacciari, «La ciudad territorio (o la post-metrópolis)», art. cit., p. 42.

la ciudad, la población comenzará a ser entendida como «un dato dependiente de toda una serie de variables que le impiden, entonces, ser transparente a la acción del soberano»²⁴. La acción de gobierno propia del paradigma metropolitano, por tanto, no se realiza directamente sobre la tierra o el suelo, sino sobre un campo de fuerzas, un «campo de intervención donde [...] se tratará de afectar, precisamente, a una población»²⁵.

Ahora bien, dada la primacía del *oikos* del capital marítimo sobre el *nomos* de la tierra, el campo de intervención no tendrá más remedio que ser el mercado. Frente a la instauración autoritaria de una armonía y un equilibrio estáticos basados en el dominio de la propiedad, el *geist* metropolitano apostará por la promoción de organizaciones flexibles orientadas a la activación de las fuerzas productivas de la población desde una sociedad civil auto-organizada según la revalorización producida por el movimiento del capital.

Esta transformación de la ciudad en metrópolis o «ciudad-financiera» no implica únicamente la pérdida de la eficacia del *disegno urbano* como proyecto de re-estructuración global de la ciudad a través de la forma, sino que, además, supone la pérdida simultánea del concepto de lo político como mediación común de conflictos a favor de la mera administración y organización del poder económico. La política, al transformarse definitivamente en Economía Política, deja de entenderse como ámbito común de decisión para devenir un conjunto de técnicas de intervención material en los mercados. Por ello la nueva función del urbanismo consistirá en intervenir directamente sobre las reglas de funcionamiento del mercado. La política fue la técnica de gobierno de la polis a través del *nomos* de la tierra. La Economía Política (no la Política Económica), que es la propia de las metrópolis, lo hace a través de la inversión en infraestructuras susceptibles de atraer los flujos del capital marítimo o internacional.

²⁴ Foucault, *Seguridad, territorio, población: curso en el Collège de France (1977-1978)*, op. cit., p. 94.

²⁵ Foucault, *Seguridad, territorio, población: curso en el Collège de France (1977-1978)*, op. cit., p. 41.

4. La Nube de las Smart Cities y la entrada en el paradigma eólico-informacional de las gobernanzas neoliberales

Las últimas décadas de desarrollo y aplicación tecnológico han abierto un nuevo horizonte epocal en la planificación y gestión de las ciudades. Aunque la mayor parte de las disciplinas académicas implicadas en la planificación y gestión de las ciudades no les han prestado la debida atención, los últimos cuarenta años han visto sucederse tres nuevas revoluciones industriales que están en camino de transformar completamente el modo de funcionamiento de las post-metrópolis: Los procesos de automatización por robots programables de las fábricas en la revolución 3.0; los actuales desarrollos de las fábricas inteligentes, el *trading* de alta frecuencia, la conexión directa de todo aparato material a la nube a través del internet de las cosas o el empleo del Big Data en la toma de decisiones informatizada a través de los ERP (*Enterprise Resource Planning*) que ya han comenzado su implementación en las principales empresas multinacionales de la revolución 4.0; y los incipientes desarrollos de la Inteligencia Artificial y los robots con capacidad de aprendizaje y creación de nuevos lenguajes de la recientemente iniciada revolución 5.0²⁶.

El punto común a estas tres revoluciones industriales es la eliminación de toda distancia espacial y temporal en la transmisión de información y/o comandos de actuación. El nuevo horizonte aéreo abierto por la post-metrópolis implica, según palabras de Paul Virilio, que «las nuevas tecnologías traen a efecto las tres características de lo Divino: Ubiquidad, Instantaneidad, e Inmediación»²⁷. Además, como consecuencia de la velocidad de transmisión y el número de emisiones de información, se instaura una estética de desaparición por sobre-exposición. Para Virilio, el inicio de la estética de la sobre-exposición propia de la post-metrópolis se produce con la aparición de la fotografía, el cine o las tele-comunicaciones. En estas, la desaparición parcial de las cosas por exceso de estímulos es sustituida –y casi invertida– por la aparición de la ilusión óptica a través de una cierta «permanencia de una ausencia». Por ejemplo, la percepción del cine como movimiento se produce porque somos incapaces de percibir el paso de la presencia de un fotograma a la presencia del siguiente, de modo que lo que propiamente se percibe como «algo», realmente es la ausencia de la

²⁶ Cada vez son más numerosas las noticias publicadas por la *MIT Technology Review* sobre robots que han aprendido por sí mismos a (auto-re-programado para) identificar conductas o patrones para los que no estaban inicialmente programados e incluso sobre varios robots puestos en interacción que en la optimización de su comunicación desarrollaron un lenguaje informático propio que ningún humano es capaz de descifrar.

²⁷ Citado en Armitage, John (ed.), *Virilio live: Selected Interviews*, SAGE, London 2001, p. 38.

permanencia mínima que permite al sujeto adquirir una memoria del estatus real de lo percibido en tanto que micro-permanente.

Es más, lo que este nuevo *geist* aéreo significa es la desaparición del espacio como tal. Es decir, como dimensión susceptible de ser medida individualmente. Como Ernst Cassirer afirmó hace casi un siglo, a partir de la teoría de la relatividad será imposible concebir espacio y tiempo como dimensiones autónomas e independientes²⁸. A partir de aquí, la posibilidad misma de existencia de lo que normalmente consideramos un objeto físico, «la esencia del objeto físico, está en que sólo se le puede concebir en forma de una ‘idea límite’»²⁹.

Según Paul Virilio, esta nueva comprensión del espacio físico significa que «habrá que examinar urgentemente, una vez más, la acepción filosófica según la cual el accidente es relativo y contingente, y la sustancia, absoluta y necesaria»³⁰. Así pues, sería obligado concluir que «la materia se ha convertido en un ‘proceso’, y lo que solemos llamar sus propiedades fijas es una función de eventos»³¹.

En lo que se refiere al impacto que tiene esta evaporización de las categorías y conceptos de medida más primarios (sustancia, accidente, *nomos*, vectorización, campo) para la post-metrópoli, si bien es pronto para poder decir de forma precisa el nuevo funcionamiento que adquirirán las ciudades, existen cuatro grandes visiones sobre su posible futuro: Las *Smart Cities* implementadas desde hace más de una década por las Administraciones Públicas y los ingenieros, el *General Intellect* de las multitudes descrito por Antonio Negri, las espumas atmosféricas de la psicopolítica analizadas por Peter Sloterdijk, y la pesimista *ultracity* del *exurbanism* criticado por Paul Virilio.

El primer modelo proyecta una aplicación directa de las tres revoluciones tecnológicas ocurridas durante las cuatro últimas décadas a la (auto)gestión y mantenimiento de las ciudades. Básicamente, la estrategia consiste en conectar a la nube todas las infraestructuras, edificaciones (públicas y privadas) y servicios de la ciudad con la intención de desarrollar un campo de datos a tiempo real del estado de los mismos, la automatización de su auto-reparación y la optimización del tráfico de todos los flujos (materiales, mercantiles, económicos y de información) que la atraviesan. Además, en sus versiones

²⁸ Cfr. Cassirer, Ernst, *Filosofía de las formas simbólicas vol III*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D.F. 1998, p. 551.

²⁹ Cassirer, *Filosofía de las formas simbólicas vol III*, op. cit., p. 551.

³⁰ Virilio, Paul, *El accidente original*, Amorroutu Editores, Buenos Aires 2006b, pp. 112-113.

³¹ Cassirer, *Filosofía de las formas simbólicas vol III*, op. cit., p. 549.

más optimistas se incluye la total transparencia y publicidad en el acceso a dichos datos, si bien nunca a su gestión.

Por su parte, la teoría desarrollada por Negri acerca de la actual fase de la subsunción real de la sociedad en el capital significa que no existe ya relación social alguna que no sea inmediatamente productiva y, por tanto, biopolítica. La producción inmaterial propia de la sociedad del conocimiento se ha vuelto tan necesariamente cooperativa que el sistema social al completo se auto-organiza siempre a la búsqueda de una mayor productividad común sin necesidad de intervención por parte del Estado o las Administraciones Públicas. Según Negri, el sistema de producción fabril cuya producción de valor se podía medir a través de las horas de trabajo realizadas, ha dado paso a un *General Intellect* mundial en el que los grandes incrementos de productividad son generados por una cooperación en I+D+i que no puede ser medida a través de procedimientos matemático-temporales que diferencien horas de vida de horas de trabajo. Dada esta situación, el único sujeto hegemónico capaz de liderar la autogestión de la sociedad será una multitud rizomática de personas cuyos agenciamientos singulares estén siempre orientados a la producción de una mayor capacidad de transformación del mundo..

Sloterdijk, criticando el modelo de Negri como un intento superado de reactualización del ecumenismo cristiano³², propone a su vez un nuevo intento obsoleto de reactualización de la morfología spengleriana de las culturas a través del modelo de las espumas. Propio de la era atmosférica de la psicopolítica en la que las personas son capaces de hacer explícitas y traer a la luz las condiciones necesarias para la vida que históricamente habían permanecido como un fondo neutro, la morfología de las espumas permite a Sloterdijk seguir utilizando la forma como categoría básica con la que explicar de manera simultánea la individualización y la multiplicidad de los entornos psicosociales con los que las personas desarrollan sistemas de inmunización psicológica frente a un mundo en el que, muerto Dios, aquellas deben enfrentarse a una ingente precariedad y falta de seguridad metafísica.

En el modelo morfológico de Sloterdijk, los individuos simplemente permanecen aislados en sus microburbujas, pero mantienen múltiples contactos con una gran variedad de otras burbujas pertenecientes tanto a otros ámbitos de sus vidas como a otras personas con las que se relacionan. Si bien Sloterdijk pretende dar razón de la volubilidad etérea de las formaciones sociales contemporáneas, su incidencia en la morfología le impide explicar adecua-

³² Cfr. Sloterdijk, Peter, *Esfemas III. Espumas*, Siruela, Madrid 2006, p. 621.

damente un aspecto clave del paradigma aéreo ya comentado por Virilio: la eliminación de la distancia.

Por último, la apocalíptica propuesta de Virilio implica el cumplimiento del antiguo sueño o pesadilla –desarrollado tanto por la filosofía clásica como por la moderna– de un mundo completamente virtualizado en el que toda la materia ha perdido su resistencia y es transformada en información disponible para un *General Intellect* ubicuo, instantáneo e inmediato que, eliminando el tiempo, permitiría el acceso fenomenológico a la eternidad (inmortal o no)³³. El rasgo básico del paradigma aéreo de las post-metrópolis es sin lugar a dudas su exterioridad absoluta³⁴.

Conclusiones: Prometeo-Momo, hijo de Caín

Un par de años antes de la publicación del *De Re Aedificatoria*, libro con el que se inicia la arquitectura moderna como disciplina intelectual (artes liberales), su mismo autor, Leon Battista Alberti, publicó el *Momus*. En él, el dios Momo, versión albertiana de Prometeo identificado como el primer arquitecto, baja a la Tierra con la intención, no de ayudar, sino de sembrar la discordia y el conflicto tanto entre los dioses como entre los hombres. Para ello, en lugar de ser él quien da la técnica primigenia (el fuego) a los hombres, será él quien la aprenda de estos. Ahora bien, en este caso la técnica primigenia no es el fuego, sino el maquillaje entendido como arte de la (di)simulación y apariencia de la propia conducta («las formas») en las relaciones sociales³⁵.

Desde esta óptica, para él, la arquitectura nunca consistió ni en la construcción de formas armónicas con un orden cósmico-metafísico preestablecido también armónicamente, ni en el empleo de esta como técnica de medición de un terrorífico territorio amorfo y caótico (discurso legitimante propio de todos los imperialismos y civilizaciones), sino en un elitista intento de evasión, a través del arte, de todos los males y pesares socio-urbanos característicos de unas ciudades que, comprendidas según la tradición del

³³ Cfr. Virilio, Paul, *The Futurism of the Instant*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 158. Cfr. Virilio, Paul, *Speed and Politics*, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles 2006a, p.149.

³⁴ Cfr. Virilio, *The Futurism of the Instant*, op. cit., p. 9.

³⁵ La imposibilidad de establecer el orden en la ciudad aparece reiteradamente a lo largo del *Momus*. Esta afirmación no deriva de una imperfección del mundo material respecto al ideal, sino que la imposibilidad del orden está presente en ambos sin que ninguno pueda servir de fundamento al otro. Cfr. Alberti, Leon Battista, *Momo o del príncipe*, Consejo General de la Arquitectura Técnica de España, Valencia 2002, p. 13.

humanismo cristiano, derivaban directamente del linaje de los hijos de Caín previos al diluvio³⁶.

Esto tiene consecuencias importantes para las postmetrópolis. La planificación urbana como disciplina siempre ha estado predeterminada fáctica y jurídicamente por el carácter esencialmente telúrico de su objeto de estudio. Las Administraciones Públicas, únicas con competencia para planificar el desarrollo urbano y la organización de sus recursos naturales, tienen esta capacidad solamente dentro de un territorio finito nítidamente delimitado. Frente a este carácter esencialmente telúrico, «la esencia de aquello que insistimos en llamar urbanismo se compone/descompone en sistemas de transferencia, tránsito y transmisión»³⁷ de modo que «somos testigos ahora del deterioro de las ciudades como centros regionales»³⁸.

Si como afirman Negri y Hardt, las actuales postmetrópolis son los auténticos núcleos de producción (fábricas) biopolíticas de nuestras sociedades, la planificación urbana debe renunciar definitivamente al modelo telúrico si quiere poder re-inventarse a sí misma como una técnica eficiente para el gobierno de sus recursos materiales, humanos y financieros. Es decir, la nueva teología post-metropolitana que el fuego del Momus ha posibilitado, ha hecho patente que todo aquello que siempre habíamos creído atribuible a las bondades y bienaventuranzas del cielo no han sido más que las ilusiones con las que los bienpensantes han sido finalmente arrojados al infierno. Por ello únicamente desde un punto de vista conscientemente neo-albertiano podremos suscribir la máxima viriliana según la cual «la información es la arquitectura por otros medios»³⁹.

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³⁶ Esto es señalado claramente por Secchi, Bernardo, *La città dei ricchi e la città dei poveri*, Laterza, Roma 2013, p. 74.

³⁷ Virilio, Paul, *L'espace Critique*, Christian Bourgois Editeur, Paris 1984, p. 25.

³⁸ Virilio, *L'espace Critique*, op. cit., p. 21.

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YUIZA T. MARTÍNEZ RIVERA*

**SEGREGATION, HYPER SURVEILLANCE, AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC SPACE AND PUBLIC LIFE:
ARISTOTLE'S TYRANNICAL REGIME IN MODERN AND
CONTEMPORARY CITIES?**

Abstract

This article explores the similarities between Aristotle's description of the methods used by a tyrannical government to conserve its power and several critiques of modern and contemporary cities. Some of the tyrant's methods include: the limitation of public spaces and gatherings; the decree that all citizens remain visible; and the political effort to ensure that his subjects remain unknown to each other. This article discusses these measures within the context of contemporary urban theory in which critiques of the modern and contemporary city bear similar themes: the destruction and erosion of public space, hyper surveillance of the population, and segregation within the city leading to a lack of political agency. This analysis refers to Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Jane Jacobs' *The Death and Life of American Cities*, in addition to other texts of urban theory, to

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question whether, and how, modern and contemporary cities have tyrannical characteristics as understood by Aristotle, while still being democratically-ruled cities.

Keywords: Aristotle; Philosophy of the City; Hyper-Surveillance; Segregation; Public Space.

Segregación, hiper vigilancia y la destrucción del espacio público y vida pública: ¿El régimen tiránico de Aristóteles en las ciudades modernas y contemporáneas?

Resumen

Este artículo explora las similitudes entre la descripción de Aristóteles de los métodos usados por un gobierno tiránico para conservar su poder, y varias de las críticas que se le han hecho a las ciudades modernas y contemporáneas. Algunos de los métodos del tirano incluyen: el limitar el espacio y las reuniones públicas; el obligar a todos los ciudadanos a permanecer visibles; y el establecer políticas públicas para asegurarse de que sus súbditos no se conozcan entre sí. Estos métodos se discuten dentro del contexto de la teoría urbana contemporánea, en la cual se pueden encontrar críticas similares a la ciudad moderna y contemporánea: la destrucción y erosión del espacio público, la hiper vigilancia de la población, y cómo la segregación dentro de la ciudad impide la agencia política de la ciudadanía. Este análisis hace referencia a *Vigilar y castigar: nacimiento de la prisión* de Michel Foucault, y *Muerte y vida de las grandes ciudades* de Jane Jacobs, además de otros textos de teoría urbana, para cuestionar si, y cómo, las ciudades modernas y contemporáneas tienen características tiránicas, según las entendía Aristóteles, mientras que son ciudades democráticas.

Palabras clave: Aristóteles, Filosofía de la ciudad, Hiper vigilancia; Segregación; Espacio público.

Introduction

Aristotle's study of tyranny is made within the context of one of his main works, *Politics*, in which a comparative analysis of different forms of government leads him to explain his political proposal: the *polis*, a political community that strives to allow men to flourish. In contrast, Aristotle's description of tyranny portrays the worst form of government, one whose main objective is to cultivate citizens who are «poor of spirit» so they can be ruled with ease. To achieve this submissiveness, the tyrant must limit public spaces and gatherings, order all citizens to remain visible, and take all measures necessary for them to remain unknown to each other. Two millennia later, the topics of hyper-surveillance, segregation, and destruction of public space present in

critiques of modern and contemporary cities seem to echo the measures of Aristotle's tyrant. To present Aristotle's methods I first offer a brief description of the tyrannical state, its aims and its means of self-preservation. Then, I discuss the Aristotelian tyrant's three methods (segregation, hyper surveillance, and lack of public space/ public life) within the context of contemporary urban theory, with the aid of works like Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: Birth of the prison*, Jane Jacobs' *The Death and Life of American Cities*, and the edited work *Architecture of Fear*. I will then discuss the similar effects of these measures in both Aristotle's tyrannical regime and in modern and contemporary cities. The purpose of this investigation is not to prove that modern and contemporary cities are equivalent to Aristotle's tyrannical one but to highlight how these urban landscapes exhibit tyrannical qualities as they reaffirm and maintain established power structures.

1. «To create citizens of poor spirit»: Tyranny as the Worst Type of Constitution

At the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle states his plan to begin a study on the laws and constitutions of different cities. This study became a fundamental part of his next philosophical project, *Politics*, in which he sought to understand what type of regime would be ideal for the flourishing of men. His proposal, the *Polis*, is presented in the context of a rigorous investigation of existing regimes, which he classifies into six basic constitutions using two guiding principles: How many citizens hold the authoritative office? (one, few, many). And what is the purpose of said office? (to benefit the rulers or the ruled)¹.

Aristotle considered kingship, aristocracy, and polity to be correct forms of constitutions because their rulers look for the community's common benefit and they are organized to serve justice and the flourishing of men². In contrast, the regimes he describes as deviant are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, since their rulers strive for their own gain and are guided by their pleasure and not by virtue as the philosopher understood them. From the six

¹ Deslauriers, Marguerite, «Introduction», *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Politics*, edited by Marguerite Deslauriers, Pierre, Destrée (ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, p. 3.

² Aristotle, *Politics*, 1289a.

constitutions, he declared tyranny to be the worst³, since it is the corruption of the best regime, the kingship; and it also has qualities of the other two types of government he finds to be flawed. Like in a kingship, tyranny has a single ruler; like in an oligarchy, it aims to accumulate wealth at the expense of its subjects; and like in a democracy, the ruler acts against the upper classes⁴.

According to Aristotle, tyrants can emerge from any of the other forms of government, but most of them tend to rise to power within the context of democratic constitutions where their demagogic discourse against the rich classes gains them the support of the greater part of the population⁵. After taking control of the government, the tyrant must preserve his power by force and by establishing political measures that keep subjects humble, powerless, and distrustful of one another⁶. Citing the Persian empire and other «barbaric» tyrannies as examples, Aristotle lists the despotic measures that ensure the continuity of the autocratic regime⁷. According to the philosopher, to establish and maintain his rule, the Tyrant must: (1) ostracize and eliminate the men of free spirit; (2) ban common meals, clubs, education, study circles, debate groups; (3) do whatever it takes to maintain subjects unknown to each other; (4) force subjects to remain visible at all times; (5) have spies; (6) encourage quarrels between subjects; (7) impoverish his subjects; (8) raise taxes; and (9) be constantly at war⁸.

Although Aristotle conceived of these measures as characteristic of a tyrannical regime in 300 BC, they seem uncomfortably familiar to many of us living in democratic countries in 2017. In fact, it is common to find variations of these tyrannical measures featured in critiques of modern or contemporary cities. For this article, I refer to the critiques of modern and contemporary cities present in urban theory works that deal with the elements mentioned in Aristotle's tyrannical measures, specifically measures (2), (3), and (4) while classifying them into three categories: segregation, hyper surveillance, and lack of public space and public life.

³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1289b.

⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1311a.

⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1310b15.

⁶ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1314a15.

⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1310b25.

⁸ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1313a25-1314a.

2. Tyrannical Methods in The Modern and Contemporary City

2.1. Segregation

As mentioned before, the third method described by Aristotle aims to keep subjects unknown to each other for the benefit of this type of deviant constitution. While Aristotle does not expand on the enforcement of this decree, he does stress that the tyrant should not limit his strategies and do «whatever it takes» to achieve this goal. In consideration of this lack of practical details, I will refer to the concept of segregation since it is often related to the isolation of citizens, the lack of political action from communities, and other negative effects in modern and contemporary cities.

If the tyrant aims to prevent its subjects from knowing each other, segregating the population would further his objectives since it prevents the development of trust and community bonds that result in collective political action. In a segregated city, citizens are more likely to be fearful of, and prejudiced against, each other, and therefore feel isolated and disconnected from their fellow city residents⁹. To secure this constitution, the tyrant must encourage this sense of distrustfulness between subjects through political actions. Aristotle is very emphatic in reminding the reader that the element that most threatens the tyrannical rule is trust: if citizens trust each other, the tyrant's power is imperiled¹⁰.

Observations on the political and ethical consequences of segregated cities also appear in urban theory literature, particularly concerning the impact of modern urban planning in cities all around the world¹¹. Modern Architecture and Modern Planning were influenced and codified in The International Congresses of Modern Architecture (CIAM¹²) over the course of forty years. One of the resulting documents of this Congress was the Athens Charter, written in 1933, which proposed that all new urban development be guided by four functional categories: dwelling, work, transportation, and recreation. These four elements would be the basic components of a new, rational, and organized «Functional City» a city fit for the modern man. Even though the modern urban planning transformation of the city was said to have no overtly

⁹ Jacobs, Jane, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Vintage Books, New York 1961, p.65.

¹⁰ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1314a15.

¹¹ See Chapter «After CIAM» of Mumford, Eric, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960*, The MIT Press, Cambridge 2002.

¹² For its acronym in French: Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne.

political intentions¹³, the separation of urban functionality and services, and their transformation to a modern aesthetic «turned out to be repressive, ugly, sterile, antisocial, and generally disliked»¹⁴.

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, criticism of modern city planning began to mount¹⁵. One of its main critics was urban activist and theorist Jane Jacobs who, in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*¹⁶, denounced modern city planning's conception of the city, which according to her, damaged social fabric by displacing communities and designing urban spaces that limited social interactions necessary to build the sense of mutual trust vital to empowered communities¹⁷. As an example, Jacobs cites Dr. Dan W. Dodson, whose research focused on the «long, monotonous (...) blocks on Manhattan's West Side»¹⁸. These «Super-Blocks» are one of the most ubiquitous and isolating characteristics of modern and contemporary cities as well as one of the most emblematic ideas of modern city planning¹⁹. Dodson observed how the dimensions of Super-Blocks seemed to be physically self-isolating to the point that many of those interviewed had no conception of their neighborhood beyond the street on which they resided. He deduced that «The present state of the neighborhood indicates that the people there have lost the capacity of collective action, or else they would have pressured the city government and social agencies into correcting some of the problems of community living»²⁰. This analysis highlights the importance of a community's political agency in the context of improving the quality of life in the city. In other words, for Dodson, it is clear how the neighborhood's missing sense of community relates to the poor condition of their surroundings.

While Super-Blocks like the ones studied by Dr. Dodson hinder the process of community building because of its spatial design, other boundaries

¹³ Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism*, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁴ Edward T. Relph cited in Ellin, Nan, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa» *Architecture of Fear*, in N. Ellin (ed.), Princeton Architectural Press, New York 1997, p.53.

¹⁵ Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit., p. 25.

¹⁶ «In the 1960s a variety of post-planning positions emerged, with Jane Jacobs's and advocacy planning among the better known. Jacob's influential first-person critique of CIAM-like master planning has never been surpassed» in Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism*, op. cit., p. 271.

¹⁷ For more on this topic see: Callahan, Gene, Sanford, Ikeda, «Jane Jacobs' Critique of Rationalism in Urban Planning», in *Cosmos + Taxis*, vol. Vol 1, no. 3, 2014, pp. 10–19.

¹⁸ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p.120.

¹⁹ Modern city planners considered that frequent streets were wasteful: «The basic unit of city design is not the street but the block, more particularly the Super-block» in Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 20.

²⁰ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 120.

within a city do so as well—by segregating a city by race, culture, or class. The methods in which segregation can be manifested range from the physical (walls, blockades, checkpoints, and gated communities), to the intangible (price, status, or prejudice internalized by force or habit)²¹. In recent years, the economic segregation of contemporary cities is reflected in part by the proliferation of gated middle and upper-class communities²². In their article «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», Edward J. Blakely and Mary G. Snyder observe how segregation within a city with closed and privatized²³ communities manifests the tension between notions of civic responsibility and exclusionary aspirations rooted mainly in fear of crime and outsiders²⁴, as well as the protection of privilege²⁵. They argue that gated communities further economic segregation in the city and endanger the concept of organized community life by creating physical barriers that homogenize the population and privatize communal space.

The authors warn that: «The issues of social exclusion, privatization and segmentation that gated communities bring up raise concern that without social contact, the social contract that underpins the health of a nation will be damaged»²⁶. In their view, gated communities not only reinforce the isolation and exclusion of individuals even in the most populated cities, but endanger the communal heterogeneity needed in a democratic society. They argue that this exclusionary segregation entails a social cost²⁷ as it limits the spaces in which a diverse public can share; thus reducing the contact people from different socioeconomic backgrounds can have with each other. The democratic process is hindered by this as it reduces the potential for people to understand

²¹ Marcuse, Peter, «Walls of Fear and Walls of Support», in N. Ellin (ed.), *Architecture of Fear*, Princeton Architectural Press, New York 1997, p.109.

²² Blakely, Edward J., Snyder, Mary Gail, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», in N. Ellin (ed.), *Architecture of Fear*, op. cit., p. 85.

²³ «Private communities are providing their own security, street maintenance, recreation facilities, and garbage collection. An entirely parallel, private system exists to provide schools, playgrounds, parks, and police protection for those who can pay, leaving poor and less well-to-do dependent on the ever-reduced services of city and county governments», In Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p.95.

²⁴ Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p.87.

²⁵ Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p.97.

²⁶ Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p.96.

²⁷ I would suggest that it also entails a political cost since the authors relate the effects of this type of segregation to the workings of a democratic society.

one another and their differences, which is necessary for them to commit to a common goal²⁸.

2.2. Hyper Surveillance

Among the tyrant's decrees, the one that does the most to erode the citizens' capacity to develop collective action is the decree that subjects must always remain visible. The real purpose of this measure is to instill in the subjects an ever-present awareness that they are being observed, even if this is not truly the case. To explain this measure, Aristotle refers to a concept that is fundamental to his ethics: «habit»²⁹. For this decree to work, it must become a habit for subjects to follow the tyrant's laws as if they are being watched by the tyrant himself. The constant state of awareness along with the repetitiveness of the tyrants' approved actions would turn humbleness, or «poorness of spirit» into almost part of the nature of the tyrant's subjects³⁰. Essentially, the autocrat uses surveillance and visibility to secure his power by instilling in his subjects the habit of complete obedience.

