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MODI SIGNIFICANDI IN JOHANNES GLOGOVIENSIS' GRAMMAR

Johannes Glogoviensis (1445-1507) was one of the renowned professors of liberal arts at the Jagellonian University. He taught mandatory courses on Aelius Donatus' *Ars minor* and on the Second Part of Alexander de Villa Dei's *Doctrinale*[1]. The two were firmly established as the basic university grammar textbooks containing morphology and syntax, respectively. Glogoviensis' commentaries on the subject: *Declaratio Donati minoris*[2], and *Exercitium secundae partis Alexandri* had numerous printed editions starting from 1500 and were popular with masters and students at Cracow[3]. Both books, set in the form of *quaestiones,* took a modist approach to grammatical issues. In this way Glogoviensis continued the tradition of *modi significandi* which flourished in Cracow from the mid-15th century until the end of the 1520s. The University of Cracow became the center of that doctrine's revival[4]. Its durability and influence deserves continued research to attain a better insight into the specifically Polish tradition of speculative grammar. The study of Glogoviensis' works is important for that kind of research.

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[1]   *Liber diligentiarum facultatis artisticae Universitatis Cracoviensis*, pars I*,* W. WISŁOCKI (ed.), Kraków 1886, p. 106 (Archiwum do Dziejów Literatury i Oświaty w Polsce, 4).

[2]   The title of the Glogoviensis' commentary on *Donatus minor* slightly varied according to the edition. *Declaratio Donati minoris* is an abbreviated form of the title of the first edition: *Declaratio Donati minoris de octo partibus orationis cum pulcherrimis quaestionibus admodum studiosis scholaribus proficua*, Liptzk 1500.

[3]   Cfr. K. KRAUZE-BŁACHOWICZ, «*Declaratio Donati minoris* Jana z Głogowa – kwestia pierwsza», *Acta Mediaevalia* XV (2002) 427-433.

[4]   C. MIELCZARSKI, *Między gramatyką scholastyczną a humanistyczną. Komentarz Jana Sommerfelda Starszego do traktatu gramatycznego Eberharda Hiszpańskiego* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Warsaw, IFiS PAN, 1989), p. 77.

In this paper I will try to expose some specific features of Glogoviensis' work and the choices he made in his teaching. These become apparent when his commentaries are compared with standard late 15th century expositions popular in Cracow at the time, i.e. Johannes Versor's *Commentum super Donatum* and Gerhard of Züpthen's first and second part of *Glosa notabilis* (which is a commentary on the first and second part of Alexander de Villa Dei's *Doctrinale*). I will focus on a few issues selected from a catalogue of typical modist queries, provided mostly by Glogoviensis' and Züpthen's commentaries on the second part of *Doctrinale*. The selected issues are as follows: 1) The concept of mode of signifying, 2) grammar as *scientia necessaria*, 3) The subject of grammar, 4) The concept of construction and the related issues concerning transitivity, congruity and completeness of construction. I will touch on the status of government (*regimen*) with reference to construction.

Modi significandi

In the two commentaries, Glogoviensis provides a brief explanation of the doctrine of *modi significandi*. Unlike Versor and Züpthen, he feels it is didactically necessary. In fact, Glogoviensis' concept of *modi significandi passivi* and *activi* is nothing else but the well-known concept of Thomas of Erfurt[5]. Modes of signifying are distinctive features of parts of speech. The passive mode of signifying is a property of the thing consignified by the expression. The active mode of signifying is the mode or property of the expression given by the intellect to that expression by means of which the expression signifies the property of the thing. Glogoviensis lists further divisions into essential and accidental modes. He divides essential modes into general and special, and accidental modes into absolute and respective ones. The special essential mode refers to the essence of a particular part of speech and distinguishes one part of speech

    5   Cfr. Thomas of Erfurt (Thomas de Erfordia), *Grammatica speculativa*, ed. & transl. G.L. Bursill-Hall, London 1972, pp. 134-136; 148-150.
    6   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Donati minoris grammatici non vulgaris de octo partibus orationis declaratio*, Lipsiae 1506 (henceforth abbreviated as *Donati minoris declaratio*), f. C3r; idem, *Exercitium secundae partis Alexandri*, Cracoviae 1517 (henceforth abbreviated as *Exercitium*), f. A4v.

from another. The accidental respective modes are responsible for congruity of utterance[6]. Glogovian says that every mode of signifying originates from the mode of being through the mode of understanding[7].

