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The Human Will as Decision-Maker in the Human Person, According to the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent

In our study *Der geschaffene Wille als selbstbewegendes geistliches Vermögen in der Philosophie des Heinrich von Gent*¹, we set out a fundamental position of the celebrated XIIIth century thinker Henry of Ghent on the nature of the human will. In this study we have based ourselves particularly on Henry's own account in one of his most famous quodlibetal questions, q. 5, of *Quodlibet IX*, the critical edition of which we established in the framework of HENRICI DE GANDAVO *Opera Omnia*². Immediately after this q. 5, and based on it, follows a much shorter question, q. 6, «Whether to command is the prerogative of the will, or of the reason, also called the intellect»³. It is the contents of this question, which we intend to examine in detail in this study.

¹ R. MACKEN, *Der geschaffene Wille als selbstbewegendes geistliches Vermögen in der Philosophie des Heinrich von Gent*, in Burckhard MOJSISCH — Olaf PLUTA (Hrg.) *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi*. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zum 60. Geburtstag. 1991, Band I, p. 561-562.

² HENRICI DE GANDAVO *Quodlibet IX*. Edidit R. MACKEN (HENRICI DE GANDAVO *Opera Omnia*, XIII, Leuven University Press, 1983). This q. 5, «Utrum voluntas moveat se ipsam», is on p. 99-139.

³ «Utrum imperare sit actus voluntatis, an rationis sive intellectus» (*Ibid.*, p. 139-149).

Henry was able to be more concise, because he could take as proven the contents of q. 5 in the same *Quodlibet*. Hence we too can give a concise account, because we have already set out the contents of q. 5 in our above-mentioned study.

But Henry could further condense this question, because in the «Solutio» of this question 6, he mentions explicitly that he also bases himself for its solution on one of his other questions from an earlier *Quodlibet*. Thus he also takes the thesis of this earlier question as already proved. This is q. 14 of *Quodlibet I*: «Is the will a higher faculty than the intellect, or the reverse?» We have also published the critical edition of latter question ⁴. The reference to this question 14 in *Quodl. I* is to be found in question 6 of *Quodl. IX* on p. 141, l. 72-142, l. 76 ⁵. We have also published a doctrinal study ⁶ on the contents of this question 14 of *Quodl. I*.

The advantages of Henry's account in q. 6 of *Quodl. IX* are even greater. Indeed it is a typical advantage in Henry's two principal works, the *Summa* and the *Quodlibeta*, that as his work on them progressed, he could refer to more and more questions he had already «decided» on. Thus we even find in the same q. 6 in *Quodl. IX* a third reference to a former question: the short q. 15 in *Quodl. I*, «Does the act of the will precede the act of the intellect, or the contrary?» ⁷. This reference in q. 6 in *Quodl. IX* to q. 15 in *Quodl. I*, is to be found in the critical edition of *Quodl. IX* on p. 142, l. 787-81 ⁸.

⁴ HENRICI DE GANDAVO *Quodlibet I*. Edidit R. MACKEN (HENRICI DE GANDAVO *Opera Omnia*, V, Leuven University Press - E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1979). This question 14, «Utrum voluntas sit potentia superior intellectu vel e converso», is to be found on p. 83-90.

⁵ «Supponendo autem ex aliis quaestionibus quod voluntas est potentia superior quam intellectus, dico quod, quantum est ex parte superioritatis, potius ponendum est quod voluntatis est imperare, et intellectus et omnium aliarum potentiarum oboedire atque imperium voluntatis suscipere.» (HENR. DE GAND., *Quodl. I*, ed. R. MACKEN, p. 141, l. 72-142, l. 76).

⁶ R. MACKEN, «La volonté humaine, faculté plus élevée que l'intelligence selon Henri de Gand», dans *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 41 (1974) pp. 5-51.

⁷ «Utrum actus voluntatis praecedat actum voluntatis vel e converso» (HENR. DE GAND. *Quodl. I*, ed. R. MACKEN, p. 83, l. 2-3).