The constant surveillance of subjects clearly tries to override man's nature as a «political animal»³¹ since humbleness and servitude in this context refer to a state of complete compliance and lack of political agency. The success of this decree would have as a result a population of subjects that, because of their lack of political drive in pursuit of justice and virtue, Aristotle would call less than men³². This prospect would be beneficial for the tyrant since it would be far easier to rule over humble, obedient and less-than-human subjects than a population conformed by strong and politically-willed citizens. In other words, one of the most injurious aspects of the tyrannical regime is that it strips its subjects of one of the most intrinsic characteristics of humanity, according to Aristotle: their natural impulse toward political endeavors.

Aristotle's understanding of the importance of habits, surveillance, and control seem to foreshadow the work of the 18th century English philosopher

²⁸ Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p.97.

²⁹ For Aristotle, none of the ethical virtues are due to our Nature but due to our habits. In Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103a15.

³⁰ The difference is that for Aristotle, although it might seem difficult, you can change your habits but not your Nature. In Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1152a32.

³¹ Aristotle offers this famous definition of man's nature in ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, 1253a5-10.

³² For Aristotle, if a man does not fulfill that which is fundamental to its nature, he cannot be properly called a man. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a22.

Jeremy Bentham, specifically his design of the Panopticon. In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*³³, 20th century French philosopher Michel Foucault presents and analyzes Bentham's Panopticon: a circular building—used to house criminals, workers, or schoolchildren—consisting of radial cells surrounding a circular guardhouse for an inspector. The purpose of the building's geometry is to give the inspector an all-seeing capability while the inmate, in the case of a prison, can see neither his neighbors nor the inspector³⁴.

Foucault's description of Bentham's proposed building's power reminds us of Aristotle's tyrant: «It is necessary for the inmate to be ceaselessly under the eyes of an inspector; this is to lose power and even almost the idea of wrong-doing»³⁵. From this declaration, Foucault recognizes the principal elements of the Panopticon: the gaze itself, and the interiorization of this gaze. In both the Panopticon and Aristotle's proposed tyrannical regime, visibility is the perfect tool of control because, through interiorization, the observed becomes his/her own inspector. This discipline, or habit, «assures the automatic functioning of power»³⁶ by transforming the crowd into a collection of separated individualities. Because of this, the inspector (and the tyrant) need not worry about the possibility of collective action from the surveilled, but only about the actions of isolated individuals.

Many urban theorists have compared Bentham's Panopticon to contemporary cities³⁷, especially with the rise of surveillance systems throughout the urban landscape. In her article «The gaze without eyes: Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space»³⁸, Hille Koskela discusses the changes in urban landscape and design caused by the increase in electronic surveillance. She references Foucault and the Panopticon³⁹ to describe and understand the political and psychological effects of video surveillance in the city:

³³ Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison*, Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York 1977.

³⁴ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison*, op. cit., p.153.

³⁵ Foucault, Michel, «The Eye of Power», in *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, edited by C. Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon et al., Pantheon Books, New York 1980, p. 154.

³⁶ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of a Prison*, op. cit., p.154.

³⁷ To name a few: Cohen (1985) *Visions of Social Control: Crime Punishment and Classification*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Lyon (1994) *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

³⁸ Koskela, Hille, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», in *Progress in Human Geography*, no. 24, 2000, pp. 243–65.

³⁹ Koskela discusses the similarities but also the differences between the city and the Panopticon. In Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», op. cit., p. 251. (Because of space concerns this section focuses on the similarities).

«Through surveillance cameras the panoptic technology of power has been electronically extended, making our cities like enormous panopticons»⁴⁰. She argues that even though video surveillance was not an issue for ethical or political debate when Foucault was analyzing Bentham's Panopticon, this use of technology follows the same principle of the building, «to be seen but never to know when or by whom»⁴¹.

Koskela highlights the fact that the usage of electronic surveillance in urban spaces is considered, without much critical discussion, the first and easiest option for protecting upper-class, gated communities; semi-public spaces (e.g., shopping malls); and even city streets⁴². She further argues that although these types of surveillance technology are implemented to reduce crime and fear of crime, there is not definite evidence they do so⁴³. Instead, surveillance cameras displace crime to other areas while accentuating the atmosphere of «fear, racist paranoia and distrust among people»⁴⁴. First, it creates distrust and fear since the presence of the cameras signify the need for protection and therefore implies that the space is insecure. And second, visible surveillance cameras remind citizens of their own visibility; creating paranoia as the person observed does not know who is observing, why they are observing, and when they are actually doing so⁴⁵. In this way, video surveillance's possible scrutiny functions as a deterrent that ensures discipline while eroding the confidence of the people using the space surveilled⁴⁶.

The consequences of hyper surveillance in the city take a toll on public space and public life, for example in the case of Los Angeles, California, a city described as the ultimate product of defensible fortress-like architecture⁴⁷.

⁴⁰ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 243.

⁴¹ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 243.

⁴² Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., pp. 244-45.

⁴³ Koskela argues that «there is little agreement among researchers about whether surveillance cameras actually reduce crime» Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 246.

⁴⁴ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 247. Also in Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit., p.42.

⁴⁵ Such spatial condition is identified by Steven Flusty as «Jittery Space». In Flusty, Steven, «Building Paranoia», in *Architecture of Fear*, edited by Nan Ellin, Princeton Architectural Press, New York 1997, p.48.

⁴⁶ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 253.

⁴⁷ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban

This city's extremely surveilled public places have been described as «sadistic», and with no natural social life since the possibility of spontaneous social behavior has been replaced by feelings of distrust and ambiguity⁴⁸. Places that elicit these feelings are not welcoming to a diverse public, and even less so to the spontaneous manifestations of political indignation. The universal consequence of the crusade to «secure» the city is the destruction of any truly democratic urban space⁴⁹.

3. Lack of Public Space and Public Life

By eliminating all educational endeavors and any type of public assembly, the tyrant's purpose is clear: he must eradicate any activity that empowers his subjects and increases their trust in themselves and each other. When Aristotle lists such activities, the philosopher refers to the philosophical gatherings led by Plato and himself, as well as other intellectual and leisure activities held at the *gymnasia*, *palaestrae*, and *lechae* of his time⁵⁰. These public spaces were the settings for debates, conferences, and leisure in the ancient Greek *Polis*, and Aristotle considered these undertakings to be fundamental activities for the elevation of men's spirits.

In her appreciation of the political importance of such public spaces, Jane Jacobs echoes Aristotle's stance. Further still, Jacobs considers these public spaces to be fundamental for a healthy city life, especially for the development of trust needed to foster a healthy community. According to her, this trust is necessary for a healthy city life since «People must take a modicum of public responsibility for each other even if they have no ties to each other»⁵¹. In other words, the fundamental political function of city streets is the creation of community bonds that result in a sense of security and mutual responsibility between strangers.

Space», art. cit., p. 247.

⁴⁸ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 247. Koskela references Davis (1990) *The city of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*. pp. 230-32 and Mitchell (1995) «The end of public space?: People's Park, definitions of the public, and democracy».

⁴⁹ Davis, Mike, «Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space», in M. Sorkin (ed.), *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and The End of Public Space*, Hill and Wang, New York 1992, p. 155.

⁵⁰ [fn. 1] found in : <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:lg0086.tlg035.perseus-eng1:5.1313b>

⁵¹ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 81.

In contrast, modern city planners considered the street to be a pernicious environment for humans⁵², and instead proposed parks as the ideal for human interaction. Also, they recommended sports as a replacement for the public activities of the street⁵³. Before, streets were used for walking and socializing, but in the modern city, the street's main purpose is to be an avenue for transportation, preferably by car⁵⁴. In fact, the ideal modern city would be one in which designers were able to achieve «at least an illusion of isolation and suburban privacy»⁵⁵. In reaction to this kind of city planning, Jacobs warns that the elimination of casual public «sidewalk life», which is closely related to other types of public life⁵⁶, leads to the isolation of its citizens⁵⁷ and other social problems like segregation and racial discrimination⁵⁸.

Modern and contemporary cities' problems are not limited to the lack of public spaces, but extend to the diminished quality of social life that takes place in what few public and semi-public spaces exist due to the increase of exclusionary methods, such as surveillance and excessive control⁵⁹. Also, important public services for communities such as libraries, playgrounds, and parks are either closing or being neglected while streets are increasingly desolate and dangerous⁶⁰. This erosion of public space and public life is further aggravated by the recent and more ubiquitous forms of surveilled semi-public space (like shopping malls⁶¹) which are explicitly designed to permit only consumer-oriented activity, as opposed to the diverse activities that take place in «traditional» public spaces⁶². While these kinds of semi-public places homogenize the type of activities that can take place in them, the design of their space homogenizes the crowd with architectural and semiotic barriers⁶³. These spaces prevent people from interacting with others who are not like them in

⁵² Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 20.

⁵³ Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit, p. 22.

⁵⁴ Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit, p. 18.

⁵⁵ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 20.

⁵⁶ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵⁷ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 65.

⁵⁸ Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 71.

⁵⁹ Flusty, «Building Paranoia», art. cit., p. 58, also in Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit, p. 36.

⁶⁰ Davis, «Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 156.

⁶¹ Mike Davis compares the architecture of the contemporary shopping mall to Bentham's Panopticon because of its «security oriented design and management strategy». Mike, «Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 170.

⁶² Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit, p.34.

⁶³ Davis, Mike, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*, Verso, New York 2006, p. 257.

terms of class, religion, race, or political views; consequently threatening the cross-cultural communication needed to create a diverse public⁶⁴.

4. Aristotle's Tyrannical Regime in Modern and Contemporary Cities?

The purpose of this investigation is not to reduce the concept of «the modern and contemporary city» in order to equate it to Aristotle's tyrannical regime, but instead to identify in the urban theory literature observations made during the analysis of contemporary cities that echo Aristotle's measures for the preservation of a tyrannical regime and, in doing so, discuss the similarities and differences between them. Furthermore, I believe that the similarities I am examining serve in the effort to explore the political baggage of the city in the context of western human thought.

In terms of the differences between them, the fundamental disparity between them lies within the decision-making process. While in the tyrannical regime all decisions are autocratic, in the modern and contemporary city the decision process is far more complex due to the different participative or representative democratic mechanisms. Not only this, the modern and contemporary city is characterized by being a product of different plans or democratic processes through time, while the urbanity of a tyrannical regime would be the result of one plan or one desire: for a party or regime to remain in power.

However, after analyzing the tyrannical methods present in modern and contemporary cities, one could argue that despite any intent, both result in benefits to a few powerful citizens at the expense of most of the population. For example, after presenting their findings, Blakely and Snyder concluded that the segregation exacerbated by gated communities directly benefit the few that use such geographic separations to protect their privileged position and further increase income and wealth differences that further benefit them⁶⁵. Also, in the case of the increased surveillance of cities, Koskela argues that surveillance technology «links knowledge, power and space»⁶⁶ as it controls, categorizes, disciplines, and normalizes the population surveilled. Even

⁶⁴ Flusty, «Building Paranoia», art. cit., p. 58.

⁶⁵ Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p. 96.

⁶⁶ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 251

though power relationships relating to surveillance are complicated due to some regulation by authorities, the surveillance of places like shopping malls, gated communities, and even city streets, result in the preservation of the status quo⁶⁷, the protection of property, and the securing of profit⁶⁸. Jacobs also recognizes the relationship between power, money, and city building when she mentions the *Housing acts of 1949 and 1954* and the *Highway act of 1954*, which were lobbied by construction, real-estate, and automotive interests, as the main reasons for the massive suburbanization and vehicle dependency which developed in the second part of the 20th century⁶⁹. In other words, «form was following finance»⁷⁰ as cities' growth was determined by economic interests' lobbying in politics.

Even if there is a difference in their decision-making process, Aristotle's tyrannical regime and modern and contemporary cities seem to coincide in their effort to segregate and police their populations while limiting and eroding public space. While the tyrant's aim is clearly to secure his power, in the case of modern and contemporary cities, such measures are often taken to secure the city and control the less desirable segments of its population. However, the effect is the same in both cases, as citizens are left powerless in their respective individualities. One could reasonably say that both the tyrannical regime and the contemporary city protect their power following the well-known saying: «Divide and conquer».

This depiction of a segregated population with little political engagement is a recurring theme in the literature of urban theory and other disciplines: «we no longer speak of citizens, but rather taxpayers, who take no active role in governance...»⁷¹. Blakely and Snyder describe how the segregation of the city—with walls, street patterns, gated communities, and barricades—reduces the possibility of community, of people understanding one another and coming together for a common purpose. The authors underline how, in this context, a fundamental element of citizenship and a healthy political community is missing: sharing. Without this, the authors affirm that there is little possibility of solving social problems or regaining control of our neighbor-

⁶⁷ Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit., p. 34.

⁶⁸ Koskela, «'The Gaze without Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space», art. cit., p. 246.

⁶⁹ Jacobs, Jane, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, op. cit., p. 131.

⁷⁰ Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit., p.25.

⁷¹ Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p. 97.

hoods⁷². They are not alone in this assertion, for many urban theorists have concluded this in their investigations about various aspects of the city. Flusty also comments on how the proliferation of spaces of control, and the elimination of public spaces where face-to-face interactions occur (streets, parks, bazaars, and plazas) threatens the free exchange of ideas and deters the “cross-cultural communication” necessary to create a diverse public⁷³.

Conclusion

If we look beyond the list of «tyrannical» methods described by Aristotle and enacted in modern and contemporary cities, we can see that, regardless of the purpose behind the methods, both create an environment that reinforces the status quo, one that hinders political transformation in favor of current political dynamics and structures. The city, and the powers that rule it, reaffirm themselves through policy and new development. It is in this sense that the city seems «tyrannical» because, as Aristotle states, «A tyrant will still be a tyrant even though his subjects do not wish it»⁷⁴. Additionally, most of the time the city transforms itself—in the name of safety or progress—at the expense of those without political capital.

Using the Panopticon as an example, Michel Foucault argues that evolving technologies of power serve to maintain the status quo⁷⁵. As well as Bentham’s circular building, in modern and contemporary cities we see how defensible urban design and technology are used to control and police a population. It is in this context, when political transformations are intentionally hindered through the use of space and urban policy, that the prospect of democracy is jeopardized.

The promise of democracy—that the voice and vote of the population as a political body will reach the best decisions for all—lies unfulfilled since there isn’t a proper political community that strives for a common good. There is no «we, the people» in a segregated, hyper-policed city, where citizens are isolated and suspicious of strangers, and there is no sense of community nor sense of responsibility towards fellow citizens. In this context, the arduous

⁷² Blakely and Snyder, «Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States», art. cit., p. 97.

⁷³ Flusty, «Building Paranoia», art. cit., p. 58.

⁷⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1313a.

⁷⁵ Ellin, «Shelter from the Storm or Form Follows Fear and Vice Versa», art. cit., p.34.

and time-consuming work that is the democratic process is doomed to fail, for it thrives on compassion and empathy, which are notably absent in a city permeated with fear and paranoia⁷⁶.

If we, as a society, strive for a democratic coexistence, we must rethink what aspects of our cities hinder said political processes. In this effort we might ask ourselves: Why do our democratically-ruled cities share attributes with what could be Aristotle's tyrannical urban landscape? And, if a city itself promotes fear, distrust, and seclusion, how can we change these conditions to bring forth positive change in our communities? It may seem very difficult in our context, and even more so in the awfully suffocating regime described by Aristotle. But even under the oppression of tyranny, the philosopher offers avenues to incite political change: «for a tyranny is not destroyed until some men *come to trust each other*»⁷⁷. While Aristotle's measures to conserve the tyrannical regime might seem incredibly repressive and demoralizing, they also highlight the potential political power of its citizenry. When citizens start building a community and realizing their political agency, a repressive government's power *can* be challenged. Aristotle's words seem uncomfortably timely in our current context: first as a warning to recognize the measures and aims of a government that strives to remain in power; and second, as a reminder of our own potential power as citizens, and our capacity, when acting as a community, to transform our environment as it has been transformed before us, into an urban landscape that encourages justice, happiness, and the good life.

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⁷⁶ Martha Nussbaum shares this concern and lists «fear, envy and shame» as a danger to a democracy and good political causes if they are exploited by the government or the media. Nussbaum, Martha C., *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2013, p. 314.

⁷⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1314a.

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SOFIA MIGUENS*

**IS THERE A SINGLE WAY FOR ALL HUMANS TO BE HUMAN?
SOME PROBLEMS FOR ARISTOTELIAN NATURALISM IN
CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY**

Abstract

Aristotelian naturalists may have diverging interpretations of Aristotle's idea that the good life for a human being is a life of activity in accordance with the virtues. Such is the case of John McDowell (McDowell 1998) and Philippa Foot (Foot 1978). One important question here is whether Aristotelian naturalism in moral philosophy commits one to the idea of a good, or goods, which are *natural to humans qua humans*. Naturalism is a very widespread position in contemporary analytic philosophy yet not always very clearly spelled out. In order to search for clarity regarding what one means by naturalism, I explore several strands of McDowell's case for second-nature naturalism as a position in moral philosophy. I then assess an argument put forward against it by Bernard Williams in *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Williams 1985). Building on a suggestion by Alan Thomas in *Value and Context – The nature of moral and political knowledge* (Thomas 2006) and complementing

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it with a view of rationality inspired by S.Stich (*The Fragmentation of Reason*, Stich 1990) I end with a proposal on how to keep Aristotelianism in moral philosophy.

Keywords: Common good; Virtue; Aristotelianism in moral philosophy; Universality; Rationality.

Será que há uma forma única de todos os humanos serem humanos? Alguns problemas do naturalismo aristotélico na filosofia moral contemporânea

Resumo

Os naturalistas aristotélicos podem ter diferentes interpretações da ideia de Aristóteles segundo a qual uma vida boa para um humano é uma vida de atividade de acordo com as virtudes. É este o caso de John McDowell (McDowell 1998) e Philippa Foot (Foot 1978). Uma questão crucial é saber se o naturalismo aristotélico em filosofia moral nos compromete com a ideia de um bem (ou bens) que seriam naturais para os humanos enquanto humanos. Embora o naturalismo seja uma posição actualmente muito difundida na filosofia analítica essa posição nem sempre é claramente explicitada. De forma a procurar clareza quanto ao que se quer dizer com naturalismo exploro neste artigo várias vertentes da defesa de um naturalismo da segunda natureza em filosofia moral que é levada a cabo por McDowell. Em seguida avalio um argumento erguido por Bernard Williams contra o naturalismo de McDowell em *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Williams 1985). Com base numa sugestão avançada por Alan Thomas em *Value and Context – The nature of moral and political knowledge* (Thomas 2006) e complementando esta com uma concepção da racionalidade inspirada em Stephen Stich (*The Fragmentation of Reason*, Stich 1990), termino com uma proposta acerca de como manter hoje uma posição aristotélica em filosofia moral.

Palavras-chave: Bem comum; Virtude; Aristotelismo em filosofia moral; Universalidade; Racionalidade.

1. Is anything natural for a rational animal?

Let us take ‘common good’ to mean that which is shared by, or beneficial to, all or most members of a society, striven for, and attainable only, by the community. The idea of common good is widespread in moral and political philosophy, as well as in political discourse in general, and there is no doubt that it does useful work. My problem in this article is whether the idea of common good risks bringing us too close to another idea, the idea of that which is *natural to humans qua humans*. One might argue that Aristotelianism does at least incline us to think along such lines.

Because my focus in this article is on contemporary Aristotelianism and on what it commits us to in moral philosophy, it is important to be clear about what Aristotle's own conception of common good was, and how it related to the good for an individual¹. The following passages should suffice to remind us of Aristotle's particular take on the matter. In the *Politics*² Aristotle claims that «It is clear that all partnerships aim at some good, and that the partnership that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others does so particularly, and aims at the most authoritative good of all. This is what is called the city [*polis*] or the political partnership» (1252a3). Such claim connects the topic of common good directly with the philosophy of the city: for Aristotle men are by nature political animals. This means that the mere fact of being an animal – being, say, a lone animal – is not sufficient for humans to flourish as humans. Hence «There is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of partnership (...) the one who first constituted [a city] is responsible for the greatest of goods» (1253a29). The political partnership of the city aims at the pursuit of common good. Since common good is constituted in the good of individuals, the question of what the good is for an individual arises. Such, according to Aristotle, is the question of 'human flourishing' – or virtue. Aristotle's idea is that the good life for a human being is a life of activity in accordance with the virtues. Such life should be a life in the *polis*, associated with other humans in the pursuit of common good. Yet how does engagement in the political partnership of the city, aimed at the pursuit of common good, involve a way, or ways, of being which is in some sense 'natural' for humans? Aristotle himself certainly felt at least tempted to consider e.g. specific shapes of woman-man and master-slave relations³ as 'natural' within the city. What should we then make of Aristotle's idea, formulated against such background, that the virtues are necessary for a human life to go well? Here I am not going after the more directly political question of the type of community that is better suited for the pursuit of common good. My interest lies in the conceptual question: What does it mean to say that something is *natural* for a

¹ It is important to be clear about what Aristotle himself claimed also because Aristotle is not the sole historic source of the use of the concept of common good (one may claim e.g. that Medieval authors clarified it).

² Aristotle, *The Politics*, translated and with an introduction by Carnes Lord, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1984.

³ One could thus say that for Aristotle slavery is *natural*, the same way that the domination of women by men in the household is *natural* (in this case namely because women do not have, according to him, a fully developed capacity for deliberation. In the case of a slave, not being in a position to aim at ultimate personal flourishing is natural, since he/she is not a property-owner. See Aristotle 1984).

rational being? This is the question which interests me since it is around this question that divergences among contemporary Aristotelian naturalists such as McDowell and Foot may arise.

John McDowell is an Aristotelian naturalist. Consider his fable (or thought experiment) of the rational wolf in *Two Sorts of Naturalism*⁴ and what it tells us about what being rational is for a natural being. Suppose an animal other than a human becomes rational (in McDowell's terms, it becomes capable of giving expression to conceptual capacities and of asking for reasons of its own behavior). He would then ask himself: should I do as all wolves do? Should I hunt with the pack? Should I cooperate? Need I do it? Why should I do it? McDowell's point is that being rational is not conceiving one's own behaviour as just another phenomenon in the world, which the rational being then conceptualizes; being rational involves being able to step rationally out of oneself and ask: why should I do as other wolves (or humans) do? Being rational amounts then to, as McDowell puts it, letting (one's) mind roam over possibilities of behaviour *other than what comes naturally to wolves (or humans)*. This idea is at the background of McDowell's criticism of Philippa Foot's own version of Aristotelian naturalism which is the starting point of his article *Two Sorts of Naturalism*. McDowell believes Foot's is a less satisfying sort of naturalism in that it does not pay too much attention to the concept of nature in its own right and thus risks appealing, in a less than reflective way, to natural facts as underlying what it is for a human life to flourish⁵. At the background of what follows is then McDowell's disagreement with Foot on how to interpret, within a naturalist framework, Aristotle's idea of the necessity of the virtues in a human life if that life is to go well. I believe such apparently minor, or merely hermeneutic, disagreement is crucial for deciding whether an Aristotelian position in moral philosophy can still make sense for us, and if it does, what it commits us to.

2. Philosophical naturalism

McDowell develops his naturalism by investigating the nature of our conceptual capacities. He does it e.g. by looking into our responsiveness to reasons; that, as we will see, is in fact one main arena of his debate with Foot. Yet before going into that debate, I would like to point out something about the

⁴ McDowell, John, «Two sorts of naturalism» in J. McDowell, *Mind, Value and Reality*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1998, pp. 167-197.

⁵ McDowell, «Two sorts of naturalism», op. cit., pp. 167-68.

idea of ‘being natural’ and philosophical naturalism. Naturalism is currently a very popular position in many domains of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics to philosophy of mathematics. Being a naturalist might simply mean that one regards humans, as rational and moral beings, as part of nature, and not otherworldly. This seems uncontroversial enough. Yet if we ask ourselves who, among contemporary philosophers, is a self-professed naturalist, or gets classified by others as such, the resulting list is surprisingly heterogenous: it ranges from John Dewey to Ludwig Wittgenstein, from David Papineau to David Chalmers to John McDowell. One may doubt that there is any common denominator to all these naturalists. Actually one could think of a test, thinking e.g. of philosophy of mind. Let us say that, looking at the field of philosophy of mind, we compare the stand of naturalism and of physicalism. These are sometimes (tendentiously) identified, yet immediately one sees a difference. Whereas there are well-known arguments in favour of physicalism (e.g. an Argument from Causal Closure)⁶, a similarly clear case of an argument for naturalism is simply absent. This is a clear contrast. More often than not, what we find are not so much arguments in favour of naturalism but rather *Arguments from naturalism*. Naturalism, that is, often leads to a certain sort of project, often one of reduction (of mind, meaning, morality or modality). So maybe we should look at cases of being a naturalist, and see how the argumentation of the naturalist goes. At least that is my suggestion here. That is what I intend to do with McDowell’s Aristotelian naturalism in ethics.

3. McDowell’s liberal naturalism

So, what shape does his case for naturalism in ethics have? McDowell is classified as a liberal naturalist⁷, or generous naturalist⁸ in that his so-called

⁶ According to the doctrine known as *causal closure*, or causal completeness of the physical, all physical effects have fully physical causes. An Argument From Causal Closure could be formulated thus: (P1) Every event which has a cause has a physical cause, (P2) Mental events are physical events, (P3) [Exclusion Principle] If an event *e* causes event *e** then there is no event *e#* such that *e#* is non-supervenient on *e* and *e#* causes *e*. (C.) Mental events are supervenient on physical events [i.e. *physicalism is true*].

⁷ See De Caro, Mario – Macarthur, David, *Naturalism in question*, Harvard UP, Cambridge MA 2004 and De Caro, Mario – Macarthur, David, *Naturalism and Normativity*, Columbia University Press, New York 2010.

⁸ Papineau, David, “Naturalism”, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/naturalism/>.

second nature naturalism⁹ involves the rejection of both ontological and methodological doctrines of scientific naturalism. According to the Ontological Doctrine of Scientific Naturalism, the world consists of nothing but the entities to which successful scientific explanations commit us to. According to the Methodological Doctrine of Scientific Naturalism, scientific inquiry is in principle the only genuine source of knowledge or understanding. All other alleged sources of knowledge are either illegitimate or reducible in principle to scientific knowledge or understanding. The challenge for philosophical anthropology is then to conceive of our conceptual capacities (moral capacities included) as part of our nature, even if innate endowment (our first nature) put limits on the shapings of second nature which are possible. In McDowell's own formulation, this is a matter of conceiving of the authority of reason in the face of the authority of our first nature (*first nature* being his term for the picture of humans provided by natural science). This is what a second nature naturalist such as McDowell aims at doing.

His case for liberal naturalism in moral philosophy as it takes place e.g. in *Mind, Value and Reality* – Part II is built in several fronts. He deals with questions which range from the nature of hypothetical and categorical imperatives, or the objectivity of moral judgements, to rationality and irrationality, virtue and the metaphysical status of value. In «Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?» (1978) and «Might There Be External Reasons?» (1995) he puts forward a quasi-Kantian interpretation of the prevalence of moral reasons and an anti-Humean interpretation of motivation for action. In «Values and Secondary Qualities» (1985), «Projection and Truth in Ethics» (1987) and «Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following» (1981) he develops a non-reductionist conception of the notion of nature as well as an anti-anti-realist¹⁰ interpretation of the metaphysical status of value and reasons. These are, as it were, the fights that have to be fought if McDowell's liberal naturalism is to stand. I will first look into questions regarding hypothetical and categorical imperatives investigating the question of the authority of reason when it comes to responsiveness to reasons in rational animals such as ourselves. As

⁹ Recruiting the idea of 'second nature' for thinking about our conceptual capacities (moral capacities included) is one of the marks of McDowell's Aristotelianism. Aristotle himself uses the concept of second nature to speak of the character of a man, which becomes 'second nature' to him. McDowell speaks not only of moral capacities but of conceptual capacities in general as being *second nature* to humans.

¹⁰ I am thankful to Susana Cadilha for this term, which we used in our book on John McDowell (Miguens, Sofia – Cadilha, Susana, *John McDowell – uma análise a partir da filosofia moral*, Colibri, Lisboa 2014.).