Scientia necessaria

While trying to answer the question whether grammar is a necessary science, Glogoviensis is exlusively interested in the ontological aspect of *modi significandi*. The claim that every mode of signifying has to be derived from the mode of being of the thing[8] is an assumption leading to the statement that grammar, and in particular morphology and syntax, are necessary sciences. What is most interesting here are his replies to the objections that being a science of contingent things grammar (and syntax respectively) is not a *scientia necessariorum*. In *Declaratio Donati* he says: «The theorems of grammar are based on the principles that cannnot be changed»[9]. His argument in *Exercitium* can be summarized as follows: syntax is knowledge about government (*regimen*) and construction (*constructio*). These originate from modes of being through modes of signifying and, successively, modes of understanding. And modes of being are necessary, since the knowledge about them is also necessary, and it constitutes natural philosophy. Hence syntax is necessary[10]. By contrast,

7   Idem, *Donati minoris declaratio*, f. F3r: «omnis modus significandi ortum habet a modo essendi mediante modo intelligendi».

8   *Ibidem*, f. F1r: «omnis modus significandi in grammatica debet sumi a proprietate et modo essendi in re»**;** cfr. Martinus de Dacia, *Modi significandi*, in *Martini de Dacia Opera*, H. Roos (ed.), Copenhagen 1961, p. 6, (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, II).

9   Ioannes Glogoviensis**,** *Donati minoris declaratio*, f. B3v: «Dico: Verum argumentum concludit, quod scientia proprie est necessariorum, non autem scientia communiter dicta. Modo grammatica est scientia communiter dicta; vel dico, quod licet oratio congrua secundum se considerata est contingens, tamen relata ad sua principia, quae oportet observare inviolabiliter, sic bene est necessaria»; cfr. Simon Dacus, *Questiones super 2ª Minoris voluminis Prisciani* in *Simonis Daci Opera*, A. Otto (ed.),Copenhagen, p. 93 (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, III): «grammatica (...) potest considerari (...) quantum ad principia eius essentialia et sic est perpetuorum».

10   Ioannes Glogoviensis**,** *Exercitium*, f. A2v: «Dico verum argumentum concludit, quod regimen et constructio secundum se considerata absolute sunt res contingentes. Sed inquantum resolvuntur et reducuntur in modos essendi rerum a quibus originaliter

Gerhard of Züpthen's answer to the question about necessary science is based on a different type of argument involving the concept of aim (*finis*) of science[11].

<div align="center">Subiectum scientiae</div>

Subiectum scientiae is a formal subject, that is *subiectum attributionis*. Glogoviensis acknowledged four conditions of such a subject[12]:

1) it must be the most common term considered in that science (*terminus communissimus*)

2) it must be the term which is primarily considered in that science (*primo notus*)

3) it must not exceed the boundaries of that science (*non excedens limites illius scientiae*)

4) everything that is considered in this science must be considered with respect to it (*ad quem omnia in tali scientia considerata habent attributionem*)

It looks as if they were patterned on the three conditions given by Züpthen in *Glosa Notabilis*[13] and Glogoviensis had divided Züpthen's first condition into two. Both Glogoviensis' and Züpthen's conditions are similar in their contents to the conditions comprised in the anonymous commentary on the second part of *Doctrinale* preserved in Erfurt, Amplon.

causantur, necessitatem habent. Dictum enim est ante, quod regimen et constructio oriuntur a proportione modorum significandi, modi significandi accipiuntur a modis intelligendi, modi intelligendi a modis essendi. Constat autem quod modi essendi rerum sunt necessarii ex quo de ipsis est scientia et philosophia naturalis».