⁸ «quia ad actum imperii a voluntate praeivium oportet esse actum intellectus,

This short question 6 in *Quodl. IX*, founded on these three solid bases in Henry's own former questions, all three in the *Quodlibeta*, is thus an interesting piece of work, in which he condenses briefly but clearly one of the main aspects of his philosophy. It therefore seems useful, with the aid of the new critical edition, to study with keen interest what this celebrated independent thinker, who deserves to be even better known, has to tell us in his profound and balanced way about one of the great classical themes in philosophy. Indeed every human being, who is not afraid of making the effort required for reflexion, will try to reach a personal view on the question to be examined here: who, in the intimate human marriage between his two spiritual faculties, reason and will, is ultimately the master? Although the critical edition has been published, we have thought it useful to give extensive notes with references to the Latin text, so that the modern reader with this study before him, can adequately compare our free expression of Henry's ideas with what is really in the original Latin text.

The preliminary arguments against Henry's position and in its favour

It is difficult to characterize more clearly the two opposing positions concerning our problem than Henry has done at the beginning of this question. As usual, the (in this question single) opposing argument to the position of the author is given first. «To command is an act of the reason, not of the will, because to command is nothing other than to communicate something to someone else, so that he does it. This is exactly the relation of the reason to the will.»⁹ Such an argument is in Henry's view typically intellectualistic.

After this argument, that proposed in favour of Henry's position follows, and is also very characteristic: «To command belongs to what

quia incognita velle non possumus, qui inclinando voluntatem *modo praedeterminato* ad imperandum, volitum voluntati determinet...» (HENR. DE GAND., *Quodl. IX*, p. 142, l. 79-81).

⁹ «... arguitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, non voluntatis, quia imperare nihil aliud est quam aliquid faciendum alteri intimare. Hoc autem est rationis respectu voluntatis. Ergo etc.» (HENR. DE GAND., *Quodl. IX*, ed. R. MACKEN, p. 139, l. 4-6).

is the most supreme and free, what has the highest power. But such is only the will in the whole reign of the soul.»¹⁰

Henry in his «Solution» examines the question proposed, and gives his fundamental judgement on it

With these two opposing arguments as his point of departure, Henry in his «Solution» examines and 'decides on' this question, put to him by somebody in his audience.

Henry feels sure of his position. «To command, he says, is an act emanating from the directing power, addressed to somebody who has then to carry out the order given. We must therefore examine three things: the relation of the faculty or person who has the power to that to which his order is given; the nature of and conditions for the act which is ordered; and the disposition of the faculty or person to whom the order is given. After this examination, says Henry, it will be fully clear, that the act of commanding must be attributed to the will.»¹¹

First examination

According to Henry, the act of the will, not of the intellect, is to be considered as the act of the faculty or person which holds the command to somebody to whom the order is given. Indeed, that which has the command must have towards that to which its orders are directed to some extent the position of a superior to an inferior, because the equal has towards an equal no right to command, and still less has an inferior this right towards a superior. When we speak of the right to command in man simply, both towards that which is in him

¹⁰ «Contra. Imperare semper pertinet ad quod est supremum et liberum, dominium maius habens. Tale non est nisi voluntas in toto regno animae. Ergo etc.» (*Ibid.*, p. 139, l. 7-9).

¹¹ «Dicendum quod, cum imperare sit actio alicui directa ad aliquid exsequendum, cuius sit actio ut imperantis, hoc oportet perscrutari ex tribus ad invicem comparatis, scilicet ex habitudine quam debet imperans habere ad illum cui dirigitur imperium, et ex conditione actus cui imperatur, et ex dispositione eius cui imperatur. Quibus perscrutatis, plane patebit quod actus imperandi debet attribui voluntati, et non intellectui.» *Ibid.*, p. 139-140, l. 11-17).

as well as towards that which is outside him (the two must be ruled by the same faculty of command), some commanding power of this kind must be assumed in man, as Aristotle says in Book I of his *Politics*: «In all things reduced to a common whole, whether from things which already existed together, or from things which first existed separately, we must distinguish the commanding faculty and the subordinate faculty...» The solution to this question therefore depends on the solution of another: what is the superior and most important power in man?...»¹²

«But when the question is put as to what is superior and the most important of the faculties in man, the answer can only be: the intellect or the will.»¹³

«Those who claim that the intellect is the superior faculty, say that to command belongs to the intellect, and that the task of the will is to obey and to receive the order.»¹⁴ Henry now sets out extensively, and in great part in their own words, the thought on this question, of those who oppose his own position.¹⁵ It is striking that almost throughout this account literal quotations from the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas abound, and that the last lines of his account seem to simply summing another text from the same *Summa*