I said this is one arena where McDowell's clashes with another Aristotelian naturalist, Philippa Foot.

3.1 Does responsiveness to moral reasons entail universality of rationality? What Kant means by 'categorical imperative'.

At the background of McDowell's article «Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?»¹¹ is Philippa Foot's critique of Kant on the inescapable character of moral reasons. Foot asks: What does it mean to say that we ought to do x? (e.g. what does it mean to say that I ought to pay my debt to my friend Paula, who lent me 100.000 euros?) We inherited from Kant, and usually accept, the idea that there is a distance between hypothetical and categorical imperatives: moral imperatives are categorical. But what is really at stake when we say that moral imperatives are categorical, or that we have moral reasons to do X, such as in the case above?

According to the orthodoxy, hypothetical imperatives are conditional: I should do X, if I want Y. In contrast, categorical imperatives are unconditional – the recommended action imposes itself as an end in itself. But this is precisely what Foot rejects: if that were the only difference then we would have to admit that social rules (e.g. rules of etiquette) are also categorical. Their use is also clearly non-hypothetical; it is not dependent on further ends.

If we are not willing to admit that moral imperatives are like etiquette imperatives, we should then think of another way of supporting the Kantian orthodoxy (i.e. the idea that moral imperatives are categorical). One way to go is to claim that Kant thinks that in acting morally we do as reason dictates. But, precisely, this is something Foot thinks is ungrounded: it is perfectly rational that someone asks him or herself *Why should I be moral? Why be moral?* The imoral – he or she who sees no reason to obey moral precepts – cannot be accused of being irrational. Many things may be said about a person not willing to do x, when one thinks he, or she, should do it. We may say that she is cruel, selfish, imprudent, but someone who thinks that moral imperatives are categorical would have to say *she is irrational*, and that we cannot do. Moral requirements do not *per se* give us a reason for acting. Moral reasons are available only for she who cares about moral good. In this sense moral imperatives are conditional, or hypothetical – this is precisely what Foot thinks.

¹¹ McDowell, John, «Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?», in McDowell, *Mind Value and Reality*, op. cit., pp. 77-94.

Against Foot McDowell claims that moral imperatives are indeed categorical and not hypothetical. But he does agree with her that *there is indeed no irrationality in not conforming to them*. His strategy is to focus on the virtuous person. Of course, he is never fully explicit about what a virtuous person is (nor need he be, he thinks). There are virtuous persons; it is that (and not rules) which is the starting point for understanding moral phenomena as exercises of reason. The idea is that if one is the right person, a virtuous person, the thing to do in a particular situation is simply seen (this is what is called moral particularism). The virtuous person is distinguished by the way she reads events, not by her desires: it is her reading of the circumstances she is in that gives her the reasons to do x; no further desire needs to be added.

Now, against whom, in the arena of moral philosophy (besides Kant and the Kantians, of course) does it matter to put things in such terms? The answer is that it matters to put things in these terms also against the Humean. The Humean sees reason as motivationally inert and defends a belief-desire model of motivation for action. She claims that my having a brute desire for E by itself constitutes my having a reason to pursue E. For the Humean there is a gap between reading a circumstance and being moved to act; this gap should be fulfilled by a desire. This is simply not so for McDowell; according to him beliefs themselves are motivating. He suggests a test.

Let us ask ourselves if it is possible that two people have the very same perception of particular circumstances and still see different reasons for acting (e.g. in the case where my friend Paula has lent me 100000 euro and I think I ought to pay off my debt). If it is indeed possible that two people have the very same perception of circumstances and still see different reasons for acting then perceiving facts is not sufficient for having a reason to act. Something else is needed: an extra desire. But this is not what McDowell thinks is the case. According to him, there is no neutral perception of facts which is shared by every perceiver, to which a motivational layer is then added. If in a given situation someone does not see X as the thing to do (e.g. I see that I should pay back my debt to Paula) this happens not because she lacks the desire a virtuous person has but because she does not see reality the same way a virtuous person does.

So, to sum up: Foot proposes moral imperatives are hypothetical (Kant was wrong). McDowell thinks moral imperatives are categorical (Kant was right). They do give us the thing to do unconditionally. There is no supplementary desire needed for being motivated to do the thing to do (Hume was wrong). Yet (says McDowell against Kant) the fact that one does not see cer-

tain traits of moral reality is no sign of irrationality. Moral requirements are categorical imperatives only because once they are recognized they necessarily motivate those who see them, *not because they are recognizable by every rational being*. In other words, McDowell does not share Kant's rationality-based universalism. He thinks no rational argument can make an agent see a situation a certain way. This is so precisely because according to him the question here is seeing (i.e. conceiving), not reasoning. And thus enters an Aristotelian idea: for one to see things as being a certain way one has to be the right sort of person. It takes having learned to see things under a certain light; hence the importance of education, of *Bildung*.

How does McDowell himself then see an agent's having a reason for acting? There is (1) the circumstance the agent is in and (2) the capacity (which the agent may or not have) of seeing the moral salience of the situation. The virtuous person has an understanding of the situation which involves not only having the belief that there is something to be done but also being motivated to do it.

Criticisms to be addressed to this view are obvious. It might be considered purely intellectualist: if I don't want to do X it is because I do not know it is the thing to do. But need it really be so? Also, it might be considered, as it were, too idyllic a view of deliberation: it is as if for McDowell there is no weighing of reasons in deliberation. Rather, in the virtuous agent *moral reasons silence every other reason present* (the metaphor of silencing is McDowell's metaphor for the authority of moral reasons; for him this is what it means to say that moral imperatives are categorical).

The point anyway is that being virtuous is not something which separates rational from irrational people; it is rather a matter of education and custom, of training of the practical intellect so that certain reasons to act become visible for an agent. The exercise of our moral capacities is thus, according to McDowell, dependent on the tuning and shapening of moral perception by education. It is thus that virtue becomes an habit, a second nature to a human being.

But if things are so with our moral capacities, then not only ethics cannot be formalized into a set rules to be applied in similar cases (knowing the thing to do in each case cannot be deduced from general principles, since it requires judgement in context) but also matters ethical will turn out to be a quite different matter from what one might have expected. They will turn out to be matters of seeing or perceiving things. In this view, moral judgements – judgements regarding the thing to do – turn out to be quite similar

to perceptual judgements. In such conditions there will never be anything like a rational proof of a judgement such as ‘To pay my debt to Paula is the thing to do’. Yet this does not *per se* mean that reason is not involved in the agent’s thinking what the thing to do is.

Is this not relativism? Is there indeed such a thing as the objectivity of the thing to do, as McDowell claims there is, for a virtuous agent, if the thing to do in a particular circumstance is not universally perceivable as such? And how do we know, since having our eyes opened to reasons is the only way to have reasons for acting, that our eyes are opened to the *right reasons*? How do we know that (it is) *our* eyes that are opened to the right reasons, and not somebody else’s eyes? Notice that McDowell does not defend the universality of moral reasons, but rather their appeal to rational beings for whom virtue has become second nature. For him not only there is no universality of moral reasons but also *there is no natural foundation for morality*. In this view our ethical capacities are not merely a rechannelling of natural impulses; rather they allow us to step back from any motivational impulse one finds oneself subject to and question whether it is rational to act accordingly. This is what being rational for a human animal is. The objectivity of moral reasons is always dependent on capacities which are parochial. Such acknowledgement of parochiality is precisely what Aristotle’s position amounts to – we may now call this *contextualism*. McDowell wants to keep such contextualism. But there is another problem here: for Aristotle the rightness of action is seen by appealing to habits, and habits are habits of a particular society. Aristotle had no concern for anything like universal justification of such society and such habits. This can be seen from the fact that he addresses his ethical lectures, such as the *Nichomachean Ethics* only to those who have been properly brought up. The question is, as it has often been pointed out, whether McDowell may share this stance, whether we, now, may share such stance. Let us leave it here for now.

3.2 The place of moral value in the natural world.

I have been considering responsiveness to reasons as it occurs in the exercises of our moral capacities following McDowell’s discussion with another Aristotelian naturalist, Philippa Foot. A conception of responsiveness to reasons is an important component of the case of the liberal naturalist. In what follows I will briefly mention two others, before I move to the conclusion I am interested in.

A view of value should also be part of the case of the liberal naturalist.

How are we to understand our capacity to see value? *Can it fit the viewpoint of natural science upon nature?* As is well known, J.L.Mackie's¹² error-theory asks such question and answers it negatively.

Considering the phenomenology of evaluative discourse, the error-theorist thinks it has cognitive content: it does seem to us that there is value in the world, and that is what our evaluative discourse expresses. Yet there is not. It is a massive error, an illusion: values are not part of the fabric of the world, says Mackie; all moral judgements are false. Mackie also puts forward a famous Argument from Queerness: for moral realism to be true, he claims, there would have to be queer properties, i.e. descriptive properties which would be intrinsically prescriptive and lead to action. Yet there are no such properties. Or, at least, to think that there are, and that they make true what we say, is what he calls 'unrecommendable platonism'.

In «Values and Secondary Qualities»¹³ McDowell does what he thinks needs to be done to counter Mackie's error-theory: he brings apart the conception of nature underlying it. This is his strategy: in order to be moral realists we do not have to think of moral properties as primary properties, or assume that the world as it is in itself can only be described in terms of primary properties. In fact, it is this idea of the world as it is in itself that is a fantasy. An analogy with colour does its work here. Colours are not less real because they are to be understood in terms of how they appear to a subject (in terms of the object's disposition to present a certain kind of perceptive appearance). The property of an object 'being red' is to be understood as 'being in certain way such that under certain circumstances it appears red'. Moral properties, like colour properties, depend on being perceived by subjects with the appropriate sensibility in certain circumstances. There is no such thing as 'being red' which is not appearing red (to some mind). Yet this does not mean that such qualities are not there to be perceived independent of that particular appearing to a particular mind. Such properties are not subjective in the sense of being illusory. They are not illusory – they are there to be experienced.

McDowell's main point here is that a conception of the world should include room for experience of the world and for what there is from the viewpoint of such experience – Mackie's problem is that his conception of nature is, as it were, too thin; it identifies nature with the content of a view from nowhere, where there are only primary properties. McDowell argues that such

¹² Mackie, John, *Ethics – Inventing right and wrong*, Penguin, London 1977.

¹³ McDowell, John, «Values and Secondary Qualities», in McDowell, *Mind Value and Reality*, op. cit., pp. 131-150.

view of nature is to be rejected.

Of course, there is an alternative here: why should we then not see value not as illusion but simply as spreading (ourselves) unto the world as David Hume did? This is the point of e.g. Simon Blackburn's projectivist quasi-realism. Blackburn has a Humean, i.e. a non-cognitivist, view of our moral capacities¹⁴. He sees our moral judgements not as descriptions of reality but as expressions of our attitudes before it.

According to Humean projectivism, properties that seem to genuinely belong to objects are just a projection or reflex of our subjective responses to a world which in fact does not contain such properties. Granted, Blackburn aims to account for moral discourse being as the realist and cognitivist takes it to be (e.g. we do speak of truth and falsity of moral assertions and he thinks that we have – because we have earned it – the right to do it). Blackburn's account of this situation, i.e. his quasi-realism, is McDowell's target in «Projection and Truth in Ethics» and «Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following»¹⁵.

What, according to McDowell, is the core mistake of the projectivist? He, or she, explains aspects which we believe were genuine traits of reality as reflexes of our subjective responses. So according to the projectivist, there is priority and explanatory independence of our subjective responses in relation to the aspects to be explained. McDowell's claim is that there is no such priority. According to his 'no-priority view' feelings and traits of reality are paired as siblings, and not as parents and children. This is his alternative to both intuitionist realism, according to which moral properties are prior and independent to our subjective responses, and to projectivism, according to which our subjective responses are prior to moral qualities.

The oponent can obviously point out that McDowell's no-priority view is circular, and needs the appeal to the default human sensibility (and could there be such thing?). Its account of e.g. cruelty or benevolence appeals to what is judged as such by the virtuous person in the appropriate circumstances. But how do we know who such person is? (imagine that we take Henry VIII as our touchstone for benevolence). Also the view is conservative: Blackburn accuses McDowell of merely citing or postulating the ethical verdicts of

¹⁴ Non-cognitivism is the idea that moral language does not have a descriptive function, depending on truth conditions, but is rather a means for influencing the behavior of others by expressing non-cognitive states. Strictly speaking the non-cognitivist thinks that there are no moral judgements – so called moral judgement are simply 'imposters'.

¹⁵ See McDowell, John, «Projection and Truth in Ethics», in McDowell, *Mind Value and Reality*, op. cit., pp. 151-166 and McDowell, John, «Non-cognitivism and rule-following», in McDowell, *Mind Value and Reality*, op. cit., p. 198-218.

our own concepts and practices.

In «Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following» McDowell defends himself from such accusations. It is in fact the case that when we say that acting virtuously is what the virtuous person does that is the end of the line. We cannot go any further; there is no way out of this circle. But this simply reflects the fact that we cannot think of value from without our evaluative experience. We cannot account for the status of value except from within the experience of valuing. Only if we believe that stepping back from our ongoing practices to ground them is possible, will we believe that a realism dependent on human sensibility is not sufficient. McDowell's point is that there is no sideways-on view available here; we cannot transcend our practices nor our parochial viewpoint towards a supposed 'reality such as it is in itself'. There is no formula to look at, or look for beyond our responses, beyond that which we have learned when we were introduced into a practice when it comes to accounting for our moral capacities. In McDowell's expression, there is nothing to keep us on the rails, there are only our practices. Practices are all we have, all we might evoke, even to account for the *rightness* of practices.

3.3 Rationality, universality and 'what is natural'

McDowell builds his case for liberal naturalism by fighting the attraction of what he sees as bad metaphysics, an ungrounded metaphysics, an ungrounded attraction. There is a spell, which he thinks should be broken. Liberal naturalism is put forward after the spell has been broken. The spell is the picture of shallow empiricist naturalism, which has us accept that what science aims to discover is nature of reality in so far as it can be characterized in absolute terms. Such picture leads to forms of naturalism based on a concept of nature according to which meaning and value are injected in it 'from the outside'. But according to McDowell meaning and value are not injected from the outside. The liberal naturalist has come to accept that she is dealing with the interior of nature, in contrast with a view from nowhere; she sees moral values as attuned to particular sensibilities; she sees moral properties as anthropocentric but real; she does not see responsiveness to reasons as attached to anything like universal rationality. She thinks that we examine our moral practices from within, and that there is no possibility of dissociating their descriptive and their normative elements¹⁶. She thinks that there is no

¹⁶ I did not go into this issue here. See Miguens, S. – S. Cadilha 2014, Primeira Parte, A filosofia moral.

such thing as an evaluatively neutral reality onto which moral judgement projects, or injects, our values. In other words, there is no stepping outside our own rationality and in that sense there is no natural foundation for morality; our ethical capacities are not merely a rechannelling of natural impulses, or a flight into a space outside nature. They are rather a stepping back.

We might accept this, i.e. that there is no view from nowhere, no sideways on view on ourselves and on our conceptual capacities. But of course, in the case of ethics there is still another problem. The problem is that we can very well conceive of different ways of applying ethical concepts. We just have to look around us and we do see alternative applications of ethical concepts – what reasons do we then have to think that our way of applying concepts is the right one? How can we ever argue that one way of applying concepts is superior to another?

4. The target

As a view of the nature of our moral conceptual capacities McDowell's Aristotelian naturalism is put forward against universalist and Platonistic views in ethics on the one hand and against the scientific naturalist on the other. Yet what I believe is the major objection to his view comes neither from the reductionist viewpoint of the scientific naturalist, nor from the Kantian universalist, or the Platonic realist. It comes from Bernard Williams in *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. In his 2006 book *Value and Context* (2006) Williams' student Alan Thomas sums it up like this:

The proposed form of cognitivism [i.e. McDowell's view] can give an excellent account of particular forms of ethical reasonings and practices as they arise in a given historical community, with its culturally specific concepts and practices. However, it fails to allow for the possibility of a certain kind of radical, distinctively modern form of reflection in which we take a critical stance towards the practices of our own historic community or are challenged by practices and ideals of other communities (our way of going on is just local)¹⁷.

¹⁷ Thomas, Alan, *Value and Context – the nature of moral and political knowledge*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 2-3.

In other words, McDowell's Aristotelian and contextualist account lacks, according to Williams (and to Thomas), the capacity to account for any kind of (critical) moral insight into our own ongoing moral practices. If our own purchase of moral properties takes place strictly from within one ongoing form of life, our own, it seems we are helpless in responding to the fact that there seems to be more than one such form of life, each giving access to its own range of moral properties. We should be empty handed to cope with *radical pluralism*, i.e. with the existence of competing ethical claims within coexistent moral practices. Yet are we? One thing is certain: such form of pluralism goes, in Thomas' terms, 'beyond a reasonable pluralism within morality' as a 'welcome complement of our idea of autonomy'. It presents a further challenge, it is something different. In fact such radical pluralism can be perceived as an avenue not to freedom but to nihilism, and nihilism is definitely not compatible with any claims of objectivity of moral judgement.

At first sight, McDowell's proposal as it stands is completely derailed by Williams' critique. Thomas thinks that it is. Yet he himself suggests a way out. I believe his suggestion is a good suggestion. I also want to suggest that McDowell himself adumbrates this e. g. in the rational wolf thought experiment as it concerns rationality and freedom.

Thomas' suggestion is the following. McDowell's proposal can be put back on track if one isolates and criticizes one key assumption: we have to distinguish two ideas concerning rationality and moral capacities (and the way we conceive of our moral capacities as rational). We can indeed form a conception of what it would be for an alternative framework of ethical judgement to be superior to another. What we cannot do (without a grand, teleological, Hegelian historical metanarrative) is to iterate such conception in order to yield the idea that that framework cannot be surpassed by another. This is the distinction we need if we are to be able to defend our own moral capacities (as rational capacities) across entire frameworks of moral belief, across cultures and historical differences. This is how one might allow for the bearing of the kind of moral insight into our own ongoing moral practices that Williams urged was lacking in the original version of McDowell's cognitivism. We may very well claim that A is superior to B – what we are not in a position to claim is that, say, Z, is the ultimate framework of ethical judgement.

Thomas's suggestion concerns rationality and moral capacities, and is formulated within a discussion of moral and political philosophy. Yet his proposal is very close to a more general proposal about the nature of rationality which I would like to bring in now. Thomas' proposal is close to the core

idea of Stephen Stich pragmatist theory of rationality, as it is put forward in *The Fragmentation of Reason*¹⁸. Stich's pragmatist view of rationality has a consequence-based view of epistemic evaluation at its core. The question of the nature of rationality is to be approached, according to him, as a question of epistemic evaluation, in a situation where, for real agents, cognitive processes are tools, evaluated by consequences. Stich's approach was prompted a problem posed to him by psychologist R. Nisbett regarding results in cognitive psychology¹⁹. Stich set out to help answer it. He wanted to support Nisbett's contention that he, the experimenter, was right whereas the subjects were wrong when they fail e.g. Wason's selection task. But he admits that he failed. His conclusion, and this is what matters for me here, is that when one considers the nature of rationality there is no such thing as *the* rational agent to have as reference. From the viewpoint of a pragmatist theory of rationality, being rational for an agent is doing well in pursuing goals. Such goals are not true beliefs, or valid reasonings, or being rational *per se*; they are whichever goals the (real, physical, biological) agent has. Cognitive processes are tools for reaching such goals. The evaluation of cognitive tools such as reasoning capacities to pursue such goals is possible – Stich insists he is not an epistemic nihilist – but only in a comparative, rather than absolute, way. There is such thing, for an agent, as doing better and doing worse – only there is no

¹⁸ Stich, Stephen, *The Fragmentation of Reason – Preface to a pragmatic theory of rationality*, MIT Press Cambridge MA 1990.

¹⁹ The Wason task (named after British psychologist P. Wason) is a famous and still very relevant example of such cognitive psychology studies of rationality. In a version with cards where these have even and odd numbers on one face and vowels and consonants on another (say, E, C, 5, 4), the task is formulated the following way. Subjects are asked: "Which cards do you have to turn in order to know whether 'if a card has a vowel on one face, then it has an odd number on the other' is true?" A large number of subjects do not think they have to turn, besides a card with a vowel visible (expecting to find an odd number on the other side), also a card with an even number visible (expecting to find a consonant on the other side). It is tempting to say, since subjects fail to comply with the rules governing conditionals (one should think here of what logic tells us renders a conditional *if p then q* false) that subjects are irrational. After describing to audiences the results of his studies of the Wason task and their bleak implications for the rationality of subjects, Nisbett once asked the philosopher Stich 'what is it that I mean when I say that the subjects are wrong?'. This is how Stich describes the situation from the point of view of Nisbett: When I present these experimental results to various professional audiences and draw the obvious, pessimistic conclusions about the reasoning abilities of the man or woman in the street, people raise various sorts of objections. Some of the objections are about experimental design, 'ecological validity' and similar issues, and these I know how to handle. But from time to time, someone will challenge my claim that in a particular experiment, subjects who give a certain answer are in fact reasoning badly. These critics demand to know how I get to say that which inferences are the good ones and which are the bad ones. They want to know what makes the subject's inference bad and the inference I think they should draw good. (...) What more could be done, Nisbett asked? How could it be shown that the subjects were reasoning badly?, Stich, *The Fragmentation of Reason*, op. cit., p. 9.

absolute doing well, a doing well *an sich*. In other words it is possible to say whether a cognitive system is doing better or worse than another system, for a particular task, in a particular situation or context, with a particular cognitive equipment. But Stich's point is that there is no such thing as the doing well of the ideal rational agent independent of a world and of situations therein. The idea of such ideal rational agent is embodied e.g. in the assumption, in traditional epistemology, that God and man could be seen as doing well cognitively along the same path, regardless of the enormously different powers and conditions of their minds. But from Stich's pragmatist viewpoint there is no such thing as an ideal rational agent. Stich also insists that what he is saying does not preclude the verdict that a cognitive agent is reasoning badly in a particular situation – we just have to add: in this particular situation the agent is doing badly, and point out a better alternative in the same situation and for an agent endowed with the same cognitive equipment, or cognitive capacities. The comparison that matters for cognitive evaluation is the comparison between actual alternatives, i.e. alternatives which are equally available for the agent. This is what is needed for moral philosophy. My proposal is that such view of rationality brings extra support to Thomas' suggestion regarding the status of McDowell's conception of our moral capacities.

Conclusion

What, then, are the problems for Aristotelian naturalism in contemporary moral philosophy and how can they be faced? First, before assessing Aristotelian naturalism, we need clarity about what is meant by 'naturalism'. There are many sorts of naturalism around. Aristotelian naturalism is one particular brand of naturalism and actually clarifies what one might, and might not, mean by 'naturalism'. In this article I focused on McDowell's second nature naturalism in moral philosophy, in order to illustrate the idea that naturalism need not be reductionist; Aristotelian naturalism is a non-reductionist kind of naturalism. The idea that our rational capacities are second nature to us, that they, too, are 'natural' is a core idea of Aristotelian naturalism as non-reductionism. Humans are naturally rational – that is the proposal. Yet the very idea of second nature commits us to make explicit the relation between such second nature and our animal nature, our first nature (in other words, there is a need to make explicit what one means by 'animal' in 'rational animal'). McDowell's main point here is about the shape that this relation does

not take when it comes to our ethical capacities: our ethical capacities (our second nature) are not merely a rechannelling of natural impulses (our first nature). Rather they allow us to step back from any motivational impulse one finds oneself subject to and question whether it is rational to act accordingly. This is what being rational is for a human animal.

I want to finish by making the connection explicit between the full Aristotelian and contextualist view of our moral capacities put forward by McDowell, and his contention, in *Two Sorts of Naturalism*, that there is something not quite right with Philippa Foot's own version of Aristotelian naturalism. It is clear for both of them that being an Aristotelian naturalist amounts to dropping universalist claims for rationality – in other words, it is clear that being an Aristotelian naturalist amounts to acknowledging the contextual nature of our rational capacities. According to an Aristotelian naturalist the objectivity of moral reasons, the reasons human animals are responsive to, is dependent on capacities which are parochial. Hence the importance of the virtuous agent, and of *Bildung*, i.e. education – the virtuous agent is the one who, in such circumstances, responds to reasons as being there to be responded to. It is only after such acknowledgement of the contextual nature of our rational capacities that the problem of conceiving of how our 'second nature' and our 'first nature' relate comes and here we find ourselves in a position very different from that of Aristotle himself. Aristotle himself had a teleological conception of nature, of the *kosmos*, to rely on to when he spoke e.g. of the necessity of virtues for a human life to go well and of the city as the context for such human flourishing. It is against such background that his claims should be read, namely the claims that all partnerships aim at some good, that the partnership that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others, which is called the city or the political partnership, does so particularly, that the partnership of the city aims at the pursuit of common good, that common good is constituted in the good of individuals, and that the good for an individual is a question of 'human flourishing' – or virtue. So when Aristotle proposed that the virtues are necessary for life to go well he was certainly tempted by a picture of a good life as a human as a life in which certain things are simply natural within the *polis* (think e.g. of my two initial examples from the *Politics*, those of the relation between man and woman and the relation between master and slave).

Such background is not available for contemporary Aristotelian naturalists – yet this does not mean that contemporary naturalists do not appeal to 'natural facts'. Part of McDowell's criticism of Foot's Aristotelian naturalism is

that it appeals to such natural facts, and thus comes too close to a single view of what natural is for a rational animal – as, arguably, Aristotle’s own naturalism did. McDowell does not claim anything that strong for the rationality of rational animals –; he simply does not think that can be claimed. The core of his claim is that for a natural creature to be rational is to be able to step behind natural impulses and ask for reasons. There is no fixed way of doing that, no natural foundation for rationality (e.g. for morality). There is thus no reason to expect that there will be anything like a single way for humans to be human. When it comes to exercises of rationality we cannot make sense of a creature being rational unless it has genuine alternative possibilities of action, over which its thought can play²⁰.

McDowell’s suggestion then is that we drop any appeal to (first nature) ‘natural’ facts concerning a sort of life a human animal should naturally live – there is no such thing for animals whose conceptual and moral nature has become second nature. As for the metaphysical and political background of Aristotle’s idea that the good life for a human being is a life of activity in accordance with the virtues, McDowell suggests that we should simply stop supposing that the rationality of virtue needs a foundation outside the formed evaluative outlook of a virtuous person²¹. Naturally, we risk losing Aristotle’s smooth conceptual connections between virtue, the polis and the common good. This renders the notion of common good and the connection of virtues with the city, and with political life, more problematic for a contemporary Aristotelian naturalist than it was for Aristotle. The background of a *kosmos* is not there anymore. Yet accepting such loss may very well be the only way to keep an Aristotelian picture of human moral capacities, i.e. virtue-centered contextualism, a picture which has independent reasons to recommend itself.

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²⁰ McDowell, «Two sorts of naturalism», op. cit., p. 170.

²¹ McDowell, «Two sorts of naturalism», op. cit., p. 174.

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MARCEL MÜLLER

THE URBAN DISPOSITION. A SARTREAN FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF URBAN LIFE

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine two concepts of Jean-Paul Sartre's later philosophy, *praxis* and *hexis*, in terms of their applicability for the philosophical analysis of the urban environment. By utilizing these concepts, the city can be reinterpreted as a practical ensemble that enables certain options for action while simultaneously limiting human freedom by presenting practical constraints. The constant clash of different forms of materiality in the shape of both human beings and artifacts cultivates the urban disposition. It is a dialectical movement of stabilizing equilibrium on one side and oscillating progress on the other. The coshaped reality of the city is characterized by tension between structural dependencies and increased possibilities.

Keywords: Existentialism; Dialectics; Praxis; Philosophy of Technology; Urban Environment.