11   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis secundae partis Alexandri*, Coloniae 1499 (henceforth abbreviated as *Glosa notabilis II*), f. A1v: «Necessitas sumitur ex parte finis, sed talis est congrua locutio huius doctrinae. Secunda ratio: illa scientia est necessaria per quam rerum omnium habitudinem essentialem et accidentalem cognoscere possumus, sed hoc facit noticiam, huius scientia ergo est necessaria. Tertia ratio est: illa scientia necessaria est per quam instruimur ad eliciendum perfectam scientiam ex variis scripturis, sed hoc fit per istam scientiam, ergo est necessaria».

12   Cfr. Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Donati minoris declaratio*, f. B4r-B4v.

13   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, f. A3v: «Prima est quod sit aliquid communissimum principaliter in illa scientia consideratum. Secunda est quod non excedat metas illius scientiae. (...) Tertia conditio est quod omnia in tali scientia considerata habent ordinem ad ipsum».

Q. 70 A and attributed formerly to Marsilius of Inghen[14]. Nevertheless the wording and explanations given by Glogoviensis resemble this text[15]much more than Züpthen's. While Glogoviensis and the anonymous author say *terminus communissimus*, *primo notus*. Züpthen says *quod sit communisssimum principaliter*. With reference to his fourth condition Glogoviensis says:

«aliqua [considerata in scientia] habent attributionem ad subiectum verificativam (…) aliae autem habent attributionem reductivam»[16].

The Anonymous puts it as follows:

«talis terminus [i.e. subiectum] sit verificabilis de omnibus principaliter consideratis in scientia; (…) minus principaliter considerata considere<n>tur in ordine et attributione ad ipsum»[17].

It is therefore obvious that Glogoviensis does not use Züpthen directly. His source is closer to that of the anonymous commentary included in Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 70 A. It should be noted that Versor does not touch upon the problem of *subiectum attributionis* at all in his grammar whereas it falls within the scope of interest of Cracow grammarians[18].

According to both Gerhard of Züpthen and Johannes Glogoviensis, *sermo significativus* is the subject of grammar as a whole[19]. In Züpthen's opinion the *vox litterata articulata articulatione secunda* is the subject of syntax, where the second articulation means combination of one part of speech with another under the proper proportion of modes of signifying[20],

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14   C.H. Kneepkens «Erfurt Ampl.Q.70 A: A Quaestiones-commentary on the Second Part of Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale by Marsilius of Inghen? *An Explorative Note on a Specimen of Conceptualist Grammar*», *Vivarium* 28, 1 (1990) 40-41. The attribution of above-mentioned commentary to Marsilius of Inghen is most probably wrong. Cfr. E.P. Bos' paper presented to the 11th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Porto, August 2002.

15   Cfr. C.H. Kneepkens, *Op. cit*., p.50.

16   Cfr. Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Donati minoris declaratio*, f. B4r-B4v.

17   C.H. Kneepkens, *Op. cit*., p.50.

18   Clemens de Gembice, *Questiones super artem minorem*, MS, Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 1945, f.198r : «et talis materia alio nomine vocatur subiectum attributionis»; cfr. Ioannes Versor, *Commentum super Donatum minorem*, Argentinae 1491.

19   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Prima pars Doctrinalis Alexandri cum sententiis notabilibus*, Coloniae 1498, f. A2r; cfr. Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Donati minoris declaratio*, f. B2r.

20   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, f. A3r.

Glogoviensis says that the subject of syntax is *pars orationis ad aliam relata*, that is «in habitudine et in respectu ad aliud cum quo constituit orationem congruam et perfectam»[21]. The two authors differ here only in their terminology (and not in the concepts themselves)[22]. If we are to believe the commentary on Ludolf de Luchow's *Flores*, which was read in Cracow in the times of Glogoviensis, *articulatio prima* and *secunda* in the meaning used by Gerhard of Züpthen originate from the tradition of non-modist grammar[23]. Glogoviensis with his *pars orationis ad aliam relata* sticks to the modist line represented in classical speculative grammar, e.g. by Simon Dacus Modista and preserved by the Cracow tradition[24].