¹² «Primo ergo, quod imperare sit actus voluntatis, non intellectus, consideratur ex habitu imperantis ad illum cui imperium dirigitur. Quia enim imperans ad eum cui imperium dirigitur, habitum superioris ad inferiorem debet habere quoad aliquem gradum — par enim in parem nullum habet imperium, et multo minus inferior in superiorem —, cum igitur quaestio est de imperare in homine simpliciter, tam super ea quae sunt intra se, secundum quod in ipso debet esse aliqua virtus quae ceteris imperat, quam secundum ea quae sunt extra se — si enim in homine sit virtus aliqua quae ceteris imperat quae sunt intra se, illi etiam attribui debet imperium ad ea quae sunt extra se; talem autem virtutem unam ceteris principantem oportet ponere in homine, dicente Philosopho, I^o Politicae: 'Quaecumque ex pluribus constituta sunt et fiunt unum aliquod commune, sive ex coniunctis sive ex divisis, in omnibus videtur principans et subiectum...' Ista ergo quaestio quoad hoc multum dependet ab illa qua quaeritur quae sit virtus sive potentia superior in homine....» (*Ibid.*, p. 140, l. 17-35).

¹³ «Quae autem potentiarum in homine sit superior et principalior, super hoc non est dubitatio nisi de intellectu et voluntate.» (*Ibid.*, p. 140, l. 39-40.)

¹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 140, l. 40-42.

¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 141, l. 43-71.

Theologiae, to be found in the immediate proximity of some of the texts quoted.

Having set out the opposing position, with several literal quotations, Henry now refers to his own former extensive accounts of the relations between the will and the intellect, already 'decided' and published some years previously in his *Quodlibet I*, on which he also bases himself explicitly here for his solution to this question. He refers here explicitly to q. 14, which shows the superiority of the will to the intellect, and to the short q. 15, which is complementary to q. 14, and mentions the predisposing function of the intellect towards the will, which has to fulfil its orders. But he also refers here implicitly to question 16 in the same *Quodlibet I*. «I base myself here on my proof, given in a former question», Henry says, «that the will is a superior faculty to the intellect. I conclude from our first examination that from the point of view of superiority it pertains to the will to command, and to the intellect and all the other faculties to obey and to accept orders from the will. The will can indeed ultimately decide against the proposal of the intellect and in this way constrain reason to abandon its judgment. The will can force the reason and all the other faculties in man to obey its orders.» «But the predisposing function of the reason remains a fact,» Henry continues, «if we wish to have a balanced view of the whole human being. We cannot strive towards unknown things; therefore there must be an act of the intellect, which precedes the order of the will, and suggests to the will that it give an order in a given direction; this suggestion is not really an order, but it prepares the order.»¹⁶

¹⁶ «Supponendo autem ex aliis quaestionibus quod voluntas est potentia superior quam intellectus, dico quod, quantum est ex parte superioritatis, potius ponendum est quod voluntatis est imperare, et intellectus et omnium aliarum potentiarum oboedire atque imperium voluntatis suscipere. Voluntas enim et velle contra dictamen rationis potest, et ipsam rationem cogere ut recedat a suo iudicio, et per hoc ipsam ad consentiendum sibi, et omnes alias potentias suo imperio constringere, quia ad actum imperii a voluntate praevium oportet esse actum intellectus, quia incognita velle non possumus, qui inclinando voluntatem modo praedeterminato ad imperandum, volitum voluntati determinet quasi intimativa motione, quae non est imperium sed ad imperium disponit.» (*Ibid.*, p. 141-142, l. 72-82).

In his carefully balanced account, Henry even goes a bit further. «Because», he says, «the reason by its intimate announcing movement disposes the will to give a true order, therefore the movement which comes from the reason, although it cannot force the will, suggests a kind of model of an order to the will; but it is not a true order of the will, although it has some similarity to it; the true command can be given only by the will.»¹⁷ As was expected of medieval masters, Henry then, in order to support this last assertion, appeals to three authorities: John Damascene¹⁸, Aristotle¹⁹ and Themistius²⁰. From the first of these three authorities he even borrows a beautiful expression, which gives support to his similar view: «In executing and commanding the will has to order, but the intellect must order under the will», as John Damascene says. He means by that, he adds, what we have explained on proposing a model of an order to the will.²¹ And after this addition Henry sums up and concludes his first examination²².