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A disposição urbana. Um enquadramento sartriano para uma análise da vida urbana

Resumo

Este artigo tem como objetivo investigar dois conceitos da filosofia tardia de Jean-Paul Sartre, *praxis* e *hexis*, em termos de sua aplicabilidade à análise filosófica do meio urbano. Ao utilizar estes conceitos, a cidade pode ser reinterpretada como um conjunto prático que possibilita certas opções de ação ao mesmo tempo que limita a liberdade humana ao apresentar restrições práticas. O constante choque entre diferentes formas de materialidade na forma tanto de seres humanos como de artefatos cultiva a disposição urbana. É um movimento dialético de estabilização do equilíbrio por um lado, e de oscilização do progresso, por outro. A realidade da cidade moldada em conjunto caracteriza-se pela tensão entre dependências estruturais e possibilidades ampliadas.

Palavras-chave: Existencialismo; Dialética; Praxis; Filosofia da Tecnologia; Ambiente Urbano.

Introduction

The early philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre is known for its focus on the existential situation of the human being. Human activity is perceived as a free endeavor, that is bound by nothing but what itself determines to be obstacles. However, in his later philosophy, Sartre is more concerned with the material conditions that influence the projection of self. In *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, he introduces the concepts of *praxis* and *hexis*, that emphasize the dialectical character of human agency. Rather than conceiving human *praxis* as one of pure freedom, it is conceived as the product of the relations of production and the societal class the historical human being is situated in. The following paper is the attempt to operationalize Sartre's *praxis-hexis* framework in order to analyze human-world interaction as a mutually constitutive activity between two sectors of materiality, that enables and disables options for action by structuring the city as a practical field. The research question of this paper is: What are the advantages of a Sartrean framework for the philosophical study of the urban environment and how can this framework be applied to analyze the city as a disposition of practical constraints and possibilities? Sartre's concepts enable the analysis of a dispositional interaction between human beings and technology in the form of matter, that avoids the problems of an essentialist philosophy of technology. As such, it is of interest for philosophers of technology as well as philosophers of the city. It provides new and unbiased

insights into human-technology interaction. Also it enables philosophers to regard cities as practical ensembles, that provide the material basis for questions concerning urban justice, urban environments and inclusion/exclusion.

The attempt to answer the research question consists of several steps. Firstly, Sartre's early and later philosophy will be introduced with regard to the dialectical principle of totalization. Secondly, the tension between *praxis* and *hexis* will be elucidated. Thirdly, the advantages of the *praxis-hexis* framework for philosophical analysis will be focused. The paper concludes with an attempt to operationalize the *praxis-hexis* framework.

1. Intentionality and Self-Projection as Totalization

The key concept of Sartre's *praxis-hexis* framework, the dialectic synthesis of human *praxis*, is based on the functional principle of totalization. It is the basis of the two concepts intentionality and self-projection. Even though these two concepts have been elucidated in great depth by Sartre himself, it is necessary, to reconstruct them again with a strong emphasis on the dialectic element both have in common. The following paragraph is mainly to provide examples for the more abstract concept of totalization.

Sartre's early work *Being and Nothingness* starts with a complex introduction in which the author explains the phenomenological foundations of his philosophy. With regard to being, Sartre distinguishes two modes of existence. Human beings operate in the mode of being-for-itself, whereas everything non-human, e.g. the world and its various phenomena, operate in the mode of being-in-itself. The tripartite structure of this being-in-itself is described as follows: «Being is. Being is in itself. Being is what it is»¹. This means, that being is neither active nor passive, but pure contingent givenness. It has no *noumenon* and «does not point over its shoulder to a true being»². Instead, it is completely how it presents itself. As such, it is prone to be the object of the subjective intentionality of human consciousness. From a phenomenological point of view, consciousness is a summary term for all psychological or intentional experiences³. Every variation of intentional relationality between subject and object, e.g. touching, smelling, thinking and

¹ Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness*, Routledge, London and New York 2003, p. 22.

² Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 2.

³ Stegmüller, Wolfgang, *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Eine kritische Einführung. Band I. Stuttgart*, Kröner 1989, p. 63.

more, constitutes a different finite adumbration of the phenomenon within an infinite series of possible adumbrations⁴. Yet none of these finite adumbrations fully determines the phenomenon's being. Sartre even claims that the simultaneous presence of all contradictory, colliding or conflicting determinations within human consciousness is impossible⁵. Nevertheless, human consciousness can transcend individual determinations towards the meaning of the phenomenon. By identifying this meaning as the «principle of the series of its appearances»⁶, Sartre draws attention to its status as a totality. As such, it is the product of a synthetic act, i.e. a totalization, carried out by human consciousness. In his later work *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Sartre describes the totality as «a being which, while radically distinct from the sum of its parts, is present in its entirety, in one form or another, in each of these parts, and which relates to itself [...]»⁷. It has the ontological status of being-in-itself. But this process is never complete. The meaning of a phenomenon always represents a lack of being. Since «it would require an infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing»⁸; new determinations replace outdated ones or change its overall meaning. The totalization of determinations and its product, the constituted meaning, build the foundation for Sartre's conception of the projection of self.

The most obvious and at the same time most subtle difference between human beings and phenomena is that human beings are more than they appear. Their self can not be the principle of the series of their appearances. Sartre argues that this is because of human being's particular mode of existence, known as being-for-itself. This is characterized by the constant need to self-reflect and self-relate. Sartre calls this need freedom⁹ and it is the gap between being-for-itself and being-in-itself that prevents human beings from becoming self-contained totalities. Since being-for-itself is relational, it can only exist as an ongoing totalization towards the future¹⁰. The meaning of phenomena is the way in which they appear; the meaning of human beings is the way in which they determine themselves. This self-determination can

⁴ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 3.

⁵ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., pp. 16 – 17.

⁶ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷ Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Critique of Dialectical Reason I. Theory of Practical Ensembles*, New Left Review, London 1978, p. 45.

⁸ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 7.

⁹ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., pp. 48 – 50.

¹⁰ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., pp. 101 – 102.

be understood as a negation of the full positivity of being-in-itself¹¹. As such, being-for-itself is the totalizing existence towards one possible self while also being the negation of other possible selves. By doing so, it constitutes a specific horizon of possibilities¹². Simultaneously, it posits itself as a lack of being to exist towards¹³. In this way, contingent positings of being-in-itself become concrete conditions of being-for-itself, coupled with the necessity to exist towards them. For instance, a bus driver is not a philosopher, not a road worker, not a musician. All of those are possible selves, yet the human being may only mainly exist towards one of them by simultaneously negating the others. In doing so, it realizes certain possibilities that belong to its existing towards being a bus driver. This includes the incorporation of totalities such as buses, streets, traffic lights, traffic regulations etc.

In Sartre's case, totalization follows a dialectic triad of positing, negation and situation. The situation is in itself another positing and the triad begins anew. In intentional relations, the triad depicts the synthesis of opposing determinations and their sublation within the meaning of the phenomenon. The projection of self follows this dialectic process insofar, as being-for-itself is the real sublation of all its possible projections that are nevertheless still a part of it. As such, it can take advantage of certain possibilities that are the starting point for further dialectic processes. In Sartre's philosophy, life is never a self-contained totality but the constant totalization towards itself; outside, in a world filled with things and other people.

2. The Coefficient of Adversity

What is at least a curiosity in the early and the cornerstone of the late Sartre is how he assesses the importance of the so called coefficient of adversity of things. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre considers the social, economical and bodily dimensions of the human condition as a factor that is conditioned by the contingency of being-in-itself. Since this thrownness or *Geworfenheit* is negated by the self-determining projection of human beings; it is they who determine the severity of the coefficient of adversity. For the early Sartre: «the coefficient of adversity in things can not be an argument against our freedom, for it is by us - i.e. by the preliminary positing of an end - that this coefficient

¹¹ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 22.

¹² Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., pp. 106 – 108.

¹³ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p. 110.

arises»¹⁴. A stone is only an obstacle, if human beings determine themselves to be bothered by it on their road of freedom. The early Sartre is not interested in the power of things and their practical constraints beyond the point of self-projection.

The later Sartre accepts «without reservation the thesis set forth by Friedrich Engels in his letter to Karl Marx: ‘Men themselves make their history but in a given environment which conditions them’»¹⁵. But in his opinion, the Marxist philosophy of his time has lost sight of this fact. Sartre criticizes, that Marxism and especially Dialectical Materialism have become dogmas. Instead of analyzing the situation of human beings within capitalist societies, these dogmas expose them to dialectical laws of history. Even though Sartre is primarily concerned with human freedom, his later work, including the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, is the attempt to handle the coefficient of adversity. The focus of his later book lies on the tension between human agency and a world full of recalcitrant things. Ultimately, this tension leads to Sartre’s conceptualization of *praxis* and *hexis*.

The Marxist focus of Sartre’s later philosophy can be disputed. Nevertheless, the strictly material base of his concepts provides advantages for a philosophical analysis of the interactions and interdependencies within an urban environment. By conceptualizing materiality as a constituent of *praxis*, problematic concepts about a supposed essence of technology or a deterministic relation between human beings and things, can be avoided.

3. *Praxis* and Materiality

Sartre considers both intentionality and self-projection to follow the triadic structure of dialectic synthesis, known as totalization. In order to analyze the tension between human beings and the world, the later Sartre slightly changes the emphasis of his philosophy. Starting from the lack of being, Sartre questions why human beings are confronted with this lack in the first place. In the intentionality of human consciousness, the lack of being represents that additional content of the phenomenon, that is not sublated within its meaning. In relation to the self-projection, it represents the future self that is posited as that which human beings strive to become, but yet miss to be.

¹⁴ Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., pp. 503 – 504.

¹⁵ Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Search for a Method*, Random House Inc., Toronto 1963, p. 85.

Sartre considers these lacks to be the internal side of external needs, e.g. physical deficiencies, desires, goals etc. He conceptualizes need as the initial totalizing relation between human beings and the world. Nevertheless, it is not his concern to reduce all human actions to these needs, but rather to identify them as a constituent moment of practical world relatedness. He does so, in order to operationalize the human-world relation as a practical engagement between two sectors of materiality.

Intentionality and self-projection as such are no longer the main focus of the later Sartre. Instead, they are instantiations of the practical relation between human being and world. This *praxis* is the exteriorized functional principle of totalization; the material transition between a given lack of being and its sublation through synthesis¹⁶. Through *praxis*, external factors of concrete matter become internalized nexuses of meaning, thus the meaning of phenomena is constituted. And through *praxis*, these internalized nexuses and other internal factors like needs, wishes, and values are externalized as the striving towards a future self. The transition from lack to need and the concomitant conceptualization of *praxis*-oriented human-world relations is also the transition from a mostly internal to a mostly external view of these relations. Rather than trying to grasp the challenges of human freedom within a situation, human-world relations can be analyzed as a constituting as well as constituted engagement. Constituting, because human beings change the world and themselves in order to satisfy their needs; constituted, because *praxis* is dependent on various material factors and influenced in return by its own imprint on materiality.

Most importantly, Sartre implements a modal view of human activity. Since every *praxis* is embedded in a practical field, i.e. a structured totality of materials and means¹⁷, it is both enabling and disabling possibilities, by relating possible means to possible ends. Here, Sartre's analyses correspond to Hegel's thoughts about means and ends as described in Hubig's *Die Kunst des Möglichen I*¹⁸. All three follow a modal concept of technology, that analyzes the mediating role of technology and technological artifacts, by focusing on their enabling and disabling capabilities. Even though Sartre does so only implicitly while focusing on the individual human being, his conception of *praxis* and practical fields, as disposing possibilities for action provides the key concept for the analysis of the urban disposition.

¹⁶ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., pp. 80 – 83.

¹⁷ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 87.

¹⁸ Hubig, Christoph, *Die Kunst des Möglichen I. Technikphilosophie als Reflexion der Medialität*, transcript, Bielefeld 2006, p. 113.

4. The Imprint of *Praxis* on Matter

According to Sartre, «[e]very *praxis* is primarily an instrumentalisation of material reality»¹⁹. Through this totalizing *praxis*, both human beings and the world become inertial. This *practico-inert*²⁰, i.e. the totalities constituted through *praxis* like future selves, objects, ideas, concepts, can be understood as reifications of human activity²¹. As such, they are passively-active and dispose further *praxis*. The explanations given seem to be very abstract at first, yet they allow the human-world relation to be regarded as a result of mutual influence. The above-mentioned example of the bus driver helps to elucidate this. In order to work as a bus-driver, a human being has to learn how to drive a bus. This means, that it has to engage with an artifact. The bus itself can hold 50 people, has an automatic gear for stop-and-go traffic and a suspended seat for long sittings. By virtue of being designed, i.e. meaningfully constituted through *praxis*, the bus «transforms natural, meaningless forces into quasi-human practices, that is to say, into passivised actions»²². In artifacts, human *praxis* remains active over time by acting passively. This allows its usage as a means to specific ends. Instead of being in constant need to constitute the meaning of the artifact as part of a free endeavor, Sartre's later conceptualization of *praxis* and the *practico-inert* allows a much more nuanced analysis of the coefficient of adversity. Things are considered to be material signifiers of their meaning, constituted through *praxis*. In this way, human beings again become subject to that very *praxis* through which others or they themselves externalized their *selves* in the world. This also changes the perception of non-manufactured phenomena in the world so that they might initially be put into an involvement whole as standing reserve or *Bestand*.

Praxis, as dialectic synthesis to satisfy needs, and the *practico-inert*, the world as changed through *praxis*, constitute a practical ensemble. As the inventory of world relatedness under very specific material conditions, it is the framework for further *praxis*. The practical ensemble of the above-mentioned bus driver consists of the bus, the road, his or her expertise and the various reasons, e.g. lacks and needs, to follow this particular line of work. It enables and disables possible options for actions by limiting and delimiting the practical field that contains the roots of *praxis*.

¹⁹ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 161.

²⁰ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 46.

²¹ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 161.

²² Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 161.

5. *Praxis* and *Hexis* as Enabling and Disabling Capacities

The constant repetition of certain actions leads to the refinement of the accompanying means and to a better understanding of the achieved ends. Ultimately, this entails the preference of some and the abandonment of other practices. This may lead to a relatively stable equilibrium of interactions, that enable the achievement of reproducible and reliable results. The product of this ongoing interaction with the material world and the constant change of the conditions of that interaction is what Sartre calls *hexis*²³, «that is to say, both [...] a physiological and social determination of human organisms and [...] a practical project of keeping institutions and physical corporate development at the same level»²⁴. This *hexis* is a set of rules, norms and practices and the way of their practical implementation, that mutually shape the way human beings and world constitute each other. As cultivated through *praxis* and the *practico-inert*, it is the ongoing autopoietic dialectic totalization of both human agency and practical constraints and the result of constant theoretical and practical interaction, through which human beings internalize the way their practical ensemble operates²⁵.

It is simultaneously enabling and disabling certain possibilities by limiting and delimiting the practical field in a specific way. The most important aspect of *hexis* is, that it is cultivated through the repetition of successful interactions. Their ongoing success can increasingly obscure the initial tension between lacks and needs as constituents of a free human *praxis*. As the material resistance gradually vanishes, certain practices become ends in themselves instead of being conceived as focal points of dialectic totalization. Over time, this *hexis*, i.e. the structure of material relations brought forth by *praxis*, can gain the status of a determinant. Even though it is a product of the self-projecting dialectic relation between the free being-for-itself and the contingent being-in-itself; this being-in-itself increasingly starts to determine the self-projection in return. The conceptual roots of Sartre's *hexis* lie in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here Aristotle describes *hexis* as a disposition towards a specific way of performing actions²⁶. Also, in the social theory of Bourdieu, which was highly influenced by Sartre's later

²³ Here I chose the spelling *hexis* with the rough breathing from Greek ξις.

²⁴ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 126.

²⁵ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 455.

²⁶ Aristotle, *NE*, Book 2.4

work²⁷, *hexis* is the perceivable side of *habitus*²⁸.

6. The Advantages of Sartre's *Praxis-Hexis* Framework

Especially in considering the workings of *hexis*, Sartre's *praxis-hexis* framework can be of advantage for the philosophical analysis of the city. It allows to conceptualize the city as a merger of practical relations between human beings and matter. Also, since Sartre considers every interaction between two separate entities to be a form of *praxis*, this framework allows to uncover connections between seemingly unrelated spheres, e.g. the social and the material/technical sphere. By conceiving human *praxis* as the product of the totalization of material factors and freedom, the city becomes a vast repository for philosophical problems. Questions of inclusion and exclusion arise in a completely new way and the modal focus enables analysts to measure the practical field of the city anew. With the *praxis-hexis* framework in mind, the city is a suitable location to investigate the constant clashes of *praxis* and the *practico-inert*. By virtue of these clashes mere possibilities of being become realities of the material world. And through these realities, as products of interaction and material resistance, new options for action present themselves.

Within the necessities of the city, the possibility of a future human self might even become apparent in the first place. The above-mentioned bus driver has to feel the need for convenient mass transport systems in order to project towards his or her future self. This need is initially presented to him or her through the totalization of the material factors and social relations within the practical ensemble this human being is situated in. The *praxis-hexis* framework might also be applied to other sectors of urban life. It can provide new insights to the problem of the supposed politics of artifacts²⁹, by re-interpreting the relation between these artifacts and marginalized groups as one of enabling and disabling possibilities. Also, it presents a different view on the agency of assemblages³⁰, since practical ensembles are considered to be totalities, that can have structuring power. In terms of power and power-

²⁷ Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, pp. 72 – 76.

²⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, op. cit., p. 87

²⁹ Winner, Langdon, «Do Artifacts Have Politics?», *Daedalus*, 109,1 (1980) 121 – 136.

³⁰ Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant Matter. A Political Ecology of Things*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 2010, p. 20.

relations, Sartre's framework may take its place beside Foucault's *dispositiv* and Latour's network as a modeling for the power of technology. The modal focus of this framework prevents deterministic interpretations of technology, since it conceives the practical relations as producing both desired and undesired effects. Thus, the conceptualization of who or what is determining whom is dependent on the way these practical relations are modeled, according to the epistemic interest³¹. *Hexis* might also be analyzed with regard to the analogy of grammar³².

Within the philosophy of the later Sartre, the concepts of *praxis*, the *practico-inert* and *hexis* are already operationalizations of mutually totalizing human-world relations. His method to analyze *praxis* and *hexis* is called progressive-regressive method. In the regressive momentum of his method, the sum of all social relations that condition human beings in their self-projection are reconstructed. This includes all necessary information about history, nature and scientific paradigms that are in any way influential. The progressive momentum of this method is mainly concerned with how human beings constitute themselves by progressively analyzing how each self-projection is a succession of former conditioned projections³³. The sticking point of Sartre's method is neither the progressive nor the regressive momentum but the constant back and forth between these two. Due to the constant exchange within this method, from regression to progression and vice versa, its results have to be considered hypothetical totalizations. Nevertheless, Sartre supposes that this hypothesis is «immediately verifiable; the only valid one is that which will realize within a creative movement the transverse unity of *all* the heterogeneous structures³⁴». Sartre is convinced, that a reconstruction, which includes all influencing factors of materiality, can be considered to be explanatory for the way, this human being has become who he or she is. Considering the sum of information that has to be accumulated in order to produce significant results, Sartre's method may only be useful under certain circumstances. His own approach in using this method, namely his *Family Idiot* study about Gustave Flaubert, remains an unfinished project while spanning over thousands of pages.

³¹ Hubig, Christoph, *Die Kunst des Möglichen III. Macht der Technik*, transcript, Bielefeld 2015, pp. 114 – 124.

³² The following paper is an evolved version of an earlier presentation given at SPT 2017. However, the analogy of grammar has its limits in elucidating the structuring role of *hexis*.

³³ Sartre, *Search for a Method*, op. cit., p. 134.

³⁴ Sartre, *Search for a Method*, op. cit., pp. 147 – 148.

Nevertheless, the *praxis-hexis* framework can be utilized otherwise. Since *hexis* is a result of *praxis* such an approach may also follow the two steps of regression and progression; but not without significant modifications. Also, in order to narrow down the object area, the focus has to shift from the individual human being within history to the enabling and disabling of options for action as a result of practical interaction. In the last part of this paper, a short outline of an operationalization of Sartre's *praxis-hexis* framework is provided.

7. A Short Outline of an Operationalization of the *Praxis-Hexis* Framework

The first and most significant modification is affecting the regressive moment of Sartre's method. As mentioned before, this step includes the reconstruction of all social relations that conditioned the self-projection of the historical human being. This is mainly done in order to understand all the social and material factors that lead to estrangement and exploitation. For the analysis of the urban disposition, the regressive step provides the first challenge. Since it is necessary to find adequate empirical data as a starting point for philosophical analysis, aspects of postphenomenological approaches can be utilized.

The main claim of postphenomenology is, that the relation between human beings and lifeworld is a mediated one. The notion of lifeworld is prominently featured in Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*³⁵. For Husserl it is the entirety of all immediate intentional relations with phenomena. Ihde, remarks that the lifeworld can never be as immediate as Husserl proposes. Because technologies are used in almost every sector of contemporary human life, human beings live in a deeply mediated world that constantly changes. Husserl's undisturbed I-world relation is replaced by various I-technology-world relations. Verbeek emphasizes the importance of a postphenomenological approach that is «motivated by the postmodern aversion to context-independent truths and the desire to overcome the radical separation of subject and object, but that does not result in relativism»³⁶. Through this, the postphenomenological approach allows the

³⁵ Husserl, Edmund, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1962.

³⁶ Verbeek, Peter-Paul, *What Things Do. Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and*

analysis of the constitution of multistabilities, i.e. complex connections between cultural and technological factors³⁷ that constitute a meaning context or *Sinnzusammenhang*.³⁸

However, two problems arise with good reason. The first is one concerning the need for addressing the tension between *praxis* and *hexis*, if a strict postphenomenological approach provides all the necessary data for an analysis of the urban disposition. Yet, postphenomenological approaches do not claim to provide such complete analyses. Even if they can give insights into the multistable relations between human beings and the various artifacts within cities, they can not provide a sufficient understanding of the agency of artifacts. Rosenberger, who is analyzing the phenomenon of park benches in cities, complements the postphenomenological approach with insights from Actor-Network-Theory. This allows him to draw remarkable conclusions about the agency of these seemingly mundane artifacts.³⁹ The second problem arises in terms of the need for a postphenomenological modification. Not only does Sartre himself utilize a classical phenomenological approach in almost all of his own analyses, he also considers it a «crucial discovery of dialectical investigation [...] that man is ‘mediated’ by things to the same extent as things are ‘mediated’ by man»⁴⁰. So he talks about the co-constitution of human beings and materiality in a pre-postphenomenological way. Postphenomenology and the Sartrean *praxis-hexis* framework complement each other insofar, as the former reasonably narrows down the object area and the latter provides the theoretical framework to render the analyzed ensemble intelligible as a disposition between *praxis* and *hexis*. The postphenomenological modification represents an initial *epoché*⁴¹ that limits the available data to a feasible degree. Since world relations present themselves differently under different viewpoints, the modification focuses on only one of them. Instead of confusing I-world, human-technology, human-world and technology-world relations, the tools of postphenomenology are made for the analysis of human-technology-world relations, i.e. the way human-world relations are me-

Design, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania 2005, p. 113.

³⁷ Ihde, Don, *Technology and the Lifeworld*, University Press, Indiana 1990, pp. 144 – 150.

³⁸ Rosenberger, Robert - Verbeek, Peter-Paul, *Postphenomenological Investigations. Essays on Human-Technology Relations*, Lexington Books, Lanham 2015, pp. 11 – 12.

³⁹ Rosenberger, Robert, «Multistability and the Agency of Mundane Artifacts: from Speed Bumps to Subway Benches», *Human Studies*, 13, 3 (2014) 369 – 392.

⁴⁰ Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, op. cit., p. 79.

⁴¹ Vetter, Helmuth (ed.), *Wörterbuch de phänomenologisch Begriffe*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2004, p. 145 – 151.

diated by technology. These can be categorized as embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, background and cyborg relations⁴². Also, the focus on the modality of practical fields fits the postphenomenological framework well, since it considers the role of the *practico-inert* within concrete actions, instead of applying a classical theory of philosophy to it⁴³.

The second modification of the progressive-regressive method is affecting the progressive moment. Sartre initially conceptualizes this step to be a synthesis of all totalizing relations that constitute the historical situation of the human being. Driven by the epistemic interest in the tension between human freedom and material influence factors, Sartre considers various social determinants like societal class, relations of production, education etc. In order to analyze the urban disposition however, the epistemic interest is a different one. Since *hexis* is established through the complex interplay of practical relations and their stabilization over time, the relationality of these practices as relatively stable totalities has to be focused. In doing this, the urban disposition can be analyzed as a set of relations of relations that yields possibilities and practical constraints of second order. This step follows Sartre's thoughts about the triadic dialectic structure of *praxis*.

8. The Urban Disposition

Now, having the necessary tools at hand, the urban disposition can be investigated. Since the epistemic interest is clearly defined through the focus on the possibilities and practical constraints within the city, the initial postphenomenological progression has to include a number of human-technology-world relations within cities. Because the practical ensemble of the bus driver has been established as an example to explain the features of Sartre's *praxis-hexis* framework, it will continue to be used. Through postphenomenological analysis it is possible to determine, that the bus driver's relation to the world is mediated by at least two artifacts, namely the bus and the time clock. The bus-relation is both an embodiment relation, as physical instantiation of the bus driver's movement through the city, as well as a background relation to the bus as workspace. The time clock-relation is a hermeneutic relation, since

⁴² Verbeek, Peter-Paul, «Beyond Interaction: A Short Introduction to Mediation Theory», *interactions*, 22, 2 (2015) 26 – 31, pp. 29 – 30.

⁴³ Achterhuis, Hans, *American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 2001, pp. 6 – 9.

the time clock frames the individual stops of the bus driver's route as a physical representation of time.

Progressing from this initial regressive analysis with the *praxis-hexis* framework in mind, these two seemingly insignificant human-technology-world relations can be interpreted in terms of the dialectical interaction of their elements. Both the bus and the time clock are not mere tools for the bus driver to use, but are actively changing the way he or she perceives the world in terms of space and time. By occupying a workspace that is simultaneously moving within a city and immovable by sitting in it, the bus driver totalizes his or her self while generating possibilities for others. The bus as *practico-inert*, is by design presenting options for action, that are actualized through the *praxis* of the bus driver. The time clock is passively regulating this *praxis*, which is beneficial for the production of reliable results. Considering the relativity of both elements, the bus driver as subject relating to the bus as object changes in the same way, as the alarm clock as subject relating to the bus driver as object does. Both elements actualize possibilities that they only have because of the other's recalcitrance and both are subject to practical constraints within this relation.

Since these individual practical ensembles are as such totalizations that reach the relatively stable status of totalities, they can become elements of another totalization that eventually cultivates a *hexis*. This may lead to further practical constraints in the form of fixed bus schedules that are dependent on the working hours of other city dwellers; and also to new possibilities in the form of regular and more reliable bus services.

Even though this example also works for other contexts outside of the city, it is nevertheless very symptomatic for its mutually constitutive practical relations and its accelerated lifestyle. What characterizes the urban disposition is the way human beings engage in material relations that change the way they live their lives. The almost constant supply of goods is providing both relief and option paralysis. Technologies mediate the flow of goods and people through a complex net of traffic signals, speed bumps, railroad crossings, buslanes and pedestrian zones; all illuminated by the sepia glow of street lights and headlamps. Depending on the epistemic interest, the *praxis-hexis* framework can provide insight into the various ways human beings might appear to be trapped within the constraints they cultivate for themselves. But it also shows, that the city is not a hostile force that oppresses them. It is the complex interplay of *praxis*, both in human and material form. A city without human beings would be a more or less loose collection of buildings and streets. But

even those buildings and streets are materialized *praxis* that is presenting itself as a nexus of meaning, which lets human beings relate to it in a very particular way. Vice versa, a city without these streets and buildings would just be a loose collection of human beings. But they immediately start to feel the need for shelter, food and connection, thus starting to satisfy their needs in the material world.

The urban disposition is one of stabilizing equilibrium. It provides relief through the repeatability of actions and also remedy through the reproducibility of totalities. But it is also one of oscillating progress, because it can slightly alienate human beings from the *opus* of their own *praxis* by making it appear to be their fate.