CONSTRUCTIO, REGIMEN

While commenting on Alexander's brief fragment on construction[25], both authors agree on the most proper understanding of construction that

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[21]   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Donati minoris declaratio*, f. B4v; cfr. idem, *Exercitium*, ff. A2r, A3r.

[22]   In fact it is what Glogoviensis calls «unio unius partis cum alia», *Exercitium*, f. A4r.

[23]   Ludolphus de Luco, *Flores grammaticae sive Florista cum commento*, [Basel c. 1490-1497], f. A3v: «Dubitatur, quid sit subiectum floristae. Respondetur, quod vox articulata articulatione secunda. Pro illo sciendum, quod 'prima' secundum modistas est prima impositio dictionis ad significandum unam rem sic quod non aliam, ut cum ille terminus hoc imponitur ad significandum 'animal rationale', est articulatio prima. Secunda est, quando aliqua dictio imponitur ad significandum aliquam rem sub certam proprietatem et sub certo modo significandi, sicut cum ille terminus 'homo' imponebatur ad significandum animal rationale per modum per se stantis et sub modo habitus et quietis. Sed secundum communes grammaticos articulatio prima est, cum terminus imponitur ad significandum unam rem sic, quod non aliam. Sed articulatio secunda est, quando terminus ordinatur cum alio termino sub debitis accidentibus grammaticalibus. Sic patet qualiter vox articulata articulatione secunda est hic subiectum. Quia in isto docetur qualiter unus terminus debet combinari cum alio».

[24]   Simon Dacus, *Op. cit*, p.110: «Relinquitur ergo, quod pars orationis actualiter relata ad aliam sub forma constructibilium sit hic subiectum»; Anonymus, *Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem*, MS, Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 649, f. 233 rb: «Dico ergo quod pars rationis actualiter relata ad aliam est subiectum huius libri quod idem est subiectum»

[25]   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, ff. O3v-O6v; Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, ff. M6v-N1r.

relates to the definition of Thomas of Erfurt[26]. In Züpthen's opinion this definition describes congruous union of constructibles[27]. Glogoviensis, whose terminology is more traditional, states that the construction in that sense dictates congruous order (*ordinatio*) of words and their proportion[28]. Both Züpthen and Glogoviensis impose on this concept of construction – proper and modistic according to them – the condition that it be congruous[29], thus departing from their modist model towards the non-modist didactic model of construction. On the other hand, both authors try to present construction as a formal component of a sentence, even though they are not always consistent about it. Züpthen tries not to confuse *unio constructibilium* with *oratio*[30], while Glogoviensis tries to talk about construction as a cause of *oratio* and not treat it as *oratio*[31]. There is yet another understanding of construction, equivalent to the definition of a complete sentence. Both Glogoviensis and Züpthen acknowledge that it is Alexander's understanding of construction; the former, however, counters Alexander's position with the modist stance that a construction does not always entail a complete sentence. A construction can be complete or incomplete – *totalis* or *partialis*, as Glogoviensis puts it[32].

Gerhard of Züpthen lists the school (semantic) definitions of transitive, intransitive, retransitive and reciprocal constructions[33]. He then

26   Thomas de Erfordia, *Op. cit*, p. 279: « the construction is a combination of constructibles made up of the modes of signifying, caused by the intellect and devised for the purpose of expressing a compound concept of the mind».

27   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, f. O3v: «Secundo stricte [capitur constructio] ut scilicet est constructibilium congrua unio et illa fit solum in oratione congrua».

28   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. M7r: «constructio dicit congruum ordinem dictionum»; cfr. M. COVINGTON, *Syntactic Theory in the High Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1984, p. 42.