Second examination

The second examination which is necessary in order to solve this question, according to Henry, is that of the relationship between the faculty which gives the command and the faculty to which it is directed: the first must be able to impose its power, and the other must naturally obey; otherwise there is no natural subordination of the second to the first.²³

¹⁷ «Et quia sic ratio disponit sua intimativa motione ad verum imperium voluntatis, ideo sua motio, sive compellat sive non, etsi imperium proprie dici non potest, dicitur tamen iussio, quae quandam rationem imperii habet, et tamen verum imperium soli voluntati tribuitur,...» (*Ibid.*, p. 88-91).

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 142-143, l. 91-4.

¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 143, l. 4-6.

²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 143, l. 6-11.

²¹ «In exsequendo autem et imperando solius voluntatis est ordinare, sed intellectus subordinare, ut dicit Damascenus, et hoc secundum modum quo ei convenit iubere, ut dictum est.» (*Ibid.*, p. 143, l. 12-14).

²² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 143, l. 14-26.

²³ «Secundo autem idem consideratur partim ex habitudine eius cuius est imperare, ad illum cui dirigi debet imperium, partim ex conditione eius quod imperatur, quoniam imperans sic debet esse superior illi cui imperatur, quod compellere possit

Here Henry judges that some distinctions must first be introduced.

There are areas where the will can exercise no power on another faculty in man. Thus the intellect is absolutely unable to obey the will when it orders it to understand what it cannot understand, e.g. a supernatural truth. The intellect is also unable to obey the will if it orders it not to accept the conclusion of an evident demonstration, although the will has some power there: it can prevent the intellect from thinking about the matter. This is the situation in regard to for the intellect. Again in regard to the vegetative functions a total impossibility is found: these functions are not subject to the will at all.²⁴

There are also areas in which the obedience of some inferior faculty is only imperfect: it obeys in part, but not completely. This is the case with the sensitive appetite: it depends in part on the disposition of the organ, and in that respect cannot be stopped by an order of the will (nor can the reason in some cases foresee the activity and prevent it); but in other respects the sensitive appetite depends on the power of the soul, and when the will insists, depending on the persuasion of the reason, the sensitive appetite is simply stopped by force by the will.²⁵ As was expected of a medieval master of this period, Henry illustrates the latter situation with a passage from Aristotle²⁶. Then with the help of various works of Aristotle Henry duly situates

aliquo modo inferiorem ad exsequendum imperatum, quia imperio in superiore respondet oboedientia in inferiore. Quae si non respondet naturaliter, non habet imperium naturali ordine super illud.» (*Ibid.*, p. 143, l. 27-144, l. 33).

²⁴ «Quae in inferiori non respondet quandoque quidem, quia non est in sua potestate actus imperatus. Non enim intellectus potest oboedire voluntati si praecipiat intelligere quod est supra suam potestatem, ut veritatem supernaturalem, vel si praecipiat ei dissentire conclusioni demonstrationis manifestae, licet cum suo imperio possit retrahere ne de illa cogitet. Secundum quem modum voluntas viribus vegetativae nihil habet imperare, quia non sunt natae oboedire.» (*Ibid.*, p. 144, l. 34-40).

²⁵ «Quandoque vero non respondet oboedientia in inferiori perfecte, quia partim est in sua potestate et partim non, quemadmodum appetitus sensitivus partim dependet a dispositione organi, et sic non est in potestate illius oboedire imperio voluntatis — quae etiam ex hoc aliquando non potest praeveniri a ratione —, partim vero dependet a vi animae, et sic, cum instat voluntas et suadet ratio, necesse habet oboedire.» (*Ibid.*, p. 144, l. 41-46).

²⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 146, l. 46-52.

such 'involuntary' movements in a larger framework: he characterizes them in greater detail, and distinguishes them from 'non voluntary' movements: the latter completely escape the control of the will.²⁷

Before Henry draws a conclusion from his second examination, he makes a further distinction with the aid of Aristotle's authority between the type of matter in the inferior faculties that is subject to the will, and that which is not. Then he quietly declares that the conclusion of his second examination is valid, although of course it must be restricted to those areas in the inferior faculties that are subject to the will²⁸.

He formulates the conclusion of his second examination in the following way. The faculty in the human being, which possesses freedom, is not dependent on any other faculty in the human being. This freedom in man belongs only to the will, and to no other faculty, although we must admit that the other faculties can be free with the participation of the will as principal mover, the force of which remains active in a secondary mover, as we have sufficiently explained elsewhere. Hence it follows also from our second examination, that of the relations between the commanding faculty and the other faculties, that the command in a human being belongs to the will.²⁹

Having in all serenity formulated this conclusion, Henry sincerely and honestly mentions an objection to it, for which he resists with great energy. It is taken almost word for word from the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. Some people say that the root of freedom, and its cause, is the reason, the intellect. The will can only decide in various directions, because the reason can have different conceptions of the good.