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BENJAMIN ROSS*

THE FEED: ALGORITHMIC MEDIATION OF *SELF* AND CITY

Abstract

In our network-laden cities abounding with smart technologies, the algorithm gestures toward a material reality wherein we become what we are by making that which in turn makes us. This is especially appropriate upon examination of the feed. One feeds upon their feeds, a sumptuous meal in digital culture: Facebook feeds, Instagram feeds, and newsfeeds—consumed until all experience is first mediated in accordance to the feast of feeds. In terms of the city, whether it is a look at the map or the news, each is mediated by the appropriate feed which is built upon the ubiquity of the algorithm—arguably one of our historical moment's most important concepts. Thus, I would like to suggest that the algorithm is not only an ontic feature of experience, but an ontological one: we no longer primarily rely on the lived experience of a place, but upon the mediation of a place by an algorithm which generates its being. By focusing on the feed of Google Maps' smartphone application and the use of data-driven «predictive policing», the algorithm emerges as the primary interpretive modality of the city with the consequence of emerging as the interpretive modality of the self.

Keywords: Algorithm; Technology; Computation; Ontology; Big data

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O feed: mediação algorítmica do *self* e da cidade

Resumo

Nas nossas cidades emaranhadas em redes repletas de tecnologias inteligentes, o algoritmo aponta para uma realidade material, na qual nos tornamos o que somos fazendo o que, por sua vez, nos faz. Isto torna-se particularmente pertinente quando se analisa o feed. Todos se alimentam dos seus feeds, uma refeição sumptuosa de cultura digital: feeds do Facebook, feeds do Instagram e feeds de notícias - consumidos até que toda a experiência seja mediada, em primeiro lugar, de acordo com o banquete dos feeds. Em termos da cidade, seja quando se dá uma olhada num mapa ou se passa pelas notícias, cada um é mediado pelo feed adequado, que se constrói com base na omnipresença do algoritmo – possivelmente, um dos conceitos mais importantes do nosso momento histórico. Assim, gostaria de sugerir que o algoritmo não é apenas uma característica ôptica da experiência, mas ontológica: deixamos de depender da experiência vivenciada de um lugar, para passar a vivenciar um lugar com base na mediação por um algoritmo que gera o seu ser. Ao concentrarmo-nos no feed da aplicação de smartphone do Google Maps e no uso do «policiamento preditivo» alimentado por dados, o algoritmo surge como a principal modalidade interpretativa da cidade, com a consequência de emergir como a modalidade interpretativa do self.

Palavras-chave: Algoritmo; Tecnologia; Computação; Ontologia; Big data.

Introduction

If you subscribe to the *MIT Technology Review's* daily digest, *The Download*, perhaps you have noticed that the aggregated content is often sponsored by the Siemens Corporation. In *Radical Technologies*, Adam Greenfield also quotes this multi-national technology vendor making its vision of the future explicit: «Several decades from now cities will have countless autonomous, intelligently functioning IT systems that will have perfect knowledge of users' habits and energy consumption, and provide optimum service»¹. When I drive to work, I can see one branch of Siemens' North American headquarters—a milky-colored mainframe tower reaching toward the sky. Who could have guessed that I was driving by a repository of perfect knowledge? In this paper, I wish to speculate on the ontological implications of the mechanism which enables Siemens' claim to perfect knowledge—the selfsame mechanism which enables Google Maps' mission to take all your questions and turn them into answers, and predictive policing's solution to criminal activity. The

¹ Greenfield, Adam, *Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life*, Verso, New York 2017, p. 52.

artifact under consideration is that which declares that the world is perfectly knowable and capable of being inscribed upon a technical system: the algorithm.

Yuval Harari writes in his best-selling book *Homo Deus*, «(The) Algorithm is arguably the single most important concept in our world»². Yet, this most important concept can be described very simply as a method used to make a decision. An algorithm is not some particular calculation, but a general method to be followed when making a calculation with a desired result. For example, a recipe for a salad is an algorithm where one picks out a base like lettuce, dices tomatoes, adds bacon and sliced hardboiled eggs followed by ranch dressing. This algorithm can be followed using a variety of different ingredients, cook times, and implements, and though each will result in a different salad, it will nevertheless be a salad. One way that the algorithm works can be seen through the lens of a smartphone—the most capable feed-er of information built upon machine learning algorithms. How does an algorithm present a mediated world? One way is via the map. In order to find my way around Porto, I consulted my iPhone’s Google maps application. This app presents data to me in real time as a map interface which feeds me updates from other users and sources such as weather sensors and traffic monitors which allows me to negotiate (in theory, at least) the city with the aplomb of a lifelong resident. The feed of data is not limited to maps, however. We are constantly being fed through our feeds—a cascade of data, likes, comments, and reviews consumed until all experience is first mediated in accordance to the digital feast. This feast is served up by a cook who hides their identity in the assumed impartial objectivity of the algorithm. But, as Langdon Winner reminds us, artifacts have politics, and as this paper wishes to demonstrate, algorithms work because of a forced perspective that narrows the possibilities of being.

1. Maps and the Narrowing of Possibility

The narrowing of possibility is most evident in the city where we rely on our algorithmically-derived feeds most of all. Whether it is a planned visit to a restaurant, a trip to a museum, a look at traffic or the weather—each is mediated by the appropriate feed to inform us of opening and closing times,

² Harari, Noah Yuval, *Homo Deus*, HarperCollins, New York 2017, p. 83.

blocked streets, and shops in the area. The algorithm emerges as the primary interpretive modality of the city not only for the tourist or citizen, but also for the state. With an emphasis on Google's Maps application and the emerging enterprise of predictive policing, the algorithm is seen to not only be an ontic feature of experience, but an *ontological* one: we come to rely not on the lived experience of possibility, but upon an algorithmic probability, yet fail to consider the equivocation. This failure points toward Heidegger's admonition that every technology performs an act of revelation that is also a concealment. What the map conceals in its presentation of the city is that it only *seems* to be an impartial, objective account which portrays itself as able to fully account for all locations—but this is not the case. It is simply not feasible to label every single street, café, and shop on the map. Thus, in the maps feed, decisions have to be made about which features to identify. These decisions are driven by algorithms which use previous behavior as leverage—where we have been in the past, the websites we have surfed, our search queries, the apps we have installed—each is weighted in the algorithm in order to make a highlight on the map seem very incidental, but it most certainly is not: 4 out of 5 consumers use the map app to make searches near their location, and 1 out of every 5 of those results in a sale³.

The purpose of the algorithm calls into question the objectivity of the map by suggesting that its primary purpose is not navigation, but consumption. The map feed being shown is meant to present possibility, but this possibility has been reduced to an algorithmic probability by a human being who designed it for that purpose. What this means is that algorithms have migrated into the realm of ontology. Algorithms are the material out of which buildings, infrastructure, shops, streets, and services are presented to me—they are the new architecture. As Luciana Parisi states, «Algorithms are thus actualities»⁴. In other words, as I generate data through my likes, my searches, my walks through town, this data is chopped up—I am chopped up—with a set of swords called algorithms which hack me into marketable, governable, and consumable categories. After the slicing and dicing, the data is then sold back to me as points of interest on a map. And yet, this means that not only does my friend's phone have a different map than I do, the police have a different model of me than my university, my insurance has a different me than my bank. I am forced to rely on these perspectival algorithms as presenting

³ Greenfield, *Radical Technologies*, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴ Parisi, Luciana, *Contagious Architecture*, MIT Press, Cambridge 2013, xii.

ontological indicators of my presence. What this forced reliance results in is a near-seamless ontological shift: I come to think of myself as data first—all other considerations are secondary.

At any given moment, I am an IP address, I am a download history that I do not want anyone to see. I am an app purchase, a social security number. I am a WiFi hotspot, a banner ad. Data is the house of being, and the algorithm is its architecture. Perhaps we are all too willing to sacrifice some measure of human agency to the algorithm, to trade possibility for probability, because on the whole it seems benign. My own patterns that I take to be emblematic of my free will could be understood as algorithms—so, maybe there is no harm as we feed on what we truly are: data-generating-pattern-machines. However, a vast surveillance apparatus calls that harmlessness into question—hungry as it, too, is to feed on data through analysis. First, let us agree that data is a set of facts about the world. Seeing a population as data to be controlled is the basis for predictive policing which itself is based upon two ideas, one explicit and one implicit. The explicit idea is that with a sufficiently rich data set, police can predict locations that crime is likely to occur and that criminals are likely to inhabit. The implicit idea is that utilizing the right algorithms with the right data set, all crime is preventable.

2. Predictive Policing: Algorithms Actualized

Of the current generation of algorithm-driven law enforcement programs, the Chicago Police Department's Heat List is particularly notorious. According to Adam Greenfield's research, the Heat List, or the Strategic Subject List, was developed using a secret algorithm and contains the names of over a thousand people at any given time who the city's police department considers most likely to commit, or suffer, homicide at some unspecified point in the future⁵. Chicago Police, having used the algorithm to identify these individuals, then go out and visit the subjects at their homes, on the streets, at their jobs, or at school using a procedure that is officially called Custom Notification. What, then, are the ingredients of the algorithmic recipe that cooks and serves up these individuals on CPD's feed? The most basic questions about this tool—the recipe of who gets on the list, how one gets off the list—these questions are safe from being raised. The police department's

⁵ Greenfield, *Radical Technologies*, op. cit., p. 230.

legal affairs office refuses to answer them, and cites security reasons in their response to requests.

The ACLU has voiced a concern about the Heat List using race as a weighted category in its algorithmic recipe—an algorithm, one should note, that was developed by Miles Wernick, a medical imaging specialist by trade. The police department has said that race is not one of the 11 variables used to determine a person's ranking on the list. Though it is unlikely that the objectivity of their algorithmic proprietary blend is completely unquestionable—simply saying an artifact is impartial does not make it so. What is emphasized by CPD, though, is that the most heavily weighted variables are prior arrests and conviction records. This implies that the ameliorating balm given to soothe any who may be sensing the Orwellian implications of the Heat List's algorithm is simply that you have no reason to fear if you have nothing to hide⁶. However, the ontological implications of predictive policing are precisely to be found in this aspect of prediction in that it is not a prediction that is being performed by a human, but by a technological artifact, a machine. It is this willingness to transfer thinking and decision-making ability to a program that should be called into question. Does the algorithm's theoretical promise to predict and prevent future violence justify the ontological cost? Namely, does the deterministic trap of algorithmic pre-emption, where the reduction of a person to a dataset in the name of preventing future harm is justifiable? Only if we accept an ontology where I am first my data, and a human being afterward. Such an ontology is the enactment of capturing the possible and mutilating it into mere probability—then enforcing that probability as necessary through euphemistic concepts like pre-emptive control.

3. Algorithmic Mediation to Algorithmic Migration

It can be argued that this digital ontology has been at work at least since the inception of the internet as data has been continually making the transition from the screen into different states of matter⁷. Today, it incarnates here as a crime waiting to be committed, as criminals perpetually poised to be captured and charged, and as a police force proactively engaging in this procedure on the basis of a desire to trade an ability to think to the cold, calcula-

⁶ Greenfield, *Radical Technologies*, op. cit., p. 231.

⁷ Steyrl, Hito, «Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?», *E-Flux Journal: The Internet Does Not Exist*, Sternberg Press, Berlin 2015, p. 12.

tions of an algorithm. Borrowing from Klee, Merleau-Ponty suggests in *Les Temps Moderne* that art no longer imitates visible things; it makes things visible. Art is the blueprint of the genesis of things—paintings show how things become things and how the world becomes a world. Similarly, algorithms show how things become things when consciousness gives way to pattern recognition, and possibility becomes probability. While it is true that algorithms provide us with convenience, it is nevertheless the convenience which reduces humans to things. The convenient is a sign that the possibilities of life—the possibilities of being—are forcibly narrowed down into probabilities. This distinction between the possible and probable is not innocent—the openness of possibility is traded for the certainty predicated on the predictive power of algorithmic probability as seen in maps applications and predictive policing.

One might follow Merleau-Ponty insofar as he is attempting to reflect upon and draw a distinction between a world of experience and a world of science which, in this case, is none other than a techno-mediation via the algorithm of the most basic features of existence. Such a reflection occurs in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Perception* where he notes, «The entire universe of science is constructed upon the lived world, and if we wish to think science rigorously...we must first awaken to that experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression. Science neither has, nor ever will have the same ontological sense as the perceived world for the simple reason that science is a determination or an explanation of that world. I am not a 'living being,' a 'man,' nor even a 'consciousness'...Rather, I am the absolute source»⁸. I would like to end by suggesting that to interpret Merleau-Ponty's claim to be the absolute source is to stake a claim in rescuing possibility from probability—to wrest the programmer away from the programmed, the determination away from the determiner, to become aware that the feed-er is also the fed-upon. When we trade our perception for the algorithm, we give a silent affirmation that the aforementioned perfect knowledge is realizable for the price of dehumanization.

⁸ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. D. Landes, Routledge, New York 2014, xxii.

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GIUSEPPA SPENILLO*

PERCEPTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF SOCIAL STRUGGLES – AN INCREASE OF VIOLENCE IN BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON DIGITAL AGE

Abstract

We live nowadays, in Brazil, an estrangement, concerning social mobilization around collective struggles, to the point of being criminalized by the public opinion declared in the vehicles of wide-circulation of information. At the 2014 World Cup street manifestations, pulled by the *black bloc* tactic or by traditional union strategies, were widely rejected and ridiculed by the so-called Brazilian public opinion. This phenomenon reveals changes in the perception and acceptance of public space, political demands, and also the individual's senses of the common good. A very rapid change, if we consider recent re-democratization processes experienced during the last 30 years. The political opening in that season triggered social movements with political flags, as protection for children and teenagers, the elderly status, land reform among others. Such movements occupied the national scene and the popular imagination as legitimate ways to fight the government. How and why such changes in Brazilian public opinion were given is the present investigation about,

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bringing analysis of behaviors and opinions built at virtual spaces, during the 2014 World Cup. Are there new habitus of collective life and struggles been formed at digital age? Which new senses of the common good can be pointed as directing such formation?

Key-words: Public opinion; Brazil; Social struggles; Habitus; Norbert Elias.

A percepção e o reconhecimento das lutas sociais – um aumento da violência na opinião pública brasileira na era digital

Resumo

As mobilizações sociais em torno de lutas coletivas, no Brasil, têm sido criminalizadas pela opinião pública presente nos veículos de comunicação de largo alcance. Durante a Copa do Mundo de 2014, as manifestações nas ruas, feitas conforme a tática *black bloc* ou as estratégias sindicais tradicionais, foram rejeitadas e ridicularizadas pela opinião pública brasileira. Este é um fenômeno social que revela mudanças nos sentidos da percepção e da aceitação sobre o espaço público, as demandas políticas e, ainda, sentidos individuais em torno do que é comum a todos. São mudanças velozes, se considerada a recente redemocratização do país, ocorrida nos últimos 30 anos. A abertura política de então legitimou os movimentos sociais com bandeiras de luta como a proteção à infância e à adolescência, o estatuto do idoso e a reforma agrária, dentre outros. Tais movimentos ocuparam o cenário nacional e a imaginação popular enquanto meios para enfrentar os governos. Como e por que tais mudanças ocorrem na opinião pública brasileira é o que se propõe aqui investigar, ao trazer análises sobre comportamentos e opiniões construídos nos espaços virtuais, durante os eventos da Copa do Mundo em 2014. Haverá novos habitus coletivos em formação na chamada era digital? Quais sentidos do comum orientam tal formação?

Palavras-chave: Opinião pública, Brasil, Lutas sociais, Habitus, Norbert Elias.

Introduction

Brazil lives a very particular context since the latter 2014 within the World Cup, the president elections events and the beginning of a political reform and a fiscal adjust, in 2015. In this scene, two social phenomena call attention: 1) the collective struggles that take a new character by direct and fragmental leadership actions and 2) the so-called Brazilian public opinion, expressed in digital mass media, which shifts in relation to social struggles, considering the last thirty years. Both phenomena reveal an objective/subject-

tive increasing violence on social relationships nowadays in Brazil. Is there a new sense of the common good behind this increase of violence?

Thirty years ago Brazil was finishing a military dictatorship that lasted twenty-one years (1964-1985) and now, in October 2014, people went to the streets to ask for the return of military government. What has been shifting on Brazilian people expectations, hopes and needs? What's happening with Brazilian's public opinion? Where are the people whom struggle for democracy? Where are the flags that grew up in that season pro human rights, citizenship and liberty?

Nowadays, Brazilian people get up flags of violence, against everyone and anyone. Discourses are hate, punishment, prison, expulsion. Oppositional cultures, middle classes insatisfaction, democracy fragilities, as social theories are pointing, do not explain the shifts present on Brazilian public opinion. This paper intends giving another view to those phenomena, by interpreting them on a sociogenesis perspective from Norbert Elias studies, asking how and why Brazilian public opinion has changed in a period of thirty years.

On a sociogenesis perspective, the main argument is that in the last thirty years (1984-2014) Brazil social organization has been based on inequality and injustice as cultural habitus legitimated everyday by a tense local use of democratic instruments - as the access to official services, and to social, political and civil rights. Tension and conflict can be seen on practices of the every-day life as in the use of public transport, and sidewalks; in urban cleanness or stranger compassion by indicate a place or so on. Since Norbert Elias contributions to social life study, some subjectives as perceptions and acceptances and involvement and detachment¹ allow a deeper investigating basis to deal with subtle shifts on collective behaviour and public opinion. Those subjectives constitute dynamic relationships between people on their social nets.

In Brazil, almost ever, inequality practices are also stated and legitimate by conventional media as an actor who's involved into public opinion processes. From the last ten years, a digital or virtual sphere is re-configuring relationships and building new cultural and individual habitus. Nonetheless, virtual media and nets constituting a new element on a new figuration in which old social and cultural bases of injustice and inequality still permanent. An explosion of violence appears in that new *digital public sphere*. How do virtual media, digital technologies and upload/download internet culture enclose public opinion? How does this public opinion enclose social fights and

¹ Elias, Norbert, *A sociedade de corte*, Zahar, Rio de Janeiro 2001.

(des) legitimate them? How does public opinion reveals individual affections that spotlight the common sense of struggles, identities, stigma, intolerance and violence? Answers to these questions can be formulated as possibilities of interpretation by looking carefully to some vehicles of wide-circulation, published on internet support during the 2014/2015 – which is presented as an investigating exercise at this paper.

1. Public Opinion: perception and acceptance of violence

Suicide, incest, abortion, homicide – i.e., hard thematics in large periods of time can allow to consensus that may be interpreted as public opinion. Nevertheless, peace and consensus are not conquest conditions at all and the dynamic of social life frequently disorganizes the collective agreements. According to Durkheim, «Under the influence of some great collective shock in certain historical periods social interactions become much more frequent and active»². By the author, collective life change to a state of intensity so «The result is the general effervescence that is characteristic of revolutionary or creative epochs... People live differently and more intensely than in normal times»³. Changing practices change opinions; so, it can be consider that public opinion is something in permanent construction on public spheres.

Once one's consider contemporary epoch a «great collective shock» characterized by revolts, urban wars, digital identities and cultures, globalizations processes and, into them, fundamentalisms and radical movements, it should be asked about public opinion tendencies. But also it might be formulate questions about how and why some opinions became public and how and why social and cultural processes converge to construct a so-called public opinion.

Philosophers and sociologies had discussed the concept of public opinion and its involvements in modern societies and either in social theories. That perhaps is an outdated debate since Pierre Bourdieu affirmed that «Public opinion does not exist»⁴. However, people do continue increasing the uses of media to extern and to public their opinions nowadays all over the world

² Durkheim, Emile, *The elementary forms of religious life*, Free Press, New York 1995, p. 212.

³ Durkheim, *The elementary forms of religious life*, op. cit., p. 213.

⁴ Bourdieu, Pierre, «Public Opinion Does Not Exist», in A. Mattelart – S. Siegelau (ed.), *Communication and Class Struggle*, V. I, 1979 <http://pt.scribd.com/doc/73104573/Public-Opinion-Does-Not-Exist-Pierre-Bourdieu-1972>.

– which reposes the problem of public opinion as a social problem and as a sociological question.

The public opinion constitution – or the one which Habermas considers in «The criteria by which opinions may be empirically gauged as to their degree of publicness»⁵ originate from the games between public and private, and into them the constructions of visibilities and invisibilities. Such criteria have been developed «in reference to this dimension of the evolution of state and society»⁶. Yet, by the author, «such an empirical specification of public opinion in a comparative sense is today the most reliable means for attaining valid and comparable statements about the extent of democratic integration characterizing a specific constitutional reality»⁷. As Santos⁸ appoints, it is necessary to keep a distance from Eurocentric universal concepts – like public sphere – in an effort to open minds and possibilities of interpretation about social formations in their diversity and uniqueness.

In the same sense and looking to a prior figuration (that origins the bourgeois society), Elias⁹ analyses the French *court-aristocratic figuration* of the Ancient Regime (XVI – XVII centuries). Elias appoints to social games that an individual gets involved on at the expectative of been well accepted on court-aristocratic: etiquette, ceremony and conducts are manners of perception and acceptance by individuals in society. Elias points out those games based on objective and subjective habitus like the avoidance of some social opinions and the perception of social opinions' pressure on individual prestige. These habitus conduct dynamics of involvement and detachment in collective questions, which is a so relevant theoretical locus to understanding a public opinion constitution process.

Thus, the following lines are the result of a confrontation to that question, by the examination of recent social history in Brazil's democracy, guided by the theoretical perspective of Norbert Elias in the sense of human society's reconfigurations. And, in consequence, a carefully look to changes in a raising of violence scales on processes of communication, relationship and public opinion construction supported by digital media and digital culture.

⁵ Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, MIT Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 244.

⁶ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, op. cit., p. 244.

⁷ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, op. cit., p. 245.

⁸ Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, «Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South», in *Africa Development*, Vol. XXXVII, N. 1, 2012.

⁹ Elias, *A sociedade de corte*, op. cit.

2. Re-democratization and social struggles in Brazil

In Brazil, procedural mechanisms for constitution and enlargement of a *public sphere* – or what else converge to express, circulate and consolidate opinions – have been fixed by national characteristics as a long-term illiteracy and an insufficient educational system; a political practice ruled by a patriarchal and western Europe orientation in its structure, as a result of a predatory colonization. Those are old objective habitus, as pointed by Norbert Elias, that have been signifying a national identity and culture for so long. Also subjective habitus, as indulgence and empathies with elite groups, internal and external, have been contributing to build perceptions and acceptances of what is a Brazilian citizen – self-images and stigmas which are reinforced by conscious and unconscious acts of individuals and groups.

In consequence of those habitus, collective spaces of information and communication in Brazil have been figurate mediated since its origins by vehicles of wide-circulation of information as private enterprises. Since 1922, when radio broadcast was founded as a friend society; thus in 1950, when television broadcast was inaugurated by Assis Chateaubriand and a few others *press' men*, information's circulation in Brazil has been done as a individual capturing of social demands and a general habitus of privatizing practices, spaces, abilities and resources of communication¹⁰. Introduction of internet in Brazil, in the 1980's, has obeyed the same logic of privatizing and capturing, legitimate by indulgences and empathies from people to their elites. Such figuration reveals a Brazilian habitus of social differentiation been produced across its social history by artificial limitations of access to infrastructure.

The construction's dynamics of an information sphere – started by private people and institutions figuring a communication mediated by vehicles of wide-circulation of information – reveals a lack of public project to the Brazilian society and its people. Communication area and its configuration on capitalism basis are interesting examples of the Brazilian habitus to trend to detachment in spite of involvement – as it is discussed in Elias¹¹ – in social questions and political struggles. In the 1980's a storm of protests based on the idea of citizens' rights changed slightly this habitus for a small period, carrying to the streets some demands and problems, for a moment assumed as

¹⁰ See Spenillo, Giuseppa, «Direito à Comunicação: uma formulação contemporânea de exigências de mudanças nas estruturas coletivas de comunicação e informação», PhD Thesis, CPDA/UFRRJ, Rio de Janeiro 2008.

¹¹ Elias, *The established and the outsiders*, Sage Publications Ltd, 2.Ed., London 1994.

collective questions. Nonetheless, the digital age carry people back to home as if the problems were solved and tip the balance again pro an individual behaviour.

In 1980's scenery, some people have come to a new place in the Brazilian public sphere – or into discourses flowing at that time: women, children, agricultural workers, landless, native Indians have appeared as rights bringers. Flags like land reform and direct presidential election have occupied the streets and the collective imaginary on major Brazilian cities¹². Adjusted to a global orientation in pro of democratic governments, Brazilian elite and people had been involved with the mechanisms of a Constituent Assembly and, half-unwillingly, with social problems and actors invisible until there. The Brazilian Federal Constitution – so-called a citizen one –, proclaimed in 1988 had opened the nation to a wide system of civil and social rights guarantee – not finished until now¹³. Constituent and Constitution processes had deflagrated organized social movements and orderly political protests mostly conducted by civil institutions from intellectual elites as the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analyses (IBASE) and the Pastoral Care for Children, founded in 1983 as a National Conference of Bishops of Brazil's organ for social action. That was the air of re-democratization lived in the 1980's in Brazil¹⁴.

In the 1990's and after the impacting movement for president Collor's impeachment, Brazilian society had fallen asleep. Struggles had lead on an institutional paper or mission, concentrating efforts to build their acting spaces and to legitimate some questions as social problems, like domestic violence against women and children, (homo) sexuality, housing conditions. Gradient of perception and acceptance of re-democratization tipped to micro questions and these struggles' flags, for many reasons, had a lower impact to involve Brazilian's elite.

For example, IBASE had mobilized Rio de Janeiro's society, in 1993, to a Citizen Action against hungry and misery and for life¹⁵. After an enchantment atmosphere, Brazilian society had given up the involvement, and hungry, misery and violence keeping on as conditions of life and as artificial con-

¹² See Leonelli, Domingos, Oliveira, Dante de, 2004. *Diretas Já: 15 meses que abalaram a ditadura*, Record, São Paulo 2004.

¹³ See Machado, Otávio Luis, *Educação e Constituinte de 1988*, Frutal, Prospectiva, São Paulo 2013.

¹⁴ See more in <http://www.pastoraldacrianca.org.br/pt/>.

¹⁵ Portuguese original name: Ação da cidadania contra a fome, a miséria e pela vida. See more in <http://www.ibase.br/pt/linha-do-tempo/>

ditions to detachment between social groups. The Brazilian people's habitus to empathize with elite's style do not allow them to involve with poor people's problems or with themes that weren't on media and public spheres. A public opinion about themes like land reform, poverty, health and education had consolidated as individual problems or a problem of the others; not as collective questions. In addition, world was changing fast its configuration by many globalization processes during those years. Economic transformations due to adjustments in work conditions were experienced in different countries, including Brazil. Brazilian people had heard the echoes of these transformation processes and isolated themselves in individual practices.

In the 2000's, movements, activists and civil entities were dispersed over forums, associations and various fronts of struggles presented as rights to be guaranteed. The need for self-understand into struggles and movements' institutionalization had detached people from social and political struggles. The first World Social Forum, in 2001, maybe was an answer' seek to that state of affairs on Brazilian – and perhaps worldwide – public sphere. And even an attempt to public opinion in sense to re-placing collective questions, social problems and political acts. According to Santos¹⁶ the World Social Forum performs in a sense of raising the global left. It aimed to legitimate and turn visible common actors, flags and struggles all over the world to each other. Table 1 – as follows – is a briefing of flags and spheres of public opinion by periods at the last thirty years in Brazil.

Table 1- Social flags on Brazil's *public sphere* by periods at the last thirty years

Period	Flags	Public opinion spheres
1980/1990	Direct Presidential Elections Children Protection Land Reform Collor's impeachment Democracy	Streets; mass media (mainly radio and diary news papers)
2000/2010	New rights as Culture and Communication Digital Television and Radio Against urban violence	Internet (email and restrict nets); Specific meetings and events

¹⁶ Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, *The Rise of the Global Left. The World Social Forum and Beyond*, Zed Books, London 2006.

2013/2014	Against World Cup Meeting FIFA standard on public services Against the against Word Cup Meeting Against Black bloc Dilma's impeachment Pro Military government	Internet (social nets as Facebook, 4Share, Twitter); Streets
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As Table 1 shows, social figuration on Brazilian public spheres and on the development of public opinions about social struggles and collective problems changes since 1980's until near the World Cup Meeting in 2014. In the 2000's, a digital culture has been consolidate in Brazil's society, in spite of the largely number of individuals not users of internet and computer. Such a cultural transformation – the introduction of a virtual space on relationships – means a significant shift in perceptions and acceptances by individuals in their habitus of consensus and opinions.