29   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. M7r: «nulla oratio incongrua est constructio»

30   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, f. O3v.

31   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. M7r : «Constructiones istae dicuntur totales quae causant orationem perfectam»

32   *Ibidem*: «aliter Alexander loquitur de constructionibus et aliter autor modorum significandi. Alexander enim determinat de constructioninus totalibus et perfectis. Autor modorum significandi de constructionibus etiam partialibus et imperfectis ut 'albus homo'»

33   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, f. O4v: «Constructio transitiva est in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa vel videntur pertinere ad diversa (…) sed

defines them relating to the *motus* model[34]. Finally he quotes definitions based on the modist conception of dependency of constructibles[35]. Glogoviensis appears to be solely interested in taking a stand in the controversy concerning reciprocal construction. According to Alexander de Villa Dei, a reciprocal construction is an intransitive construction. This is because he uses a traditional (semantic) definition of intransitive construction stating that constructibles signify the same thing: «constructibilia significant idem»[36]. On the other hand Thomas of Erfurt holds that reciprocal construction is transitive[37]. Glogoviensis strongly favours the modist solution, making use of the conceptual apparatus of Thomas. When we do not refer to semantics (*quoad significatum*) but only to the modist concept of constructibile *primum* and *secundum* and the concept of dependency (*quoad modos significandi*), reciprocal construction will prove to be transitive[38]. In a sample of a reciprocal construction *ego diligo me*, the first constructible *diligo* depends on the

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constructio intransitiva est in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem vel videntur pertinere ad idem (…) Notandum quod dictiones transitive construi est illas diverse significare, sed intransitive construi est illas idem significare».

    34   *Ibidem,* f. O5r: «reciproca est in qua constructibilia significant idem vel videntur significare idem et tamen actio vel passio denotatur transire in seipsum vel in id a quo exivit»; f. O4v: «Queritur quo modo capitur hic transitivum et intransitivum. Dicendum quod similitudinarie sicut in motu reali est transitus de termino a quo ad terminum ad quem. Sic in constructione transitiva actus denotatur transire in rem obliquam. Et sicut aliquis motus est simplex ita est aliqua constructio simplex et sicut aliquis motus est compositus ita aliqua constructio dicitur esse composita».

    35   *Ibidem*, f. O4r: «Queritur quando debet sciri quod constructio est transitiva vel intransitiva. Dicendum quod secundum modistas, quod quando primum constructibile dependet ad secundum. Tunc est transitiva, ut 'lego librum'. Sed quando secundum dependet ad primum tunc est intransitiva, ut homo albus»; cfr. Thomas de Erfordia, *Op. cit*, p.282: «Resumo ergo quod dictum est, quod in omni constructione est primum constructibile et secundum. Aut ergo secundum dependet ad primum aut primum dependet ad secundum, secundo per sui dependentiam a primo recedente. Si secundum dependet ad primum, sic est constructio intransitiva. (...) Si autem primum constructibile dependet ad secundum, secundo non dependente ad primum, sed ad aliud a primo diversum sic est transitiva».

    36   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. M7v.

    37   Thomas de Erfordia, *Op. cit*, p. 282.

    38   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. M7v: «Ratio secunda quare [constructio reciproca] est transitiva: illa constructio est transitiva in qua verbum transitivum transitive positum regit a parte post actum. Sed hic 'ego diligo me' est sic, ergo est transitiva»; cfr. M. COVINGTON, *Op. cit*, p. 57.

second constructible *me*, according to precisely the same syntactic rules as in the case of *lego lectionem*, where the first constructible *lego* depends on second constructible *lectionem*[39]. Glogoviensis concedes that Alexander's approach is more common but claims that it is the modists who are right. Züpthen on the other hand refrains from evaluating the approaches he presents.