Such a conception, of which we have already elsewhere proved the falseness, says Henry, must be rejected by us. The truth is the

²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 144-145, l. 53-80.

²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 145, l. 81-86.

²⁹ «Quare, cum illud quod ex se habet libertatem arbitrii, nulli astringitur ad obediendum, sed illi potius alia omnia, et libertas arbitrii voluntati convenit ex se, ita quod non aliis nisi eius participatione, quemadmodum virtus primi moventis manet in movente secundo, secundum quod alibi sufficienter declaravimus, ex consideratione igitur habitudinis imperantis ad eum cui imperatur, patet secundo quod imperare sit actus voluntatis.» (*Ibid.*, p. 145-146, l. 86-92).

contrary, namely that the human will is the bearer of human freedom and its first root, although the act of the reason, and also those of other faculties, can participate in the command and energy of the will. It is also in the human will that the virtues have their seat, as we have explained elsewhere, he says. The result is a certain reciprocity. When the intellect by its act warns the will, the act of the will receives from the intellect the fact that it is rational, but not that it is free, but when on the contrary the act of the will precedes that of the intellect, the act of the intellect receives from the will the fact that it is free, but not that it is rational. And because naturally the act of the intellect precedes that of the will, — we cannot issue an order concerning things we do not know —, the rational character, which characterizes the intellect, is naturally prior to freedom, which characterizes the will, and the will receives first from the intellect the fact that it is rational, before the intellect receives from the will the fact that it is free.³⁰ As a true medieval master, Henry then supports what he has just said concerning the priority of the intellect, by appealing to the authority of John Damascene.

In the light of this reciprocal priority, Henry now proposes the following rule for the correct interpretation of the sayings of the authorities concerning intellect and will. Where they attribute freedom to the acts of the will and the reason together, it must be understood in the acts of the will, but by participation also in the act of

³⁰ «Unde, quod dicunt aliqui, quod 'radix libertatis, sicut causa, est ratio sive intellectus, licet subiectum eius sit voluntas, ut ex hoc solo voluntas libere possit ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni', absit hoc, quod alibi ostendimus non posse stare; immo voluntas et est subiectum libertatis et radix prima, a qua per participationem ad imperium et impressionem eius invenitur in actibus rationis et aliarum virium, sicut et virtutes, prout alibi declaravimus. Unde, quando intellectus sua actione praevenit voluntatem, actio voluntatis habet ab intellectu quod sit rationalis, non quod libera arbitrio, quando vero e converso actio voluntatis praecedat intellectum, actio intellectus habet a voluntate quod sit libera arbitrio, non autem quod sit rationalis. Et [quoniam?] intellectus naturaliter prior est, sicut et operatur, quia non possumus velle nisi cognita, ideo rationale quod est proprietas intellectus, naturaliter prius est quam liberum arbitrium quod est proprietas voluntatis, et naturaliter prius habet voluntas ab intellectu quod sit rationalis, quam intellectus quod sit liber arbitrio...» (*Ibid.*, p. 146, l. 93-8).

the intellect. In a reciprocal way, where they attribute rationality to the acts of the will and the intellect together, it must be understood of the intellect, but by participation also in the act of the will.³¹ According to the custom of medieval masters, Henry supports the interpretation which he proposes with some quotations from John Damascene³².

Henry intends the interpretation of the sayings of the authorities, which he gives here, to be at the same time a warning to use terms in these matters correctly, in other words, more rigorously and in a more scholarly way. The reason, he says, why both some theologians and some philosophers frequently confuse the intellect and the will, and their functions and ways of working, is that they do not sufficiently apply this rule of interpretation, but the prudent reader, with the help of this rule should be able to distinguish what they say.³³ In order to give a series of examples of the correct use of reciprocal priority, he then adds various quotations from John Damascene, who expresses it correctly.³⁴

Third examination

The third and final examination which Henry judged necessary for a complete answer to the question proposed, concerned what is concretely ordered by the commanding faculty. In the third place, he says, the fact that commanding is a task for the will, results clearly from the concrete orders given to the subordinate faculties by the reigning faculty. It orders the inferior faculty to act, to do something itself, not to have it executed in it by another. Therefore, the will has

³¹ «Et secundum hoc, ubi libertas arbitrii attribuitur actionibus voluntatis et rationis, per se debet intelligi in actionibus voluntatis, per participationem vero in actionibus intellectus; similiter, ubi rationabilitas attribuitur actionibus voluntatis et intellectus, per se debet intelligi in actionibus intellectus, per participationem vero in actionibus voluntatis.» (*Ibid.*, p. 146-147, l. 14-18).

³² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 147, l. 18-39.

³³ «Et secundum hoc tam theologi quam philosophi frequenter confundunt in simul intellectum et voluntatem et eorum operationes et modos operandi, sed diligens lector debet singula distinguere.» (*Ibid.*, p. 147, l. 40-42).

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 147-148, l. 42-62.

nothing to order, except those things which belong to the exercise of other faculties, e.g. it orders the intellect to consider, to reflect on something, and things of that kind (which some other people erroneously think the intellect decides). The first order comes from the will to the reason (the same people concede this order, but they erroneously call it the 'second order'). Indeed the second order does not come from the will, which on the contrary moves itself, as is explained in the earlier q. 5 of *Quodl. IX*), but from the intellect and from the good, as the intellect knows it, (which they thought to be the first order). It follows, that the will cannot be «commanded» by any of the inferior faculties, but only be constrained in a despotic way, as we have seen above that the vegetative faculty can in some cases be constrained in a despotic way by the will. The intellect simply cannot command the will, but commanding is simply a task for to the will, which has to issue its orders to the intellect. It therefore pertains simply to the will, to command the intellect, not to the intellect to command the will.³⁵

Henry's judgment on the arguments in the two senses, proposed at the beginning, is, he says, already sufficiently given in the solution

It was the duty of the medieval quodlibetist, after writing up his solution, to give at the end of his treatment of the question, his own judgment on each of the arguments in the two senses, proposed at

³⁵ «Tertio apparet quod imperare sit actus voluntatis, specialiter ex conditione eius quod imperatur et cui ab imperante dirigitur imperium. Id enim quod imperatur, est aliquis actus exsequendus ab illo cui imperatur. Unde nulli habet fieri imperium de dispositione quae non habet causari ab ipso, sed tantum habet fieri ab alio in ipso. Quare, cum voluntas non habet velle nisi ea quae pertinent ad exercitium aliarum potentiarum, ut quod vult intellectum considerare, consiliari et huiusmodi, aut quae determinat sibi intellectus secundum dictum quorundam, et primum velle nullo modo imperatur voluntati a ratione, sed potius per ipsum voluntas imperat rationi, (ut ipsi concedunt, secundum etiam velle secundum ipsos non causatur ab ipsa voluntate se ipsam movente, sed potius et a bono cognito secundum eos) et ideo voluntati imperari non potest, nisi communiter sumendo 'imperium' quemadmodum in membris corporis, principatu despotico, nullo ergo modo ponendum est quod intellectus habet imperare voluntati, sed alterum eorum necessario habet alteri imperare,

the beginning of the question. But Henry says that he has given his judgment on them in his *Solution* so explicitly and completely, that all he has to say on them, is already stated there.³⁶

Thus we conclude our short but condensed account of Henry's conception of the human will as the decision-maker in the human being. Henry left no doubt as to what he thinks of this matter, and remains in the line emanating from Plato, passing through Augustine, and continued in christian philosophy from the patristic period until the end of the 13th century, in which Henry was a celebrated and respected master of theology. Nevertheless, he was at the same time original and daring in many of his views. He displays in addition his well-known quality of 'exhaustivity'. He generously answers the least objection, and always explains at length why he rejects or only admits in part the opinion of another; in that respect he was far from being a man with extreme views, but was on the contrary a man of dialogue. But he was also 'exhaustive' in setting out his own views as a creative thinker, in which he was often an audacious innovator and pioneer, who opened up new ways in several respects. We are quite convinced that in our time some conceptions of this profound and balanced thinker, when they are well set out in a modern language, can provide fruitful stimuli and inspiration to creative thinkers in our time, who try to provide our contemporaries with a profound, balanced and elevated philosophical synthesis.

cius est imperare simpliciter. Simpliciter est ergo voluntatis imperare, non autem intellectus.» (*Ibid.*, p. 148-149, l. 63-79).

³⁶ «Per dicta patent obiecta utriusque partis.» (*Ibid.*, p. 149, l. 81).