3. Brazil 2014: what has changed? And why?

Digital media and digital culture reconfigures social and political organization and constitute new bases to relationships and processes of agreement. Many studies have already been trying to understand present and future characteristics of digital and virtual configurations into human life. But it is also important studying the long processes of formation and sharing of private opinions and public opinions on digital bases. So, this is the central point: current digital and virtual configurations revealed stocks from social history of a nation that converge on actions, expectations and needs to a *new* space of coexistence into which the tension between involvement and detachment could be partially reconciled.

Into a digital culture, distance and agenda do not exist. Life is really just now; online and in networks. By digital media one is able to convince others, begin a war, make peace and love, overthrow a government and destroy reputations, share emotions and opinions, using conventional (internet portals) or alternative media (blogs, photologs, social nets). Everyone, potentially, can upload a virtual space. Everyone can enunciate things, thinks, ideologies, feelings and fallings. That's the scenery so expected by 'democratization' struggles. Nevertheless, a question disturbs the exercise of democracy on digital con-

figurations' societies: What does *signify data* in virtual spheres? Which senses of community and common good sustain social dynamic there?

In Brazil, media are – since ever – a reflex of the global North style on doing journalism. The creation of radio, television and newspaper did not originate as a social commodity but as a business one and was historically undertaken as an elite playing. An economic elite forged by the agrarian structure reserves information practices on mass media for its own pleasure. Practices of that elite reproduce on the communication field the culture of latifundio and oligopoly. What is original is that on the digital age, channels of communication and information have proliferated and, technically, all individual can express their opinions and know the opinions of others, whatever wanted, independent of the traditional media. Practically, what is happening? Brazilian society is reproducing that latifundio culture on its uses of virtual world and digital technologies. Each person on the virtual space seems to look for colonizing that space and the ideas circulating on there.

In contemporary Brazilian society, internet is used as a protagonist, what is revealed by number of users on blogs, sites, Facebook, Youtube and others channels. But comments of hot notices and posts on social networks are the most representative stage of virtual relationships. Racism, homophobia, social prejudice, machismo, region hates, xenophobia, religious fundamentalism. Four examples can be mentioned: a) the demand of a military government; b) a campaign to divide Brazil into North and South after the last president election in 2014; c) the black bloc mobilization and the counter-black bloc mobilization during the events of World Cup by 2013/2014; d) and mostly astonishing, the users' commentaries' posts on blogs.

All of those events were in virtual nets. During election period, users fought with each other publically, and many persons posted appeals of peace and control by their *friends of Facebook*. A military government request was the top of a high gradient of violence externalized on virtual nets. What's the filter to a gradient of violence like it? Perhaps, a public opinion could guide the construction of intense expressivity and discussions' spaces – in a word, a democratic space of communication – acting as a good filter established on respect and self-control. Nonetheless, the digital space is been used as a wasteland – yet in the latifundio culture.

Virtual nets attempt to necessities of speech and share knowledge, information or data – for a long time denied to people by the mass model of communication operated by capitalisms' institutions. Nonetheless, the logic of analogue and mass culture continues on, exacerbated by an impunity sensa-

tion that comes from the wasteland digital space. It is possible to understand this phenomenon by interpreting the black bloc phenomenon during the World Cup at 2013/2014.

3.1. The black bloc mobilization and the counter-black bloc mobilization

The black bloc mobilization has occurred as a new in the Brazilians' public scenery during the Confederations Cup in 2013. Known as a social struggles' tactic, the black blocs in Brazil has brought together people from various virtual networks. Those people went to the streets in different cities holding the flags of education, health, public transport but also democracy, respect and liberty. They were organized as the north-American stream, that attacks State and capitalism icons. The Black Bloc is a concept and a tactic of direct action on political struggles, which had already occupied the streets all over the world. Their origins, as pointed by Dupuis-Déri, might be placed between the anarchists and the «West German Autonomous movement (Autonomen in German)». To the author: «The Autonomen strived to carry out 'here and now' an egalitarian and participative political practice, without leaders or representatives, in which individual autonomy and collective autonomy were complementary and of equal importance».

Virtual nets may bring out to social movements and social activists a perception of success in the direction of equality, autonomy and democracy. Nevertheless, conventional media – mass or digital one – act as a hard filter against equality, autonomy and democracy. In this sense, it brings the use of masks by the black bloc tactic, which appears as a big discomfort to the Brazilian' public opinion what was exposed on conventional digital media in 2013. For example, on an online article from *Veja* it affirms: «Masked preparing to throw a Molotov cocktail, on a protest against World Cup at Rio de Janeiro» – as in photo 1. A masked is one who believes in political actions as social struggles, and that is the keynote of black bloc tactic. Though, on media discuss the mask represents criminality and vandalism – a stigma that follows up the matter of how public opinion interprets social struggles in Brazil.

The top was in the World Cup 2014 opening event, when a 16 years old activist has been taken off a protest march by his father, «literally des-masked by his father publically», according to the blog *BrasilPost*, associated to *Abril*, a Brazilian published house. A video clip made during the event has become the example of a self-image of father (responsible and clear-sighted) and of a stigma of younger (naïve and obedient). After that, a new media episode: the

young activist and his parent have been invited by Senator Eduardo Suplicy to watch a Brazil's game caring for the Constitution. Senator Suplicy wrote on Facebook: «it is important the youth participation in protest marches, but not with violence». The blog BrasilPost pointed out: «Black bloc pup has decided to pull back, dismiss his masked friends [...]. Whereas the private school tuition has been paid, guaranteed by the sweat of a good dad, it is easy to have time to literally detonate the capitalism system, isn't it?!».

Photo 1 – Social struggles as violence



Photo Source: Pâmela Oliveira/Veja

That *public mass opinion* reveals an increasing acceptance of objective and subjective violence, which justify instruments of regulation, like the Masks Law, sanctioned by São Paulo government in 2014. More revelatory is the fact of site G1¹⁷, act on this social history constructing a discuss that wants to legitimate the Law, based on a reportedly information from military policy that «violency in protests decrease when there is not ‘masked’ people»¹⁸.

It is been configuring an age in which democracies are founded on violent social practices by enclosure the freedom to expression into stigmas and self-images that legitimate discuss and performances, either on the streets or on virtual nets. It is been configuring, as a result of long-term processes, a digital age into which the seeming security at virtual nets allows to a new and fragile freedom sensation.

¹⁷ See <http://g1.globo.com/index.html>

¹⁸ Original text: «a violência nos protestos diminui quando não há a presença de ‘mascarados’.»

Informational elite behave in virtual nets as the ones whom have privileged access to information and also know how to use that information (nor voting in a corrupt politician, neither involving into streets' struggles as black blocs, for examples). Those commentaries playing the same role the gossip does into small communities, as pointed by Elias¹⁹: they derivate into coercions to the way of life for groups and for a singular person – a subjective violence practice. Nevertheless, it remains a question: How and why cyberspace changes public opinion in its discourse about political and social life in an increasing gradient of violence?

For such a question, it's possible to go with Elias studies of emotion's control. In virtual spaces, gestures and facial expressions are absent, which is a guarantee of security in relation to interlocutors' interpretations. In court-aristocratic figuration, take control of emotions was a grand art at social life. In digital figuration, it is suppressed the art or ability to control emotions. Distance and mediation guarantee dissimulation and suppress the fear of been dis-masked by interlocutors, as if non enduring relationships allow ones relaxing the control of emotions.

Last Considerations

Specifically in Brazil, public opinion cools down in the last thirty years on perception and acceptance of political and social struggles despite of justice, equality and community. A subjective violence has been increasing and also its acceptance. Nowadays just individual freedom stills as a political flag that legitimize discourses. Is there a shock or an emergent fracture, as pointed by Durkheim? Is there a new stage of civilization, as theorized by Elias, in progress? Are there new senses of living in community emerging from this enlarged violent digital figuration?

What has changed on public spaces and public opinion at digital age remains an open question. The recent social history in Brazil's democracy, as described here, offers some interesting clues in a perspective of changes on perceptions and acceptances that configure human society's stages and specifically the subjective/objective significance of violence. These changes are transforming digital spaces into new public spaces of practices and relations. Are there new habitus of collective life and struggles been formed at digital

¹⁹ See Elias, *The established and the outsiders*, op. cit.

age? Is it possible to affirm that violence is a fundamental characteristic of the new civilization' stage?

Virtual nets become a possible new locus of political expressivity, social struggles organization, and also of violence manifestation and regulation. After all, expectations and needs of individuals on societies define directions, meanings and involvements of collective life – so, the uses of digital spheres, which can be a locus to organize and spotlight the individual's senses of the common good. Norbert Elias studies of emotions control and the civilizing processes offer a rich way to interpreting the news bringing by changes on objective/subjective behaves and opinions – particularly the violence with social struggles, and to reveal individual affections that spotlight the common sense of struggles, identities, stigma, intolerance and violence.

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DAVID W. WOODS*

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHER OF THE CITY: FOSTERING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRATIC CITIES

Abstract

John Dewey and George Herbert Mead's public sociologies complemented each other during their forty-year collaboration to develop *big ideas*, and more importantly, *methods to implement them*. Mead's public philosophy model offers useful tools and an effective historical perspective for re-centering the fields of philosophy and sociology to enhance public transformative engagement. The key aspect of Mead's social theory this essay analyses is the concept of sociality focuses on the change-producing tension in individual worldviews that comes from participating in a diverse social group or in more than one social group with differing values and norms. Mead understood that learning to cultivate community involves processes of recognizing and influencing sociality through participation in multiple generalized others, as well as individual creativity and social leadership. Mead's social theories of community are instrumental in serving as *educative* tools for leaders in democracies, and for processes for nurturing new norms to change cultures as transforming democratic cities.

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Key Words: Democratic cities; socialities; Three architectures: built, environmental and social/political; Gentrification; Social inclusion, deliberative and participatory democracy.

George Herbert Mead, filósofo público da cidade: promovendo o potencial transformador para a construção de cidades democráticas

Resumo

As sociologias públicas de John Dewey e George Herbert Mead complementaram-se durante as suas colaborações ao longo de quarenta anos, permitindo o desenvolvimento de *grandes ideias* e, acima de tudo, *métodos para implementá-las*. O modelo de filosofia pública da Mead oferece instrumentos úteis e uma perspectiva histórica efetiva para recentrar os campos da filosofia e da sociologia, de modo a aumentar o envolvimento público transformador. O aspeto central da teoria social de Mead que se procurará analisar no presente artigo consiste no conceito de socialidade, concentrando-se na tensão geradora de mudanças nas mundivisões individuais que advêm da participação em grupos sociais diversos ou em mais de um grupo social com valores e normas diferentes. Mead entende que aprender a cultivar a comunidade envolve processos de reconhecimento e influência da sociabilidade através da participação em múltiplos outros generalizados, bem como a criatividade individual e a liderança social. As teorias sociais de comunidade de Mead são fundamentais enquanto ferramentas educativas para líderes em democracias e para processos de criação de novas normas para mudar culturas enquanto cidades democráticas transformadoras.

Palavras-chave: Cidades democráticas; Sociabilidades; Três arquiteturas: construída, ambiental e social/política; Gentrificação; Inclusão social, democracia deliberativa e participativa.

The real assumption of democracy inside the society of a nation and within the society of different nations is that there is always to be discovered a common social interest in which can be found a solution of social strifes. ...Democratic advances, therefore, has always been in the direction of breaking down the social barriers and vested interests, which have kept men [and women] from finding the common denominators of conflicting interests¹.

¹ George Herbert Mead, *Democracy's Issues in the World War*, 1917.

Introduction

Since the September 2008 economic crash, the world has seen times of human suffering and uncertainty on multiple levels—economic, social, ecological and existential—that has led to a crisis in cities worldwide. This crisis focusing on cities has further exasperated the already widening inequalities between income groups—wealthy versus low-income, with the middle class being squeezed out of the worlds’ largest cities—as well as growing inequalities in social capital, which enables individuals and groups to expand their horizons; in ecological capital—potable water for all citizens, not just those who can purchase it, as well as clean air, accessible parks and open spaces; and in existential capital, which allows for the belief in oneself and hope in the future. In this paper, I argue that sociologists and city planning scholars need to undertake a more nuanced analysis of the role of culture, equity and social inclusion in global cities, and to present a pragmatist model of transformation that draws from Dewey, Mead, Habermas, Green, Fung and Woods.

1. Advancing Culture, Equity and Social Inclusion Matters—A Theoretical Framework

Theoretical frameworks for addressing why it is important to work to eliminate inequality on citizens globally are substantial; however, in this paper, I will briefly address only three theoretical frames, which are necessary to mobilize and guide a culture of deep democracy in our cities: 1) liberal economics, specifically the arguments of economists, Joseph Stiglitz; 2) the political theorists Margaret Kohn arguing for the right of the city for all not just those who can afford to live there; and American pragmatists, specifically John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Jane Addams arguing that inequalities distort the ongoing development of individual and community democratic selves.

Judith M. Green in her forthcoming book *Pragmatist Political Economy: Deep Democracy, Economic Justice, Positive Sustainability, Positive Peace*, analyses the arguments of economist Joseph Stiglitz’s recent book *Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agency for Growth and Shared Prosperity* (2016) that income inequality needs to be addressed because of the economic harms to the ways in which inequalities: 1) undermine democracy, 2) create inefficiencies in the operation of markets, and 3) is costly to national and

regional economies. Specifically, Stiglitz argues,

Our challenge is to rewrite the rules to work for everyone. To do so, we must re-learn what we thought we knew about how modern economies work. We must also devise new policies to eliminate the inefficiencies and conflicts of interest that pervade our financial sector, our corporate rules, our macroeconomic, monetary, tax, expenditure, and competition policies, our labor relations, and our political structures. It is important to engage all of these challenges simultaneously, since our economy is a system and these elements interact. This will not be easy; we must push to achieve these fundamental changes at a time when the American people have lost faith in their government's ability to act in service of the common good².

The costs to participate in social inclusionary ways for those individuals who have to work two or three jobs just to live are prohibitive. Stiglitz continues «The new view, ... is that *trickle-up economics—building out the economy from the middle*—is more likely to bring success; in other words, *equality and economic performance are complements, not substitutes*»³. If only those of means are able to participate in the economy of a city this does not allow the economy to function for all, and similarly, high levels of inequality means that real economies of scale are not being utilized to benefit all citizens.

Political theorist Margaret Kohn argues in her recently published book, *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth* (2016) that inequality both reflect and cause dispossession and denial of people's right to the common oeuvre of the city, that is, their right to the city. Kohn focuses on the right to affordable housing inequality specifically on the «five primary harms of gentrification: residential displacement; exclusion; transformation of public, social, and commercial space; polarization; and homogenization»⁴. While these five *harms* identified by Kohn focus on the impacts to individuals, she also focuses on how these harms negatively affect the neighborhood by arguing that «gentrifiers also use political as well as economic power to transform the

² Stiglitz, Joseph E., *Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agency for Growth and Shared Prosperity*, Roosevelt Institute, New York 2016, p. 5.

³ Stiglitz, *Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agency for Growth and Shared Prosperity*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴ Kohn, Margaret, *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth*, Oxford University Press New York 2016, p. 90.

character of public spaces.» Kohn continues her argument that gentrifiers will work to «remake the public realm in order to fulfill their needs and desires, and through this process a neighborhood's social system is changed and its history is effaced»⁵.

John Dewey and George Herbert Mead argue that social inequality works to distort or damage the ongoing development of democratic selves and characters, which harms individuals, their significant social groups, their cultures, their neighborhoods and cities, and their nations. Specifically, Dewey called for a new paradigm of equity in *The Quest for Certainty* (1929):

The life which men, women and children actually lead, the opportunities open to them, the values they are capable of enjoying, their education, their share in all the things of art and science, are mainly determined by economic conditions. Hence we can hardly expect a moral system which ignores economic conditions to be other than remote and empty... That the economic life, thus exiled from the pale of higher values, takes revenge by declaring that it is the only social reality, and by means of the doctrine of materialistic determination of institutions and conduct in all fields, denies to *deliberate morals and politics* any share of causal regulation, is not surprising.⁶

Together these distortions impact individuals and communities through the lack of social recognition, fails to meet basic social needs, as well as educating individuals for democratic citizenship, and excluding them from a substantial role in shaping their future through social inclusion.

2. Resources from John Dewey and George Herbert Mead: Culture, Habits and Social Inclusion

While it is true that a radical democratic vision based on Dewey and Mead is not, in and of itself, a grand theory of economic equality and redistribution of wealth in the Marxist tradition, Dewey and Mead did argue that context-specific values, habits and institutions and a more general vision of social and economic justice will emerge over time *if* participants are given opportunities

⁵ Kohn, *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth*, op. cit., p. 102.

⁶ Dewey, John, *The Quest for Certainty. Later Works*, Vol. 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale 1988.

for empowering education, collaborative democratic inquiry, and organized weight throwing (Woods 2012 and 2014), which provide the framework to mobilize citizens in a substantial role in shaping their futures. In other words, it is through problem-focused processes of social engaging and empowering citizens to provide direct input through collaborative, democratic participation that Deweyan radical democratic visions were instituted and now work to influence elected and appointed officials and economic leaders in many cities throughout America and globally. Judith M. Green persuasively argues in a forthcoming article titled, «Advancing the Meaning of Justice for All», what is needed to accomplish this «requires the concerted, collaborative efforts of many individuals and groups, motivated by sufficient and well-founded concerns, communicating effectively with one another, and guided by practically feasible and morally desirable models of institutional transformation over a sufficient span of time»⁷.

George Herbert Mead's context-specific, radical transformation-focused insights about how to achieve a deeper, social democracy date from the late years of the nineteenth century, before the beginning of his close partnership with the famous pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. These insights include the idea that local urban activism is the most effective way to foster wider social change. Since the early 1960s, leading sociologists, urban planners, philosophers, and other political theorists have developed Mead's original insight, producing a considerable body of scholarship on the effectiveness of participatory and deliberative democracy as a tool for transforming communities through empowering local civic leaders and other citizens to influence public decisions, both in the United States and in other nations. Dewey would point out that achieving this goal requires individual and civic investment in a long-term process of educating citizens in more deeply democratic social and cultural habits of community living. Specifically, Dewey Mead and Robert Park would add that it also requires adapting our existing cultural institutions to respond to the inputs of more deeply democratic individuals and communities. This will not be easy, because empowerment changes power relations.

Important recent works in transformative social theory that combine Mead-inspired ideas and methods from Jürgen Habermas on deliberative democracy and from John Dewey on democratic citizen participation have become effective and influential guides for scholars and activists. Over

⁷ Green, Judith (Forthcoming), «Advancing the Meanings of Justice for All: Deploying Philosophical Pragmatism in Democratic Political Economy», p. 3.

the last twenty years, considerable scholarship has focused on participatory democracy and deliberative democracy, at times using the terms interchangeably. This is not a distinction of theory versus practice, but of emphasis on either an active public role in shaping public policy or on deliberative means of assuring that all are respectively heard.

Citizen participation beyond the franchise is not necessary for ordinary public decision-making on matters like whether an applicant for a land-use permit has submitted all necessary documents, or for ordinary representative decision-making on issues like whether to grant a variance to allow a new restaurant to use a portion of a public sidewalk for outdoor seating in a business zone in which this is already common practice. However, in post-disaster contexts of deciding whether to rebuild a city neighborhood or a village park, citizen participation can contribute to social healing. In making long-range plans, including budget planning, dispersed and diverse citizen-embedded knowledge and values can make plans more effective as well as more achievable. In these and more ordinary kinds of planning for significant change, citizens can contribute epistemically what they know and value. Moreover, their participation contributes to their education and to the emergence of new social habits in the culture, as Mead and Dewey argued. This is how real, twenty-first-century people move from abstract, formal citizenship, which may mean little to them, to substantial citizenship in which neighbors become real players in shaping their civic future. Deep democracy (Green 1999, Woods 2012) becomes grounded in real ways of living that shape cities in more sustainable ways through collaborative planning and shared citizen commitment to creating livable cities through requires what I argue is interlinking three architectures of: social/political, built and environmental architectures.

3. Pragmatist Reframing for Social Inclusion

These last ten years of the Great Recession have seen times of human suffering and uncertainty on multiple levels of urban living that have led to a crisis in cities worldwide. This requires planning practitioners and scholars to develop a more nuanced and inclusive analysis of sustainable livability that reflects real inequalities in cities, and to bring forth a realistic and desirable, participatory democratic model of transformation that incorporates the social, built, and ecological architectures of sustainability, income equality, and culture.

It was not until the 1960s that federal, state, and local legislation required opportunities for affected stakeholders to participate in public decision-making, especially in areas of comprehensive planning that focus on visions for the future, land use, transportation, and environmental protection. My definition of «affected stakeholders» is all those who are in the position to make or break a public decision and, more importantly, those who are directly affected by that decision. The 1960 election of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States, with his promise of youth, vigor, and the push for a «New Frontier,» together with the beginning of the largest influx of youth to enter college at one time that the world has ever witnessed, created the basis for rethinking the role of city planners from passive reviewers of plans by developers who submitted them for review to a more activist role in developing the civic space in collaboration with affected stakeholders.

One of the most important paradigm shifts for the new role of urban planners and citizen activists was inspired by Jane Jacobs's *Death and Life of the Great American City* (1961). Jacobs was highly critical of «business as usual,» whereby city planners only passively used their compulsion powers by reviewing plans based on the existing zoning code and passing these plans onto elected or appointed bodies to make decisions, instead of taking on the activist role suggested above. Equally important was her criticism of the growing dominance of the automobile in the built environment; more specifically, she announced the imperative to plan for public spaces for people, not just the automobile, with safe streets, pedestrian activity, and public markets where citizens could meet and congregate. She called for citizens who were affected by decisions to stop being passive, and get out and organize for what they wanted, not what development czars, such as Robert Moses, wanted.

The second key event that initiated a planning paradigm shift in the early 1960s was the Port Huron Statement in 1962, which brought the concept of a contentious, counter-culture, anti-authoritarian participatory democracy to the American consciousness⁸. During this historic era that shaped many young college students' generally shared worldview and broad social values, the inclusive principles of the Students for Democratic Society's founding Port Huron Statement also were widely advocated by participants in the Civil Rights Movement, the Peace Movement, the emerging Women's Movement, and the still-incubating Environmental Movement. The Port Huron State-

⁸ Woods, David W., *Democracy Deferred: Civic Leadership after 9/11*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2012, pp.2-3.

ment laid out several root principles for participatory democracy:

We would replace power rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity. As a *social system* we seek the establishment of democracy of individual participation, governed by two central aims; that the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his [or her] life; that society be organized to encourage independence in men [and women] and provide the media for their common participation⁹.

These root principles of «contentious participatory democracy of the 1960s» are still the basis for later «collaborative participatory democracy of the 1990s»¹⁰.

It is collaborative participatory democracy that emphasizes, among other factors, the educative function (Green 1999) of participatory events and planning processes, as these can affect both citizens and elected and appointed leaders. Participatory democratic philosophers, sociologists and city planners place relatively greater emphasis on how specific social issues develop through direct interaction among groups and individuals so as to produce shared community goals and values. Last but not least, a distinctive feature of participatory democracy in contrast to deliberative democracy is concerns about «empowerment». City planner and sociologist proponents of participatory democracy are relatively more concerned about lessening inequalities between «elites» and «grassroots» participants in decisions about the built, social/cultural, and environmental architectures. Participatory democracy seeks to help all citizens to influence representative bodies that have power to affect their lives.

For the last seventy years, participatory democracy has supplied such guiding ideals more than deliberative democracy, including questions about hierarchical inequalities between «expert» leaders and grassroots «followers»¹¹ that pose an ongoing (and perhaps never fully resolved) challenge. As planning theorist Charles Hoch articulated in this shift in *What Planners Do* (1994), stating that

⁹ Lemert, Charles, *Social Theory: The Multicultural and Classical Readings*, Westview Press Boulder, CO 1999, 355.

¹⁰ Woods, *Democracy Deferred: Civic Leadership after 9/11*, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

¹¹ Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems. Later Works*, Vol. 4, op. cit.

The pragmatists replace the model of the planner as an expert of-fering truthful advice to the public with that of the planner as a coun-selor, who fosters public deliberation about the meaning and conse-quences about relevant plans with those who will bear the burden and enjoy the benefits of purposeful change¹².

The notion of «empowered participatory democracy» (Green 1999, 2008; Fung 2004; Guttmann and Thompson 1996; Woods 2012) was em-braced by sociologists and city planners as potentially offering a hopeful and preferable vision for future organizing and rebuilding cities starting with the 1964 Model Cities Program as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson's «War on Poverty». The Model City Programs were designed to work with low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, planning with affected stakeholders, with the goals to eradicate poverty, create affordable housing, enhance local jobs, and strengthen schools, transportation options, and infrastructure (streets, sewer, water, and parks). It was one of the first federal programs that required «real» citizen participation by local stakeholders in developing these locally specific plans (Arnstein 1969). While this program had lofty goals, it was only partially successful in transforming issues of low-income neighborhoods due mostly to the problem of finding local stakeholders who could pay the economic, education, and opportunity costs of a robust citizen participation program of the kind that was required to be eligible for funding.

Important recent works in transformative social theory that combine ideas and methods from Jürgen Habermas on deliberative democracy and from Thomas Jefferson and his pragmatist inheritors on democratic citizen participation, have become effective and influential guides for scholars and ac-tivists (Green 1999, 2009; Forester 1999; Fung 2004; Pateman 1970; Woods 2012). As Richard Bernstein correctly pointed out, Dewey argued that there is «no dichotomy between theory and practice»¹³, or in Dewey's words:

The depersonalization of the things of everyday practice becomes the chief agency of their repersonalizing in new and more fruitful modes of practice. The paradox of theory and practice is that theory is with respect to all other modes of practice the most practical of all things, and the more impractical and impersonal it is, the more truly

¹² Hoch, Charles J., *What Planners Do: Power, Politics, and Persuasion*, APA Press, Chicago, IL 1994, p. 294.

¹³ Bernstein, Richard, *The Pragmatic Turn*, Polity Press, New York 2010, p. 197.

practical it is. And this is the sole paradox¹⁴

However, we sociologists and city planners need to understand what participatory and deliberative democracy means in ways that highlight their specific differences as well as their similarities in order to identify and inter-relate the strengths and weaknesses of each unique model and method as these impact civic, professional, and personal motivations and opportunities to organize and to participate in the public arena.

Re-reading Mead's work has been decisive in shaping «the pragmatist turn» in the work of Jürgen Habermas and thus in the emergence of the influential, interdisciplinary school of deliberative democracy, which treats his work as a research platform. Habermas highlighted constitution-guided communication among government representatives as paradigmatic of democratic deliberation, although other deliberative democratic theorists, such as James Fishkin, have expanded his vision to include other citizens at carefully constructed, rule-governed communicative events. For Habermas, the public is to be involved in the decision process only as far as this is constitutionally mandated. For example, to meet the letter of the law by holding «official» public hearings on all land use decisions. He does not see a general need to include the «public» in developing the vision for which an urban plan was mandated in the first place. This is why Habermasian deliberative democrats believe it is legitimate to argue that a process that involves the «public» might be inclusive, transparent and deliberative, but not necessarily participatory in giving citizens a «real» voice in directly influencing final decisions of what livability means in their community, because their view can rightly be expressed by elected representatives and their expert appointees. Again, this is a key difference between Habermas and Mead, James, and Dewey is because the classical American Pragmatists offer an effective visioning process brings forth a shared vision that did not previously exist, and citizens could not be «represented» until after the interactive exchanges that participating in collaborative planning makes possible.