The issues of congruity and completeness of construction are dealt with by Glogoviensis in just a few passages that do not move far away from Thomas of Erfurt's text. The differences coincide with the ones that can be found in the Cracow manuscript treatise on construction[40]. Züpthen claims that congruity and incongruity are not worthy of discussion because it has been assumed that every construction that Alexander talks about is congruous. A complete construction is one which represents a complete sentence in the mind of the listener : «perfectam sententiam repraesentat in animo auditoris»[41].

Some of the 15th century grammarians including Züpthen show no interest in congruity and completeness according to sense (*ad sensum*) and according to understanding (*ad intellectum*). By contrast, Glogoviensis shows a great interest in those issues, similarly to the author of the above mentioned Cracow treatise on construction[42]. Clearly he considers these problems as significant and his text shows traces of a debate on whether subjectless expressions with the verb in the third person were good examples of constructions according to understanding[43].

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[39]   Cfr. Thomas de Erfordia, *Op. cit*, p. 282.

[40]   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. M8r: «congruitas est proprietas vel passio sermonis ex modorum significandi respectivorum conformitate ad aliquam speciem constructionis requisitorum derelicta (...), perfectio est proprietas sermonis vel constructionis ex debita unione constructibilium derelicta ad exprimendum sufficienter et perfecte mentis conceptum ordinata. Ut scilicet quod generat perfectum sensum in animo audientis»; cfr. Thomas de Erfordia, *Op.cit*, pp. 312, 316; cfr. Anonymus, *Tractatus de constructione*, Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 1945, f. 14r.

[41]   Gerardus de Zupthania, *Glosa notabilis II*, f. O6r.

[42]   Anonymus, *Tractatus de constructione*, Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 1945, f. 14r.

[43]   Ioannes Glogoviensis, Exercitium, f. M8r: «congruitas ad intellectum est quando non ambo constructibilia secundum vocem quoad congruitatem sunt expressa, sed alterum illorum per intellectum subintelligitur; ut quando verba primae personae vel secundae personae proferuntur. (...) [Perfectio] est duplex: ad sensum et ad intellectum. Ad sensum est, quando ambo constructibilia congruitatis secundum vocem sunt expressa, (...) ad

With most classical modistae, *regimen* is not discussed, but it is not possible to avoid it when discussing *Doctrinale*[44]. Züpthen sums up the problem with a short non-modist explication of the term. In Glogoviensis' lengthy discussion the concepts of regimen and construction are linked with each other, and the concept of *modus significandi* is involved in the definition of regimen, which entails the four causes presented in a similar manner to Thomas of Erfurt's definition of construction. Glogoviensis' discussion of regimen aims towards presenting it as a genuine modist concept[45].

This brief outline shows that the teaching of Glogoviensis is not a restatement or simple compilation of the work of Gerhard of Züpthen. The reason for that is certainly not his unfamiliarity with the standard handbook. On the contrary, Glogoviensis' text gives the impression that the author prepares or revises his commentary with the *Glosa notabilis* in his hand. On the basis of the material presented here, it is also possible to reflect on the specificity of his sources and predilections. He chooses different terminology and argumentation than his western colleague. He presents himself as a more eager adherent of modism than Gerhard and modifies the didactic tradition in a specifically understood spirit of modism. In doing so he paradoxically shows an attachment to the traditional school grammar, which he endeavours to reinterprete according to the modist principles (*secundum modistas*). All this appears to have been characteristic of the phenomenon which I refer to as the Cracow revival of speculative grammar*.

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intellectum est, quando non ambo constructibilia congruitatis secundum vocem exprimuntur, sed alterum illorum per intellectum subintelligitur; ut contingit in verbis primae secundae et tertiae personae»; cfr. Thomas de Erfordia, Op.cit, pp.312, 318.

44   Cfr. M. COVINGTON, *Op. cit.* p. 47.

45   Ioannes Glogoviensis, *Exercitium*, f. A3v: « Ad regimen itaque grammaticale requiritur proportio modorum significandi non quorumlibet sed activorum et maxime accidentalium respectivorum, ut enim postea dicetur modi significandi sunt causa efficiens intrinseca regiminis grammaticalis»

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