In contrast, citizen participation beyond the franchise of voting is not necessary for ordinary governance decision-making on matters like whether an applicant for a land use permit has submitted all necessary documents, or for ordinary representative decision-making on issues like whether to grant a variance to allow a new restaurant to use a portion of a public sidewalk for

¹⁴ Dewey, Introducing Thomas Jefferson, *Later Works*, op.cit.

outdoor seating in a business zone where this is already common practice. Moreover, citizens' participation contributes to their education and to the emergence of new social habits in the culture, as Mead and Dewey argued. This is how real, twenty-first-century people develop substantial citizenship whereby neighbors become real players in shaping their civic future. Democracy becomes grounded in real ways of living that shape cities (and rural areas) in more desirable and sustainable ways through collaborative planning that can generate shared citizen commitment to key goals.

Conclusions: A Framework for Deep Democratic Engagement for Social Inclusion

What I have discussed above is aimed toward developing a framework for interweaving the built architecture, environmental preservation architecture, and a social/cultural architecture grounded in deep democratic engagement into a planning process that can create more naturally and socially sustainable, ideal, livable cities in the future. This last section will explore two main questions: How is planning with nature related to planning for human welfare in ideal cities of the future? What are some solutions to interweaving all three elements—social, built, and natural—that have arisen within collaborative planning for land use, transportation, economic development, and social-natural sustainability? Given the general principle of sustainability that links the three architectures, we need to learn from recent best practices that provide sustainable solutions for cities of the future, which include some changes in the patterns of land use, transportation, economic development, and social/cultural sustainability. Land use is one of the most controversial areas to focus on in dealing with sustainable built environments, especially in Europe and the United States, perhaps less so in Latin America, Asia and Africa. But, there still exist social inequalities between extreme wealth and extreme poverty in some of the most rapidly developing cities in the world today, e.g., in Rio de Janeiro between the citizens who live near the world-famous Copacabana Beach and those who live in the shacks in the Favelas only a few miles away. These are contexts in which real urban development projects need to put people to work and to provide healthy and safe living environments, while designing for clean air, water, and sanitation. This takes government action and political capital—it cannot be left to the «free market» which is not free but leads the wealthy to build for themselves and not for the less-well-off.

Sustainability also means that new development must include more density in affordable housing units (specifically targeting low- and moderate income households), office buildings, and shopping areas located close to where there is employment, schools, and recreation opportunities. For sustainable development to work, affordable transportation systems must be built to lessen dependency on the automobile, including high speed rail, light rail, dedicated bus lanes, bicycle lanes and lockers for their storage, and more walkable designs for people to move around cities more easily. Such land use changes and enhanced transportation systems can bring about living-wage jobs, as well as enhance the ability of employers to locate businesses closer to employees. Whether these aspects of social sustainability are planned for and actualized depends on whether the everyday citizens they affect most intimately participate in the planning and the implementation processes. As George Herbert Mead argued, such active social inclusion is the best, perhaps the only way to shape new culture and habits that reflect and actualize our ideals. In this century, deep democracy and sustainability go hand-in-hand through a deeply democratic engagement of citizens who know and care about specific locations, planning for Earth's survival at the same time they work together to develop more ideal, livable global communities.

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RECENSÓES / BOOK REVIEWS

RICCI, MATTÈO, *Tratado da Amizade (1601)*, prefácio de Martin González Fernández, Estudo, preliminar, tradución e notas de Jorge Cendón Conde, apêndice de Alba Iglesias Varela e epílogo de Oscar Parcero Oubiña, Ed. Seminário de Estudos Galegos - Área de pensamento e Edições Húmus, Vila Nova de Famalicão, 2015; 683 pp.; ISBN 978-84-608-4860-8.

A edição desta obra de Ricci em Galego tem tanto interesse pelo que é, como pelo que se constrói em torno dela, através do prefácio, do estudo, dos apêndices e do epílogo desta equipa de investigadores da Universidade de Santiago de Compostela.

Em primeiro lugar, o prefácio, o limiar (pp. 9-162).

Glosando sobre a reflexão filosófica da amizade, Martin González Fernández deixa-nos uma narrativa de como ela foi considerada entre os gregos e na Idade Média e Renascimento europeus, tanto do ponto de vista da produção das ideias e da ocorrência dos factos, como do ponto de vista da sua receção pelas instituições e da assimilação pela sociedade.

É imprescindível, com efeito, percebermos este ambiente, pois só assim seremos capazes de compreender na minúcia e em toda a dimensão, o que, na obra sínica do missionário jesuíta italiano, terá sido imanante da cultura europeia, para sermos capazes de mensurar as dimensões do esforço de *accommodatio* (acomodação), que vai marcar os contornos e os problemas principais do comportamento da implantação evangélica no Oriente extremo...

Em Aristóteles, na visão política da *Ética a Nicómaco*, onde a amizade, vinda do que Platão já afirmara no *Fedro*, se desenvolve escalonando-se como modo de ser, numa comunhão de moralidade; na visão epistemológica da *Ética a Eudemo*, onde a amizade, agora com um toque vindo das comunidades pitagóricas, é uma virtude potencial que se realiza na sabedoria e prudência, não abandonando, porém, a conjunção resultante dos interesses comuns e até da partilha do prazer. Para o Peripatético, o homem solitário é necessariamente infeliz, pois é um ser social que, por natureza, se dispõe a viver com os outros, precisando para isso de amigos, senão de muitos, pelo menos dos *suficientes*.

Na *Ética Eudemia*, o fundador do Liceu trifurca três ramos da amizade, a amizade primeira, situada no plano ontológico, a da utilidade e a do prazer, sendo que é sempre um dos maiores bens, já que a sua falta significaria uma experiência terrível. Porém, aqui, o Estagirita desenha também a figura do amigo como um *outro eu*, isto é, como sublinha Fernández, como um igual, pois a amizade entre desiguais será impossível, muito mais se for ao nível, ou

melhor, ao desnível, de entre deuses e os humanos.

Claro que, estando muito perto de Heracles, estamos também próximos de Narciso, apresentado neste Limiar como eixo estruturante do inconsciente coletivo ocidental e motivo de alargada reflexão especulativa, ou não detivesse o espelho, como o sexo, a virtude de reproduzir a realidade até ao infinito.

Mas estamos ainda, em geral, no terreno aristotélico do comunitarismo político. Célere, com o surgimento das comunidades epicuristas, saltaremos para o individualismo, com o princípio autárquico da *polis* a ser transferido para o indivíduo que busca, por si, uma salvífica terapia da alma, num desejo de ataraxia universal, ou mesmo, nos termos da *Carta a Meneceu* de Diógenes Laércio, de ascensão a divindade entre os homens, pois, como afirma Epicuro, quem vive entre os valores imorredoiros como a amizade em nada se parecerá com um mortal. Mantem-se o círculo de amigos, mas tende a esbater-se apenas na lembrança, uma espécie de refúgio...

A *philautia*, o amor a si próprio, ponto de partida já do Estagirita, avança nos estoicismos para o muito cuidado consigo mesmo, assumido como componente ideológica do Império, manifestando-se em Cícero no seu *Lelio* ou *Da Amizade*: politicamente, enquanto concórdia entre o povo e o senado; ideologicamente enquanto republicanismo; culturalmente enquanto conservação dos costumes e práticas ancestrais.

Discorre e glosa, Fernández, sobre a obra cicerina, abrindo para o cristianismo... Chama então novidade, ao retorno aos temas bíblicos e mergulha em Agostinho de Hipona, Cristo como mediador por excelência entre o amor e a amizade... Navega então, Reno acima, águas místicas, até mestre Eckhart, e encalha, ou aporta, nas dissidências carnavais embora, ainda assim, idealizadas... Sim, claro, Pedro Abelardo e Heloísa, os cantares de amigo provençais e os galaicodurienses. Surgem, em tortuosos e abísmicos desfiladeiros, as reelaborações do *De Amicitia*... em particular as do controverso monge escocês cisterciense Aelredo de Rievaulx, a atravessar os meados do Século XII, autor do *De Spirituali amicitia*, como se depreende, obra sobre a amizade espiritual entre os monges para a santificação. Mas tendo Rievaulx ficado conhecido pelo Bernardo do Norte, “o abade *gay* de Rievaulx”, é esse trilha surpreendente, necessariamente fecundo, que Fernández vai seguir em vinte páginas magistrais do seu Limiar à amizade, que prosseguem na pista de Pedro Blois e de Albertano de Brescia e que exauram a segunda metade do Século XII e a primeira do XIII, quando a tolerância cristã medieva à homossexualidade masculina ou feminina começa a dar lugar ao seu contrário, na espoleta da cristianíssima, e universalíssima, repressão geral a toda a diferença...

O Século XIII, nesta reavistação do professor galego, vai ainda presentear-nos com a relação *perigosa* de amizade entre o dominicano sueco Pedro de Dácia e a leiga beguina Cristina Stommeln, trazida por Renan em 1880, num convívio intelectual e devocional muito mais marcado pela mística do que por qualquer tipo de teologia racional. Na trinitária cristã da fé, amor e caridade, ou das três santíssimas pessoas de Deus, onde se entrosa a relação entre amigos mediada em Cristo, a lembrar a inserção no Cosmo, aquela toma a forma de uma espécie de amor místico, que se explana, explícita ou sublimadamente, quando não se esconde, em vasta e rica epistolografia exaustivamente dissecada, num trabalho que ultrapassa, generosamente, os parâmetros que se esperaríamos, de um prefácio ao pequeno livro do missionário jesuíta na China...

A exatidão analítica leva Fernández, como não podia deixar de ser, ao Renascimento, elencando um conjunto de autores sobre a amizade, de Petrarca e Alberti a Lionardo Salviati e Duarte de Resende, passando por Johannes Altensteig, que Mattè Ricci, como homem culto do seu tempo poderá ter lido ou tido conhecimento, tudo funcionando como um prelúdio a uma reflexão aprofundada sobre os autores que mais lhe importam, a saber, Montaigne e Bacon, com os quais concluiu esta elucidação do *mistério da amizade...*

Segue-se, em segundo lugar, o Estudo preliminar de Jorge Cendón Conde, intitulada o “Oriente de Mattè Ricci”, alargando-se, durante duas centenas de páginas (pp. 165-356), em cinco capítulos, pelas presenças intelectual e evangélica, propriamente ditas, do missionário jesuíta italiano, no Império do Meio.

Uma sucinta biografia de Ricci desde a formação romana que termina em 1568, e se aprofunda nos ramais científicos tanto em Florença, como em Roma, até 1577, quando ingressa em Coimbra tanto para o aprofundamento dos estudos teológicos, filosóficos e científicos como para os de língua portuguesa, uma vez que o seu destino estava traçado. No ano seguinte, em março de 1578, Mattè foi recebido pelo rei Sebastião, o que acontecia com todos os missionários destinados aos territórios do Padroado Português do Oriente, partindo em seguida para Goa, onde chegou em setembro e onde aprofundou os estudos teológicos e clássicos. Em seguida, em 1582, Ricci partiu para a China, chegando a Macau em agosto, ao encontro do irmão Ruggieri, também da Companhia de Jesus e já “sinólogo” iniciado nos rudimentos da difícil língua chinesa, instalado em Macau desde Julho de 1579, talvez se possa dizer, com bonomia, o primeiro sinólogo europeu...

Entre 1580 e 1581, Ruggieri acompanhara diversas vezes os mercadores portugueses a Cantão, para aprender a língua, conhecer os costumes e tentar travar conhecimento com os mandarins e outros altos funcionários. Ao mesmo tempo que avançava nos rudimentos da língua, em particular da escrita, Michele Ruggieri encetou a compilação de um “Vocabulário da língua chinesa com a declaração em português”, assim como a coordenação da “Cartografia de Macau e dos litorais da China”, com base na cartografia chinesa, que viria a considerar pronto em 1588 e a fazer público em Zhaoqing.

Embora Cantão fosse secularmente o grande centro cosmopolita, artesanal, comercial e populacional da província setentrional do Guangdong, na altura unida com a do Guangxi, a capital administrativa de toda aquela vasta região, onde o vice-rei e a sua corte de altos funcionários letrados estavam instalados, era a pequena cidade de Zhaoqing, a poucas horas de Macau...

Ruggieri conduziu Ricci a Zhaoqing, na companhia dos missionários jesuítas italianos Francesco de Petris e Lazzaro Caetano e dos portugueses de Macau, António de Almeida, João Soeiro e Duarte de Sande, aí os instalando, sob a proteção do letrado Wang Pan, numa casa denominada “Templo da Flor dos Santos”, devendo este ser considerado o momento fundacional da primeira missão jesuíta na China.

Instalados, os jesuítas, nomeadamente Ruggieri e Ricci, adotaram as vestes e o estatuto dos bonzos, ao mesmo tempo que procuraram negar qualquer identificação com portugueses ou castelhanos que sabiam serem mal vistos na China.

Porém, doze anos depois, tendo-se apercebido do pouco ou nenhum prestígio social dos bonzos num budismo em decadência, como já se sabia pelo Japão, mas agora sabia-se diretamente pela Mãe-China, Ricci abandonará a designação budista de *heshang* e substituirá as respetivas vestes pelas de letrado confucionista, porque apenas estes eram reconhecidos como a elite filosófica, cultural e política de prestígio pelo povo chinês, enquanto, com a ajuda de discípulos chineses e eivado de um sentido bastante funcional da leitura, mergulhava cada vez mais aprofundadamente no estudo dos “Cinco Clássicos” da cultura chinesa e dos “Quatro Livros” do confucionismo.

Mesmo que isso fosse um desarranjo na visão tradicional do europeu, e provavelmente sem consciência do problema que carregaria para a controversa metodologia da evangelização, a verdade é que a elite chinesa era cultural e não religiosa. Assim também, Matthieu Ricci, o missionário jesuíta, tornava-se *Li Mateou*, um letrado do Ocidente! Sim, a implantação era também infiltração... E se, mais tarde, no fogo da polémica sobre a evangelização

que ficou conhecida pela “Querela dos Ritos”, procurou colocar no lugar do deus cristão criador e transcendente, o senhor do céu chinês mero princípio regulador imanente, arguiu também com tenacidade, *a contrario*, durante mais de um século sobre a mera civilidade e não religiosidade dos ritos chineses ancestrais, nomeadamente os de homenagem ao Kong Zi, o mestre que os jesuítas denominaram de Confúcius!

Já em 1584, a 25 de Janeiro, Ruggieri tinha escrito, numa carta para o geral dos jesuítas, que, “nos começos, é necessário proceder com muita doçura nesta nação e não agir com zelo indiscreto, porque nos arriscaríamos a perder as vantagens obtidas e não saberíamos como recupera-las”. Diz fazer tal afirmação por ter percebido que a China “é muito inimiga dos estrangeiros e desconfia particularmente dos Portugueses e dos Castelhanos que são tidos como gente belicosa”; pouco depois, a 30 de Maio, Ruggieri detalha, em outra carta, que é preciso agir “docemente e delicadamente” e manifesta os maiores temores pelas consequências da entrada na China de outros missionários cuja impaciência grosseira ameaçaria tudo pôr a perder de forma irreversível.

Além do mais, Ricci - tal como Ruggieri, Pasio e Valignano - renunciava à pregação das massas e procurava impor-se junto aos altos funcionários como sábio e letrado, não hesitando em utilizar o prestígio que a técnica e a ciência ocidentais, tais como objetos profanos derivados, relógios ou mapas-múndi por exemplo, lhes propiciava. Só depois entravam, quando entravam, na exposição da doutrina cristã.

Todavia, como desconheciam a pregação nestoriana na China, que ocorrera pelo menos desde o Século VII, conforme está testemunhado na estela de Singan-fu gravada no século seguinte, assim como a presença dos franciscanos em Pequim (Cambalich) no início do Século XIV, não tinham reboço em se apresentarem como seguidores dos apóstolos, revelando aos Chineses o evangelho. Ao mesmo tempo estudavam o chinês e, em particular, Confúcio, o budismo e o taoísmo... Mesmo que a sua predileção fosse para os primeiros e os segundos tivessem sido eleitos inimigos principais... É preciso não esquecer, porém, que este denominado (pelos jesuítas) neoconfucionismo é uma releitura sincrética dos “Quatro Livros” já com algumas influências budistas e taoístas...

Faziam analogia com a experiência japonesa, onde foi pela conversão dos *daimiô* — provavelmente mais aos seus próprios interesses comerciais do que à luminescência evangélica dos missionários macaenses — que se operou, através da obediência social, a conversão em massa. Acalentariam, em toda esta longa expedição apostólica ao Império do Meio, a utopia de uma China convertida

ao cristianismo por um sucedâneo hierárquico e piramidal de obediência ao imperador. Até porque consideravam a obediência dos Chineses ao imperador como o óbice principal a que fossem feitas as conversões à sua margem, pois, em outros aspetos, os Chineses não tinham qualquer dificuldade em acompanhar as temáticas teológicas, antes pelo contrário...

Mas esta *accommodatio* (acomodação) que viria a ser tentada pouco depois também na Costa da Pescaria, Índia, não pode ser no caso chinês, por parte dos jesuítas, só missão, infiltração, adaptação... numa palavra, dissimulação, ou ainda, tática, algo trazido de Roma como uma técnica para a conquista das mentes orientais, uma vez que não havia hipótese para a *tabula rasa* que tentaram em África e na Ameríndia... Tem de haver mais do que isso, tem de haver também, por parte dos missionários entrados na China, no mínimo, consideração e admiração pela civilização, cultura e pensamento chineses... A Companhia de Jesus, pensada para os diversos continentes, mas instruída para usar a metodologia mais adequada para cada caso, foi montada com um sistema epistolar de controlo da união, constituído por um eixo horizontal de comunicação livre entre as “casas” *cruzado* com um outro vertical, hierárquico, numa cadeia de mando e obediência... Todavia, nem os tempos nem as distâncias davam garantias de que, nas longínquas periferias, a *accommodatio* não tivesse evoluções imprevistas, mas consentâneas com a junção explosiva do exercício da inteligência de mentes poderosas com realidades culturais superiores ou pelo menos elevadas... Imagine-se agora estas evoluções quando surgem tensões ou ruturas emocionais com o centro irradiador romano, suscetíveis necessariamente de abalarem as fés menores e a entrega à obediência administrativa contraditória com as realidades que surgiam bem à frente dos olhos... quando os caminhos se tornavam muito difíceis e, sobretudo, estéreis... quando as tentações, sendo humanas, enfrentavam formas alternativas de ver as humanidades... tudo em formações conservadoras, por vezes reacionárias, nascidas das elites sociais, tendentes a considerar, numa civilização evoluída como a chinesa, os valores dominantes como os bons valores.

Pode parecer excessivo, mas não estamos a dizer muito mais do que Henri-Bernard nos deixa, quando refere que a profunda estima dos jesuítas pela China vem essencialmente, como Ricci afirmará mais tarde, “de ver realizado de facto o que Platão concebeu apenas em teoria”, ou seja, a supremacia dos filósofos, verdadeiros condutores do povo.

Entretanto em agosto de 1589, Ricci e demais seguem para Xao Cheu (atual Chaozhou, Shaozhou no leste da província) logrando obter autorização

para erigirem uma nova residência, a segunda, o que fazem, desta vez construindo um edifício com características arquitetônicas chinesas, onde se formou e se começou a afirmar, na matemática e astronomia, Kiú Tay So, filho do presidente do tribunal da Fazenda de Pequim... Uma verdadeira lança... na China...

Em dezembro de 1593, Ricci anunciou que estava a acabar de traduzir os “Quatro Livros” para latim, o que aconteceria no ano seguinte para o quarto livro tendo, em 1595, enviado o manuscrito para a Itália, para ser publicado. Trata-se do *Sì Shu*, a primeira obra clássica chinesa a ser traduzida para uma língua ocidental, constituída pelos textos confucionistas, “Grande Estudo” (*Dà Xué*), “Doutrina do Meio” (*Zhong Yóng*), “Diálogos” (*Lunyu*) e “Mencius” (*Meng Zi*), obras que foram posteriormente publicadas em separado.

Tradução é, como Étiemble avalia em 1988, seguindo o que Henri Bernard já tinha constatado em 1937, um pouco (ou bastante) excessivo... Mais apropriado será falar de projeção interpretativa de textos, já de si relativamente básicos, convertidos, com muita ajuda externa, a um conjunto de paráfrases enriquecidas por numerosas anotações de um iniciado amador de sinologia e de orientalismo, que viriam, porém, a ser utilizadas pelos missionários recém-arribados ao Império do Meio, com grande proveito na sua habilitação que era, na matéria específica, praticamente nula.

Valignano, o visitador-geral, seguindo a percepção que já tinha sido de Francisco Xavier, da iluminação referencial da China sobre o Japão em material cultural, quis que o trabalho de Ricci, tanto as paráfrases apresentadas como as transliterações do *Sì Shu* (Quatro Livros), mesmo que elementaríssimas (e talvez por isso), fossem estudadas, nomeadamente pelos missionários do Japão.

Como as obras confucionistas que expressavam o pensamento de Confúcio eram inteiramente omissas em temas como a existência de Deus, a espiritualidade da alma, o paraíso e o inferno, que lhes eram completamente estranhos, Ricci não hesitava, na construção das suas paráfrases, como afirma Étiemble (I, 246) em fazer a Confúcio e seus discípulos, a mesma barreira, o mesmo que, outrora, Tomás de Aquino tinha feito a Aristóteles... extraindo-lhe o *vero* sentido, retirando-lhe as ambiguidades de mestre, de forma a apresentá-lo de acordo com a criatividade e... a conveniência do discípulo... e, sobretudo, da cristiania, no caso um Kong Zi - Confucius cristiano, cristianizado, acristianado, ou acristianável...

Nessa onda, Cendón Conde aponta, no seu estudo, precisamente, “cinco casos” de sincretismo de Ricci em relação ao pensamento chinês de que o

quarto é o “senhor do céu” e o quinto o “tratado da amizade”.

Em 1595, Ricci tenta, sem sucesso, chegar a Pequim, integrado numa comitiva dum dignitário chinês e vê-se obrigado a encetar o regresso a Xao Cheu. Porém, na viagem de regresso, conheceu em Nanchang, província do Jiangxi, um médico que lhe propiciou a entrada no círculo dos letrados, sendo convidado a instalar-se na cidade, o que fez, fundando uma nova missão, a terceira na China, com o apoio de José Soeiro, enviado por Sande de Macau, e com Francisco Martins. É a data, portanto, do abandono definitivo da província meridional do Guangdong por Ricci.

Este encontro com o médico letrado confucionista coincide com a já referida desilusão dos jesuítas em relação a estratégia de enculturação com os bonzos, usando as suas vestes e estatuto. Confirmarão a perceção de que os bonzos não tinham assim tanta aceitação, nem nas elites, nem no povo chinês, A decisão de seguir a aproximação à linha confucionina em todos os aspetos tornou-se então irreversível, ficando apenas a aguardar autorização superior, ou seja a de Valignano, o visitador do Japão e da China, cuja concessão chegou em 1594. É neste contexto, que Ricci vai procurar demonstrar a existência de uma grande convergência entre os preceitos morais ditados pelo cristianismo e muitos dos preceitos morais ensinados por Confúcio.

Com vestes de letrado e algum conhecimento dos Clássicos, mesmo que elementar, Ricci apresentar-se-ia a partir de então como um laico e letrado do Ocidente (*xishi*), como convinha, até porque no meio confucionino desta fase final dos Ming, as coisas da religião eram tidas como desinteressantes, fúteis, mesmo inúteis, pelo que Ricci se apresentou agora como moralista, filósofo e sábio, um espécie de conferencista profissional (*jiangxue*) figura que tinha, entre a elite chinesa, grande aceitação... Por isso nem sequer abriu uma igreja ou templo, como tinha feito com a liderança de Ruggieri, em 1583, em Zhaoqing, mas apenas uma casa de pregação, ou seja, uma sala de conferência, uma *shuyuan*, que Gernet traduz por “academia”, onde, sem sacralidade ou religiosidade embora, pontificava uma rigorosa ritualidade e solenidade cerimoniais, à semelhança do que faziam os mais famosos pregadores chineses, sentindo atingido o objetivo inicial ao constatar que, a partir de então, eram tidos também como letrados... Na verdade, talvez ele próprio, naquele ambiente, com o estudo dos Clássicos e o debate moral, se comesse a sentir um pouco em casa... Também não repetirá a experiência de colocar à cabeça a tarefa de redigir um catecismo, pelo contrário decide avançar apenas com a divulgação dos mistérios cristãos junto aos chineses

que se predispuessem a aceita-los através da fé... Na Muralha da China, e no próprio fosso da teologia cristã, ruía o mito neoescolástico da pregação racionalista universal do cristianismo... E a obra “O Verdadeiro sentido do Senhor do Céu” (*Tianzhu shiyi*), que virá a ser apresentado como o catecismo necessário — porque o outro, o *Tianzhu shilu* de Ruggieri, tinha sido mal aceite — teria muito pouco a ver com um catecismo, tendo Ricci eliminado os elementos doutrinários como a criação em sete dias, a rebelião dos anjos caídos, a expulsão de Adão e Eva do paraíso, a desobediência dos homens à exceção de Noé e Loth, a entrega da lei de Moisés, a crucificação de Jesus, a descida aos infernos, a ressurreição e sua vinda no fim dos tempos, resumindo a muito pouco os dez mandamentos e deixando apenas uma alusão ao pecado original.

Gernet observa que se esta política extremamente prudente permite explicar o sucesso inicial e seguinte de Ricci, também permite compreender por que razão os chineses demoraram tanto tempo a perceber os verdadeiros intentos dos missionários de imporem uma fé com caráter exclusivista...

Mas a verdade é que neste ano de 1595, Ricci, mais livre para o trabalho intelectual, redige e publica em Nanchang a sua primeira obra em chinês, o “*Jiaoyou lun*” (Tratado de como fazer amigos) numa primeira versão, a que se seguirá o “*Jifa*” (Tratado da memória ou Tratado das artes mnemotécnicas ou Tratado para aprender de cor) e o já referido novo catecismo, “*Tianzhu shiyi*” (Verdadeiro sentido do senhor do céu) em substituição do de Ruggieri...

Ricci acrescentou ao título “*Jiaoyou lun*” (Tratado de como fazer amigos), também denominado apenas “*You lun*” (Tratado sobre a amizade), o título latino, *De Amicitia*. Escrito para o leitor chinês não cristão em geral, elabora o conceito da amizade virtuosa e reflete os esforços de Ricci para levar a cultura da Renascença e o humanismo até a China. De acordo com o “*Si ku quan shu ti yao*” (Bibliografia anotada da Biblioteca Imperial), a obra foi recomendada por Qu Rukui, um discípulo de Ricci, membro de uma família com peso de funcionários e letrados em Changshu, Jiangsu, que se tornaria convertido ao ser batizado em Nanquim, em 1605.

O tratado surgiu a partir das discussões de Ricci sobre a amizade com Zhu Duoje, príncipe de Jian’an. Trata-se da primeira obra de Ricci em chinês. Inclui textos traduzidos ou parafrazeados, além de aforismos de santos e sábios ocidentais, que estão apresentados de forma facilmente identificável e legível pelos letrados chineses. No prefácio, Ricci alude à hospitalidade do príncipe de Jian’an, que, em determinada ocasião, o interrogou sobre o que os ocidentais pensariam da amizade. As sentenças e máximas surgem autónomas, sem

um encadeamento sistemático, mas com numerosas citações de Aristóteles, Cícero, e Séneca, tal como de pensadores cristãos como Ambrósio de Milão ou Agostinho de Hipona. A obra teve bastante sucesso entre os letrados que apreciaram a capacidade de Ricci e verteram algumas das ideias ínsitas nas suas próprias obras, como a ideia de que o amigo é um outro eu, uma espécie de metade de cada um, razão pela qual se deve considerar como a si mesmo.

Estava lançada a carreira intelectual de Ricci no Império do Meio: em 1597, Valignano nomeia-o superior de toda a missão na China, cargo que virá a desempenhar até morrer!

Mesmo que, no ano seguinte, com o apoio de Wang Tchong Ming, um velho amigo que acabava de ascender a presidente do tribunal dos ritos de Nanquim, tenha tentado, sem sucesso, chegar a Pequim, a prestar vassalagem ao imperador. A sua presença na capital não teve o apoio da corte, pelo que, com vários irmãos vindos do Jiangxi, regressou a Nanquim onde, porém, em 1599, conseguiu com os bons ofícios de um amigo Li Zhi (Zhuowu), obter autorização de residência do vice-rei, assim surgindo a *terceira* residência jesuíta na China.

Li Zhi deixará dito, em tom encomiasta, um pouco ficcionado, que Ricci tinha vindo de terras longíssimas, sem nada saber da China nem da língua chinesa e que se tinha entregue denodadamente ao estudo, não havendo livro chinês que não houvesse lido, sobre o sentido de tudo pedindo conselho, entrando nos mais difíceis debates onde sempre se manteve imperturbável, escrevendo o seu comentário em chinês.

No entanto, é deveras significativo que ao terminar o encómio, depois de afirmar que nunca viu ninguém como Ricci, Li Zhi deixasse cair:

“Mas não sei bem o que veio cá fazer, mesmo depois de me ter encontrado com ele três vezes. Penso que se pretendesse substituir os seus ensinamentos pelos de Zhu ou de Confúcio, isso seria demasiado estúpido. Não deve ser, portanto, por isso”.

Há mais do que perplexidade, há desconfiança porque por mais mestre que Ricci pudesse afirmar na arte da dissimulação dos verdadeiros objetivos da sua presença e ação, dificilmente fugiria a um espírito arguto, a intuição de que havia muita matéria silenciada.

No ano seguinte, em Nanquim, enquanto publica uma nova versão dos mapas de 1596, intitulando-os *Shanghai yudi quantu* (Mapa do mar), Ricci recebeu significativos apoios de Macau para um presente para o imperador, constituído por diversas peças da tecnologia europeia, com destaque para um valioso relógio e para relíquias do Santo Sepulcro, o que lhe permite chegar a

Pequim, com a companhia de Diego Pantocha, entrar na corte, e fazer chegar ao imperador Wan Li a oferenda. Embora não o recebendo, o imperador fez saber, através dos letrados e eunucos da corte, que apreciou o presente, respondendo favoravelmente ao pedido dos missionários de permanência na cidade, malgrado o parecer negativo emitido pelo tribunal dos ritos.

Ricci tratou de mostrar aos chineses, a ritmo intenso, o mapa-mundi e a noção de hemiférios, fazendo com que a China aparecesse no meio, como se impunha, e publicou uma obra sobre relojoaria, outra sobre a utilização do astrolábio e ainda outra, musical, ensinando a fabricar o clavicímalo... Como Álvaro Semedo deixou registado, os jesuítas impuseram-se não apenas através das ciências nobres como a matemática e a astronomia, mas sobretudo através dos diversos ofícios técnicos e práticos.

Assim se constituiu a implantação na corte chinesa e a *quarta* casa da Companhia de Jesus, na China. O projeto de Francisco Xavier entrava em marcha acelerada.

Em 1601, Ricci publica em Pequim “*Jingtian gai*”, uma tradução efetuada com a ajuda de Li Zhizao, adaptada dum longo poema chinês “Jin muda o dia”, com as posições dos astros no devido lugar, conforme a astronomia europeia de origem grega, que poderemos bem transliterar por “Tratado das Constelações”. Em 1602, também em Pequim, publica *Kunyu wanguo quantu*, (Mapa dos mil países do mundo), xilogravura em seis painéis, uma edição desenvolvida e melhorada da versão de 1584.

A verdade, trate-se de retraimento didático ou dissimulação tática é que, como Gernet aponta, neste que deve ser considerado “o grande tratado de Ricci, não se encontra mais do que uma breve alusão a Jesus”.

A obra, interpretando as tradições chinesas conforme o interesse argumentativo de Ricci, mas em bom chinês, pois para uma e outra serviu a ajuda preciosa dos amigos nativos, teve algum sucesso, embora obras menores, entretanto produzidas pelo missionário, tivessem uma divulgação e audiência mais notórias:

É caso do “*Jiaoyoulun*” (Tratado da Amizade), surgido em Nanchang em 1595, republicado em Nanquim em 1599 e, agora, em Pequim em 1603, do “*Ershiwu yan*” (Vinte e cinco propostas), em 1604, e do “*Jien hi pian*” (Dez textos de um homem extraordinário) publicado em 1608, que são opúsculos de moral estoica numa versão composta por Ricci e, claro, na sua tática de *accommodatio*, com aproximação dos pontos de vista e criação de uma essência comum a europeus e chineses, no plano da filosofia moral... O sábio jesuíta italiano não podia ter escolhido melhor... Ou talvez, passo a passo, texto a

texto, dia a dia, reflexão a reflexão, debate a debate, a aproximação, no terreno moral, por parte de Ricci ao confucionismo, tendesse a deixar de ser apenas uma tática, um mero método, para se ir tornando algo de mais substancial.

Para os chineses, o que chamavam “estudos ocidentais” ou “estudos celestes” era um saber profano que atravessava indissociavelmente a ciência, a técnica, a filosofia e a moral, num período favorável, em que a influência budista, em geral já em decadência acentuada, incluindo os desvios budizantes emersos recentemente da escola de Wang Yangming (1472-1529) (mais conhecido por Yangming Xincheng ou Yangming Zi tanto na China como no Japão) era fustigada, marginalizada e exaurida por um forte movimento de ortodoxia confucionista que sublinhava a responsabilidade pelo bem-estar social das elites e se tornava preponderante nos meios letrados, portanto administrativos, desde os finais do século XIV.

Wang Yangming acreditava em que a ação e o conhecimento tinham de se processar em simultâneo, pois qualquer anterioridade ou posteridade acarretaria necessariamente a ilusão. Considerava que era a mente que moldava os objetos, dava a razão ao mundo, possuía uma luz interior constituída por bondade inata que permitia identificar o bem e o seu caminho, eliminando o egoísmo que o obscurecia. Por isso a via era a do autoexame e da reflexão. Até aqui o caminho é puramente confucionista clássico. Mas Wang Yangming considerava também que a eliminação dos desejos egoístas poderia ser efetuada pela meditação e pelo quietismo (*jingzuo*), literalmente, *sentado quieto* ou *sentado silencioso*, o que já era, não só uma prática estranha ao confucionismo clássico que detinha uma atividade reflexiva que se desenvolvia no confronto dialógico racional, como uma assimilação, por parte deste neoconfucionismo, de uma prática típica do budismo *Chan*. No entanto, ainda assim, deve esclarecer-se que estes neoconfucionistas entendiam que a meditação quietista era a aquisição de uma disciplina mental orientada para este mundo em que vivemos e visava o aperfeiçoamento próprio pelo auto-cultivo, enquanto a meditação budista e taoista visava, pelo contrário, o afastamento do mundo através do esquecimento, o isolamento em relação aos temas humanos e até o abandono de si próprio, sendo o *jingzuo* uma espécie de complemento da prece que, por sua vez, conduziria o espírito para uma realidade transcendental, ou seja, para outro mundo. O neoconfucionismo pois, recebendo embora a influência ambiental budista e taoista na adoção do *jingzuo*, orientava este método meditativo num sentido bastante diferente, mesmo antagónico, pois entendia que a progressão interior no caminho espiritual para o homem moral se fazia necessariamente neste mundo e enfrentando os temas dos

homens integrados na vida social. O *jingzuo* do neoconfucionismo não é uma continuidade da prece, porque esta significava a alienação do mundo concreto e o abandono das responsabilidades sociais característico do budismo; este, pelo contrário, era agora feramente fustigado pelo novo confucionismo.

Não só porque a demarcação lhe convinha, como porque procurava colar-se à corrente dominante para poder vir a ocupar um espaço de sagrado deixado vazio pela marginalização do budismo, Ricci não teve dúvidas em cavalgar a onda anti-búdica para o sucesso, acusando o budismo de corromper as antigas tradições chinesas o que, se era uma verdade que soava como música celestial para os confucionistas, embora o céu de uns e o de outros fossem muito diferentes, ao ponto de não terem qualquer tipo de identidade, por mais sobreposições que os jesuítas intentassem para colocar NSJC no trono imperial.

Ricci entregar-se-ia a refutar abertamente as concepções búdicas e taoicas, e só muito veladamente, com mil cuidados, as confucionistas tanto antigas como modernas...

Neste ambiente e com este procedimento, os primeiros anos do século XVII foram para os missionários da China um período de excepcional acalmia e de trabalho sem percalços. Os letrados chineses estavam fascinados pelo “Letrado do Ocidente” que astutamente ia semeando analogias entre o cristianismo e a cultura tradicional chinesa. Como não haveriam os letrados chineses de apreciar a assimilação e a prática, por parte de Ricci e dos outros jesuítas, das exigentes regras da cortesia e da polidez chinesas, o seu conhecimento dos *Clássicos* e da língua escrita, a sua memória espantosa fundamentada num “Tratado da Memória” ou “Método Mnemotécnico” que Ricci se deu ao trabalho de compor em chinês? A aprovação e apologia de Kong Zi (Confúcio), a condenação do budismo, do taoísmo e das superstições chinesas? E como não acolher calorosamente quem apresentava como sua moral as máximas estoicas, sendo que, para Ricci, ao que diz por escrito a Acquaviva em 1593, Confúcio era um outro Séneca, e a sua primeira obra *a solo*, o *Jiaoyou lun* (Tratado da Amizade), na sua primeira versão, publicada em 1595 e a pedido de um Príncipe de Nanchang, é uma recolha de ditos sentenciosos, na quase totalidade retirados de autores da antiguidade europeia, que assentavam como uma luva no pensamento moral chinês e, concretamente, nas sentenças expressas no *Lunyu* (Diálogos, Analectos) que colige as intervenções do grande mestre?

Numa carta de 14 de Agosto de 1599, Ricci escreve a propósito da publicação das primeiras versões do “*Jiaoyou lun*”, que “este tratado de amizade deu mais crédito a mim e à nossa Europa do que tudo o que fizemos até agora”.

E prosseguiria persistentemente a mesma via, na assunção do estoicismo pré-cristão, pois o “*Ershiwu yan*” (As Vinte e Cinco teses), que publica em 1605, é de novo uma tradução cuidadosamente ampliada do “*Encheiridion*”, também conhecido por “*Manual*” de Epictetus. Uma vez descoberto o filão estoico para promover a aproximação Este-Oeste, como notou Gernet, Ricci não mais o abandonaria, mesmo fazendo passar este por cristianismo.

É que, com efeito, a moral chinesa é de *tonalidade* estoica. Dada a cronologia, aliás, deveremos dizer, na ordem inversa. Facto é que, ao lermos o *Lunyu*, o *Mencius*, o *Da Xue* ou o *Zhong Yong*, se não conseguirmos fugir a analogias sempre perigosamente deletérias – mas como não correr o risco? – lembrámo-nos precisamente de Séneca, de Epicteto, de Cícero, de Marco Aurélio. Sim, num ponto ou outro, embora com raridade e necessariamente com uma imaginação alimentada pela boa vontade, uma parábola do Evangelho cristão, uma daquelas, precisamente, que possa ter sido desenhada sob inspiração estoica.

Há uma pergunta que se coloca ao lidar-se com as leituras confucioninas de Ricci e de outros jesuítas, para mais parecendo sincera a declaração repetida de admiração pelo sistema chinês, mormente no campo social e no da justiça: ao constatarem o altíssimo nível da filosofia moral e da educação confucionistas sem, para isso, precisarem de Deus, nem sequer de qualquer tipo de encarnação messiânica, não se sentiriam em causa?... Ou a teima e freima jesuíticas de distorcer o Filho do Céu chinês como o Senhor do Céu cristão, também não seria meramente tático, mas resultante da antevisão desta posição insustentável? A de estar escarrapachado, à frente de todos e dos seus próprios olhos, que, no reino do ateísmo, e da própria arreligiosidade, a doutrina e o comportamento morais podiam ser tão ou mais elevados do que no reino do cristianismo, em que foi o próprio Deus que teve de ditar, do outro lado, os ditames da conduta para um judeu? Para que serviria então o cristianismo? O Evangelho? A missionação? O que significaria afinal a salvação das almas senão uma narrativa tida alegremente por quimera por todos os não ungidos pela fé, nem sequer pela graça e, ainda pior, por todos as que se foram, nomeadamente na China, em tantos milénios de civilização anteriores ao advento do Salvador? Que quando se fez ouvir na China, num pequeno grupo, nos tempos dos Tang, foi através dos discípulos do herético Nestor, mais do que excomungado por Roma? Onde ficava a racionalidade? Ficaria a nu uma outra verdade sobre a motivação da missionação jesuítica? Poderiam aqueles que se entregavam totalmente àquela causa viver com essa perversidade? Seria possível, por mais que os olhos e a mente se fechassem a estas interrogações, refugiar-se na crença surda e cega, no *credo quia absurdum*? Homens de cultura, de elite e da neoescolástica racionalista? A soçobrarem ao neo-

agostinismo jansenista? Seguia-se Tomás ou Agostinho? Ou seria tudo uma farsa?

Sem com a mostra da floresta perdermos de vista a pequena árvore, tenha-se ela por uma magnólia *yulan* do centro do Império, por uma japoneira das ilhas a marcar os galécicos jardins românticos ou pelo osmanto, delícia das fragrâncias nos chás e perfumes a que servia, em suma, o cristianismo, ou a religião em geral, como fundamentação da moral, se a China, não precisava nem de um nem de outro para ter a funcionar a boa moral na sociedade e a reflexão moral ao melhor nível na filosofia?

Mas há quem diga, como Nicolas Standaert, um pouco o contrário, mesmo entre os que lhe são muito mais próximos do que nós, como é o caso do distinto sinólogo jesuíta da Universidade de Lovaina. Ou, pensando melhor, talvez diga o mesmo em outros termos.

“Tentei mostrar que o papel do “Outro” na formação da identidade de Ricci é certamente tão importante quanto a atividade do Self de Ricci. Embora Ricci pudesse ter reagido de outras maneiras, em todos os casos, “o Outro” desempenhou um papel decisivo nas reações que mostrou. Pode até argumentar-se que “o Outro” tornou possível a Ricci tornar-se em quem se tornou. Sem “o Outro”, isso não teria sido possível”.

Porém, o volume está longe de suscitar apenas estas interrogações ou ficar por aqui nos conteúdos. Muito longe disso, a ponto de uma recensão equilibrada e relativamente sintética, que faça jus à profundidade, complexidade, especificidades e contextualidades, analíticas e sugestivas, destes estudos sobre o pensamento chinês e o lugar no Império do Meio do ocidental Mattè Ricci, que redundam, no fundo e no fim, numa reflexão global alimentada pelo diálogo entre os dois pólos, se tornar obra deveras dificultosa.

Aliás, deixe-se, para terminar, que o volume, além de apresentar, como não podia deixar de ser uma tradução do *Jiaoyou (Tratado da Amizade)* (pp. 357-374) de Ricci, apresenta também, numa sólida antologia anexa, a tradução dos textos ocidentais mais referidos como fundamento das exposições sobre o pensamento europeu (pp. 431-632) e o estudo de Alba Iglesias Varela e Jorge Cendón Conde “Os raposos ante o dourado crisantemo. O Xapón dos Xesuítas” (pp. 377-430). Antes de encerrar com o índice onomástico (pp. 661-683), encontra-se o epílogo de Oscar Oubiña que aprofunda, no plano filosófico alguma problemática já aqui equacionada, em termos iniciáticos, sob a glosa de “entre o si mesmo e o outro”, limitando-se, todavia à esfera histórica do pensamento ocidental (pp. 632-659).

Pedro Baptista

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2nd citation: Courtine, *Inventio analogiae*, op. cit., pp. 319-322.

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Initial(s) of the author's first name(s) with period + Author's last name, «Title of the study, in quotation marks», in Editor's name (ed.), *Complete Title of the Volume in italics*, Publisher, place of publication year of publication, page numbers (collection: optional).

Ex.: R.J. Hankinson, «Philosophy of Science», in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, pp. 109-139, cf. p. 127.

2nd citation: Hankinson, «Philosophy of Science», art. cit., p. 125.

CITATIONS OF CLASSICAL WORKS AND CRITICAL EDITIONS

Author's name, *Title in italics*, Editor's name, Publisher, place of publication year of publication, page numbers or lines (collection: optional).

(in special cases of easy recognition, an abbreviated form is allowed, cfr. ex. 1 e 2)

Ex. 1: Plato, *Rep.* 531b; Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I-II, q. 95, a. 3.

Ex. 2: Aristóteles, *Sobre da alma*, trad. A.M. Lóio, rev. T. Calvo Martínez, (Obras completas de Aristóteles) Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa – Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, Lisboa 2010, Liv. II, 5, 417b2-16 (p. 77).

2nd citation: Aristóteles, *Sobre da alma*, op. cit., Liv. III, 5, 430a10-25 (pp. 116-117)

Ex. 3: Séneca, Lúcio Aneu, *Cartas a Lucílio*, trad., pref. e notas J.A. Segurado e Campos, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa 1991, p. 49.

2nd citation: Séneca, Lúcio Aneu, *Cartas a Lucílio*, ed. cit., p. 362.

CITATIONS OF MANUSCRIPTS

City, Library, Collection, shelf mark, folium/folia.

Ex.: Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Alc. 262, f. 149ra.

Note: In the first citation, the name of the Library cannot be abbreviated.

ESTATUTO EDITORIAL

A *Revista da Faculdade de Letras – Série de Filosofia* foi fundada em 1972. A primeira série publicou 4 tomos em 2 volumes, em 1972 e 1973. A publicação foi retomada em 1985, iniciando-se então a sua atual IIª série. Em 2014 (volume 32) a revista assumiu o seu nome atual: *Filosofia. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto*.

Área científica e objetivos

Filosofia visa contribuir para a criação e a transmissão do conhecimento nas diferentes áreas da Filosofia e da História da Filosofia e não possui orientação disciplinar, de escola ou de método

Filosofia publica estudos inéditos no âmbito da Filosofia, ou de outras áreas disciplinares, quando sejam considerados contributos relevantes para o debate ou o conhecimento filosóficos.

Filosofia procura manter um elevado padrão de qualidade, bem como a regularidade e pontualidade da publicação, de modo a assegurar aos autores e aos leitores a participação nos debates em curso na comunidade filosófica.

Filosofia rege-se por padrões de rigor, clareza e fundamentação académica e científica nos textos que publica, adotando a prática da dupla avaliação anónima por pares.

Temas e secções

Filosofia tem as seguintes secções: — Estudos; — Estudos críticos (sobre obras recentes); — Recensões; — Notícias; — Crónica. Se se considerar adequado, a revista poderá criar novas secções, de modo permanente ou ocasional.

Filosofia, se o Conselho de Redação assim o decidir, poderá publicar volumes temáticos, ou dossiers temáticos (Comemorações; Homenagens; Atas; etc.).

Línguas de publicação

A revista tem carácter internacional e, por isso, publica textos nas mais importantes línguas académicas europeias (Alemão; Castelhanos; Francês; Inglês; Italiano; Português).

Arbitragem

A revista adota as melhores práticas de transparência e rigor na arbitragem. Todos os artigos e estudos críticos são submetidos a leitura anónima por 2 especialistas externos, que poderão fazer sugestões de alteração do respetivo conteúdo. As propostas de alteração são submetidas ao autor, que as deverá integrar até a versão ser considerada final pelos editores. Em casos não decididos pelos 2 avaliadores, o artigo é submetido a um 3º leitor anónimo externo.

O Diretor e o secretariado de redação / editorial staff asseguram o anonimato de todo o processo de arbitragem, bem como a resolução de todos os conflitos de interesses.

Organização editorial

A revista é dirigida pelos seguintes órgãos: Diretor, Conselho Editorial, Conselho de Gestão.

O Diretor dirige e organiza a publicação da revista, é responsável pelo processo de arbitragem eterna e independente; organiza as colaborações nas diferentes secções da revista; é responsável por todos os atos administrativos necessários à edição, que pode delegar no Secretariado / Editorial staff. São ainda funções do Diretor: presidir ao Conselho Editorial; manter informado o Conselho Científico. O Diretor não avalia artigos submetidos para publicação. O Diretor é designado pelo Conselho Editorial por um período de dois anos.

O Conselho Editorial (CE) é o órgão consultivo da revista. É composto por um máximo de 20 académicos e investigadores convidados, nacionais e estrangeiros, mantendo um equilíbrio entre as diferentes áreas e orientações filosóficas. São designados por um período de 4 anos, renováveis uma vez. As suas funções são: apresentar propostas para números temáticos; sugerir propostas de colaboração a publicar pela revista; colaborar na arbitragem externa e

anónima de artigos submetidos para publicação; colaborar com o Conselho Editorial e com o Diretor indicando árbitros externos e independentes adequados para os artigos submetidos para publicação.

- O Conselho de Gestão (CG) é constituído por todos os professores do Departamento de Filosofia. Funções: assessorar o Diretor; definir as orientações científicas da revista; definir padrões de qualidade; decidir sobre a publicação de números temáticos; determinar regras de arbitragem externa e independente; aprovar as normas redatoriais dos textos; aprovar o modelo gráfico da revista; aprovar ou alterar o Estatuto Editorial da Revista; pronunciar-se sobre assuntos que lhe sejam submetidos pelo Diretor; indicar os membros do Conselho Científico, procedendo à sua rotação ou renovação periódica. O Conselho de Gestão reúne uma vez por ano, por convocatória do Diretor.
- O Secretariado de Redação (SR) inclui pessoal técnico de apoio, os Editores de secção, os Editores convidados de números monográficos. O secretariado é uma estrutura de apoio coordenada pelo Diretor para o assessorar nas diversas tarefas e etapas da produção editorial da revista. Os membros do SR não avaliam artigos submetidos para publicação.

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A revista rege-se pelos princípios da ética editorial em publicações académicas e segue o “Code of Conduct for Journal Editors” do Committee On Publications Ethics (COPE).

A revista adota uma prática de transparência e respeito ético no processo de avaliação de artigos e na publicação dos artigos avaliados. Para garantir a transparência do processo de avaliação, todos os avaliadores anónimos subscrevem uma declaração relativa a conflitos de interesses.

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A denúncia de publicação de material plagiado, manipulado ou fraudulento será investigada pelo Conselho Científico e por 2 avaliadores independentes. A revista reserva-se o direito de suspender a qualquer momento ou retirar de publicação qualquer artigo onde seja identificado plágio ou qualquer outra conduta académica inapropriada.

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A revista não aceita publicação de material patrocinado. A revista aceita a oferta de obras para recensão, mas não aceita recensões patrocinadas por editoras, nem orientações quanto ao conteúdo das recensões.

A revista aceita a publicação de publicidade de editoras.

Distribuição e permutas

Os autores de artigos, notícias ou recensões têm direito a 2 exemplar impressos. Aos autores é fornecido o PDF com o respetivo artigo, que pode ser livremente difundido.

Os membros do CR e do CE têm direito a 1 exemplar impresso da revista.

A revista mantém permuta com revistas congêneres. Os títulos permutados são depositados na Biblioteca Central da Faculdade.

A distribuição comercial da revista e o serviço de assinaturas são assegurados pela Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto.

Edições

A revista tem dupla edição: impressa (para permutas, venda, assinaturas e autores) e online em acesso livre.

O número de páginas de cada volume é variável, de acordo com o tema ou o período abrangido, oscilando entre 150 e 300 pp.

A revista adota os princípios defendidos pela “Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association”.
Endereço online: <http://ojs.letras.up.pt/index.php/filosofia/>

Repositório online FLUP: <http://ler.letras.up.pt/site/default.aspx?qry=id04id16&sum=sim>

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EDITORIAL STATUTE

The *Revista da Faculdade de Letras – Série de Filosofia* was founded in 1972. Four issues in two volumes were published in the first series, between 1972 and 1973. Publication resumed in 1985, initiating its current series II. In 2014 (volume 32) the journal has assumed its present name: *Filosofia. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto*.

Scientific area and objectives

The purpose of *Filosofia* is to contribute to the creation and transmission of knowledge in the various areas of Philosophy and History of Philosophy. It is not biased towards any specific subject, school of thought or methodology.

Filosofia publishes unpublished studies in Philosophy or other areas, when these are considered relevant contributions to philosophical debate or knowledge.

Filosofia seeks to maintain a high standard of quality, as well as timely publication, so as to assure its authors and readers the opportunity to participate in ongoing debates within the philosophical community.

Filosofia is guided in the texts it publishes by standards of rigor, clarity and academic and scientific grounding, adopting the practice of double blind peer review.

Themes and sections

Filosofia has the following sections: — Studies; — Critical notices; — Reviews; — News; — Chronicle. If considered appropriate, the journal may create new sections, either permanently or on occasion.

Filosofia, should its editorial board so decide, may publish thematic volumes or sections thereof (Memorials; *Festschriften*; Proceedings; etc.).

Publication languages

The journal has an international character. As such, it publishes texts in the most relevant European academic languages (Castilian; English; French; German; Italian; Portuguese).

Refereeing

The journal adopts the best practices of transparency and rigor in refereeing. All articles and critical studies are read anonymously by two external specialists. Should these specialists recommend acceptance, this may be conditional on alterations. In this case the author would be expected to revise accordingly until the version is considered final by the editors. In cases undecided by the two referees, the paper is given to a third anonymous external reader.

The editor and the editorial staff ensure anonymity throughout the entire reviewing process, as well as the resolution of all conflicts of interest.

Editorial management

The journal is directed by the following organs: Editor, Editorial Board, Managing Board.

The Editor (E) directs and organizes the journal's publication; he/she is responsible for the external and independent refereeing process; organizes cooperation in different sections of the journal; is responsible for all administrative acts necessary for publication, which he/she may delegate on the editorial staff. The Editor's functions also include: to preside over the Editorial Board; to keep the Scientific Board informed. The Editor does not evaluate papers submitted for publication. The Editor is appointed by the Editorial Board for a period of two years.

Editorial Board (EB) is a consultative organ of the journal. It is composed of a maximum of 20

invited, both national and foreign, academics and researchers, in such a way as to preserve a balance between the different philosophical areas and orientations. These are appointed for a period of 4 years, renewable once. Its functions are: to present proposals for thematic volumes; suggestions for cooperative work to be published by the journal; to cooperate with the external and anonymous peer reviewing of articles submitted for publication; to cooperate with the Scientific Board and with the Editor, suggesting external independent referees, suited to the articles submitted for publication.

The Managing Board (MB) is composed of all the professors in the Department of Philosophy. Functions: to advise the Editor; to define the journal's scientific guidelines; to define standards of quality; to decide on the publication of thematic issues; to determine the rules for external and independent refereeing; to approve the editorial norms for texts; to approve the graphic style of the journal; to approve or modify the journal's Editorial Statutes; to pronounce on matters submitted to it by the Editor; to appoint the members of the Scientific Board, according to their periodic rotation or renewal. The Managing Board assembles once a year on the Editor's call.

The Editorial Staff (ES) includes technical support personnel, section editors, and invited editors for monographic issues. The Editorial Staff is a support structure coordinated by the Editor to provide advising in the several tasks and stages of the journal's editorial process. The Staff's members do not evaluate articles submitted for publication.

Ethical code

The journal is governed by the principles of editorial ethics in academic publications and follows the "Code of Conduct for Journal Editors", by the Committee On Publication Ethics (COPE).

The journal adopts a practice of transparency and respect in the process of evaluation and publication of submitted articles. To ensure transparency in that process, all anonymous referees sign a declaration concerning conflicts of interests.

The journal explicitly and unequivocally rejects all forms of plagiarism or academic fraud (the deliberate providing of false, unverified, fraudulent or injurious information). The authors are solely responsible for the reliability and authenticity of their work's content.


The submitted articles are verified with plagiarism detection software.

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The authors commit themselves to publish original, not previously released work, and they assume the responsibility for the work they publish.

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The journal holds exchanges with similar journals. The exchanged titles are deposited in the Faculty's Central Library.

The commercial distribution of the journal and the signature service are maintained by the Faculty of Arts of Porto University.

Editions, Open access and Repository

The journal has double edition: printed (for exchanges, selling, signatures and authors) and online, freely accessed.

The number of pages for each volume varies according with the theme or the time period, from 150 to 300 pp.

The journal espouses the principles upheld by the "Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association".

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